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Preface and acknowledgements
Livelihood insecurity and social conflict are manifest in contemporary Nepal. 
The country is in the process of an enormous transformation. Nepalese society, 
historically organised as hierarchical and feudal, has experienced 10 years of 
armed conflict (February 1996 to November 2006), a conflict stimulating the quest 
for access to development, questioning traditional power relations and practices 
of social exclusion. To this date, the 19-day Jana Andolan II uprising of April 2006 
and the subsequent change process has brought fundamental transformation 
and opened new avenues. There have been many positive steps forward in this 
change process: the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between 
the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN (M)] 
1 on 21 November 2006, the successful completion of the Constituent Assembly 
election on 10 April 2008 and the declaration of Nepal as Democratic Federal 
Republic on 29 May 2008 ending the more than 245 years of the institution of 
monarchy. The accelerated change process of the last 18 years (1990 to 2008) 
clearly demonstrates that Nepal is moving towards an open, inclusive and liberal 
democracy and being integrated into the globalisation and liberalisation process. 
However, institutionalisation of these achievements requires sound livelihood 
security for the Nepalese people. As more than 30.9 per cent2 of total population falls 
below poverty line, it is a tremendous challenge to initiate an inclusive development 
process. Hence, a proper analysis of the livelihood complexity of the poor and of 
the structural and proximate causes of livelihood insecurity is a precondition for 
addressing these challenges, and necessary to strengthen achievements made so 
far and guide the change process in a positive and sustainable direction.
The old established institutions (like the caste system and the monarchy), with their 
social norms and values legitimatising exclusion and discrimination and enforcing 
unbalanced power relations, have been challenged by new political actors, which 
has created enormous social conflict and unrest. Although such social conflicts 
are common during times of transition, analysis of their causes and exploration of 
options to address them is vitally important.  
1 In January 2009, the CPN (M) changed its name into the United CPN (M) once the Janamorcha Nepal and CPN (M) 
united. So, the terms UCPN (M) and CPN (M) throughout this book imparts interchangeable meanings.
2 See http://indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=np&v=69 (accessed on 4 June 2009).
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In this book, the basic causes of livelihood insecurity and social tension and conflict 
in Nepal are documented and analysed and possible ways of addressing these 
challenges envisioned. We do not claim that this book gives a comprehensive 
framework for addressing all the challenge this country is facing, but we firmly 
believe that its will contribute to a deeper understanding of the livelihood complexity 
of poor people and elucidate potential ways to enhance their livelihood security and 
contribute to solving social conflict in Nepal.
This book is the outcome of the collective efforts of several researchers, scholars 
and professionals engaged in the fields of livelihood, globalisation and food security. 
We would like to acknowledge their efforts and thank them. Our thanks go to Swiss 
National Centre of Competence in Research North-South for creating a conducive 
environment for preparing this book. We are also thankful to the staff of the South 
Asia Regional Coordination Office for their support in bringing this book into its 
present shape. Dr Abid Suleri, Director of the Sustainable Development Policy 
Institute, Islamabad is thanked for his time in reviewing parts of the chapters, and 
for constant input and support we would like to thank Professor Ruedi Baumgartner 
of ETH, Zurich. We would like to thank Susan Sellars-Shrestha for her efforts 
in English language editing and Safal Ghimire for general editorial support and 
proofreading. Constructive suggestions and comments from the readers are 
always welcome. 
Bishnu Raj Upreti
Ulrike Müller-Böker
January 2010
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Nepalese society, historically organised as hierarchical, discriminatory and feudal, 
has encountered 10 years of armed conflict – a conflict that stimulated the quest 
for access to development and questioned traditional power relations and practices 
of social exclusion. After more than 240 years of rule by the monarchy and the 
Rana regime, Nepal is now a federal democratic republic and is in the process of 
transforming into an inclusive, decentralised, modern state.
However, livelihood insecurity and social conflict are still manifest in contemporary 
Nepal. The country is undergoing enormous societal change and is in the 
process of negotiating the future form of the country through the drafting of a new 
constitution. There is widespread discrimination based on sex, caste, ethnicity 
and religion; discriminated groups are raising their voices and some segments of 
the Nepalese elite are expressing concern. To resolve these issues and achieve 
peace and stability requires visionary leadership, democratic practices, and the 
protection of human rights and social justice, as well as economic development and 
political stability, which are major challenges for the coming years. These factors 
will determine people’s livelihood options in the ‘New Nepal’.
As more than 30.9 per cent of the total population of Nepal lives below the poverty 
line1, it is a tremendous challenge to initiate inclusive development for poor and 
disadvantaged groups. Hence, a proper analysis of the livelihood complexity of 
poor people and the structural and proximate causes of livelihood insecurity is 
necessary to address these challenges in order to strengthen achievements made 
so far and guide the change process in a positive and sustainable direction.
This book looks at livelihood insecurity and social tension in Nepalese society. 
Conceptual links between livelihood insecurity, social tension and conflict in Nepal 
have seldom been made. Therefore, we examine this relationship from different 
perspectives. Nepalese experts, campaigners, academic and non-academic 
scholars engaged in the fields of public policy analysis, food rights and globalisation, 
livelihoods, conflict transformation and social change were invited to contribute 
1 See http://indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=np&v=69 (accessed on 4 June 2009) for details on poverty trends (42 per cent 
of the population lived below the poverty line in 2000 decreasing to 30.9 percent in 2008). 
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2their views and analysis. Their contributions provide the reader with a wide range 
of perspectives on livelihood insecurity and social conflict. Another aim of the book 
is to test the explanatory power of the livelihood approaches and to enrich the 
livelihood perspective by constructive and evidence-based criticism.
It is hoped that the book will initiate a debate on the importance of livelihood 
security in minimising social tension and conflict and to provide a conceptual 
basis and empirical evidence for politicians, policymakers, researchers and people 
engaged in the field of social transformation and agrarian change. Each chapter 
has a specific topic and theoretical entry point, but all chapters tackle the meaning, 
concepts and the framework of various livelihood approaches and their linkages 
with social tension, conflict and peace building.
Chapter 2 looks at the decade of armed conflict and livelihood insecurity in Nepal, 
focusing on the structural and proximate causes of conflict in Nepal. Bishnu 
Raj Upreti argues that the armed conflict in Nepal is the cumulative effect of 
structural causes, proximate causes, changing international security dimensions, 
psychological aspects, the failure of leadership and geo-political specificity, not the 
sole product of the failure of multiparty democracy. It is the reflection of more than 
240 years of a top-down, exclusionary, centralist, autocratic and feudal political and 
social system that nurtured social exclusion, marginalisation, poverty, discrimination 
and subordination in Nepalese society.
The structural causes of the conflict are identified as poverty, discrimination and 
exclusion, skewed distribution of production resources, as well as geographic 
marginalisation. The proximate causes include governance failure, the absence of 
a vibrant civil society and of non-violent mechanisms to manage public differences, 
the strategies and tactics used by the Government and the CPN (M), a culture of 
denial and resistance, and the ineptitude and lack of vision of political leaders. 
This chapter also highlights the ideological dimensions of Nepal’s conflict, the 
monopolisation of Nepalese politics, and the international dynamics of ongoing 
conflict and its relationship to development. Further, a link is established between 
development, conflict and the livelihood insecurity of the people, and the increase 
in insecurity during the 10-year Maoist insurgency is pointed out. Finally, Chapter 2 
sheds some light on the people’s movement of April 2006 and subsequent political 
changes such as the completion of the CA elections and the declaration of a federal 
democratic republic.
In Chapter 3, Netra Prasad Timsina examines natural resource governance 
practices and the livelihood dimensions in Nepal from the perspectives of the 
political economy and the political ecology. He discusses the power structure of 
society, which is determined by the political and economic processes, and their role 
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in shaping livelihood security/insecurity, and highlights the production, distribution, 
exchange and consumption systems of a society as important components of the 
political economy determining the institutions and policies that frame the allocation 
of, access to, and control over natural resources.
The notion of the political ecology is considered an extension of the political 
economy in order to accommodate ecological considerations, i.e., society and 
nature. As this chapter deals with natural resources and people, the combination 
of the two theoretical perspectives provides a conceptual and pragmatic basis for 
analysing the livelihood security/insecurity dichotomy. The author broadly examines 
the political and economic history of natural resources in Nepal, focusing on forest 
resources, and analyses resource ownership, use and management patterns over 
time, depicting how the government's bureaucratic interests maintains control 
over valuable forest resources. Chapter 3 offers interesting insights into how the 
conservation and elitist discourse sidelines the needs and priorities of people 
in the name of participatory resource management, and how the political and 
economic interests of the ruling class controls natural resources through top-down 
policy processes and rigid institutional arrangements. Based on the examples of 
various forestry programmes, Timsina argues that poverty and livelihoods are 
political issues and cannot be fixed with technical instruments that ignore resource 
management politics.
He also discusses new thinking and debate on development, which includes the 
natural resource management sector. The author’s core message is that freedom 
of agency is important if individuals are to capture the social, political and economic 
opportunities. Freedom can only be achieved with an organised and conscious 
people's movement that exerts pressure for a complete transformation of the 
institutions and policies in favour of the poor and marginalised sections of society. 
The author concludes that the policies and governance of natural resources need 
a complete transformation, as existing institutions are not able to ensure the rights 
of people over resources.
Chapter 4 presents the overall situation of food security and livelihood threats in 
Nepal. Jagannath Adhikari investigates the food security situation and its relationship 
with livelihood insecurity in the context of the armed conflict in Nepal. He discusses 
different approaches used to analyse food security and argues that food security has 
been defined in different ways because it is affected by many factors, including the 
changing domestic and international contexts. The author feels that it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to develop and apply specific methodological approaches to 
investigate food security, especially during times of crisis. He emphasises that the 
political crisis in Nepal made people vulnerable in different ways, and the factors 
that determine vulnerability change frequently, making it difficult to focus only on 
4currently food insecure people. The conflict deteriorated the food security situation 
in Nepal after both internal and external policies and practices had made this 
situation precarious.
The author concludes that food security is a complex phenomenon and, therefore, 
solutions must incorporate different dimensions, ranging from policy and institutional 
responses to access and equitable distribution. In discussing pathways to solving 
the problem of food insecurity, the author advocates reinforcing local food systems 
that use diverse technical, social and economic resources to improve the availability 
and accessibility of food produced on a sustainable basis and distributed to all 
as part of the 'right to life' principle. Last, but not least, he emphasises citizens’ 
participation in shaping the food system.
In Chapter 5, Yamuna Ghale presents the relationship between corporate 
globalisation, hunger and livelihood insecurity in Nepal. She discusses hunger 
and livelihood insecurity from the perspective of the economic reform process 
and control over the means of production and distribution systems. She looks at 
different forms of hunger and analyses them from a wide range of perspectives, 
including physical access to the systematic denial of access to resources. The 
conventional school of thought on hunger, which focuses on short-term measures 
to alleviate hunger and livelihood insecurity, is challenged. Emphasis is placed 
on service delivery for the symptomatic treatment of the phenomenon of hunger, 
which is criticised for being unable to address the present food crisis. The author 
contends that livelihood insecurity in Nepal and other developing countries is due 
to conventional thinking, which has dominated policies and practices in developing 
countries. She emphasises the need for new thinking and a new perspective 
in addressing livelihood insecurity and hunger, which is gradually emerging. 
The newly-emerging perspective considers hunger as a political issue caused 
by the continuous and structural denial of access to and control over means of 
production. Such structural denial paralyses production and purchasing capacity. 
The philosophy behind the ‘right to food’ and the ‘right to livelihood security’ is 
to change this structural denial and to ensure that people have the freedom to 
organise and mobilise resources for sustained food sovereignty and a dignified life, 
especially for socially and economically disadvantaged people.
The author assesses hunger, food insecurity, exclusion and the denial of an 
individual’s right to secure a dignified life as the main components of livelihood 
security. She argues that, as millions of Nepalese people are engaged in agriculture 
for their livelihood, priority should be given to eliminating agricultural resource-
based discrimination and denial. If not properly handled, economic globalisation 
could present serious problems for poor and marginalised farmers in Nepal. She 
concludes in that hunger is a central element of food and livelihood security and, 
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therefore, addressing poverty and resource-based discrimination and ensuring 
Nepalese people’s access to production resources is one of the most essential 
elements of a broader social safety net.
Chapter 6 presents a critical reflection on sustainable livelihood approaches and 
their application to Nepal’s community forestry sector. Bharat Pokharel introduces 
four livelihood approaches promoted by development agencies such as OXFAM, 
UNDP, CARE, DFID and RLS, and compares the DFID and RLS approaches. 
Based on Nepal's experience, the author critically analyses livelihood approaches 
in terms of their contribution and argues that livelihood approaches are useful tools 
for understanding various elements of livelihoods. However, these approaches are 
unable to provide an analytical framework for political and structural transformation 
processes, power relations and wider social change. The livelihood approaches 
do acknowledge the importance of the transformation of policy, institutions and 
social processes and capital formation, but do not offer any clues on how the 
transformation actually takes place or how people can increase their capital and 
reduce vulnerability. The author further highlights that livelihood approaches are 
silent on the means of structural and policy change, such as a people's movement. 
Rather, as with other development approaches, the livelihood approaches tend 
to promote ‘reformist’ ways and means of social and policy change. Although 
the approaches provide development practitioners with a coherent and flexible 
framework for programming, their core principles, such as people-centred, holistic, 
dynamic, building on strengths, macro-micro links and sustainability, are yet to be 
proven in ensuring livelihood security for poor and marginalised people. However, 
the livelihood approaches ‘add value’ to various existing development approaches, 
as they capture the experience and learning of most of the leading concepts of the 
past.
Despite these limitations, Chapter 6 demonstrates the usefulness of the livelihood 
approaches as tools for analysing development programmes such as community 
forestry. This is exemplified by outlining a community forestry case in Nepal where 
the DFID and RLS frameworks are used to examine the contributions of the project 
to the livelihoods of people in the project areas. Although the chapter portrays 
livelihood approaches as widely practised in development organisations, the author 
contends that the approach must be broaden conceptually and methodologically 
to accommodate a human rights based approach to development. A human rights 
based approach would enhance the focus on political and civil rights together with 
livelihood.
Chapter 7 deals with the livelihoods of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nepal. 
Based on an in-depth case study of an IDP camp situated in Rajhena, Banke district 
in Western Nepal and in the Kathmandu Valley, Anita Ghimire, Bishnu Raj Upreti 
6 
and Subash Pokharel discuss the different dimensions of the livelihoods of people 
internally displaced by the armed conflict. The livelihood realities of IDPs are 
examined using and further developing DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
(SLF) (DFID 2002) and the Rural Livelihood System (RLS) (Baumgartner 2006) as 
analytical tools. In order to understand the specific psychological and emotional 
situation of refugees and to integrate the humanitarian and human rights aspects, 
the classical frameworks are broadened by the Human Security Framework (Deng 
1998). 
The authors present the overall situation of conflict-induced IDPs and are 
concerned with the political-administrative concept of ‘IDP’ on the national and 
international agenda, as well as the Government’s response to the IDP problem. 
The case study informs not only about livelihood insecurities and coping strategies, 
but also about the emotional stress and trauma experienced by IDPs. Issues 
such as returning back to their village of origin, rehabilitation, reconciliation and 
reintegration into society, as well as the uncertainties and risks faced by IDPs are 
taken up. Furthermore, different types IDPs and their knowledge, networks and 
power relations, and how these factors shape their course of action, are examined. 
Finally, the authors suggest some practical steps, mechanisms and procedures to 
address the problems of IDPs in Nepal.
Chapter 8 presents the need for thorough research into and analysis of livelihood 
options to formulate conducive policy, institutional frameworks, and regulatory and 
procedural provisions to secure the livelihoods of the poor and marginalised people 
in Nepal. Chapter 8 proposes restructuring the fundamental pillars of the state, 
such as security, the judiciary and the bureaucracy, to enable them to address the 
new challenges and opportunities presented by the political changes in Nepal.
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Abstract
This chapter looks at the different sources of the decade-long armed conflict in 
Nepal and their interrelationship with livelihood insecurity. The complexity and 
interwovenness of the different causes is highlighted and their collective impact on the 
livelihoods of the poor and marginalised people examined. Poverty, discrimination, 
exclusion, skewed distribution of production resources, malgovernance, failure 
of development, weak civil society and geographical isolation are some of the 
main sources of livelihood insecurity and conflict in Nepal. The strategies of the 
Government and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) during the armed conflict, 
were another source of conflict and livelihood insecurity, as well as the culture of 
denial, political ineptitude, ideological conflict, and external forces. The Nepalese 
people have faced severe livelihood insecurity over the last decade, mainly because 
of the negative impact of the armed conflict on important sectors such as health, 
education, agriculture and transportation, which previously provided a livelihood for 
millions of people. The shift of resource from social/development sectors to military 
to fight the insurgency severely affected livelihoods. However, after the end of the 
armed conflict in November 2006 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) between the government and the CPN (M), the peaceful exit by 
the King, the successful completion of the Constituent Assembly election in April 
2008, and the declaration of Nepal as a republic, a broader framework for stable 
political change is in place. It is hoped that the changes that are afoot within this 
new framework will provide livelihood security for the Nepalese people.
2.1 Context
From 1996 to 2006, Nepal was in the midst of a violent conflict, which claimed more 
than 13,000 lives and caused billions of rupees worth of damage to property and 
infrastructure. On 4 October 2002 King Gyanendra took over legislative power, 
claiming that the Government had failed to deal with the insurgency; on 1 February 
2005, he declared direct rule, ending multiparty democracy. In reaction to this, in 
April 2006, there was a 19-day popular uprising referred to as Jana Andolan II, in 
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which the people, political parties and CPN (M) rose up to overthrow the monarch 
and restore multiparty democracy. This precipitated the signing of the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006 and the ended 
of the armed conflict between the CPN (M) and the State. Nepal is now in a state 
of transition towards a federal democratic republic, with a Constituent Assembly 
elected to write a new constitution.
Although the means were questionable, and the pain and suffering inflicted upon 
the Nepal people considerable, the conflict challenged the centuries-old feudal 
socio-cultural and political systems of Nepal. The country now has a tremendous 
opportunity to restructure the previously centrally controlled, feudalistic, unitary 
state. Hence, it is highly relevant at this point in Nepal’s development to analyse 
the root causes of conflict and livelihood insecurity to ensure that the new state 
structure provides an opportunity for all Nepali people to prosper. 
The notion of livelihood is complex in its scope, nature and understanding. 
Generally, the term livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (both material 
and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. An livelihood 
is sustainable when it can cope with, and recover from, stresses and shocks and 
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while 
not undermining the natural resource base (Chambers & Conway 1992). According 
to the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the livelihoods of 
Nepalese people will improve if they have: 
1. Access to basic rights established through international conventions 
and access to high-quality education, information, technologies and 
training, and better nutrition and health
2. A supportive and cohesive social environment
3. Secure access to, and better management of, natural resources
4. Better access to basic and facilitating infrastructure, and financial 
resources
5. A policy and institutional environment that supports multiple livelihood 
strategies and promotes equitable access to competitive markets for all 
(DFID 1999)
Based on these criteria, the livelihoods of the poor and marginalised were severely 
threatened during the armed conflict, and are still at great risk. 
Poverty; gender, caste and ethnic-based discrimination; social and political 
exclusion; skewed distribution of production resources; malgovernance (weak, 
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ineffective and corrupt governance); failure of development; weak civil society; and 
geographical isolation are the root causes of the armed conflict and sources of 
the persistent livelihood insecurity of the poor people of Nepal (Thapa & Sijapati 
2003; Upreti 2006). The strategies of the Government and the CPN (M) during 
the armed conflict, a culture of denial, political ineptitude, ideological conflict, and 
external forces are some of the other sources of conflict and livelihood insecurity. 
This chapter aims to develop an understanding of these causes and the complexity 
of their interrelationship with livelihood insecurity. 
2.2 Sources of conflict and livelihood insecurity
The armed conflict in Nepal was the cumulative effect of structural causes, 
proximate causes, changing international security dimensions, psychological 
factors, failure of leadership and geo-political specificity. The Maoist insurgency 
was not the sole product of the ‘failure’ of multiparty democracy, as claimed by 
some sources. Rather, it was the manifestation of the centuries-old, exclusionary, 
centralist, autocratic and feudal political and social system in Nepal, which had 
nurtured social and political exclusion, discrimination, poverty and subordination 
in Nepalese society.
Table 2.1 presents a broad overview of the various sources of insecurity and 
conflict in Nepal.
Table 2.1 Overview of sources of insecurity and conflict
Structural sources External sources Triggers and catalysts
x Political sources
x Socio-economic 
sources (e.g., caste, 
class and religion 
based discrimination 
and inequality; poverty 
and unemployment; 
social exclusion, etc.)
x Geographical isolation 
x Constitutional and 
legal sources
x Ideological sources 
x Changes in the international 
security paradigm
x Interests of powerful 
nations (political, economic, 
e.g., in natural resources 
such as gas, oil, water and 
forests; historical legacy 
of autocracy; religious; 
strategic and military)
x Information technology, 
global advancement
x Vested interests 
x Unforeseen events (e.g., 
the Royal massacre in 
Nepal on 1 June 2001) 
x Failure of political 
leadership 
x Failure of development 
x Psychological factors 
(e.g., revenge and 
retaliation) 
x Irresponsibility factor and 
a culture of denial 
Source: Modified from Upreti (2007)
In summary, poverty and inequality, social and political exclusion, gender disparity, 
caste and ethnic-based discrimination, corruption and malgovernance can be 
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identified as root causes of the conflict. The following sections discuss the different 
sources/causes of the armed conflict and livelihood insecurity in Nepal.
2.2.1 Poverty
It is well known that poverty and livelihood insecurity are closely interrelated and 
that they are both a cause and consequence of conflict. Poverty in Nepal is one 
of the major determining factors of livelihood insecurity, as the vast majority of 
the population live below the absolute poverty line and face immense livelihood 
insecurity. They are excluded from access to food and other resources necessary 
for their bare subsistence including shelter, safe drinking water, health care and 
education. This causes malnutrition and high infant mortality, among other things 
(Seddon & Hussein 2002). In 2008, it was estimated that 30.9 per cent of the 
population in Nepal were living below the poverty line (dropping from 42 per cent 
in 2000).1 Hence, we can assume that poverty and livelihood insecurity were the 
primary root causes of the armed conflict, and are potential sources of new/ongoing 
conflict in Nepal.
Poverty in Nepal is a function of many things including discrimination and exclusion, 
skewed distribution of production resources, malgovernance and geographic 
isolation, among others. These will be discussed in more detail in the sections 
below.
2.2.2 Discrimination
State-nurtured discrimination (based on caste, ethnicity, gender and religion), and 
interrelated political and social exclusion, are also main causes of the armed conflict 
and of livelihood insecurity in Nepal. The state structures in Nepal are discriminato-
ry and exclusionary in structure and operation. For example, the state constitution-
ally declared Nepal a ‘Hindu state’ in the Constitution of 1990, implicitly excluding 
other religious groups; Madheshi and Newari people are not properly represented 
in the military; citizenship certificates have been denied to those applying under 
the name of their mother, and to some Madheshi cultural and ethnic groups; and 
landless people have not only been denied access to land, but to other livelihood 
resources including traditional sources such as fish and forests. As well as struc-
tural discrimination, the state has applied policies and laws in a discriminatory way, 
and remained passive in relation to ‘untouchability’ and discrimination, despite the 
abolition of the caste system in the Civil Code of 1963 (Muluki Ain 1963).
It is widely perceived by many ethnic groups, marginalised sections of society, 
and social and political analysts that the 1990 Constitution, which was regarded 
1  http://indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=np&v=69 (accessed on 4 June 2009)
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as one of the best constitutions in the world, is sexist and racist (Lawoti 2005). 
The 1990 Constitution promoted one language, one culture and one religion, 
thereby discriminating on the basis of race, and it did not treat men and women 
equally in fundamental issues like citizenship, thereby discriminating on the basis 
of gender. The Constitution of 1990 also protected authoritarian institutions, which 
discriminate against minority religious groups, women and so-called ‘lower’ caste 
people. Another common criticism of the 1990 Constitution is that, although it 
enshrined freedom of expression, it failed to ensure equity (Upreti & Dhungana 
2006). In addition to the Constitution, many legal provisions are also exclusionary 
and discriminatory, and are unable to ensure justice to poor, marginalised and 
socially excluded sections of society. 
Deep-rooted social cleavages along the lines of caste, ethnicity, gender, region, 
culture, language and religion are characteristics of Nepalese society and are a 
structural source of conflict. People had great expectations that these divisions 
would be overcome with the political change and reintroduction of democracy 
in 1990. However, with the poor performance of successive governments, the 
Nepalese people became disillusioned with political parties and the government. 
The highly unsatisfactory democratic transition of the 1990s, in terms of the 
transformation of the state, politics and society, contributed to the emergence of 
the armed conflict in 1996. The dominance of certain groups such as Brahmins, 
Chhetris and high-caste Newars in all social, political and economic sectors, and 
the exclusion of ethnic groups and so-called ‘low’ caste people created strong 
feelings of injustice and a need for revenge. It is also widely documented that the 
livelihood insecurity of a vast majority of Nepalese people is the outcome of such 
exclusion and marginalisation (Seddon & Hussein 2002; Upreti 2006).
2.2.3 Social and political exclusion
Intentional social and political exclusion is common and serious in Nepal. Intentional 
social exclusion is the deliberate action of certain powerful elites to protect their 
vested interests and to maintain the prevailing economic and social structures upon 
which their existence is largely based (Karki & Seddon 2003; Upreti 2004a). These 
elite groups overtly and covertly developed filtering mechanisms (such as higher 
fees for health and other basic services, the need for literacy and numeric skills to 
access certain facilities, and rigid regulations) to limit poor people from accessing 
resources and services, and from obtaining power (Kumar 2006; Upreti 2004c). 
Overt social exclusion includes the inheritance of traditional exclusionary social 
practices, myths, belief systems (e.g., caste-based hierarchy, untouchability, and 
restrictions in relation to marriage, religion and occupation). The structural basis of 
Hindu society is principally shaped by a notion of exclusion that goes beyond the 
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general social division of society (Lawoti 2005; Upreti 2004d). The Hindu system 
has promoted centralised exclusionary practices in the lives of individuals including 
in their food habits, marriage, religious beliefs, education and day-to-day activities. 
The Hindu system has maintained a rigid social hierarchy in Nepal. This blatantly 
exploitative social structure has not been eradicated by any political system in 
Nepal and still has tremendous influence in Nepalese society (Baral 2006; Aditya 
et al. 2006). Discrimination against women in the form of polygamy; discrimination 
against girls and women on the basis of gender, which affects the distribution of 
resources, decision making power and division of labour; untouchability of women; 
sexual harassment and exploitation; and the inhumane treatment of women who 
are deemed witches is still common in Nepal.
As well as social exclusion, the vast majority of the Nepali people have been 
politically excluded. Nepal’s national politics has been historically monopolised by 
a few oligarchic families (e.g., Shah, Rana and Koirala). Like fixed property, politics 
(leadership and control of power) is inherited in these elite families. This feudal 
transfer of power within elite families is backed and supported by traditional culture, 
values and religious systems nurtured by the exclusionary and feudal state. 
The current conflict is the cumulative outcome of the monopolisation of national 
politics and the failure of political systems, which goes back 240 years. The Shah 
and Rana regimes (including the partyless Panchayat regime) systematically 
denied inclusive political processes and focused on capturing power and resources. 
The Nepalese people have protested against this by participating in various 
democratic movements in 1950, 1979, 1990 and 2006. The general public has 
had great expectations of each political change. However, after every movement, 
the Nepalese people have been (ab)used as a ladder for oligarchic families 
and their coteries to capture state power and resources. The ruling elites have 
consistently failed to govern the country based on democratic ideals and norms 
(Thapa 2002; Upreti 2006; Kumar 2006). The resulting frustration provided fertile 
ground for social unrest and conflict. It is widely recognised that the post-1990 
politics in Nepal failed to democratically govern the country or to alleviate the most 
urgent economic, social and political needs (Baral 2006; Upreti 2006; Aditya et al. 
2006). Hence, the CPN (M)’s proposal of agragami chhalang (progressive political 
change) and a total restructuring of the state were able to attract a large proportion 
of the Nepalese people.
The political parties created and nurtured a narrowly politicised civil administration 
and security apparatus. The bureaucracy, the stable government, has been 
increasingly engaging in fulfilling vested personal and political (party) interests. 
This helped develop a widespread distrust in the democratic process and spurred 
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civil unrest and conflict. Even democratic parties and governments enacted and 
used draconian legislation (such as the Terrorist Control Act), committed severe 
human rights violations (including killing innocent civilians and non-combatants, 
unlawful detention, disappearances, torture), which led to the development of 
negative feelings in ordinary people toward the political parties, the government 
and the security forces.
Certain caste and ethnic groups dominate all of the political structures and 
processes in Nepal. This is reflected in the representation of certain castes and 
ethnic groups in parliament and in the central committees of political parties, a vivid 
example of exclusionary politics (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 Political representation of different groups (% total)
Caste/ethnicity House of representatives Parties' central committees
1991 1994 1999 NC UML RPP JM NSP NWPP
Total seats 205 205 205 29 46 41 38 29 9
Brahmin 37.6 42 37.6 62.06 65.21 19.51 44.73 - 22.22
Chhetri 19.1 19.5 20.5 10.34 10.86 31.70 7.84 - 11.11
Newar 6.8 6.3 6.8 3.44 13.04 4.87 10.52 - 66.66
Hill ethnic groups 15.2 12.2 14.7 13.79 6.52 26.82 21.05 - -
Terai communities 21.0 20.0 19.5 10.34 4.34 17.07 5.26 100 -
Others 2.9 2.0 2.5 - - - 10.52 - -
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Adapted from Hachhethu (2003, p 16, Table 3) 
2.2.4 Skewed distribution of resources
Centralised policies, regional imbalances in the allocation of state resources, 
and highly skewed ownership, distribution, access and control of land and other 
productive resources have also contributed to the armed conflict in Nepal. Among 
the production resources, land is the main means of livelihood for the Nepalese 
people. Owning land is also a form of social status, which provides the basis for 
securing other rights such as citizenship, eligibility for loans from banks, birth 
certificates and so forth. If people are landless they not only lose their means of 
livelihood, they are also deprived of many other rights and entitlements.
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Table 2.3 Land distribution in Nepal
S.N. Category of people % of Total population 
1 Landless 24.44
2 Semi-landless (owning less than 0.20 acres or 0.08 hectares) 6.98
3 Marginal cultivators (owning 0.21 to 1 acres or 0.084 to 0.4046 hectares) 27.59
4 Small cultivators (1.01 to 2 acres or 0.4087 to 0.809 hectares) 20.15
5 Semi-medium (2.01 to 4 acres or 0.809 to 1.618 hectares) 13.42
6 Medium cultivators (4 to 10 acres or 1.659 to 4.05 hectares) 6.25
7 Large cultivators (more than 10.01 acre or 4.06 hectares) 1.17
Source: Adapted from UNDP (2004, p 176, Table 11) 
Table 2.3 shows the general landholding pattern prevalent in Nepal. More than 24 
per cent of the population is landless and another 6.98 per cent of the population is 
semi-landless. If more than 30 per cent of the population of an agricultural country 
is landless or semi-landless, they face livelihood insecurity, and, if the state fails 
to provide a means for their survival, they will become frustrated and may take up 
arms (Hutt 2004).
The series of rallies and mass protests (in Siraha, Saptari, Dang, Kailali and 
Chitwan) organised by tenants, Dalits, landless, squatters and ex-Kamaiyas 
(bonded labourers) is evidence of the frustration of these groups. When people feel 
ignored, neglected or victimised by the state, they become organised and protest 
from time to time to demand their rights. This is one of the perennial sources of 
conflict and instability in Nepal. Similar inequalities can be observed in relation to 
access to and control over forest resources (e.g., threats to forest-based livelihoods, 
lack of decision-making power of poor and women over forest resources) and 
water resources (e.g., privatisation of water and high user fees). This situation is 
discussed further in chapter three.
The work of Seddon and Hussein (2002) shows that in rural areas 20 per cent of 
the population are wealthy landowners and peasants, and the remaining 80 per 
cent experience livelihood insecurity. The lives and livelihoods of women, girls and 
children were especially threatened by the armed conflict because many remained 
in the village where resources for their basic needs were scarce, whereas men 
were often out of the village. The poor, marginalised and socially excluded were 
engaged in a constant struggle for their survival because of lack of control over and 
access to productive resources, weak social capital and networks, and the lack of 
a stable or regular source of income, among other things (Upreti 2006; Seddon & 
Hussein 2002). 
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When there is a huge accumulation of land and other natural resources in the 
hands of a small section of society and other large sections have to depend on 
limited resources, there is always competition. When some people have more and 
others have to suffer, feelings of injustice develop. The unequal distribution of land 
in Nepal (see Table 2.3) not only threatens the livelihoods of people with little or no 
land, but has also implanted feelings of injustice. The Maoist insurgents capitalised 
on this, gaining the sympathy of the exploited and marginalised. The state was 
simply not able, or unwilling, to address the concerns of poor and marginalised 
people (Lawoti 2005; Kumar 2006; Upreti 2004c).
Examining the local dynamics of resource use patterns from the perspective of 
power relations, the ‘winner-takes-all’ model appears to be common; local elites 
hold almost all production resources and exploit poor and marginalised sections 
of society. The inequitable use of natural resources by powerful elites in villages is 
depriving poor people. Previous studies conducted by this author (Upreti 2001 and 
2002a) show, for example, that it is almost impossible for poor Dalits to get access to 
water for irrigation in dry summers before it is used by the local elites. Furthermore, 
exploitation is not limited to physical resources. Elites have not only captured 
productive resources, but are also controlling the negotiation and peace process. 
None of the three negotiations (2001, 2003, and 2006) between the Government 
of Nepal and the CPN (M) involved representatives from civil society, women or 
socially excluded/marginalised groups. The need for broader participation (i.e., 
representation of the interests of a broad cross-section of society) was ignored, 
and the peace process was neither transparent nor accountable. The main reason 
for this was to protect the vested interests of the elites in the negotiations (Upreti 
2006; Baral 2006).
2.2.5 Malgovernance
Lack of democratic legitimacy and effective governance was one of the proximate 
causes of the conflict (Kumar 2006). Successive governments not only failed to 
address social exclusion, inequality, poverty and lack of access to resources, 
but also blatantly engaged in corruption (Thapa 2002), nepotism and favouritism 
(Shrestha 1997; Pandey 1999).
Table 2.4 World Bank Institute Governance Index for Nepal (1996–2006)
Year Dimensions of governance (in %)
Voice and 
accountability
Political 
stability
Government 
effectiveness
Regulatory 
quality
Rule of law Control of 
corruption
1996 50.2 25.0 48.3 23.4 51.4 44.7
1998 44.2 23.6 37.4 24.4 52.4 43.2
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2000 44.7 14.4 39.3 27.3 45.2 40.3
2002 22.6 6.7 36.5 30.7 41.0 46.1
2003 23.6 5.3 32.2 32.7 36.7 51.0
2004 17.8 2.9 22.3 24.4 33.9 34.5
2005 13.9 1.4 15.6 26.3 24.8 28.6
2006 13.0 1.9 19 28.8 29.0 25.2
South Asia 
Average 
(2006)
25.5 26.8 37.7 37.0 39.3 33.9
Source: Manandhar (2007)
Table 2.4 shows that the governing situation in Nepal has deteriorated since the 
armed conflict started in 1996. All of the six governance indices used to measure 
the various dimensions of governance indicate a worsening trend.
The Nepalese state has consistently failed to reduce poverty, provide a decent 
means of livelihood, control exploitation and generate employment opportunities 
(Upreti 2002a and 2002b). Consequently, semi-educated, left-out, unemployed and 
frustrated youths have become a source of civil unrest. Corruption and irregularity 
are blatant characteristics of the governing system and political process in Nepal, 
which have diverted state resources that should have been invested in the livelihood 
security of poor and marginalised people (Pokharel 2004).
Another factor leading to the armed conflict was the Government’s repressive 
behaviour towards the supporters of the United Peoples’ Front (UPF) in the early 
1990s. In the parliamentary election of 1991, one of the factions of the UPF won 
nine seats in parliament, becoming the third largest party. However, the ruling party 
(the Nepali Congress) tried to wipe out the UPF in its stronghold areas in the Mid-
Western Development Region using state power and resources. Under Operation 
Romeo, the state used local administration and police to brutally suppress the 
members of UPF and their supporters. As a result, ordinary people did not feel 
secure, even though democracy had been reinstated in the widely acknowledged 
political change of 1990. The excessive and unlawful acts of the police under 
Operation Romeo terrorised the local people. The Parliamentary Investigation 
Committee made the following statement (summarised by Pahari 2003, p 7):
Between 1990 and 1996 successive regimes in Kathmandu, starting with 
that of strongly anti-communist Girija Koirala, pursued a conscious policy of 
trying to undermine and ultimately dismantle the considerable electoral clout 
of the Maoists in Rukum, Rolpa, Salyan and Jajarkot – a region with strong left 
support since 1950s. […] mobilising not only party cadre, but local and regional 
civil administration and the police force as available and necessary, the Girija 
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government started a trend of committing and compromising state resources 
to undermine opposition parties to win local and national elections. …If free 
and fair elections are to be regarded as forming the most inviolable aspects of 
democracy, then the trend initiated by the Nepali Congress government under 
Koirala in the Maoist hinterland and beyond can be taken as the beginning of a 
series of egregious and systematic violence of democracy from within the state 
in post 1990 period.
A major boost to the Maoist cause was the local governance structure. The CPN (M) 
wanted to make local bodies dysfunctional to create a political vacuum, which they 
could then fill with their local janasarkar (government). The then Deuba Government 
greatly assisted the Maoists in meeting this objective by neither conducting local 
elections nor extending the tenure of existing elected bodies. Instead, he assigned 
the responsibilities of the elected local representatives to central government 
officials, which virtually eradicated local government. The CPN (M) emerged even 
stronger in the absence of local government, maintaining their high degree of their 
control. Most of the office bearers in the local government offices (except teachers 
and health workers) withdrew from the villages.
2.2.6 Development failure
In the history of Nepal’s planned development, policies, strategies and practices 
have consistently discriminated against and excluded poor people and ethnic 
minorities (Pandey 1999; Shrestha 1997; Upreti 2004a). The exploitative nature 
of development in Nepal has created tension, fear, mistrust, feelings of injustice 
and resentment. It is widening the gap between the rich and the poor, promoting 
the accumulation of wealth by certain elite groups at the cost of grave livelihood 
insecurity for the vast majority of the Nepalese population (Pandey 1999). This 
created a group of oppressed people looking for an opportunity to oppose the ruling 
elite. The Maoists presented them with such an opportunity; hence, development 
failure is one of the main reasons for the expansion of the Maoist conflict in Nepal. 
It is naive to believe that all development interventions have a positive impact on 
the wellbeing of socially excluded and marginalised people. The experiences of the 
five decades of planned development in Nepal have proved that development is 
not able to secure the livelihoods of poor and marginalised people. Development 
interventions often overlook or exclude the poorest members of society (Upreti 
2004a; Shrestha 1997; Pandey 1999). Despite the rhetoric on decentralisation, 
Nepal’s development practices are still strongly centralised, elite-biased and 
exclusionary, and ultimately create livelihood insecurity and social tension.
More than 60 per cent of Nepal’s development budget comes from the international 
community. Hence, the role and influence of donors through development 
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assistance is substantial. Donors have a significant influence over development 
policy, strategy, structure, process and practice in Nepal. However, the role 
and influence of development assistance has so far been sectoral, producing 
competition on particular development issues and resulting in contradictory advice 
to the Government. Development assistance is also rigid and conditional (e.g., on 
relinquishing incentive systems or on price rises in basic goods and services like 
electricity and water, which often leads to severe conflict), and priorities change 
frequently, ultimately leading to development failure (Pandey 1999; Shrestha 
1997). 
It is worth stating one of the findings of research on the impact of donor assistance 
in Nepal (Seddon & Hussein 2002): 
Despite a heavy donor presence and sustained high levels of aid to Nepal (with 
foreign agencies contributing some 60 per cent of Nepal’s development budget) 
and the existence of a wide variety of development programmes, the number 
of people falling below the poverty line has not decreased over the last twenty 
years. There can be little doubt that, even after half a century of development 
interventions, Nepal is still in crisis. (Seddon & Hussein 2002, p 2)
There is an extensive corpus of material that evaluates the impact of donor 
interventions in Nepal (Acharya 1998; Panday 1999; Shrestha 1997; Upreti 2004b; 
Mainali 2003; Sharma & Rana 2006), but the following remains symptomatic of 
the negative repercussions of the contribution and effectiveness of donor funded 
development interventions in addressing the root causes of the conflict and 
livelihoods security of poor and marginalised people in Nepal. For example, USAID 
invested 50 million US dollars in a 15 year project (from 1980-1995) called the 
Rapti Zone Rural Area Development Project (later called the Rapti Development 
Project) to fulfil the basic needs of the poor people in the project area by improving 
household food production and consumption, and improving income generating 
opportunities for poor farmers, landless labourers, occupational castes and women. 
However, this project failed to improve the wellbeing of poor people in the project 
area specifically because of failure of the project to reach the poor. Instead, the 
CPN (M) began their armed movement with the support of poor and marginalised 
people in the project area (Mainali 2003).
2.2.7 Weak civil society
As in many developing countries, there has been an absence of civil society sector 
to closely watch the political, economic and social processes in Nepal and to hold 
the government and political actors accountable if they do wrong. Only after the 
political change of 1990 did the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector 
emerge strongly and, claiming to be an important civil society actor, has started 
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to raise its voice in some crucial areas such as human rights, women's rights, 
children's rights, access to resources for poor and marginalised groups, and the 
right to education, food and shelter, and so forth. However, this sector has also lost 
its credibility due to its non-transparent dealings in relation to external funding and 
the use of resources (often charged as dollorko kheti garne haru2), its adoption of 
the agendas of donors and its fragmentation in terms of political ideology. However, 
after the grand failure of the Government to respect human rights and civil liberties, 
the civil society movement emerged strongly, starting in the Kathmandu Valley and 
quickly moving to district headquarters. If a vibrant civil society existed, it could 
perform the role of a watchdog in relation to malgovernance, human rights abuses, 
and so on, minimising the potential for conflict to erupt.
One of the proximate causes of the conflict was a lack of effective non-violent 
mechanisms to address problems and overcome differences. The legal system was 
ineffective, exclusionary, expensive and ultimately unable to deal with the social 
cleavages reflected in terms of caste, ethnicity, gender and discrimination (Upreti 
2001). When people have no other way of resolving their differences they opt for 
coercive or violent means. Some of the traditional non-violent mechanisms such 
as guthis (a special endowment arrangement), dharma bhakaris (a fund created 
for a special purpose) existed, but these were also religiously biased, elitist and 
hierarchical in nature, and they excluded people who did not believe in them (Upreti 
2002a). If there had been a common platform available to the poorest, marginalised 
groups, development agencies, government offices and political parties promoting 
a non-violent approach to negotiation it would have helped to mitigate conflict. For 
example, local government bodies (village development committees) could have 
been one such platform, but the Government did not enable them to function.
2.2.8 Geographical isolation
Remoteness, especially in the Mid-Western and Far West Development Regions 
and other remote areas, is associated with widespread poverty and spatial 
disparities. The unwillingness of the state to invest in infrastructure, such as roads, 
schools, hospitals, electricity, drinking water and irrigation, has exacerbated social 
exclusion and increased livelihood insecurity. Spatial disparities have caused 
feelings of injustice. One reason for the start and rapid expansion of the Maoist 
insurgency in the Mid-Western Development Region (Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan and 
Jajarkot) is its geographical isolation and the state’s neglect of the area (Hutt 2004; 
Mackinlay & Upreti 2003).
2  Meaning ‘the harvesters of money’.
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Lack of good networks for transport and communication in these remote regions 
favoured the launching of the rebellion, partly because these uncontrolled areas 
(forests) served as hideouts and training centres for the rebels. Hence, geographical 
isolation became one of the main causes of conflict and livelihood insecurity.
2.2.9 The Maoist’s war strategy
The CPN (M) learnt from the strategies and tactics of the Peruvian communist party, 
the Shining Path; Mao's strategy of protracted people's war (developing in rural 
areas and expanding to urban centres to capture state power); and the Russian 
strategy of armed insurrection. The CPN (M) dealt with very sensitive issues and 
aligned themselves with the agenda of the poor, attracting large portions of Nepal's 
population. In addition to poor people, peasants and workers, they also tactfully 
used media, intelligentsia and politicians in their favour. The power struggle 
between, and within, the political parties over the past 10 years greatly contributed 
to the expansion and strengthening of the Maoist movement.6
The CPN (M) adopted Mao Zedong's strategy of three weapons for the people's 
revolution: (i) party (to develop and maintain ideology, and formulate policies and 
strategies related to people's war), (ii) people's army (responsible for attacking 
enemies and defending areas under control) and (iii) united front (to consolidate 
friendly forces). One of the main strategies of the CPN (M) was to mobilise the 
frustrations and aspirations of ethnic minorities (Upreti 2006; Thapa & Sijapati 
2003). The Maoists created a strong united front, bringing several ethnic and 
regional forces together like the Kirat National Liberation Front, Magrat National 
Liberation Front, Tharuwan National Liberation Front, Tamang National Liberation 
Front, Thami National Liberation Front, Majhi National Liberation Front, Madheshi 
National Liberation Front, and the Karnali Regional Liberation Front. These fronts 
are coordinated by the CPN (M) Ethnic and Regional Coordination Committee. 
Ethnic support was one of the foundational strengths of the Maoist insurgency 
(Sharma 2003).
The CPN (M) became successful by dichotomising identities such as ‘oppressor-
oppressed’, ‘ruler-ruled’, ‘rich-poor’, ‘landlord-landless’ and ‘patriot-non patriot’ to 
establish political, social, cultural and economic cleavages. These dichotomies 
fuelled the already developed feelings of injustice and frustration of the Nepalese 
people. Hence, the Maoist gained wider sympathy for their cause (Seddon & 
Hussein 2002). The differences between ethnic groups and caste groups are 
based on language (Nepali language versus ethnic languages), cultural practices 
and religious practices (Hindu versus non-Hindu). The different groups have been 
discriminated against in various ways, including legally and judicially, through the 
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denial of their indigenous identity, political exclusion and by denial of citizenship by 
the state. These injustices were used by the CPN (M) to gather support. 
2.2.10 The Government’s war strategy
The Government’s strategy for dealing with the Maoist insurgency had a negative 
impact on the conflict, leading to further insecurity and livelihood stress. Instead 
of trying to resolve the conflict through dialogue and negotiation, the Government 
opted for a coercive approach. It launched a police operation called ‘Operation Kilo 
Sierra II’ against the CPN (M) in 18 districts between May 1998 and 1999. This 
operation was counterproductive because of the high number of casualties. Many 
people, especially the victims’ families and relatives joined the insurgency to take 
revenge (Sharma 2003). In 1999, the Government provided an extra allowance for 
members of the police force working in Maoist influence areas. This also helped 
to expand the Maoist movement, because the police acted unlawfully to prove the 
presence of the CPN (M) in their working area so that they would be eligible for the 
allowance. Police operations such as Operation Romeo, Kilo Sierra II, Operation 
Jungle Search (1998-99), Operation Silent Kilo Sierra III, and Operations Delta 
and Chakrabyuha (2000-May 2001) were unsuccessful in controlling the rebellion 
and contributed to the development of anti-government feelings in ordinary people. 
This strategy helped to escalate conflict in certain geographical areas. The 
Integrated Development Programme (November 2000 to March 2001), in Rolpa, 
Rukum, Salyan, Kalikot and Jajarkot, and the Integrated Security and Development 
Programme (ISDP) implemented by the Government in Maoist stronghold districts 
(since May 2001) were ineffective (Thapa & Sijapati 2003; Upreti 2006). Until 
1999, the confrontations, actions and counter-actions were limited to between the 
police and CPN (M). Although the Army was deployed in the Maoist affected areas 
(Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Jajarkot and Pyuthan) under the Integrated Security and 
Development Programme (ISDP), there were no confrontations between the Army 
and the CPN (M) at that time. Later, after an attack by the CPN (M) on a military 
barrack in Dang district in 2001, the Government mobilised the Nepalese Army 
to control the CPN (M). However, the Nepalese Army was not able to control the 
insurgency. Instead, the Army bore heavy losses and lost the trust of the Nepalese 
people because of its grave human rights violations (AI 2005a and 2005b; ICG 
2003; INSEC 2005). The serious mistrust by the people of the military caused 
permanent damage to the Nepalese Army. The Government’s strategy of issuing 
red corner notices to CPN (M) through Interpol, fixing bounties on the heads of 
Maoist leaders, repeatedly imposing a state of emergency, issuing Terrorist and 
Destructive Activities Control Ordinances, creating a special Armed Police Force, 
and forming a unified command by bringing police, armed police, intelligence and 
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military under the command of the Nepal Army were all ineffective and unsuccessful 
in controlling the insurgency. Instead, the CPN (M) gained tremendously from the 
Government’s failed counter-insurgency tactics and strategy.
2.2.11 Culture of denial
People’s reaction to the political situation in Nepal, especially to the armed conflict, 
was largely either denial, coercion or revenge. Politicians and bureaucrats often 
preferred to ignore or deny the existence of exclusion, discrimination, hunger, and 
civil and human rights violations, rather than accept the reality and acknowledge 
the need to reform the state and society (Upreti 2004c). All major actors in society 
used denial as a powerful mechanism. Those in power denied the seriousness of 
the country's situation, afraid to admit that their weaknesses were reflected in the 
attitudes, behaviour and practices responsible for the country's problems. They 
were even more defensive when confronted with evidence of their bad governance 
and corruption. In Nepal, denial is rooted in the psychological makeup of the 
individual and, at the institutional level, in political parties, government departments, 
and other power centres. The magnitude of denial is reflected in the ideas, values, 
greed, and orthodoxy of the major political and social actors in Nepal.
The self-interest of many of the key political and social actors in Nepal was the 
main factor influencing the dynamics of the conflict. For example, the urban elites 
feared that their privileges and comfortable lifestyles would be lost. Their needs and 
interests were, therefore, to protect this lifestyle by pacifying and neutralising those 
trying to restructure the state or advocating for social change. The urban elite used 
all available means at their disposal, such as the media, information, networks and 
strategic alliances, including a large segment of the international community, and 
national power centres. It is in their access to such diverse and powerful means 
that the elites display their potential to influence and direct the course of the conflict 
in Nepal. In sharp contrast, the poorest and most marginalised groups have few 
ways of influence the power/decision-making centres, and are, therefore, pushed 
to violence as a last resort. Although there is no established causal relationship 
between poverty and the use of violence, in Nepal it seems that the Maoists gained 
most of their early support from the poorest regions and the poorest and most 
marginalised groups.
2.2.12 Political ineptitude
It is very hard to find statesmanship in any of the current political leaders in Nepal 
(Baral 2006). Senior leaders are surrounded by coteries of people with vested 
interests. Nepal has received tremendous financial and technical support from the 
international community over the last five decades; however, misery caused by 
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poverty, discrimination and exclusion is still rampant. India, South Korea, China 
and Nepal all started to develop economically at the same time (in the 1950s). 
All these countries, except for Nepal, have made huge economic progress. The 
single most important reason for the lack of development of Nepal is the ineptitude 
and lack of vision of the country’s political leaders. Nepalese politicians have 
failed to prove themselves as leaders of the Nepalese people and have reduced 
themselves to leaders of their political faction (not even accepted by all members 
of their own political party). Hence, failure of the leadership and the absence of 
visionary leaders is one of main reasons for the lack of economic development, 
which in turn is a source of insecurity and livelihood stress.
2.2.13 Ideological conflict
The revolutionary politics of the CPN (M) are based on a clear ideology (Bhattarai 
2005; Onesto 2005), that of Mao Zedong. The CPN (M) perceive Nepal’s problems 
to be caused by deep-rooted oppression and feudalistic production relations, 
unequal power structures and the capitalist system (Upreti 2006; Bhattarai 
2005; Sharma 2003). In contrast, the Government and the parliamentary parties 
advocated for a capitalist political system and constitutional monarchy. This 
resulted in an ideological conflict. The CPN (M) refined their theoretical orientation, 
calling it Prachandapath (after leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal whose alias during the 
insurgency was Prachanda), claiming that it was the way to address the challenges 
of the 21st Century. For their proletariat revolution, the Maoist combined the 
Chinese strategy of protracted people’s war and the Russian strategy of armed 
insurrection with the discontentment of the Nepalese people with the state (Upreti 
2006; Sharma 2003). Parliamentary parties and their successive governments were 
confused or unwilling to realise the strong ideological dimensions of the Maoist 
insurgency (Nickson 2003; Karki & Seddon 2003). Further, the state systematically 
underestimated and trivialised the United People’s Front – the political wing of the 
CPN (Mashal) led by Baburam Bhattarai. This is reflected in the statement of the 
then Home Minister, “we will be able to bring the present activities under control 
within four five days" (Sharma 2003, p 371).
In the early years, Nepal's armed conflict was ideologically influenced by the 
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) and the Coordination Committee 
of Maoist Parties and Organisations in South Asia (CCOMPOSA), as the CPN (M) 
was a member of both organisations (Upreti 2006). It even had some connection to, 
and official relations with, the communist party of the USA. However, none of these 
organisations influenced the armed conflict as much as the Peruvian communist 
party – the Shining Path – which was the real ideological, strategic and tactical 
source of Nepal's Maoist insurgency (Nickson 2003). 
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2.2.14 International dimensions
The armed conflict in Nepal has very strong international dimensions. The roles 
of India and the USA, and, to lesser extent, the UK were crucial during the entire 
duration of the conflict. India’s role was particularly crucial in both the escalation 
and resolution of the armed conflict. 
After 11 September 2001, the international security situation changed, greatly 
influencing the dynamics of the armed conflict in Nepal. Indian and American 
security interests in Nepal expanded. Although, the influence of the UK was not 
at the level of the other two countries, it had a significant influence on Nepal’s 
armed conflict. The longstanding ties between Nepal and the UK (the role of 
the Gurkha soldiers in the British Army and the royal linkage between the two 
countries) enhanced the UK’s interest in the armed conflict. Hence, it provided 
military aid to the Government of Nepal, despite the vehement opposition of human 
rights organisations such as Amnesty International. After 9/11, the USA took a very 
aggressive stance on terrorism, and Nepal was in its top six countries for military 
assistance. The USA also provided security intelligence, training and millions of 
US dollars in financial support to strengthen the Nepal Army. Even the Belgian 
Government provided 5000 weapons to Nepal. Selling arms was one of the major 
international interests in the Nepalese conflict (Upreti 2004a).
The open border (1808 km) between India and Nepal gave the CPN (M) easy access 
to India. The Maoists had easy access to India and strong ties with Indian ultra-
leftists. They obtained training and weapons from India, and used Indian territory 
for meetings, to organise themselves, for publications, the collection of donations, 
to expand networks, and to access media. India has always been concerned with 
‘anti-Indian’ activities in Nepal, particularly on the part of the Pakistani intelligence 
agency (ISI) and the support of the CPN (M) to Indian Maoists groups active in more 
than 12 states of India. After 9/11, India declared the CPN (M) as ‘terrorists’, started 
to extensively search for Maoist cadre and arms caches in India, reinforced border 
security by deploying troops, sealed borders, and provided military equipment 
and helicopters to crack down on the rebels. However, the CPN (M) continued its 
activities inside India. After the King’s takeover on 1 February 2005, India changed 
its position. India not only supported the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) in its fight 
against the royal takeover, it also facilitated the meeting of the CPN (M) and the 
SPA and the 12-point understanding between these two political forces. 
Although, China was close to the Palace in the past, it remained indifferent about 
the armed conflict saying that it was an ‘internal problem’ and that China does 
not want to engage in the internal politics of Nepal. However, it was watching 
developments very closely and used silent diplomacy. Contrary to the speculations 
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of many people, China did not support the CPN (M) insurgency. Instead, it had 
frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the use of Mao’s name in the conflict. 
After the 2006 people’s movement, China changed its position on the monarchy, 
distancing itself and expressing support for the people’s choice. 
2.3 Effect of the armed conflict on livelihoods
Livelihoods are secure when they can cope with and recover from stresses and 
shocks and maintain or enhance capabilities and resources without undermining 
the resource base (Chambers & Conway 1992). Once capabilities and resources or 
assets are disturbed, people face livelihood insecurity. The armed conflict in Nepal 
disturbed these dynamics and consequently led to enormous livelihood insecurity. 
It also created some opportunities for alternative means of livelihood through the 
redistribution of land to landless, by forcing the Government to channel resources 
to pro-poor activities, and by prompting donors to focus on social exclusion and 
livelihood insecurity. 
To achieve livelihood security for the Nepalese people, their basic rights must be 
guaranteed (according to international human rights conventions) in the constitution 
and legislated into national law. Furthermore, the Government must ensure the 
access of Nepali people to quality education, health services, markets, information 
and technology. Other important factors in livelihood security are secure access to 
and better management of natural resources; better access to basic and facilitating 
infrastructure and financial resources; and a policy and institutional environment 
that supports multiple livelihood strategies and promotes equitable access to basic 
services for all (DFID 1999). None of these conditions have been met to date and 
all were seriously disturbed by the armed conflict. Hence, the livelihoods of the vast 
majority of Nepalese people are insecure and vulnerable.
2.3.1 Diversion of state funds
One of the serious impacts of the armed conflict on the livelihoods of poor 
people was the resource shift from basic service sectors to unproductive military 
expenditure. The proportion of the budget dedicated to security invariably increases 
overtime. This increase in military expenditure and the disproportionate increase in 
the amount of ‘administrative costs’ compared to the development budget led to a 
decrease in the proportion of resources allocated to basic social service sectors 
(e.g., health, education, and drinking water). 
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Table 2.5 Comparative expenditure in different sectors in Nepal (million 
rupees/year) 1996-2004
Fiscal 
year Total budget
Royal Nepal 
Army Police
Royal 
Palace
General 
(administrative 
costs)
Development
1996/97 57566 (100%) 2425 (4.21%) 2235 (3.88%) 70 (0.12%) 24984 (43.40%) 32581 (56.60%)
1997/98 62022 (100%) 2629 (4.24%) 2521 (4.06%) 73 (0.12%) 27983 (45.12%) 34039 (54.88%)
1998/99 69693 (100%) 3028 (4.34%) 2922 (4.19%) 83 (0.12%) 31952 (45.85%) 37741 (54.15%)
1999/00 77238 (100%) 3511 (4.55%) 3324 (4.30%) 88 (0.11%) 35686 (45.81%) 41852 (54.19%)
2000/01 91621 (100%) 3897 (4.25%) 5271 (5.75%) 93 (0.10%) 43513 (47.50%) 48108 (52.50%)
2001/02 99792 (100%) 4521 (4.53%) 5795 (5.81%) 116 (0.12%) 49322 (49.42%) 50470 (50.58%)
2002/03 96125 (100%) 7228 (7.52%) 6304 (6.56%) 388 (0.40%) 57445 (59.76%) 38680 (40.24%)
2003/04 102400 (100%) 7179 (7.02%) 6279 (6.13%) 329 (0.32%) 60555 (59.14%) 41845 (40.86%)
Source: Pokharel (2004)
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are percentage of total budget. 
Table 2.5 demonstrates that administrative costs have increased from 43.40 per 
cent in 1997/98 to 59.14 per cent in 2003/04. The trend continues to increase 
further.
2.3.2 Damage to infrastructure
Table 2.6 shows the estimate of the value of damage to property and infrastructure 
during the armed conflict and the amount needed for reconstruction. The total 
destruction was estimated at about 5 billion rupees, out of which 3.8 billion rupees 
is required to reconstruct, and damage worth 1.2 billion rupees has already been 
reconstructed.
Table 2.6 Damage to physical infrastructure during the armed                  
conflict in Nepal
S.N. Ministries and constitutional commissions Damage (NRs.)
Cost of 
Reconstruction (NRs.)
1 Ministry of Local Development 596446000 161722000
2 Ministry of Water Resources 342703000 297243000
3 Ministry of Health and Population 417000 130130000
4 Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation 354461000 377123000
5 Ministry of Education and Sports 20960000 44984000
6 Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 260755000 00
7 Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies 18123000 15064000
8 Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology 3209000 00
9 Ministry of Information and Communication 741555000 145166000
10 Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation 134747000 26550000
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11 Ministry of Physical Planning and Works 25174000 19746000
12 Ministry of Land Reform and Management 12187000 00
13 Ministry of Defence 24799000 00
14 Ministry of Finance 4666000 2270000
15 Home Ministry 2428646000 2428203000
16 Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare 230000 00
17 Supreme Court 27489000 165555000
18 Election Commission 2946000 00
19 Office of Attorney General 201000 00
20 Public Service Commission 4780000 00
21 Total 5004494000 3813756000
Source: Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (2007)
2.3.3 Health
Access to health facilities is an important component of livelihood security, because 
physical and psychological readiness and ability to work and tap opportunities is 
higher if individuals are healthy. During the armed conflict ambulances, health 
posts and other health related infrastructure were damaged and the supply of 
medicines restricted in Maoist influenced areas to prevent them from falling into 
Maoist hands. Medical professionals were unwilling to go to remote areas for work, 
which led to a deficiency in health services. State investment in the health sector 
decreased leading to a rapid ‘brain drain’ as qualified doctors and nurses left Nepal 
for better opportunities. Frequent disruption of water supply and blockades of water 
sources by insurgents created serious problems in the health sector. Blockades 
and restrictions on visiting district headquarters by the insurgents has seriously 
disrupted or obstructed people’s access to health facilities.
2.3.4 Education
Access to quality education is another important element of livelihood security. The 
armed conflict created anarchy in the education sector and warring parties held 
schools to ransom. Between 1996 and 2005 the CPN (M) killed 60 teachers and 66 
students, caused the disappearance of 151 teachers and abducted 516 students 
and 62 teachers (not including mass abductions for indoctrination purposes). 
Similarly, the Army killed 44 teachers, 172 students, detained 158 teachers and 
115 students, and caused the disappearance of 14 teachers (The Himalayan Times 
10 July 2005). Further, the mass abduction of students and teachers by CPN (M) 
and suspicion on the part of the security forces caused great insecurity. As a result, 
teachers and students left schools and colleges in rural remote areas. Strikes, 
bandhs (forced temporary closure of businesses and schools and the restriction 
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of movement by vehicle) and the closure of schools have seriously obstructed the 
school and university calendars, and the teaching/learning environment. Schools 
were used as battlegrounds by the warring parties and as camps by security forces. 
Students and teachers felt confused and afraid when the CPN (M) forced them to 
follow their curriculum in schools. Regular extortion and payment of levies added 
an extra financial burden on parents, teachers and students.
The performance of community schools in villages and remote areas was very 
poor because the teachers, students and parents were obliged to participate in the 
programmes of the CPN (M). The School Leaving Certificate (SLC) examination 
results from conflict-affected areas were poor and a high percentage of students 
failed, creating frustration among the under-educated youth. School leavers who 
were unable to obtain (suitable) employment consequently became restless, angry 
and disconnected from society, and some of them joined the rebellion.
2.3.5 Transportation
The regular restriction or obstruction of the movement of people and goods during 
the insurgency (and since) has severely affected livelihood security, particularly 
of people in remote areas. Transportation was regularly obstructed, and for long 
periods of time, during the insurgency by the placement of landmines on major 
roads and due to physical damage to roads, transport infrastructure (civil aviation 
towers, roads, suspension bridges, etc.) and vehicles (burning or blasting of 
buses, loaded trucks, ambulances, cars, motorbikes, etc.). Blockades prevented 
truckloads of food and other goods from reaching markets and from reaching 
district headquarters, which severely disrupted market systems (leading to price 
rises; shortages of basic foods; increases in black marketing, smugglings, and 
cartels, etc.), all of which have caused severe livelihood insecurity. 
The disruption of transport slowed down economic activities. Big construction 
projects (e.g., Melamchi Drinking Water Project, Kali Gandaki ‘A’ Hydro Power 
Project, various road construction projects, etc.), which required a huge amount 
of construction materials, were not able to continue work smoothly. This had a 
direct impact on daily wage labourers. Many ongoing infrastructure construction 
projects (e.g., the Chhinchu Jajarkot Road Construction Project) were stopped due 
to security risks and many other projects slowed down. All these transport and 
travel related problems created severe livelihood insecurity. 
2.3.6 Market disruption
The Maoist strategy of sabotaging the infrastructure of large companies such as 
Uniliver Nepal, Surya Tobacco Company, Coca-Cola Bottlers Nepal, and various 
distilleries has had a negative effect on the employment of labour and created 
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livelihood insecurity. It has also had a substantial negative impact on the economy, 
which affects the livelihoods of many people.
During the insurgency market opportunities were severely constrained and trade 
imbalances observed. The local hat-bazaar (a local market where people gather to 
buy and sell goods) system was disrupted and there were shortages of goods and 
services due to physical damage to goods and food stuff (hundreds of truckloads of 
goods were destroyed by the Maoists). As a result, the black market flourished. The 
diversion of scarce resources to unproductive uses and the destruction of capital 
severely weakened essential service delivery mechanism. Farmers were forced 
to throw away the milk, vegetables and other agricultural products on the road 
because of the frequent transport bandhs, which forced people towards bankruptcy. 
Employment opportunities were also severely constrained due to the scaling down 
of existing industries. All of these factors created an unfavourable environment 
for investing or establishing new enterprises. People engaged in self-employment, 
agriculture and small-scale cottage industries left their villages/occupations due 
to insecurity. Because of market disruption, uncertainty and insecurity (looting, 
robbery, etc.) the banking sector was also significantly affected. This has had a 
major impact on productive investment and employment generation in Nepal.
Tourism, an important livelihood sector in Nepal, was also severely affected during 
the conflict. Some big hotels closed due to onerous labour strikes. Demands by 
the Maoists for huge donations from big business were frequent and created a 
negative image internationally about the situation in Nepal. Forced donations and 
levies imposed on tourists and restrictions on the movement of tourists due strikes, 
bandhs (forced temporary closure of businesses, schools and transport) and 
blockades led to a reduction in the number of tourists visiting Nepal.
2.3.7 Food security and livelihoods
An examination of the food availability situation in Nepal, which is one of the most 
important elements of livelihood security, reveals that 60.2 per cent of households 
experience food insufficiency. Table 2.7 demonstrates the harsh reality.
Table 2.7 Food sufficiency of Nepali households 
Household characteristics 
(food sufficiency situation) Total no of households
Total number of households with 
land holdings
Total 3364139 (100%) 26700 (100%)
Sufficient to feed household 1337965 (39.8%) 1728 (6.5%)
Not sufficient to feed household 2026174 (60.2%) 24972 (93.5%)
1. 1-3 months insufficient 439592 (21.7%) 755 (3%)
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2. 4-6 months insufficient 877362 (43.3%) 2250 (9%)
3. 7-9 months insufficient 342039 (16.9%) 2275 (9.1%)
4. 10-12 months insufficient 357544 (16.6%) 19633 (78.6%)
Source: Adapted from CBS (2004 pp 104-107, Table 2.32)
If the state fails to secure food for more than 60 per cent of households and more 
than 16 per cent households in Nepal have food insecurity all round the year, the 
legitimacy of the state is in serious question.
A study conducted by Seddon and Hussein (2002) reveals that during the 
insurgency security forces restricted local people from holding more than one-day’s 
food supply at a time to deny the CPN (M) access to food, as against the general 
practice of people to hold a few months supply. This imposed great hardship on 
the people as in rural areas people have to walk up to three or four days to reach 
the nearest market.
The traditional livelihood opportunities of local poor were jeopardised by the conflict, 
as they were prohibited by the security forces from entering forests to collect forest 
based means of livelihood (e.g., mushrooms, young sprouts of plants, medicinal 
herbs, non-timber forest products, firewood, etc.). Anyone found in the forest 
by security forces was suspected to be Maoist. As a result, there were frequent 
famines in the Karnali region (Ibid, p 29) and other high-conflict areas.
2.3.8 Land, agriculture and water resources
Land is symbol of power, prestige and social status. It is also a means of production. 
Land is one of the natural resources that has been most affected by the armed 
conflict. During the conflict, power brokers and local elites captured valuable land 
resources using their networks and connections with state power centres and 
traditional power structures. Hence, land remained one of the major means of 
exploitation. As a result, the CPN (M) targeted landowners, evicting local landlords 
and village elites from Maoist controlled villages and capturing their lands. In some 
areas, especially in the Maoist controlled areas, they redistributed the land to the 
poor. However, because of intimidation by the security forces, the poor could not 
make use of the land. Local landlords were not able to cultivate their land and, 
consequently, scarce land resources were underutilised. The Government at that 
time started a Land Bank concept to buy land back from the landlords and sell it to 
the landless. However, critics say that it is a game plan of the feudal government to 
serve the interests of the feudal elites by buying their lands. 
The Maoist slogan ‘land to the tillers’ gained the sympathy of the tenants, poor 
farmers and marginalised groups, but the conflict disrupted traditional production 
relations in rural areas. In a recent study (Upreti et al. 2008) key informants 
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explained that most of the large landholdings were either directly controlled by the 
CPN (M) or the CPN (M) exerted pressure on tenants to stop paying contractual 
payments to landlords. The CPN (M) asked tenants to pay the landlords’ share to 
them. This had a negative impact on the productivity of land, as lands were either 
uncultivated or under cultivated or cultivated with no/low investment. Some of the 
commercial farming (e.g., tea gardens in Ilam and Panchtahr, which are usually 
owned by middle class to rich farmers or local elites with strong links with power 
centres) was controlled or disturbed by the CPN (M). Such control ultimately forced 
the commercial farmers to leave the area. Rich and medium class commercial 
farmers faced continuous pressure to pay the Maoists huge sums of money. Such 
extortion greatly affected commercial farming including tea gardens, fruit farms, 
livestock farming, and cardamom, broom grass and ginger growing. In turn, this 
negatively affected agriculture processing and distribution systems.
Investment in the agriculture sector by the Agriculture Development Bank (ADBN) 
and other financial institutions decreased. It became extremely difficult for ADBN 
staff to visit the field, as the insurgents were very negative towards ADBN loans 
and had damaged several branches of the ADBN destroying documents. Many 
farmers were unable to invest money loaned due to loss of their business. Big 
farmers and entrepreneurs were not ready to take the risk of investing in agriculture 
due to insecurity. In some cases farmers did not even draw down after the approval 
of the loan from the bank (Upreti 2005c).
The CPN (M) recognised the importance of agricultural development in their 75 
point Common Minimum Policy and Programme. The 31st point states, “…Special 
attention shall be paid on the development of agricultural industries and proper 
arrangement shall be made for agricultural market”. However, what they say (or write) 
and what they do are often different. The office buildings for agriculture and forestry 
(e.g., the Regional Agriculture Directorate in Biratnagar, Agriculture Development 
Office in Dhankuta, Forestry and Agriculture offices in Khotang, etc) were bombed 
by the insurgents. Several restrictive rules imposed by the Government directly hit 
farmers. For example, farmers needed a recommendation from the VDC Secretary 
to sell their rice, but there were no VDC secretaries available due to the conflict; 
the CPN (M) stopped the selling of timber by community forestry user groups; and 
communities/local people had to pay tax twice (to the Government and the CPN 
(M)) on the sale of non-timber forest products. 
Similarly, investment in water resource was severely disturbed due to the armed 
conflict. Investment in water resources for hydropower, irrigation, drinking water, 
recreation and industrial uses was limited because the political environment was 
not conducive. Water sources were also polluted by the war and normal water 
supply systems disturbed.
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2.3.9 Violation of human rights
Human rights abuses by the warring parties severely threatened the livelihood 
security of the Nepalese people as they were not able to freely engage in livelihood 
earning activities. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbor 
issued the following press statement highlighting the severe human right crisis during 
her visit to Nepal (23-26 January 2005): “I would warn the leaders of the insurgency 
not to misread development in the wider world or to believe that they can operate 
outside of the law.” A series of reports by Amnesty International (Nepal: Killing with 
Impunity 20 January 2005; Nepal: State of Emergency Deepening Human Rights 
Crisis, 1 February 2005 and Nepal: A Long Ignored Human Rights Crisis Now 
on the Brink of Catastrophe, 18 February 2005) highlighted the worsening human 
rights situation in Nepal. Similarly, Amnesty International in its statement of 19 
December 2004 stated:
The heightened threats occur as the international community reacts to the 
human rights situation with growing alarm. The UN Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) concluded a visit to Nepal on Tuesday 
having received more reports of disappearance cases than from any other 
country in the world. (Upreti 2005a, p 7)
The then Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan also repeatedly expressed his 
concern about the crisis in Nepal. His statement of 23 December 2004 issued by 
his office demonstrates his worries about the deteriorating situation in Nepal: 
The Secretary-General is deeply troubled by reports of an escalation of 
fighting in Nepal and of continued grave human rights violations. The conflict is 
undermining democracy and human rights and seriously hindering development 
activities. Reports that human rights defenders in Nepal face grave threats 
to their safety and security are very disturbing. The safety and ability of the 
National Human Rights Commission and all human rights activists to carry out 
their essential work should be guaranteed. In that regard, the recent signing of 
a Memorandum of Understanding between His Majesty's Government of Nepal 
and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is a welcome step. 
The Secretary-General once again calls for an urgent cessation of fighting and 
the initiation of dialogue between the Government and the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist) with the participation of all political and civil forces. He stands 
ready to assist such a national effort. (Upreti 2005a, p 7)
The Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) while 
visiting Nepal said on 30 November 2004:
We are deeply concerned about the escalating and gross human rights 
abuses being committed by both sides of the conflict in Nepal. Addressing 
the breakdown of the rule of law cannot wait for a peace settlement. On the 
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contrary, urgent steps can and must be taken to protect non-combatants, halt 
the spiralling descent into lawlessness and build the confidence for a political 
process. (Upreti 2005a, p 7)
According to the reports of globally reputed organisations such as International 
Crisis Group and Amnesty International, the situation further worsened after the 
royal takeover of February 2005 (AI 2005a and 2005b; ICG 2005).
2.3.10 Displacement
Migration from rural areas to urban areas and from the hills to the Terai has been 
a general demographic phenomenon in Nepal for the last 40 years, particularly 
after the eradication of malaria in the Terai. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish 
between conflict-induced Internally Displaced People (IDP) and voluntary migration 
(in search of a better life). The prevalence of both types of migration in Nepal is 
high. In the past decade the rate of migration continuously increased. Economic 
migration often positively contributes to secure livelihoods (Thieme 2006); conflict 
induced internal displacement, on the other hand, has devastating effects on the 
livelihoods of displaced people. Conflict-induced internal displacement is one of the 
main forms of migration in Nepal (Pyakuryal et al. 2008). India is the destination 
for the largest number of migrants from Nepal, due to ease of accessibility (open 
border, similar religion, culture and language, relatives working there, and so forth). 
More information about conflict-induced displacement is discussed in Chapter 7.
2.3.11 Gender relations
Gender roles and gender relations in the villages have drastically changed in the 
areas most affected by the armed conflict (Upreti 2005). Because of displacement 
of men from the villages, the conventional roles of men and women have changed. 
For example, women have started to plough the fields in the absence of male 
family members, which was previously culturally forbidden. Women have also 
been starting to take on other functions performed by men such as participating 
in meetings and discussions, attending funerals and dealing with outsiders (e.g., 
security forces and insurgents). As well as changing the role of women, the conflict 
has increased the work burden of women as they now have to perform the tasks of 
their absent men folk, as well as their traditional roles
Several cultural restrictions have been forcefully changed by the CPN (M) in 
Maoist influenced areas. Women have been empowered and opportunities opened 
up for them. For example, during the conflict, women took decisions and other 
responsibilities in the absence of their husbands and other male family members. 
Women participating in the armed conflict as combatants in the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) discovered a new environment.
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Gender violence is another dimension of the armed conflict. During the conflict, 
there were increased incidences of rape by perpetrators from both the armed 
forces and the Maoists. Both sides used rape as a deliberate tactic to intimidate the 
opposing side (AI 2005a and 2005a). The Nepalese press has frequently reported 
that incidents of rape were increasing. Reports of Amnesty International and 
various national human rights organisations stated that rape and intimidation were 
common characteristics of the armed conflict in Nepal. Rape survivors experience 
serious psychological effects and feelings of insecurity, anger and revenge. They 
are also often blamed by their family and the society and treated as social outcasts 
by the community. There were also some reported cases in the Nepalese media 
of a connection between the spread of HIV/AIDS and the armed conflict as some 
female IDPs were directly or indirectly forced into the commercial sex industry 
(Upreti 2006). Men forced to migrate for work or due to the conflict brought the 
disease back to their villages, infecting their wives and other partners. There has 
been a high increase in the commercial sex sector in IDP influx areas such as 
Nepalgunj, Surkhet and Kathmandu. 
The number of single women and widows increased during the armed conflict. 
These women have difficulty in securing access to government compensation, 
basic rights and resources such as land and public services, etc. The subordination 
and exploitation of women is common during civil war. However, the situation in 
Nepal is exacerbated by cultural practices. If a women’s husband is killed by either 
warring party, she and her children can end up displaced because of insecurity 
and fear.
In Nepal, women were not just victims of the conflict, they also actively participated 
as combatants. In the Maoist PLA, approximately 30 to 35 per cent of the fighting 
forces were women. This showed both men and women in Nepal that women are 
equally capable of fighting and serving in the armed forces. As a consequence, the 
Nepal Army has started to recruit female soldier.
In agriculture and resource management sectors in the conflict affected areas 
farming systems were very much dependent upon women as their men left the 
villages to avoid the warring parties. Field research (Upreti 2005a) revealed that 
women were taking responsibility for both the household and agriculture including 
crop production, livestock and the marketing of agricultural products.
2.3.12 Trigger for reforms
In a strategic sense, the armed conflict exposed the fundamental causes of 
livelihood insecurity prevalent in Nepal for centuries, making these issues a topic 
of national debate. The armed conflict has forced the promotion of transparency 
and the minimisation of corruption in development activities at the local level. The 
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armed conflict has also increased the direct entitlement to land and assets of certain 
households and poor people in the Maoist stronghold areas (Onesto 2005). As 
discussed, gender roles in rural areas have also shifted, particularly since the CPN 
(M) vehemently opposed discrimination against, and the exploitation of, women. 
Thus, the conflict has helped to empower women, Dalits, ethnic groups and 
marginalised people in Nepal. Gambling and alcohol abuse has also decreased in 
Maoist controlled villages (Upreti 2006). Similarly, the exploitation of the poor and 
small farmers by village moneylenders has decreased in rural areas. All of these 
changes have contributed to addressing livelihood insecurity. The armed conflict 
has forced the Government to start some reform programmes on such as issues 
as the maximum landholding ceiling, women’s property rights, the regulation of the 
sale and consumption of liquor, and the formulation of anti-corruption legislation. 
Further, the CPN (M) introduced various community decision-making mechanisms 
to deal with land issues, domestic violence, alcoholism, polygamy, and so forth, 
which have given a voice to socially excluded people, the poor and rural women. 
The CPN (M) raised legitimate questions regarding the performance and benefit 
of development projects in terms of the volume of budget spent and the types of 
people who have benefited. These concerns have contributed at a strategic level to 
improving the livelihoods of poor and marginalised sections of society. 
2.4 Newly emerging sources of insecurity
In its transition towards an inclusive, federal democratic republic, Nepal is facing 
new challenges and threats to security and livelihoods. Even with a fully functional 
elected government, Nepal is still struggling with a weak law and order situation 
and increasing violence causing insecurity and livelihood stress. General strikes 
(bandhs), closures (even indefinite closures) and blockades are still routine, and 
even turn violent (burning vehicles, smashing or destroying public and private 
property, harassing travellers, etc.). Killing, bombing, kidnapping, looting and 
extortion continue. In addition, Nepal has experienced shortages of fuel (gasoline, 
kerosene, petrol) and power cuts of up to 16 hours a day. All of this has placed a 
burden on businesses (leading to the permanent closure of some businesses and 
factories), increased unemployment, and put pressure on daily wage earners who 
find it harder and harder to work. At the same time, rising commodity and food 
prices have increase the cost of living.
2.4.1 Ethnic movement
On the political front, the Terai region has become increasingly insecure and 
violent since the promulgation of the Interim Constitution. Some of the Madheshi3 
3  ‘Madheshi’ is a term used to describe the people from the Terai (or ‘Madhesh’), the plain region of Nepal.
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groups and political parties claim that their demands for ethnic autonomy (reflected 
in the slogan ‘One Madesh One Pradesh’) are not being met. The movement is 
both powerful and aggressive. The Madhesh uprising in January/February 2007 
(during which 27 people lost their lives) resulted in the amendment of the Interim 
Constitution 2007 to incorporate federalism and proportional representation, two 
of the main issues in the ethnic movement. It also succeeded in increasing the 
number of seats in Constituent Assembly allocated to the Terai from 43 per cent 
to 49 per cent. The regional parties have emerged as new political force in Nepal. 
The Madheshi movement regrettably turned out to be anti-Pahadi4 (although the 
Pahadi’s are not the only ones being targeted). Madheshi armed groups have been 
involved in kidnapping, extortion and killings (Hachhethu 2009). This lack of law 
and order in the Terai has brought about a new source of livelihood insecurity. 
Market disruption due to strikes and demonstrations, blockades preventing the 
transportation of goods from India and the Terai to urban centres in Nepal, and 
the closure of businesses and factories, some temporarily and others permanently, 
are common place as the different political actors promote their causes. All these 
factors have created livelihoods insecurity. 
2.4.2 Emergence of armed groups in the Terai
The security situation in the Terai is also severely affected by several small, armed 
groups that have emerged in the wake of the ethnic movement and are taking 
advantage of the extremely poor transitional security situation in the Terai. These 
groups include Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (led by Jwala Singh), Janatantrik 
Madesh Mukti Morcha (led by Goit), Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (led by Bisphot 
Singh), Madeshi Mukti Tiger, Terai Cobra; Python, Terai Baggi, Terai Army, Madeshi 
Virus Killers Party, Royal Defence Army, Gorkha Line Mukti Morcha, Liberation 
Tigers of Terai Ilem (LTTE) and the Kirat Workers Party (mainly in Udayapur and 
Khotang), and many more. There are more than 60 armed groups active in Nepal. 
Most of them have no political aim, but are encouraged by being reported in the 
media and perhaps by the Maoist access to power by use of violence to extort 
resources and to be popular leaders. There are only five or six armed groups 
with political aims and an organisational structure. Their formal demands are 
mostly related to the recognition of their community’s/ethnic group’s interests and 
representation in state structures; however, some of these groups want autonomy 
or a separate state. The open border with India has greatly contributed to the 
organisation and expansion of several militant and fringe groups, most of whom 
have no political base, popular support, or clear organisational structure.
4  ‘Pahadi’ is a term used to describe the people from the hills, as opposed to the people from the Terai.
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2.4.3 Criminal groups
There are also many criminal groups active in the Terai, based both in India and 
Nepal. Chhotelal Sahani, Sanju Baba, Raju Singh Rathor and the Munna Singh 
Groups are a few of the many groups mainly operating from India). This is creating 
severe insecurity and obstructing the normal livelihood activities of people. The 
open border between India and Nepal is becoming a haven for illegal arms traders 
and smugglers. The phenomena of criminal-led insecurity, such as the kidnapping 
of children, murder and attempted murder, robbery, the illegal trafficking of arms 
and ammunitions, human trafficking, drug trafficking, massacres, and forced 
displacement are continuing (Upreti 2009).
2.4.4 Militant arms of political parties
A new security dilemma is emerging as the main political parties are organising 
their youth as fighting forces against each other. Violent clashes between workers 
of different political parties are frequent. All the major political parties have created 
coercive sister youth organisations such as the Young Communist League (YCL) 
by CPN (M) (the largest party), Youth Force (YF) by the CPN (UML) (third largest 
party), Madesh Rakshya Bahini by Nepal the Sadbhavana Party, Madeshi Youth 
Force by Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (fourth largest party). These organisations 
are operating without any legal mandate, reinforcing the ‘might is right’ culture that 
was prevalent during the worst of the Maoist insurgency, and are consequently 
creating enormous insecurity and fear all over Nepal. The Police Force is stretched, 
politicised and demoralised and consequently not able to act against the unlawful 
actions of these groups.
2.5 Changing political context
Nepal is now undergoing an historic transition from a feudal, centralist, autocratic 
and exclusionary state, to an inclusive, federal democratic republic. The popular 
uprising of April 2006 (Jana Andolan II) toppled the monarchy and led to the signing 
of the Comprehensive Pease Agreement in November 2006 and the election of the 
Constituent Assembly charged with the task of writing a new constitution for Nepal. 
While this is being done, the Nepal Army has been confined to its barracks and the 
PLA in cantonments. 
The CPN (M) emerged as the largest political party in the Constituent Assembly 
Election held on 10 April 2008 and led the coalition government for nine months 
(September 2008 to mid-May 2009). At the time of writing, the ideologue of the 
CPN (M), Baburam Bhattarai, Finance Minister while presenting the country's 
budget for the fiscal year 2008/09 in the Legislature Parliament on 19 September 
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2008, identified some major challenges for the development of Nepal: (i) 
underdevelopment and absolute poverty; (ii) the stagnation of the agriculture 
sector, (iii) widespread unemployment and semi-unemployment; (iv) inequality and 
discrimination, (v) inadequacy of physical infrastructure, (vi) economic dependency, 
(vii) the deteriorating quality of public education and educational discrimination, 
(viii) corruption and (ix) very weak service delivery. These problems are widely 
cited to be the root causes of the armed conflict and livelihood insecurity of poor 
people of Nepal. Regarding underdevelopment and extreme poverty, the Finance 
Minister wrote:
Alarming figures of extremely low per capita income and more than half of 
population living below absolute poverty line present an awful image of the 
overall economic condition. Average growth rate of 2 per cent during the period 
of last fifty years clearly reveals that there is structural bottleneck in the economy. 
Therefore, breaking the vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment 
through rapid economic growth along with its equitable distribution is the major 
economic challenge of the day. (MoF 2008)
Identifying the problem is said to be half of the solution. Now it is up to the Government 
of Nepal to address this issue. In Nepal, challenges related to underdevelopment 
and poverty are well identified. The problem is lack of commitment, capacity and 
sincere efforts to address these issues. Similarly, the Government assessment of 
the stagnation of the agriculture sector is:
Despite agriculture sector being a source of employment for about 68 per cent 
of manpower, its contribution to Gross Domestic Product is only 32 per cent. 
Poverty is rampant among those engaged in agriculture because the per capita 
productivity is the lowest one. Our goal of rapid economic growth and poverty 
alleviation can never be achieved until we succeed to increase productivity of 
agriculture sector and shift the excess manpower from agriculture to the other 
sectors of economy by way of creating opportunities for gainful employment. 
Overall transformation of agriculture sector cannot take place without breaking 
the century-long feudal production relations rooted in the sector. Because of the 
feudal-based production relations, where peasants cultivating the lands do not 
have their ownership and those owning the land do not cultivate, productivity 
of agriculture is always low creating adverse impact on the economic growth. 
(MoF 2008) 
This is not an easy task for the Government, particularly with the deep tension 
between the major political parties over land related issues. Breaking the feudal 
relations of production means challenging the status quo, which is reinforced 
by most of the senior leaders of all the major political parties, as most of them 
come from either a feudal socio-economic background or from that mindset. The 
Maoist led government’s assessment of the situation of unemployment and semi-
unemployment was:
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Unfortunately, our youth force is unemployed within our own country and are 
compelled to engage in painful foreign employment. Brain drain of educated 
and trained manpower is increasing. It has become a major challenge to 
create employment opportunity within the country for those youths who are 
marginalized from the mainstream of development, and make them participate 
in the process of building new Nepal. (MoF 2008) 
Addressing widespread semi-unemployment and disguised unemployment 
requires a holistic approach to development, and the institutional arrangements 
and procedural provisions are complicated. This presents serious problems in 
tackling unemployment, disguised employment and underemployment. Until there 
is a national consensus on addressing the root causes of the conflict, which is 
highly unlikely, achieving livelihood security and economic prosperity and social 
stability will be extremely difficult. 
When the citizens of Nepal are engaged in democratic practices and when the 
state protects the human rights of its citizens, ensures social justice and promotes 
equity, livelihood security will improve. For that, economic development, political 
stability, lasting peace and inclusive democratic practices are required. The new 
constitution, to be framed by the 601 members of the Constituent Assembly, will 
hopefully ensure these conditions. The start is promising: the Constituent Assembly 
is the most diverse legislature in the history of Nepal, with as the 191 women and 
49 Dalits, and numerous other previously marginalised and excluded groups finding 
representation. For the first time a broad cross-section of Nepal will be involved 
in writing a constitution to represent all of their interests. The livelihoods of the 
Nepalese people will be secure in the future if the new constitution: (i) ensures the 
participation of all members of society in decision making (ii) deals with some of 
the structural causes of poverty in Nepal, and (iii) addresses social discrimination. 
In addition, the state must provide a conducive policy framework and responsive 
institutional arrangements to ensure equity and livelihood security, and sincerely 
implement these mechanisms in the new Nepal. 
Regrettably, the political environment seriously deteriorated in April and May 
2009. The political parties, deeply entangled in their vested political interests and 
personal egos, have put aside the important components of a successful peace 
process such as constitution making, addressing PLA issues, restructuring of the 
state and delivering peace dividends. The termination of chief of the Nepal Army by 
the Government resulted in the collapse of the coalition government led by UCPN 
(M) and a deep political divide and mistrust. The ousting of the UCPN (M) from 
the Government raised serious concerns among the Nepalese people about the 
potential for future conflict. Although, the senior leaders of the CPN (UML) are well 
known to be moderate politicians, and one of the few important players in the past 
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peace process, Mr Madhav Nepal, was elected as Prime Minister with the support 
of 22 out of 24 political parties present in the parliament, the challenges ahead for 
him are serious given the seriously deteriorated relationship between the UCPN 
(M) and the CPN (UML).5
2.6 Conclusions
Livelihood security cannot be achieved without addressing the problems of 
poverty, structural inequality, political and social exclusion, discrimination, and bad 
governance. The political change of 2006 paved the way for a federal democratic 
republic, but it also brought with it enormous challenges. The changed political 
context has provided a broader framework for change, but structurally embedded, 
pervasive socio-cultural and economic discrimination and inequality on the basis of 
caste, ethnicity and gender are still obstructing factors that must be overcome. 
The livelihood basis and options of poor and marginalised people were severely 
affected during the decade of conflict in Nepal. State funds were diverted away 
from development to fight the insurgency. Damage to property and infrastructure 
during the armed conflict is estimated at 5 billion rupees, of which 3.8 billion 
rupees is required to reconstruct. Health, education, transport and markets were 
all severely disrupted. Food security in Nepal hit an all time low, with 60.2 per 
cent of households experiencing food insufficiency. The conflict also negatively 
affected agriculture processing and distribution systems, as well as investment in 
water resources. The serious violations of human rights committed by both the 
security forces and the insurgents created a culture of fear in which people were 
not able to freely engage in their usual livelihood activities. Conflict-induced internal 
displacement further disrupted livelihoods and left many villages without a male 
workforce. All of these factors severely disrupted livelihood security in Nepal. 
Supporting people to achieve livelihood security should be a priority of the new 
5  The UCPN (M) blame the CPN (UML) for the collapse of the UCPN (M) led coalition government as the CPN (UML) 
was second largest coalition partner. The UCPN (M) led government had a series of disputes with the Chief of Nepal 
Army (such as denial of entry of Defence Minister into one of Nepal Army Barracks in Chitwan, recruitment of Nepal 
Army personnel despite the disapproval of UNMIN and the coalition government, opposition of the discontinuation 
of Nepal Army Generals after their retirement, withdrawn of Nepal Army players from the national games due to 
participation by the PLA, resistance of Nepal Army Chief to the integration of PLA into the Nepal Army, submission of 
a complete draft of the constitution by Nepal Army Chief to National Interests Protection Committee of CA containing 
some provisions that contradict political agreements, labelling the CPA simply as a political document and not legally 
binding, and so forth etc.). Hence, the UCPN (M) wanted to remove the Chief of Nepal Army from his post and 
sought approval from the main coalition partner CPN (UML), whose general secretary gave the go ahead before 
visiting China in late April 2009. But once the Government issued the termination letter to the Army Chief, the CPN 
(UML) withdrew from the coalition government and coordinated all other political parties to oppose the decision. 
They requested the President to keep the Army Chief in the post against the decision of the Government. Hence, the 
President issued a letter at midnight asking the Army Chief to continue in his position. Consequently, the UCPN (M) 
resigned from government.
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government. The government should give priority to addressing the structural 
causes of the conflict (exclusion, discrimination and unequal distribution of 
resources). Changing existing power relations is an important structural means 
of enhancing the access of poor and marginalised people to alternate livelihood 
opportunities. Similarly, development strategies should consider the need to create 
livelihood security, which will also help to address the structural causes of the 
conflict, and strengthening peace and security.
A critical examination of the overall impacts of development programmes (Pandey 
1999; Shrestha 1997; Upreti 2004a) raises the fundamental question as to why 
development has failed to address poverty and social exclusion in Nepal, the 
major structural causes of the conflict. The question directly points towards the 
performance of the government, the governing system and the development 
administration (proximate causes). The effective implementation of the Tenth 
Five Year Plan was severely affected during the period of the escalated conflict 
(2002–2006) and by malgovernance within the development administration of 
Nepal. Rural-urban inequalities, internal displacement and migration, the diversion 
of funds by the government to security and the fragile state of the private sector 
have held Nepal’s development back and are jeopardising Nepal’s prospects of 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.
The people of Nepal lost trust in the political change of 1990 because of broken 
promises and failed delivery. They harbour a deep mistrust toward the Government 
and political parties because of their poor performance and many failures. Hence, 
the politicians and ruling elite that emerged after the political change of 2006 have 
to learn a lesson from the past. Many of the challenges faced by Nepal today are 
the product of the inherent weaknesses of the governing systems, social exclusion, 
the lack of public engagement in governance practices and failure to recognise 
pluralism in Nepali society. These issues need through consideration. 
The main political actors and the government are still able to offer the Nepalese 
people a realistic hope of attaining a decent standard living. The poorest groups 
are entrenched in a deprivation trap – a cycle of social exclusion and poverty. This 
needs to be addressed or it will sow the seeds for future discontent and instability. 
Livelihood security is essential to lasting peace. 
To ensure the livelihood security of the Nepalese people requires a radical shift in 
current thinking and practices. The principle of inclusiveness must be applied by civil 
society, political actors and other segments of society. A culture of tolerance, respect 
for diversity, inclusiveness and reconciliation must be incorporated into governance 
principles and practices. The root causes of conflict such as poverty, social and 
political exclusion and the marginalisation of ethnic minorities, discrimination, 
unequal access to resources, and bad governance need to be properly addressed 
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to create lasting peace in Nepal. It is essential for all political and social actors to 
change their perceptions, shed stereotypes and promote tolerance and embrace 
inclusiveness. In essence, the current conflict should be used as an opportunity to 
broaden political and social reforms in Nepal. The armed conflict undoubtedly had 
many negative impacts, but it also contributed positively to altering the unequal 
social relations in Nepalese society. These gains must be consolidated, and Nepal 
must move forward to create a society in which all of its citizens can prosper and 
live in dignity.
Although Nepal has experience armed conflict for the past ten years (and suffered 
the causes of the conflict for a lot longer), there is a ray of hope emerging. After 
the defeat of the autocratic regime by the people’s movement of April 2006, the 
new government and the Constituent Assembly are entering into serious political 
negotiations for the restructuring of the state and the establishment of an inclusive 
federal democratic republic. If the negotiations are successful, this nation will be 
transformed into an inclusive modern Nepal, where all citizens are represented. A 
Nepal where everyone has an equal right to dream, work and prosper.
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Natural resources governance 
and livelihoods in Nepal: Political 
economy and political ecology 
perspectives1
Netra  Prasad  Timsina
Abstract
In this chapter, the ‘political economy’ and ‘political ecology’ are used as conceptual 
frameworks for analysing the livelihoods of people who depend on natural resources 
in Nepal. The political economy takes into account the power structure of the society 
including the social relations in production and distribution. The political ecology 
accommodates ecological considerations, referring to the relationship between 
nature and society. This chapter combines these two concepts in analysing 
resource policies and, in particular, access to and control over natural resources for 
livelihoods. Land and forests are the most important natural resources in Nepal. The 
state has direct control over these resources through various policies, legislation and 
institutions. Although the Government has introduced participatory approaches in 
managing natural resources, particularly in the management of forestry resources, 
the outcomes have been variable depending upon the level of autonomy given to 
the local people. Forests, as common property resources, are easier to manage 
using a participatory approach than land. Nevertheless, even when forests are 
managed by communities, the interests of local elites and bureaucratic classes 
and existing policies and institutions continue to marginalise the natural resource 
dependent poor. Overcoming inequity in the distribution of resources is essential to 
ensure people’s livelihoods. This requires a complete transformation of the natural 
resource sector to infuse inclusive democracy into the processes and institutions 
related to natural resource management.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at natural resource governance and livelihoods in Nepal from 
the theoretical perspectives of the political economy and the political ecology. The 
political economy encompasses the power structure in society, which determines 
the institutions and policies that frame the allocation of access to and control over 
resources. The political ecology refers to the relationship between society and 
1 The author thanks Dr Bharat Kumar Pokharel for his valuable comments, Prof Dr Ulrike Müller-Böker for cordial 
comments, Dr Bishnu Raj Upreti for the constant feedback, and all the reviewers for their help in reaching the final 
draft.
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nature, and is considered here as an extension of the political economy in order to 
accommodate ecological considerations.
This chapter examines the political economic history of natural resource management 
(NRM) in Nepal, particularly of forest resources and, to some extent, of land 
resources, and analyses resource ownership, use and management over time. It 
also outlines how the Government maintains control over valuable forests such as 
the Terai forests. It is argued that conservation and elitist discourses sideline the 
needs and priorities of people in the name of participatory resource management. 
It is asserted that policies and institutions for natural resource management need 
a complete transformation, as existing institutions do not ensure the rights of 
people over natural resources. This chapter also recommends an organised social 
movement for a complete transformation of the institutions and policies in favour of 
the poor and marginalised sections of society.
The information in this chapter is primarily based on secondary data and a literature 
review. The author also draws on his several years' research experience in the field 
of natural resource management in Nepal. This is supplemented by observations 
gathered in interactions with a number of people involved in advocating for people's 
rights in relation to natural resources.
3.2 Political economy and political ecology
The concept of the political economy looks at two closely related questions: how 
politics determines economic aspects and how economic institutions determine 
political processes (Staniland 1985). Theoretically, the political economy begins 
only when someone's access to resources and the means of production are 
affected. It begins with the production system, which is based on the social 
division of labour and regulated by rules and regulations external to the will and 
consciousness of the individuals concerned. The production system in a definitive 
historical period and, under a certain set of conditions, determines the mode of 
distribution, thereby shaping the specific structure of a society. The issue of land 
distribution in Nepal is being debated to reduce class antagonism by giving a large 
proportion of people access to directly engage in small-scale agricultural production. 
Large-scale agriculture, such as in the large tea estates in Northern India, can lead 
to class antagonism as the elite class controls resources and receives most of 
the benefits/profits, while the working class provides the labour. With differences 
in the distribution of resources, class differences emerge in society between the 
privileged and the underprivileged, the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’, the exploiter and 
the exploited, and the ruler and the ruled (Engels 1880). The relations of production 
directly influence the use and management of resources, such as forests, in a 
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society. It is, therefore, important to understand the different production systems 
determining people’s relationships in a society. In this sense, production systems 
may serve as an entry point for understanding disparities within a society. Society 
has never been the mere sum of individual acts, but rather a totality of interacting 
individuals, facing one another in various relationships. Modern society did not 
emerge from a series of simple human relations among individuals, but instead 
arose out of an array of historically specific social and economic relations, such as 
those of capitalists to workers and landlords to tenants (Rodolfo 1975).
Individuals in society are embedded in particular class relations, with their own 
class interests. The determinants of class depend on the relations of production, 
which relates directly to the social division of labour and the political ideological 
superstructure. If capitalists and workers are defined by their position in production 
relation, the capitalists, as the owner of resources, exercise a definite power over 
the workers. Although Marx (1977) explained this phenomenon in relation to the 
industrialised 19th Century, it is equally applicable today in developing countries, as 
local elites/landlords exercise power over poor and marginalised people. The elites/
landlords become the ruling class in which ‘class’ is used as an economic term and 
‘rulers’ as a political one. The phrase ‘ruling class’ thus contains the theory that an 
economic class rules politically (Bottomore 1993).
However, Marx (1977) explains that the given social relations can be changed by a 
militant class, which is conscious of its historic vocation and deliberately acts upon 
it. According to Marx, freedom for an individual must be achieved; his/her feeling of 
dignity, which transforms the society, must be respected. This dignity and freedom 
is achieved through widespread class-consciousness among the oppressed, which 
threatens the ruling class. In the case of Nepal, it is more relevant to understand 
the Maoist movement as an example of a class struggle. However, as Scott (1976; 
1985) argues, a social relationship is not only determined by material conditions, 
it is also the product of the ideology of a group in society. This explanation applies 
to Nepalese rural society, which has hierarchies in a chain of relationships and an 
exploitative structure. The elite represent the formal power structure at different 
levels. There are the political elite, the politically elected representatives and the 
top civil servants. Social elites are those who control non-political organisations 
like businesses, professions and so forth. All the elites (politicians, bureaucrats, 
administrators, business people and landlords, etc.) whether local or national, 
share certain common ideologies and political positions, values and perspectives 
(Gough 1979).
However, the conventional concept of the political economy is criticised for being 
limited to economic reductionism. To avoid such a limitation, the political ecology 
approach emerges to internalise the sensitivity of the diverse socio-political forces 
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and their relationship to environmental change (Bryant & Bailey 1997; Graner 
1997). The political ecology can be understood as an extension of the political 
economy, which accommodates ecological considerations. Blaikie and Brookfield 
(1987) define the political ecology as follows:
The phrase 'political ecology' combines the concern of ecology and a broadly 
defined political economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting 
dialectics between society and land based resources, and also within classes and 
groups within society. (p 17) 
Moreover, Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997) explain the concept of political ecology 
along the same lines as Blaikie and Brookfield that the political ecology deals 
with the relationship between society and nature and also with various socio-
economic groups within society. Neumann (1992) takes land users and their social 
relationships in the context of a broader spatial setting and historical perspective as 
the main subject matter of the political ecology. The political ecology focuses on the 
political causes of environmental change and the struggle for access to, and control 
over, environmental resources (Paudel 2005). The idea of a politicised environment 
conceives the environment as the subject of intense struggle between different 
social actors in their efforts to meet their own interests (Ibid). Accordingly, Harvey 
(1993, p 25) says "all ecological projects (and arguments) are simultaneously 
political economic projects (and arguments) and vice versa".
3.3 Political economic history of natural resource management in 
Nepal
In Nepal, many people rely on natural resources for their livelihood. Land, forest 
and water are the major natural resources on which the majority of Nepali people 
depend. The following statement made by a farmer from Chitwan district to a 
researcher reflects the needs of a typical farmer in Nepal: 
My land should be near a natural source of water, so that I can irrigate my 
rice fields. A bit of Sarhad (dry field) should also be available to plant mustard 
on. My land should be close to the forest, so that my cattle can graze there. I 
would like to be allowed to get everything I need from the forest, wood, grass, 
and reeds, fruits and vegetables. When I am not working in the fields, I would 
like to go fishing, so streams and rivers should also be close by. (Müller-Böker 
1999, p 91)
Until the 1950s, land and forest resources in Nepal, the major means of production 
and livelihood, were controlled by the ruling classes (Regmi 1978a; Malla 2001; 
Upreti 2004). Generally, the rulers granted land to the people who supported them 
in their campaigns for state expansion. Land was granted mostly by patronage to 
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family members and local elites in the form of Birta (Regmi 1978a; 1976). In this 
way the ruling classes maintained control over resources located in distant places. 
Although the system of Birta existed before the Rana period, the control over forest 
resources by the Ranas accelerated in two ways. One, they gave land in the form 
of Birta to their own family members, patrons or relatives of the ruling classes. 
Two, the ruling classes received a significant amount of income from the export of 
timber from the Birta land to India (Regmi 1978a). The Ranas were excited by the 
handful of income received from forest products and promoted the slogan "Hariyo 
ban Nepalko dhan" (green forest, Nepal's wealth), a saying originally introduced 
by Prithivi Narayan Shah. However, the ordinary people rarely benefited from this 
notion of forest wealth. There were separate rules and regulations for the use 
forests by the general public, and Birta land was exempt from these rules (Mahat 
et al. 1986).
Other forms of land tenure in Nepal include Jagir and Kipat, which are also the 
product of the political and economic situation of the period (Regmi 1978a 1976). 
Land given to soldiers and government officials for their services and loyalty were 
called Jagir. The Jagir system, which was inherited from the previous Gorkhali 
rulers, was established due to a shortage of cash to pay lower ranking soldiers. The 
Rana rulers retained the Jagir system to make the Nepalese Army as attractive as 
the British Gurkha regiment, especially to lower ranks (Mahat et al. 1986). The Kipat 
system represented a communal form of land tenure. A tribe, village, community or 
family held land with individuals having defined rights of use (Regmi 1978a).
Among the land tenure systems, Birta was the most prominent from the time of 
1HSDO¶VXQL¿FDWLRQE\3ULWKLYL1DUD\DQ6KDKLQWRWKHHQGRI5DQDSHULRGLQ
the 1950s. According to Regmi (1978b):
Oligarchic regimes, such as those that governed Nepal prior to 1950, have 
always depended on a select class for the sustenance and continuance of 
the authority. Birta land grants to members of such classes ensured a regular 
stable income for them and thus left them free to indulge in war or politics in 
the interest of rulers.
Under the Birta system, different forest management systems were in operation, 
among them, the Talukdari system and, in the eastern hills, the Kipat system. 
Talukdars were local functionaries of state and were responsible for revenue 
collection for the state. Most often, local landlords were appointed as Talukdars. 
Under the Kipat system, Jimmawals (local headmen) were recognised as tax 
collectors and were also responsible for forest resource management (Hobley & 
Malla 1996). Although, there was some sort of a two-way relationship between 
the people and the state functionaries, the latter exercised state power over the 
people as they were appointed politically by the state (Regmi 1978b). Most of 
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the forests in Nepal were used under the Birta tenure system, before and during 
the Rana period, to maintain the loyalty of local allies to the Shah dynasty. This 
practice continued until the 1950s. In 1957, forests were nationalised with a view 
to putting an end to elite control of vital resources. However, after the dismissal of 
the elected government in 1960 and the introduction of the partyless Panchayat 
system, stringent regulations were enforced to protect forests from people who 
were thought of as enemies by the Panchayat elites and forest bureaucrats (Ojha 
et al. 2005).
During the Rana period, the Nepali timber market was expanded up to India. The 
Government encouraged the clearing of Terai forest for infrastructure development. 
Major deforestation of the Terai forest took place during the construction of the 
Koshi and Gandaki barrages, and the Sunauli highway, almost halving Nepal’s 
Terai forest area. Terai forest destruction accelerated when the then King Mahendra 
decided to construct the East-West highway from the bottom of the Chure hills. At 
the same time, in 1963, King Mahendra invited non-resident Nepalese to settle on 
cleared Terai forestland. He also encouraged landless mountain people to resettle 
in the Terai by clearing the dense forest. Forest technocrats used landless people 
to clear the forest to earn money. Landlords competed to capture the fertile lands 
of the Terai by clearing the forests (Karki 2001).
In 1977, then Prime Minister, Kirtinidhi Bista, decided to clear the Sissau forest 
of Kapilbastu to sell to the Indian match industry, with a view to acquiring Indian 
currency. In 1979, when Surya Bahadur Thapa became Prime Minister, he invited 
the forest contractors to clear the forest (Nepal Weekly 2005). The money collected 
was used to defeat the multiparty democratic system and replace it with the 
partyless Panchayat system in a referendum held in 1980. At that time, government 
supporters could do whatever they liked to the forest if they committed themselves 
to vote against democracy. As an extra incentive, voters were also resettled inside 
the Terai forests.
In 1964, The Panchayat regime enacted the Land Reform Act with the stated 
objective to increase agricultural productivity through the distribution of land to 
the peasants who cultivated it. However, the cultivators, agricultural labourers and 
landless people did not benefit from this initiative. Instead, the ruling class and 
landlords legalised holdings of land that were above the legal land ceiling (maximum 
area of land that could be held by one family) set by the Act by registering the land 
in the name of their family members. Bribery and corruption in land transactions 
were rampant, and many landless and small farmers were provided with fake land 
certificates (Karki 2001; Upreti 2001).
As land is the principal economic resource for all categories of people, the elite and 
powerful captured most of the land and many poor peasants became landless. The 
Natural resources governance and livelihoods in Nepal
55
Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal
political elites and the land owning classes continued to control the land in the same 
way as they did before the 1950s. These classes included ministers, members of 
parliament, high-ranking bureaucrats, as well as members of the army and the 
police. A significant area of arable land was (and still is) controlled by the members 
of the Royal family and the Ranas, the then rulers of Nepal. This became evident 
when the Ministry of Land Reform and Management made public the area of land 
registered in the name of Royal family (Kantipur Daily, 4 August 2006). These 
classes are usually absentee landlords. They do not live in the villages where their 
lands are situated, but extract the income from the land. Most of the cultivators, on 
the other hand, are landless and property-less, but are fully integrated within the 
wider economy and are important to labour relations in the village closest to their 
settlement (Ghimire 1998).
Dalits and some ethnic nationalities have been deprived of land ownership 
since the formation of modern Nepal. The struggle for land rights by landless 
peasants has increased over time, particularly since the 1950s. From time to time 
governments have brought in land reform programmes as a response to the land 
rights struggle. Since 1976 (and even after 1990), governments have consistently 
formed landless resettlement committees with the stated objective to solve the 
problem of landlessness. However, all these attempts have remained in rhetoric 
only. In practice, the land settlement and reform processes in Nepal, then and now, 
have served only to safeguard the economic and political interests of the ruling 
class, politicians and bureaucrats (Upreti 2004). This is a prominent area of class 
struggle in Nepal. Because the political elite formed the dominant segment of the 
landowning elite, the implementation of land reform policies and programmes was 
determined by the landowning members of the aristocracy and bureaucracy.
3.4 Participatory forestry in Nepal
The changes in the policies and programmes for forest resources over time 
have been slightly different than those concerning land, as forest resources are 
considered common property and also have a direct environmental significance. 
The 1970s were a ‘push decade’ for community forestry (CF) in Nepal from the 
point of view that external agencies were interested in being involved in the forestry 
sector as a strategy for environmental conservation (Hobley & Malla 1996; Graner 
1997). 
Worldwide, donor agencies started to pressure national governments to change 
their development and natural resource policies. As the environmental agenda 
became a prominent issue in the 1970s, external donors, alarmed by the perceived 
environmental degradation in the Himalayan region (Eckholm 1976), insisted 
that Nepal was among the most affected countries. Concurrently, a community-
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oriented group of foresters promoted the idea of working with local people in forest 
management. In 1976, a National Forestry Plan was formulated, which made 
provision for the allocation of some forestland to village Panchayats. Under the 
plan, full power was given to the then Divisional Forest Officers (DFOs) to formalise 
the transfer of nationalised forestland to individual village Panchayats (Hobley & 
Malla 1996). Hence, the initiation of community forestry in Nepal was the product of 
both national and international efforts in this field.
Based on the National Forestry Plan, in 1978, Rules and Regulations were 
promulgated to manage local forests in the form of Panchayat Forests (PFs) 
and Panchayat Protected Forests (PPFs). Between 1978 and 1990, forestry 
development work in the hills had been strongly influenced by these Regulations, 
and much of the Government’s and aid agencies’ efforts have focused on the 
creation of PFs and PPFs (Gilmour & Fisher 1991).
The 1980s were a period of experimentation with different participatory forestry 
practices. The Government declared a forest sector policy for the first time in its 
Sixth Five Year Plan (1981–1985), emphasising the need for active community 
participation in the management, conservation and utilisation of forest resources 
(NPC 1985; NPC 1992).
The diverse experiences in community forestry led to the development of a 20-
year Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS) in 1988. The MPFS formed the 
basis for forest policy and clearly articulated meeting local people’s basic forest 
product needs through community forestry. The Forest Act 1993 identified six 
major forest management regimes, according to management responsibility. They 
are community forest, government managed forest, protected forest, leasehold 
forest, religious forest and private forest.
Community forestry in Nepal has been the ‘mother programme’ of all other 
participatory forest resource management programmes. In 2006, 20 per cent of 
the country's forest was under community forestry, with almost 35 per cent of the 
country's population participating in CF. Even though the donors supported CF as 
a programme of the government, it has been institutionalised at the community 
level and is one of the most successful community development programmes in 
Nepal (Ojha et al. 2005). CF established the rights of communities over forest 
resources. Many other programmes have adapted learning from the community 
forestry programme. Some of the lessons derived from the community forestry 
programme include:
x If communities are granted full power and authority over resource 
management, both the objectives of conservation and livelihoods can 
be achieved. 
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x CF encourages dialogue between the policy level and the practice 
level, which has allowed a number of innovations in forest resource 
management. 
x CF has been a platform for the development of a critical civil society 
in Nepal, which has constantly advocated for decentralisation, 
devolution and people's rights in forest resource management.
Other forest management approaches have also been implemented in Nepal, 
and some have been in place for nearly two decades. These include leasehold 
forestry, buffer zone management, conservation area management, watershed 
management and collaborative forest management, all of which come within the 
larger framework of participatory forestry.
Leasehold forestry aims at supporting the poorest of the poor and has been the 
focus of national policies and programmes for poverty alleviation. Under this 
approach, the management of degraded land is handed over to a group of poor 
people for income generation from forestry activities. However, the programme 
does not appear to have benefited the poor. The programme has proved to be 
impractical in supporting the livelihoods of people.
The buffer zone management approach allows people who live around the national 
park to access forest resources, particularly grasses and reeds, from a ‘buffer zone’ 
around the park. However, the buffer zone management approach has also been 
criticised for not being participatory and accessible to people, particularly the poor 
(Paudel 2005; Soliva et al. 2003; Budhathoki 2003).
The conservation area management approach is being implemented in Nepal 
within certain protected areas and a number of community development activities, 
including conservation, have been carried out. This approach was first adopted 
in 1985 with the Annapurna Conservation Area Project (ACAP), which has had a 
mixed impact. Although ACAP has had a positive impact in promoting community 
development and conservation activities, it has been criticised for not addressing 
the livelihoods needs of poor people in the area.
Watershed management is an integrated development approach that looks at the 
landscape as a whole. The approach was first implemented in Nepal in the mid-
1970s and aims to increase the ecological and economic benefits to the people. 
The impact of this approach is yet to be assessed.
Collaborative forest management is currently being implemented in the Terai region 
of Nepal. The approach is modelled on the Indian Joint Forestry Management 
approach, and, although it is a participatory approach, it is not compatible with the 
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long running and highly successful community forestry programme. Under CF, the 
community has autonomy over the management of forest resources, and benefits 
are channelled back into the community. In contrast, under collaborative forestry 
management, the government bureaucracy controls the forest management 
committee and 75 per cent of any revenue generated goes to the government. 
Leasehold forestry, buffer zone management, protected area management and 
collaborative forest management are discussed and compared with community 
forestry in the following sections. 
3.5 Competition between community forestry and other programmes: 
Issues of power and authority
As discussed above, various natural resource management approaches have been 
implemented in Nepal including leasehold forestry, collaborative forest management, 
buffer zone management and protected area management. Unfortunately, some of 
these approaches compete with community forestry. These approaches will now 
be compared with community forestry.
Although the rationale behind leasehold forestry is to enhance the livelihoods of the 
poor, the poor appear to have limited access to productive resources, including land 
and forests, under the approach (Thomas et al. 2003). Under community forestry, 
land is handed over to communities for an indefinite time period, ensuring their 
autonomy. Whereas under leasehold forestry, the community has limited autonomy 
as leasehold forests are handed over only for up to 40 years. Although the focus 
of leasehold forestry is on the poor, the way that it is structured and the actors 
involved make it unlikely to improve local people’s livelihoods. In many cases, CF 
is in competition with leasehold forestry. 
While the community forestry process has recognised CFUGs as autonomous 
institutions for local forest management, under buffer zone management, the 
buffer zone council has no autonomous decision making power. The park warden 
has the sole control over the buffer zone council. Centralised power and authority 
lies with the warden in the name of conservation, not with the community. Hence, 
the warden has the right to control land use within the buffer zone (Paudel 2005; 
Dhakal 2004; Soliva et al. 2003; Sharma & Shaw 1993).
Under protected area management, there is a provision to invest 30 to 50 per cent 
of park income in local development activities. However, the poor do not benefit 
from this provision as local elites have captured the benefits and used them to fulfil 
their political and economic interests. Nitya Nanda Khanal, a researcher of buffer 
zones, quotes a forest user, “Wild animals destroy our crops and harm us, but the 
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development activities have been implemented somewhere else” (cited in Ojha 
et al. 2005). People have realised the economic value of conservation, but the 
process has yet to be made democratic and transparent. The park authority often 
denies people entry to the park to collect forest products, reducing their access to 
basic forest resources, which are essential for many poor people. This seriously 
affects the livelihoods of the local people (Budhathoki 2003; Heinen et al. 2000; 
Ghimire et al. 1997).
3.6 Terai forest management: Political and bureaucratic interests
Despite the progressive nature of the community forestry programme in Nepal, 
the national government and bureaucracy in Nepal have resisted the devolution of 
power and authority to communities for the management of Terai forest resources. 
So far, they have only agreed to hand over the hill forests, which are barren and 
degraded. When the Federation of Community Forest Users-Nepal (FECOFUN), 
a network of community forestry user groups (CFUGs) in Nepal, and some NGOs 
suggested the wider application of forest legislation to include Terai forests, the 
forest bureaucracy started to put constraints on the process of community forestry 
in Nepal.
Some donor agencies also have their own political interests in managing Terai 
forests. One such agency, Finish International Development Agency (FINIDA), 
initiated pilot projects in Bara and Parsa districts. FINIDA planned to hand over 
the Terai forest in Bara to a Finnish timber company, but their ill intention was 
exposed and vehement protests by FECOFUN and various NGOs resulted in the 
plan’s withdrawal by the Government. However, the Government has continued to 
make plans for Terai forest management without consulting users and civil society 
organisations such as FECOFUN and NGOs. A resource inventory was carried out 
in the Terai to develop an Operational Forest Management Plan (OFMP), including 
a plan for the conservation of Churia forest in mid-1990s by the Department of 
Forest. In fact the OFMP led to the development of Terai forest policy in 2000. The 
Terai Forest Policy it introduced the concept of collaborative forest management, 
a regressive milestone in the history of community forest resource management in 
Nepal.
Collaborative forest management was developed as a sector-wide programme 
to sideline community forestry. The institutional structure of the District Forest 
Coordination Committee (DFCC) developed under this programme is undemocratic 
and centralised, providing limited space for civil society organisations to influence 
the decision making process. The Government developed guidelines under the 
Terai Forest Policy without consulting other stakeholders and has not moved ahead 
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towards any tangible outcomes. This is evidenced by result as collaborative forest 
management seems to be not moving forwards in terms of participatory forest 
management in collaborative forest management. Recent confrontations over the 
proper management of the Terai, inner Terai and Churia forest are a result of the 
tension between community forestry, promoted by civil society organisations and 
communities, and collaborative forest management, imposed by the Government 
(Bhattarai 2006).
From time to time the Government has imposed a number of taxes with the intention 
of controlling the Terai forest. Table 3.1 gives an overview of these provisions.
Table 3.1 Government orders for tax/revenue collection
Date Government orders for tax collection Remarks
May 2000
The Council of Ministers decides to collect 
40% of the income from the sale of timber by 
CFUGs for commercial purposes.
FECOFUN challenges this 
decision in the Supreme Court.
March 2003 7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¿QGVWKDWWKHGovernment’s taxation of CFUGs is illegal.
0R)6&¿OHVDUHYLHZSHWLWLRQ
to the Supreme Court but the 
Supreme Court rejects it.
July 2003
The Government includes a provision in the 
Finance Ordinance to allow it to collect 40% 
of all income received by CFUGs.
FECOFUN, civil society and the 
donor community oppose this 
provision.
August 2003
The Government publishes a notice to 
collect 40% of the revenue only from the 
sale of timber to the non-users of particular 
community forest for commercial purposes.
FECOFUN, civil society and the 
donor community oppose this 
provision.
January 2004
The Government amends the Finance 
Ordinance and includes a provision to collect 
40% of the revenue from the sale of timber 
from two species, sal (Shorea robusta) and 
khair (Acacia catechu), and 10% from other 
species sold for commercial purposes to the 
non-users of particular forest.
FECOFUN and all stakeholders 
DUHQRWVDWLV¿HGZLWKWKLV
provision oppose it. CFUGs 
responding by not selling timber 
commercially.
July 2004
In the new Finance Ordinance, the 
Government inserts a provision that requires 
CFUGs in the Terai to deposit 15% of the 
revenue collected from the sale of two 
species of timber, sal (Shorea robusta) and 
khair (Acacia catechu) to the non-users of 
the particular CFUGs.
)(&2)81LVVWLOOQRWVDWLV¿HG
with this provision.
Source: Adapted from Bhattarai and Khanal (2005)
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3.7 Conservation and elitism: An example of aristocratic class 
interests
Although nature conservation has long-term benefits, it can create hardship for 
poor and marginalised people. Often, the economic and cultural rights/interests 
of people are ignored by national and international agencies working for nature 
conservation (Müller-Böker 1999). Conservation is an international discourse 
controlled by elite environmentalists. Environmental protection is considered a 
global issue. Environmentalism keeps people away from forests and water by 
restricting their access to these resources; people do not have access even to 
protect the environment the way they want to protect it. Thus, discourse about 
environmentalism prevents people from protecting the environment, although 
participatory approaches to protected area management have been introduced 
(Zimmerer et al. 2003; Paudel 2005). Nepal is no exception. For example, the Royal 
family set up a number of trusts for conservation (e.g., for biodiversity, heritage, etc.) 
and controlled their governance. Although the stated goal of the nature conservation 
trusts were to let local people benefit from biodiversity conservation, the unstated 
goal appeared to be to provided a centre for recreation for elites, primarily the 
Royal family and their allies. However, it is not only the intentions of the ruling elite 
that need to be critically examined; there is also a need to understand the intentions 
of international conservation organisations working in Nepal.
3.8 The struggle for rights over natural resources management
Both in Nepal and elsewhere, struggles between the government, bureaucracy, 
elite class, and forest and land dependent people over who should control natural 
resources are common. While the liberal development policies of capitalism have 
pressured the government to adopt people-oriented policies for natural resource 
management, there has not been any focus on the control and ownership of the 
resources by people themselves. Moreover, policies are rarely put into practice, and 
the rights of people, especially the poor and marginalised, are yet to be realised. 
There have been a number of recent struggles to establish the rights of people over 
natural resources, provoking resistance and class antagonism in response.
The cases below show how people are concerned to protect their class interests. 
Tension exists between the powerful and the powerless in relation to the control 
and ownership of natural resources. Environmental actors are vested with differing 
amounts of power and pursue differing interests, resulting in conflict over natural 
resources. Soliva et al. (2003) described the conflict as follows: "On one hand, the 
state may be responsible for nature conservation, on the other, it is interested in 
making money out of its natural resources".
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3.8.1 Rights over forest resources
Case 1: FECOFUN's struggle to establish the rights of forestry user groups
Since its establishment, the Federation of Community Forest Users-Nepal 
(FECOFUN) has been struggling to establish the rights of forest users over local 
forest resources. Although many of the Government’s policies, legislation and 
regulations appear to be progressive, their implementation has often been resisted, 
distorted and avoided by the forest bureaucracy and the Government, particularly 
in relation to valuable Terai forest resources. FECOFUN has been advocating 
that Terai forest management should be handed over to local users in the spirit of 
community based natural resource management. However, the Government and 
the forest bureaucracy appear to be reluctant to devolve power and autonomy to 
the people. Even after the people's movement in April 2006 (Jana Andolan II), the 
bureaucracy and Government have continually tried to undermine the achievements 
of more than 13 years of struggle to establish forest users’ rights. For example, on 
1 July 2006, the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation (MoFSC) responded to 
pressure by FECOFUN and agreed to implement a list of ten demands. However, 
only a few weeks later, the Ministry breached the agreement without consulting 
FECOFUN. Proponents of collaborative forest management lobbied against the 
agreement, gathering support from a few members of parliament, resulting in the 
Government backing out of the agreement. This indicates that the Government still 
does not want to devolve power to the local people and seems to be very much 
influenced by the interests of the bureaucracy and elite politicians (see Kantipur 
Daily 2 June 2006).
Case 2: Issues of impunity and injustice
A poor local Tharu resident of Chitawan living near the national park was detained 
by the park authority for illegally poaching rhino. He was beaten in detention and 
eventually died while undergoing treatment in hospital. The local people organised 
a mass rally of thousands demanding that action be taken against the perpetrators. 
The local administration took the responsible individuals into custody for 
investigation, but only because of pressure from the people. In response, foresters 
within the MoFSC and its departments and allies of the park authority expressed 
their solidarity with the staff responsible for the killing. They locked their own offices 
demanding the release of their colleagues. This conflict went on for months.
Case 3: Timber smuggling in Banke
In mid-2006, the illegal felling of sal trees in community forests and national forest 
areas in Banke district became a national issue. It appears that the District Forest 
Office in Banke gave timber contractors permission to fell sal trees from community 
forests, immediately after the forests were handed over to the community. A large 
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number of trees were harvested against the approved plan of the community forestry 
users group. Local people suspected the DFO office of colluding with an alliance 
of timber contractors, elite members of the community and the CPN (M) (Kantipur 
Daily 1June 2006). The users of the community forests demanded action against 
those involved in the misuse of authority and power. The Government formed a 
probe committee, which was also blamed for siding with the illegal harvesters and 
smugglers. The dispute has not yet been resolved.
3.8.2 Movements related to land rights
In Nepal, movements for land rights are not new. The landless, including Dalits 
and indigenous people, have been struggling for land rights since the 1950s. 
Although dozens of policies and programmes are in place in the name of land 
reform, marginalisation and landlessness have continued. Indigenous minorities 
are particularly vulnerable to landlessness. The cases below highlight some of the 
issues facing marginalised and landless groups in Nepal.
Case 4: Farmers reclaim their land
About 35 years ago, a landlord, the then Chief District Officer, registered land 
under cultivation by the local farmers in his and his family members’ names. The 
farmers were not informed that the land was registered by a powerful bureaucrat 
and were later removed from the land. In 2006, the farmers took back the land 
claiming that it belonged to them. The Government has remained silent on this and 
other prominent land rights cases (Kantipur Daily 5 July 2006), thereby protecting 
the interests of the land owning class.
Case 5: Protests by landless
On 4 July 2006, police destroyed more than 100 small huts built by landless people 
in the eastern Terai region of Nepal. The landless staged a protest against the 
Government’s action in front of the District Administration Office. When the police 
tried to break up the protest some of the protesters were seriously injured (Kantipur 
Daily 5 July 2006).
Case 6: Kamaiya's movement for land rights
In 2000, the Government of Nepal freed a total of 35,621 Kamaiyas (bonded 
labourers) from their landowners. Now free from slavery, the Kamaiyas found 
themselves landless and without a source of livelihood. In 2006, the Kamaiyas 
staged a seven-day protest at Singha Durbar the principal government secretariat 
in Kathmandu, demanding that the Government provide them with land and 
grant facilities. The Ministry of Land Reform and Management and the Kamaiyas 
reached an agreement that an all-party commission would be entrusted to make 
64
recommendations to the Government within 30 days (The Kathmandu Post 24 July 
2006). Despite the Government’s commitment in 2000 to provide them with land, 
over 19,477 Kamaiyas are still landless.
3.9 Politics of resource management and impacts on livelihoods
Poverty is compounded by the political economy (the production and distribution 
of power, wealth and knowledge) of communities, societies and nation states. The 
political economy determines access to and control over productive resources 
and the decision-making processes of people. Poverty is less concerned with how 
to manage forest resources or grow food crops, and more concerned with how 
people can derive benefits from forest resources, how arable land is distributed, 
and how entitlements over land and other productive resources can be ensured. 
Poverty in Nepal is closely related to the socio-political structure of society, which 
marginalises women, Dalits, Janajatis, disabled people, and other disadvantaged 
groups (GCAP-Nepal 2005).
Although participatory natural resource management has been widely applied in 
Nepal, the process of marginalisation of Dalits, women and Janajatis continues, 
and has even escalated. Property rights are denied to these groups and the 
development process has failed to address the key issues, working around the 
periphery of core issues and problems (DFID & WB 2005). Many excluded ethnic 
and marginalised groups live around large forests or along riverbanks. These 
groups are often denied access to the resources necessary for their livelihood by 
conservation laws and policies such as the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation 
Act and the Forest Act. For example, the Mushar (a so-called ‘low’ caste Terai 
group of indigenous fisher people) are prohibited from fishing to earn their living 
because of conservation politics. Furthermore, wild animals trample local’s crops 
and cause injury and even death, but it is an offence under these Acts to capture or 
kill wildlife. A local of Nawalparasi district resident pointed out:
Tigers are fed meat and other nutritious food, while the children of local people 
die of hunger. Birds are preserved for the sake of biodiversity conservation, 
and millions of rupees have been spent for their habitat, but local people are 
deprived of food and shelter in the same places and their habitats have been 
abandoned (pers. comm. with Kamal Bhandari, 5 May 2006). 
Conservation politics does not consider the issues of poverty and livelihoods as an 
urgent need to be addressed. The biodiversity conservation discourse appears to 
be so strong that the Government has a policy of expanding protected areas into 
human habitation, even though Nepal already contains a wide expanse of protected 
areas covering around 18.57 per cent of the total landmass. Attempts to exclude 
people from conservation benefits have undermined the livelihoods of people. 
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3.10 Incompatibility of policies and practices with people’s livelihood 
needs
While many scholars and practitioners advise that policies need to be improved 
through trial and error (Lee 1993), politicians and bureaucrats take policy as a 
rigid instrument and do not adopt a process of learning and reflection. There are 
a number of policies in place related to poverty reduction and natural resource 
management in Nepal. But these policies have been formulated without consulting 
the poor. The elite politicians and bureaucrats develop these policies, and the 
priorities represented in the policies are largely set for them. There is no evidence 
that the poor have influenced the NRM policy process in any way in Nepal. 
Moreover, no policies have been developed yet to guarantee the land ownership 
and rights of small farmers and landless people in Nepal. 
Even in the post-1990 democratic period, NRM was conceptualised within the broader 
framework of the liberal economy. Institutions in Nepal are built by transplanting 
the principals of liberal democracy upon the feudal social structure – without 
challenging the underlying ideology or practices of feudalism. This has resulted in 
the present crisis in the governance of the state, as well as in the governance of 
NRM (Ojha et al. 2005). The focus has been on the economic aspects of livelihoods, 
with less consideration given to the political processes. Although there are some 
good policies in place, institutions have not been transformed accordingly, and 
are therefore unable to implement them properly. Centralised, bureaucratic and 
hierarchal institutions are too rigid and exclusive (Timsina 2003 and 2002; Malla 
2001) to facilitate a pro-poor development approach. Institutions for land resources 
are not sensitive to the needs of poor people. Such institutions mainly serve the 
interests of the powerful and rich, while Dalits, women and Janajatis are excluded.
3.11 A paradigm shift in natural resource management
To overcome the deprivation, destitution and oppression of the poor, women, 
Dalits, indigenous people and other marginalised groups, we have to recognise 
the role of freedom of different kinds. Individual agency is central to addressing 
these deprivations. Individual agency can be constrained by the social, political 
and economic opportunities that are available to individuals. The term ‘agency’ 
herein represents the autonomy and freedom of individuals (Giddens 1984); the 
degree to which they may act independently of, and in opposition to, structural 
constraints, potentially reconstituting the existing social structures through their 
freely chosen actions. For example, marginalised groups in Nepal have not been 
‘free’ to earn a reasonable livelihood because their access to resources that form 
the basis of this livelihood has been constrained. It is important to recognise both 
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the centrality of individual freedom and the forces of social influence on the extent 
and reach of individual freedom. Individual freedom needs to be considered as a 
social commitment (Sen 1999).
Under new concepts of development, the expansion of freedom is viewed both 
as the primary end and the principal means of development. Development, in this 
sense, consists of the removal of various types of bondage that leave people with 
little choice and little opportunity to exercise their reasoned agency (Sen 1999).
Economic and political freedoms reinforce one another, rather than conflicting (as is 
sometimes assumed). Institutions such as the state, the market, the legal system, 
political parties, the media, public interest groups and public discussion forums, 
among others, are important to ensure the livelihood rights of people. These 
institutions need to be seen as democratic ways of enhancing and guaranteeing 
the substantive freedoms of individuals (Sen 1999). 
For example, Nepal's community forestry processes have entered the debate 
about social transformation towards a pro-poor, inclusive and more democratic 
social system (Timsina et al. 2004). The transformation process has to transform 
both the agency and the structures of society, which are historically constructed 
and embedded in social traditions, values and norms. In some of the community 
forestry user groups, the empowered agencies have changed the structure (norms, 
values and rules) to favour poor and marginalised users.
3.11.1 Transforming the mindsets of the rich to uplift the poor
Conventional development thinking defines equity as a problem of the poor. 
Mainstream development actors perceive the gap between the poor and rich as a 
deficit of the powerless, not as a fault of the powerful. They see a lack of education, 
access to credit or tools as the reason for the problem and advocate remedies to 
bring the poor up to par. They develop programmes for raising the living standards 
of the poor towards the level of the rich. In short, it is the poor who have to be 
developed in order to achieve greater equity. NRM strategies also usually aim at 
lifting those at the bottom, rather than transforming the mindset of the top. The 
wealthy and their way of exercising power remain entirely outside the spotlight, as 
always, in development discourse, and the burden of change is heaped solely upon 
the poor. However, from the perspective of poverty and livelihoods in a context of 
competing power for access to and control over resources, justice is also about 
changing the rich, not just the poor. Today, any debate on equity in natural resource 
management must first focus on transforming the top (Sachs 1999).
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3.11.2 People’s movements: A tool for social change
Making good policies is not sufficient to ensure people’s rights over natural 
resources. There have been a number of good policies in place in Nepal, but, due to 
a lack of political will of the implementing politicians and bureaucrats, these policies 
have not been not implemented. Even where policies were implemented, most of 
them were distorted. Evidence shows that policies are often only implemented as 
a result of pressure exerted by public interest groups or people’s movements. For 
example, FECOFUN’s activities in ensuring forest users' rights have had an impact 
in Nepal. If the movement had not been launched by FECOFUN, the community 
forestry programme in Nepal would not have had such a significant impact. 
Similarly, land rights movements (organised by Dalits, women, ethnic groups and 
other marginalised groups deprived of land rights) have also exerted pressure on 
the Government and politicians. People's movements appear to be among the 
most powerful instruments for policy change and implementation.
3.12 Conclusions
The political economy and political ecology is a framework for the analysis of 
natural resource governance and livelihoods. Rights and ownership over natural 
resources are essentially a phenomenon of the political economy, especially when 
they involve the diverse interests of different individuals, groups and the state.
Tension between the state and communities in relation to NRM, especially in relation 
to the management of valuable resources such as forests and land, manifests in 
different ways. In the Terai and high hills, the state appears to be reluctant to hand 
over authority over forests to local people. This is due to the political economy 
(the relationship between production and distribution) of the highly valued forest 
resources. Similarly, the creation of landless people in Nepal resulted from the 
gradual evolution of land as a highly sought after commodity. Landlessness is the 
result of structural problems that have existed since state formation in Nepal.
However, as the development paradigm shifts over time, discourse on people’s 
participation in NRM pushed the state to involve local people in the use and 
management of forest resources. Forest, as a common property resource, is 
easier to handle than land, when it comes to a participatory approach to its use and 
management. Community forestry has become a priority programme in NRM and 
is considered as the ‘mother programme’ of community-based natural resource 
management in Nepal. Nevertheless, given the resistance from the Government 
and bureaucracy to the devolution of power to communities and the antagonistic 
behaviour towards community forestry user groups, a constant interaction with the 
political process is needed to institutionalise these achievements.
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While critically focusing on the prevailing inequity in Nepalese society, natural 
resource management needs to create opportunities for positive discrimination 
in relation to marginalised groups and the poor, such as providing them with the 
exclusive right to decide on the management of, access to and control over natural 
resources such as land and forests. A complete transformation of the natural 
resource sector is needed in the search for sustainable livelihoods, a transformation 
that ensures inclusive democracy in the processes and institutions related to natural 
resource management.
People’s movements are a powerful instrument for change in NRM policies and to 
ensure proper implementation. The mobilisation of people through mass movement 
empowers individual agency and strengthens their ability to realise their rights. 
People’s movements put aristocratic and bureaucratic classes under pressure and 
compel them to enter negotiations. In other words, people’s movements help to 
break the present production relations, thereby impacting on the political economy. 
Organised and conscious movements are more relevant at the moment as Nepal 
is undergoing a process of state restructuring through the Constituent Assembly 
process.
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Abstract
This chapter examines the food security situation in Nepal and the impact of the 
recent armed conflict on the food security situation. To begin with, the chapter 
discusses how food security or insecurity is understood in developing countries, 
in general, including in Nepal, specifically. The approaches used to analyse food 
security, particularly during times of crisis induced by civil war or violence leading 
to an increase in the risks associated with different aspects of food security (i.e., 
availability, access, utilisation and stability), are also briefly discussed. This chapter 
argues that food security is understood in different ways and that definitions have 
changed over time, as these definitions are influenced by different factors – both 
subjective and objective, and domestic and international. Our understanding of food 
security has also influenced, as in recent times in Nepal, policies and actions related 
to food security. Moreover, there has been difficulty in developing approaches to 
the investigation of ‘food security’ or ‘insecurity’, especially during times of crisis. 
The armed conflict in Nepal has made people vulnerable in different ways than 
previously, and the factors that determine vulnerability change frequently, making 
it difficult to define vulnerable groups and target them. The armed conflict has, 
generally, made the food security situation in Nepal worse, where both internal and 
external policies and practices had already made the situation precarious. Based 
on the analysis, some recommendations are made as to how to improve the food 
security situation in times of conflict, during normal times and in the context of 
globalisation. 
4.1 Introduction
Nepal, an agrarian country, with a population of about 26 million in 2007, used to 
produce sufficient food at the aggregate level until the early 1970s, even though 
cases of food deficit and malnutrition were reported in the hills and mountains. 
The lack of infrastructure, mainly roads, connecting food producing areas like the 
plains in the south (Terai) with the hills and mountains, has affected the distribution 
and availability of food in many hill and mountain villages. Mountain regions, to a 
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large extent, and hill regions, to a smaller extent, have been food deficit. The deficit 
was particularly high in the Mid-Western and Far West Development Regions of 
Nepal. The special trading practices (north-south trade involving Tibet, the mid 
hills of Nepal, the Terai region in Nepal, and India) ingrained in the local culture, 
which were developed to adapt to local ecological systems, had helped the local 
people to secure food. However, these practices have been largely eroded due to 
socio-economic changes, and particularly by restrictions in trade with Tibet. There 
have also been changes in people’s food habits and increased dependence on 
food aid. The Karnali region, which is located in the mountains of the Mid-Western 
Development Region, suffered hunger deaths in 1997 when about 1400 people 
died due to famine. Food crises are still reported from time to time in this region. 
The Karnali is also the region that suffered the most from the armed conflict, which 
adversely impacted on the food security of this region. Urban areas were less 
affected by the armed conflict than rural areas. As a large number of people (almost 
84%) live in rural areas in Nepal, the conflict had an impact on a large proportion of 
the population. Almost all village development committees (VDCs) suffered in one 
way or another from the armed conflict.
The armed conflict in Nepal started in 1996, when the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist) [CPN (M)] resorted to armed struggle to bring about change in the political 
system. The Government also used the army to control the armed struggle of the 
‘rebels’. This so-called ‘counter-insurgency’ also created many problems for the 
people. In a way, the people were caught between the two armed struggles – that 
of the rebels and that of the Government. Many people lost their lives during the 
conflict (approximately 13,300 people). There were also frequent disruptions to 
transport; frequent strikes, bandhs (forced temporary closure of businesses and 
schools and the restriction of movement by vehicle) and blockades; the restriction 
of the movement of goods and commodities including food and people; the internal 
displacement of people (IDPs) and their mass out-migration from Nepal to India; 
and the destruction of property and infrastructure of the people, communities and 
the state. The other cost of the conflict is delayed development. Funds that could 
have been used for development were spent on the army and weapons. As a result, 
the budget for security has increased tremendously. For example, the defence or 
security budget was only NRs.5.16 billion in 1998/99, but increased to NRs.19 
billion in 2003/04. 
The overall impact of the conflict on food security is analysed in this Chapter, 
even though the conflict ended after the political revolution (Jana Andolan II) in 
April 2006. ‘Conflict’, for the purpose of this chapter, refers to the armed conflict 
between the CPN (M) and the Government from 1996 to 2006. This conflict was 
not only characterised by differences in the interests and objectives of different 
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groups, but also by the violence unleashed by CPN (M) in the name of people’s 
revolution, and by the Government in the name of counter-terrorism. This violence 
was mainly responsible for the adverse impact on the livelihoods and food security 
of the people. In this chapter, the term ‘livelihood security’ is used to refer to overall 
security in the means of securing sustenance (including food and other basic 
necessities), whereas ‘food security’ mainly relates to the different dimensions of 
food as a basic need (see below for further explanation).
4.2 Understanding food security
There is no common framework for understanding food security or insecurity. 
There is even more disagreement with regard to what action and approach to take 
to mitigate food insecurity problems. The approaches of different organisations 
and institutions to food insecurity seem to depend on various local, national and 
international factors including philosophy regarding the role of the market or trade, 
political and human rights, ecological sustainability, and national sovereignty with 
regard to food and food production, as well as larger political-economic interests. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, food security was understood more generally as the ability 
of a nation to meet its aggregate food needs in a constant manner. Accordingly, 
countries used to develop food balance sheets showing the aggregate supply and 
demand or requirement based on food requirement norms (like 180 kg food per 
capita per year in the past, and 200 kg now – this was particularly so in Nepal). 
The World Food Conference in 1974 identified sufficient food production, reliable 
supply and less fluctuating prices as crucial for meeting food security. Accordingly, 
technologies introduced with the green revolution, which contributed to increases 
in production, were emphasised to improve food security in developing countries. It 
was believed that the market will regulate supply and prices once food production 
has increased sufficiently. In the 1980s, with the seminal work of Amratya K. Sen 
(discussed below), which emphasised entitlements or access to food, the approach 
to food security shifted towards the ‘demand side’, i.e., providing individuals access 
to food through the market or social/political mechanisms. Lately, some concerns 
have also been raised by economists with neo-liberal principles over placing 
re-emphasis on the supply side (i.e., the production of food and productivity of 
resources). They have also focused on the role of technology. As a result, technology 
like genetic engineering or other forms of bio-technology have been promoted and 
used by multinational companies to increase the food supply. At the same time, 
social activists, mainly from developing countries, have expressed concerns about 
food safety and about the right to adequate food, right to feed oneself, the need for 
developing countries to have food sovereignty (i.e., control over the food chain so 
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that they can make independent decisions on how to best meet their food security 
needs) and cultural suitability. Increased integration of different nations’ economies 
associated with the processes of globalisation, as well as new international trade 
institutions, agreements and policies, such as those promoted by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), have given rise to these new concerns. These concerns 
have also been vital in shaping the food security policies in developing countries, 
including Nepal. After the political revolution of April 2006 in Nepal, civil society 
activists have focused on the right to food and food sovereignty. These rights were 
enshrined in the Interim Constitution of 2007. In line with this, Nepal’s Three-year 
Interim Plan (2008–2010) has, for the first, included a chapter on food security.
7KHUHDUHQXPHURXVGH¿QLWLRQVRIIRRGVHFXULW\DQGWKHGH¿QLWLRQKDVFKDQJHG
RYHUWLPHDQGZLWKFKDQJHVLQDSSURDFKHVWRIRRGVHFXULW\7ZRGH¿QLWLRQVDUH
JLYHQKHUHWKDWDUHLQÀXHQWLDOLQGHYLVLQJSROLFLHVLQGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV
Access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life 
(World Bank 1986).
Food security means that food is available at all times; that all persons have 
means of access to it; that it is nutritionally adequate in terms of quantity, 
quality and variety; and that it is acceptable within the given culture. Only when 
all these conditions are in place can a population be considered ‘food secure' 
(FAO, http://www.fao.org/).
Of these two definitions, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO’s) definition 
seems more comprehensive. It focuses on four key components: availability, 
access, utilisation and stability. FAO considers these as the four pillars of food 
security.
4.2.1 Availability
Availability refers to the possibility of feeding oneself (individual, household or other 
units) either directly from productive land or other natural resources, or through 
distribution, processing and marketing systems that can move food from the site 
of production to where it is needed. At the international level, there is sufficient 
food available to feed about 6 billion people (Lappe et al. 1999). All nations can 
achieve and maintain a sufficient food supply for their population through domestic 
production, imports or a combination of both (Ibid). Hence, for sufficient availability, 
proper policies are needed regarding the production, distribution, processing and 
marketing of food. In Nepal, lack of infrastructure and marketing information and 
support, especially in the hills, often places constraints on the availability of food. 
The decade-long armed conflict has also led to increased food deficits, especially 
in hill and mountain districts.
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4.2.2 Access
Access refers to economic and social access to food or purchasing and/or the food-
gaining capacities of people (which include food prices in relation to wage rates, 
income opportunities, and social networks that provide food during times of distress, 
traditional safety nets, etc.). Each household/individual should have access to food. 
Sen (1981) used the idea of entitlement and endowments to explain how a person 
can have access to food. According to Sen, food availability in the market does 
not guarantee people's access to food for consumption. Therefore, individuals and 
households only have legitimate command over foods and other commodities if 
they have entitlement to a 'bundle of resources' such as land, capital, technology, 
skills, stocks and income. Sen later used the term 'expanded entitlement' to include 
social networks, kin relations and the like that help in receiving food, especially 
during times of stress.
4.2.3 Utilisation
Utilisation refers to the proper use of food, good food habits and the availability of 
culturally acceptable food. It also means the conversion of food intake into nutrition 
and into physical functions, which also depends upon other ‘complementary 
factors’ like safe drinking water, health protection and the like. Given that food is 
only valuable when it can be converted for bodily or metabolic use, its conversion 
into nutrition (utilisation) is essential. Therefore, it is important that each individual 
should have food utilisation capacity. Nutritional status (nutritional security) is an 
indicator of food security from the perspective of food utilisation. Another critical 
dimension of the utilisation aspect of food is food safety. 
4.2.4 Stability
Food security also means a sustainable food system (production, distribution, 
consumption and waste management) at all levels – from the household to the 
national and international levels, and at all times. Therefore, stability means a food 
system that is able to meet the basic food needs without much fluctuation. To 
reduce fluctuation, availability and access to food must be ensured beyond the 
level required for mere subsistence.
There are also other dimensions to food security, which are usually not discussed 
in the literature of international agencies like FAO and World Bank. These include 
the control over food chains (production, distribution, processing, marketing 
and consumption) by a few transnational companies, changes in consumption 
behaviour and the role of media, the erosion of traditional or indigenous knowledge, 
and gender dimensions in food security. Women play an important role in every 
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step of the food cycle in Nepal – from food production and gathering to food 
preparation and feeding. Women’s lack of economic power at the household level 
and various socio-cultural taboos that deny women access to resources and a 
healthy environment mean that they face discrimination in access to food. For 
example, in Nepal, especially among the Hindus, women have to remain content 
with whatever food remains after all males are fed. They also have to follow difficult 
and torturous rules (e.g., staying in an animal shed while giving birth or during 
menstruation periods). These rules are still very common in the Mid-Western and 
Far West Development Regions, which suffer from food insecurity and malnutrition. 
Women in Nepal have ownership of only about ten per cent of the land holdings 
and about five per cent of the total cultivated land (Adhikari 2006a). The income of 
the household/family is generally controlled by males. This deprives women of their 
choice of food and from controlling food purchases. The media’s role in changing 
food habits is also growing. Industrially produced food, which is often less nutritious 
in comparison to its price, is becoming popular (Adhikari & Ghimire 2006). For 
example, this can be seen in cases where rural farmers exchange a litre of milk for 
a small packet of biscuits or a bottle of Coca-Cola. The change in food habits is also 
considered to be one of the reasons for the growing food insecurity in the Karnali 
region of Nepal, where, as discussed above, hunger and death have been reported 
from time to time. Because of the new food habits of the lower hills and Terai (e.g., 
the consumption of rice) introduced in this region, local foods are now not grown 
and new generations have lost traditional knowledge about these foods. On the 
other hand, rice is not generally grown in the Karnali region, mainly due to climatic 
reasons. Jumla of Karnali is an exception to this and rice is grown in Tila and Sinja 
river-valleys using a technology that requires strict adherence to time-bound farm 
practices, especially in the growing of seedlings. 
Until the recent past, 'food production' was generally equated with 'food security'. 
The assumption was that if a country produced enough food (food self-sufficiency) 
it would meet its food security needs. This assumption has been invalidated, even 
though 'production' is one factor in the availability of food and food self-sufficiency 
is important for various political and social reasons. Several studies have supported 
this finding. Some of the critical food insecurity situations that have resulted in 
hunger, malnutrition and death have occurred in periods where food production 
was above average. Therefore, even though food production is considered a 
prerequisite for food security, it is not considered a sufficient condition on its own 
(Sen 1981; Watt 1983). These research studies also consider the larger political-
economic situation affecting distribution, entitlement and access to food as causes 
of food insecurity. Other causes are the breakdown of traditional food security 
mechanisms by external forces (colonisers, liberalisation and globalisation) and 
the lack of new measures to replace them. This fact has led to the conclusion 
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that food security cannot sufficiently be examined only from a national perspective. 
Rather, one has to look into micro-level processes, encompassing the household 
level and, if possible, the intra-household level. The need to consider the intra-
household level arises from the fact that the household is also a unit within which 
all forms of social injustice takes place. Discrimination against girls, women, elderly 
and the disabled is widespread in many developing countries. The predominantly 
patriarchal family system in Nepal, for example, creates such discrimination.
The new emphasis on ‘access’ to food has also led to changes in the measurement 
of food security. Now anthropometric measurements (like weight and height 
according to age, arm girth according to age), food and nutrition intake surveys (like 
food intake, calorie and protein intake, existence of symptoms of malnutrition like the 
protein-energy deficiency symptoms seen in cases of stunted growth), and socio-
economic surveys (to gauge food security in indirect ways using various proxies 
like poverty, real wage rate relative to food prices, employment and demand on 
emergency food supply situations and the like) are also used to examine the food 
security situation. These measures usually measure the short-term crisis in food. 
But for ‘security’, which means a secured feeling of availability and access to food, 
a long-term perspective is necessary. Security also requires a lack of vulnerability 
in the long run. Therefore, vulnerability analysis is important. In this chapter, the 
food security situation in Nepal is examined from the above perspectives.
4.3 Vulnerability, access to resources and livelihood security: The 
political economy
As discussed above, sustainability and availability (i.e., stability in availability and 
access) are key components of food security. Because of this ‘sustainability’, the 
concept of ‘vulnerability’ has become important in the analysis of food insecurity. 
Individuals and households or communities and nations should not be vulnerable 
to food security. Freedom from fear of going hungry is also one of the criteria of 
food security, and, if there is vulnerability, fear will increase. This is also a condition 
of food insecurity. Because of the long-term focus, the livelihoods of individuals 
or households should be improved for sustainability in food security. ‘Food First’ 
programmes (programmes aimed at meeting nutritional requirements in the short 
term, without considering food production aspects), such as vitamin A programmes, 
food programmes for children and women, and food-aid in crisis programmes, which 
are generally implemented to improve the nutritional intake of women and children, 
provide only short-term solutions. Such programmes can be considered as an 
immediate form of food security, which, in fact, is not food security at all, because 
security requires a long-term perspective. But, unless livelihoods in general are 
improved, food security is not secured.
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The term ‘livelihood’, as will be discussed below, refers to the different dimensions 
of securing sustenance. A secure and sustainable livelihood is considered to be 
a sufficient and necessary condition for food security. Therefore, food security 
depends on individuals and households having a reliable and sustainable source 
of livelihood. In line with this approach, the World Food Summit in Rome in 1996 
emphasised the sustainable management of natural resources, elimination of 
unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, and equality between men 
and women as essential conditions for food security. 
As livelihood improvement is an essential condition for food security, it is essential 
that its components are discussed, particularly the reasons for vulnerability. 
Livelihoods are generally defined as the means for living or sustenance. Blaikie 
et al. (1994, p 5) define livelihood as the “command an individual, family, or other 
social group has over an income and/or bundle of resources that can be used or 
exchanged to satisfy its needs”. A livelihood is sustainable if it can bear the weight 
of present activities for a long period without compromising future prospects. The 
opposite way of looking at livelihood security is the analysis of 'vulnerability', a 
condition that has been defined in various ways. For example, Chambers (1989, 
p 1) has defined vulnerability as “the exposure to contingencies and stress, and 
difficulty coping with them”. He goes on to say that “Vulnerability thus has two sides: 
an external side of risks, shocks, and stress to which an individual and household 
is subject; and an internal side which is defenceless, meaning a lack of means 
to cope without damaging losses" (Ibid). According to Blaikie et al. (1994, p 9), 
vulnerability describes “characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity 
to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of natural hazards”. In 
essence, vulnerability arises from two main factors – risk in securing the assets 
and capacities required for a livelihood and inability to cope with that risk. The risk 
could arise from various factors like natural hazards, market failures, a decline in 
the price of commodities sold, an increase in the price of commodities purchased, 
personal loss in the family, health problems in the family, loss of employment or 
wages, and the like. A decline in social insurance or safety nets provided in the 
society, on a traditional or formal basis, can be another cause of vulnerability.
There is, generally, a lack of theoretical basis for vulnerability analysis, despite 
some attempts by a few scholars. Bohle (1995) and Watts and Bohle (1993) have 
developed a three dimensional approach for mapping the space of vulnerability. 
They argue that the space of vulnerability is formed by three co-ordinates – risk 
exposure, coping capacity, and recovery capacity. Each of these co-ordinates 
has three dimensions – endowments, political ecology and empowerment. These 
dimensions are in a way linked to the political capacity to secure access to 
resources or the influence required for securing resources (from the society or the 
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state). Two models developed by Blaikie et al. (1994) to explain the vulnerability 
of a particular individual or a household also centre around 'political power'. In the 
Pressure and Release (PAR) Model a disaster is located at the intersection of 
two forces – processes generating vulnerability and physical exposure to hazards 
(Blaikie et al. 1994, pp 90-91). The forces or processes generating vulnerability 
are rooted in the socio-political and economic structure of the society. The root 
causes of vulnerability (which reflect the distribution of power in a society) put 
people in unsafe conditions. It is generally the powerless (economically, politically 
and socially) who are pushed into such unsafe conditions. When the hazard or 
accident takes place (e.g., drought), they are the ones who suffer the most as 
they are in the unsafe or hazard-prone situation. Moreover, these people lack the 
assets to cope with hazards and recover from them. Another model, called the 
Access Model (Blaikie et al. 1994) focuses on the way that unsafe conditions arise 
in relation to the economic and political processes that allocate assets, income 
and other resources in a society. The 'access' of an individual to resources is 
determined by political-economic processes and is linked to the social relations of 
production, gender, ethnicity, status and age. The Access Model takes into account 
the dynamic situation of the society, and, thus, is more capable of explaining the 
access position of households and their vulnerabilities. Concepts like FAD (food 
availability decline) and FED (food entitlement decline) (Dreze & Sen 1989), which 
are used to explain food insecurity and famine/hunger, are also linked to access. 
As the concept of entitlement includes production-based entitlement, trade-based 
entitlement, own-labour entitlement, inheritance and transfer entitlement, and other 
forms of expanded entitlement (Dreze & Sen 1989, p 10), the study of food security 
should also be concerned with the food system or food chain. The food system 
involves not only the system of food production, but also the degree of access to 
land and inputs, the operation of markets, and the ways in which food is distributed, 
transported and processed, how prices are determined, and how traders behave.
The importance of a political and economic perspective (Fig 4.1) in the analysis 
of food (in)security has also been pointed out by Seddon and Adhikari (2003, pp 
5-15). They suggest that the most effective approach is the one that begins with 
an analysis of the ‘historical political economy’ of food production, distribution and 
consumption, which is capable of providing a broad framework for examining and 
exploring key issues of unequal food availability and unequal entitlement to food. 
The historical political economy is concerned with how social-political and economic 
structures are developed and how they impact on the formation and functioning of 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGRUJDQLVDWLRQV7KLVDOVRLQÀXHQFHVWUHQGVDQGVKRFNV7KHRWKHU
major component in the framework is ‘assets’. The historical political economy 
impacts on the claims and entitlements of an individual, household or group to 
assets, which, in turn, shapes livelihood (natural resource-based or non-natural 
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resource-based) strategies. These strategies then determine food security and 
insecurity. Seddon and Adhikari (2003) argue that “embedded within the political 
economy of food security should be a livelihoods analysis which enables us to 
appreciate the range of constraints and opportunities operating on the livelihood 
strategies of households and individuals, which, in turn, affect their ability to provide 
RUQRWWRSURYLGHDGHJUHHRIVHFXULW\DVUHJDUGVDFFHVVWRIRRG ´+HUHFRQÀLFW
VXFKDVWKHDUPHGFRQÀLFWLQ1HSDOFDQLQFUHDVH
VKRFNV
OHDGLQJWRDGHFOLQHLQ
claims and entitlement to assets of all types, including natural assets like land and 
forests. This increases food insecurity.
Figure 4.1 Framework of food production, distribution and consumption
Analysing food security from a household perspective, the possession of assets 
is crucial to food security. Swift (1989) divides assets into three broad categories: 
investments, stores and claims. Here, investments include human (individual and 
collective) assets; stores include food stores and items of value, such as gold and 
money in the bank; and claims are potential assets to be obtained from others 
(loans, gifts and other forms of support and assistance). Ellis (2000) identifies five 
sets of assets or capital: natural, physical, human, financial and social. He notes, 
tellingly, that human capital is perhaps the most crucial to the poor: “...it is often 
said that the chief asset possessed by the poor is their own labour” (p 33). In a 
very real sense, for each individual, the most immediate and precious asset is that 
of health and wellbeing. Significantly, in their analysis of food security and how hill 
farmers cope in Nepal, Adhikari and Bohle (1999a) agree that:
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[P]ersonal assets (health status, skill and physical power or fitness) and 
household composition were by far the most important factors in helping the 
households to cope with food deficiency. Other type of assets like land and 
forest were also found to affect food security, but their role was much less than 
that of personal assets and household structure. (p 16)
The role of other factors like ownership of land and forest was low in food security 
because of the fact that land holdings are small and food self-sufficiency is low for 
most households, and because farming is difficult and labour intensive.
However, moving away from the individual and household level towards the 
community, regional or national levels, structural causes seem to be more important 
in food security. Claims and entitlement to food shaped by these structural causes 
also change as a result of changing power structures and definitions of eligibility. For 
example, a study conducted by Rural Reconstruction Nepal (RRN) and Action Aid 
Nepal (AAN) (2003, pp 33-34) has identified the following causes of food insecurity, 
which are, in general, linked to socio-economic, political and environmental factors 
(cited in Seddon & Adhikari 2003, pp 5-15):
x Socio-political structures, which effectively prevent the rural 
poor from having equitable access to productive resources and 
community assets
x Persistent degradation of natural resources and community assets
x Policies and institutions that exclude small/marginal farmers and 
ZRPHQIURPWKHEHQH¿WVRIGHYHORSPHQWDQGSXEOLFVHUYLFHV
x Caste, gender and class based exploitation, violence, discrimination 
and marginalisation, that limit the access of these social categories 
to education, health and employment opportunities, and other basic 
human rights and justice
x Imperfect mechanisms for the distribution of goods and services, 
nationally, regionally and locally
x Low purchasing power of the majority of the population
x Gender discrimination in general
x Limited recognition of food security needs
x Lack of commitment on the part of governments to implement 
appropriate changes
During periods of conflict, the analysis of the political economy is important. The 
political economic perspective helps us to understand the ‘claims and entitlement’ 
structure. As the power relations change during periods of conflict, the entitlement 
matrix will also change. For example, the seemingly wealthy people who had more 
assets before the ‘conflict’ in Nepal were considered class enemies and displaced. 
Similarly, others not directly supporting the rebels were also displaced. As a result, 
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their entitlement to food declined and they became vulnerable. Therefore, as 
explained above, conflict increases the shocks or risks to entitlement for certain 
categories of people, which can be poor as well as wealthy, placing them in a 
vulnerable position. A common approach to the study of livelihood security has 
been the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) used by DFID (http://www.
livelihood.org/), even though the approach has been criticised as inadequate for 
understanding vulnerability in a conflict situation. This approach (see Figure 4.2) 
is an analytical tool for understanding people’s livelihood strategies as shaped by 
interactions between livelihood assets, vulnerability and transforming structures 
(institutions and processes), and for developing intervention mechanisms based 
on existing livelihood strategies (capacities). 
Figure 4.2 Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
Source: DFID, http://www.livelihoods@difd.gov.uk
In this model, five livelihood assets (physical, natural, social, financial and personal) 
are considered central, but they need to be analysed in terms of the vulnerability 
context and transforming structures. The interaction of these three components 
shapes livelihood strategies to achieve the livelihood outcome. This tool is also 
used for research, evaluation, policy analysis and development. It is not a new 
approach, with its origins in the early 1980s at the Stockholm Conference on 
Environment and Development. It uses the key concepts discussed above, but 
integrates them in a simplified model. The focus of the framework is to improve 
livelihood strategies and the long-term viability of those strategies. This approach 
also puts people at the centre of the analysis and considers that their asset position 
is important when exploring options open to them. The other components of the 
framework are transforming structures and processes (now termed the ‘rules of 
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game’ (http://www.livelihood.org/), livelihood outcomes and livelihood strategies. 
By analysing the assets and institutions and processes it is argued that one can link 
the micro-level situation with the macro-level policies.
By analysing food security situations during conflict (as is done in the later section in 
the case of Nepal), one can find various weaknesses in this approach for explaining 
food insecurity and in devising targeting mechanisms. For example, the approach is 
more concerned with the individual situation and is depoliticised, as it mainly aims 
to identify the efficient management of assets of the targeted people without much 
emphasis on the context or the circumstances. It also sets limits on the inclusion 
of factors to be considered and the relationships between these factors. The 
approach emphasises the role of social agencies, but undermines the role of the 
larger political economy. For example, the conflict in Nepal has its roots in unequal 
political-economic structures set by social relations among the variables of caste, 
class, region, gender, and so forth (Thapa & Sijapati 2003). Which factors are more 
important and how their importance changes over time cannot be analysed using 
DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. Similarly, the threat to food security 
by globalisation and the control of food chains by a few multinational companies is 
not explained very well by this approach. The external environment like agricultural 
subsidies from developed countries and the use of political and economic power by 
developed countries in negotiations (e.g., negotiations by the WTO) are affecting 
agriculture in developing countries. These are the main factors in determining how 
developing countries meet food security needs and in generating a situation of food 
insecurity. Even though these are major events or processes, they are narrowly 
included under the vulnerability context. For example, the international context 
affecting food production caused food prices to increase in 2008, leading to food 
riots in the Philippines and in some African countries. Such global socio-political 
and economic structures and their impacts are not explained by this framework. 
The opportunities available at the global level are also not explained by this model. 
The role of culture and traditions, like changes in food habits, which has caused 
severe food security problems in the Karnali zone, is also important. Such changes 
are also taking place at an increasing rate among young people in urban areas. 
DFID’s SLF has no specific place for these cultural aspects, but deals with them as 
part of the vulnerability context.
The ‘livelihood approach’, as used in SLF model, does have some advantages in 
analysing food security. For example, Young et al. (2003) argue that the livelihood 
approach is useful in understanding short-term as well as long-term food security/
insecurity. In this approach to food security, the severity of food security is gauged 
by its impact on people’s ability to feed themselves in the short term (risk to lives), 
and on livelihood and self-sufficiency in the long term (risk to livelihood) (Young et 
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al. 2003). The risk to lives can be understood by studying the food consumption 
pattern. If there is significant change in the major exchange entitlement to, or 
sources of, food, and if this impacts on the nutritional status of people, then we 
can say that there is risk to lives requiring immediate attention from the state and 
responsible agencies and individuals. Risk to livelihood is understood by studying 
the vulnerability, risk and coping strategies of the livelihood groups, i.e., people 
adopting different means for their sustenance. In essence, the livelihood approach 
helps in “finding out the food availability, ability of people to feed themselves 
and how different groups of people gain access to food, risk to lives and risk to 
livelihoods” (Young et al. 2003). Conflict increases these risks.
4.4 Conflict, livelihoods and food security
The livelihood approach became popular after Sen’s study of famine (discussed 
above). Sen considered that the exchange entitlement (or the livelihood sources) 
reflects the ability of the individual/household to acquire food. The livelihood of a 
person is a combination of exchange entitlements. Risks to livelihood occur when 
there are vulnerabilities, threats and a lack of coping mechanisms. Various risks can 
erode exchange entitlements, as discussed above. This can lead to a reduction in 
sources of food and an inability to make up the difference or deficiency, malnutrition 
and the over extension of coping abilities leading to the destruction of livelihood 
assets. Then the real case of food insecurity occurs requiring immediate help in 
the form of ‘food aid’. If food aid is required, then it is necessary to understand 
the following things: How much food aid is necessary and what type of food? Who 
needs food aid and why? How long food aid is required and the point at which the 
need for food aid is reviewed? Whether or not there are locally available resources 
and capacities to transport, store and distribute food? In a conflict situation, it is 
difficult to identify the target group based on the SLF approach as vulnerability 
conditions can vary for different groups. Even the wealthy and those with enough 
livelihood assets can become food insecure if their entitlement to food declines. 
Moreover, during periods of conflict, it is difficult to physically provide food aid; food 
meant for the target group can end up in the hands of the groups causing the food 
shortage.
The entitlement approach that is central to livelihood analysis and to understanding 
famine or food insecurity, gives little attention to conflict, violence and political 
factors. Sen (1981) views famine and food insecurity as economic disasters. The 
impact of conflict and violence are not examined because Sen’s analysis is of the 
exchange entitlements that take place within the legal regime. However, during 
periods of conflict, this legal regime is ineffective, and food is illegally and forcefully 
transferred from one group to another (Young et al. 2003). As violence and food 
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insecurity are closely associated, one cannot dismiss violence (caused by conflict) 
as something illegal. This political vulnerability is not adequately dealt with by Sen’s 
(1981) analysis. During periods of violence and conflict, food transfers take place 
from one group to another, but are outside the legal boundaries. Even though 
the livelihood approach, and, in particular, the SLF of DFID, has been refined to 
take into consideration crisis situations (such as drought in Africa), it has some 
limitations when analysing food insecurity during periods of conflict.
In general, there is still a lack of conceptual approaches for studying and analysing 
the impact of political instability or conflict on food security and livelihoods. 
The genesis and impact of conflict on food security in Nepal is not dealt with in 
detail here, only the conceptual approach to examining this impact is discussed. 
Generally, models of food security and livelihood analysis take political instability 
and conflict as a type of shock or stress, and, hence, see it in neutral terms. Seddon 
and Adhikari (2003, pp 10-15) argue that in any political conflict, like that of the 
Maoist insurgency in Nepal, there will be 'sides', and that there will be those who 
are directly and deeply implicated, and there will be those indirectly and less deeply 
implicated. This will have significant implications for the nature and distribution of 
effects and consequences – and, hence, for the differential impact on different social 
categories. This explains how the kind of conflict affects different social categories 
differently. From a theoretical point of view, a political insurgency or revolution like 
the Maoist insurgency should have direct adverse impacts on what they term as 
'class enemies' or the 'ruling class'. Therefore, the components of the economy 
(like infrastructure) that have been beneficial to these people are disrupted. But 
there are also unintended consequences of any revolution, however pure the 
motives may be. The actions taken by the opposite parties (both supporters of the 
conflict and those who oppose it) in the conflict need to be analysed. Accordingly, 
the impact of the actions taken by the parties who oppose the conflict (in Nepal, 
the ruling class and the state and its security and administrative forces) need to 
be examined to determine how they have affected food security. In a way, those 
agencies opposing the conflict are also part of the conflict. On the other hand, 
although the parties supporting the conflict (e.g., Maoist insurgents) say that they 
are working for the food security of poor and marginalised people and communities, 
their actions can adversely impact on the food security of the people they want to 
help. Moreover, the actions of these insurgents also push previously food secure 
or well-off households (who the insurgents call ‘class enemies’) into a precarious 
position as these households are also obstructed from using their various assets. 
Therefore, the ‘entitlement’ approach is more suitable in conflict situations for 
analysing food security and identifying the target group. An understanding of this 
requires a political-economy perspective. As the power position changes, the use 
of livelihood assets may be disrupted with the aim of harming certain groups of 
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people. Hence, the entitlements of people shift considerably during periods of 
conflict. However, overall risks increase for all groups due to unintended impacts.
One common way of analysing the impact of conflict is to disaggregate the different 
components of food security as discussed above and then examine the impact on 
these components (see also Seddon & Adhikari 2003). The various components of 
food security include entitlements and claims (production, exchange, social safety 
nets and political support like government supply, which includes the transportation 
and storage of food) and how they impact upon availability, access, utilisation, 
acceptability, and adequacy of food and food systems. The approach of capital or 
assets may also be combined by analysing which assets are lost by an individual, 
household or community due to conflict. In general, conflict may have an adverse 
impact on food security in the following ways. 
x Food production may decline.
x Exchange entitlement to food may decline.
x Overall physical availability of food may decline.
x Access to food may decline.
x Political claims on government or public resources (like food 
supply and medical services by the government, NGOs and other 
agencies) are reduced.
x Overall capacities, and, especially, the personal assets, of 
individuals and families may decline due to malnutrition and injuries 
FDXVHGE\WKHFRQÀLFW
x Lack of security generally, combined with food insecurity, can also 
lead to large-scale internal displacement and involuntary migration 
within Nepal and to India. These displaced people are not able to 
use their assets (like natural resources such as land, forest, water 
and so forth) for food-security related activities.
These are also the ways in which food security has been impacted in Nepal, and 
will be discussed in more detail later on.
4.5 Food security: A basic human right
Increasingly, food security is seen as a basic human right, and as a means of 
achieving other human rights. In 1953, the United Nations specified twelve elements 
for 'living', of which, food, nutrition and food security were the main elements (see 
Adhikari 2004). This is now being advocated mainly by NGOs and INGOs. Food 
security is considered a part of people’s economic rights. 'Freedom from the fear 
of hunger' is basic to all political and social freedoms of individuals. Considering 
food security from this perspective, it is the obligation of national governments 
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and international agencies to provide adequate food for the people. However, 
this has not been the approach of most of the bilateral and multilateral agencies 
like the World Bank. These agencies still subscribe to the idea that the market 
regulates food availability and ensures 'food security' to the people. On the other 
hand, these agencies still focus on the 'production' of food despite the fact that the 
world has more than enough food to feed its population. Bio-technology, including 
the production of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), has been promoted 
with the aim of producing more and nutritious food. However, this technology and 
the current free trade in agricultural products have led to the increased control of 
multinational and transnational companies (MNCs or TNCs) on food production 
and the consequent decline in food security and food production at the household 
(farm) and national levels in poor and developing countries (ActionAid 2005). This 
is also illustrated in Table 4.1.
There has been a decline in the share of developing countries in the international 
food trade in the last 30 years. They have become net importers of food, and their 
imports are increasing (FAO 2001). The price of the food stuff they export has been 
declining and fluctuating, creating hardships. As a result, their income, which could 
also be used to pay for food imports, has been declining. The increased control 
of the food system by a few multinational companies is creating a crisis in food 
security. The existing neo-liberal policy initiated in World Bank circles in the 1980s, 
and the other policies linked to that, represent the main political economic sphere 
worldwide; this has helped multinational companies to expand their tentacles 
around the world. 
Table 4.1 Concentration of corporate power: Control of top 10 companies of 
world market share (in 2005)
Sector Top 10 companies (in descending order of economic power)
Control over market share 
(by top 10 companies)
Pharma
3¿]HU*OD[R6PLWK.OLQH6DQR¿$YHQWLV
Johnson & Johnson, Merk & Co., AstraZeneca, 
F. Hoffman-La Roche, Novartis, Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb, Wyeth
59% market share of world’s 
GUXJ¿UPV
Animal Pharma 3¿]HU0HULDO,QWHUYHW'60%D\HU%$6))RUWDodge, Elanco, Schering-Plough and Novartis.
55% of the US$ 20,255 
million world’s veterinary 
pharmaceutical market
Bio-technology
Amgen, Monsanto, Genentech, Serono, Biogen 
Idec, Genzyme, Applied Biosystems, Chiron, 
Gilead Sciences and Medimmune.
75% of the global market
Seeds
Monsanto (with Seminis), Dupont, Syngenta, 
Groupe Limagrain, KWS AG, Land O’Lakes, 
Sakata, Bayer Crop Science, Taikii, DLF-
Trifolium, Delta and Pine Land. 
About 50% of US$ 21,000 
million commercial seed 
market
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Pesticides Bayer, Syngenta, BASF, Dow, Monsanto, Dupont, Koor, Sumitomo, Nufan and Arysta
84% of US$ 29,566 million 
global pesticide market
Food retail
Wal-Mart, Carrefour, Metro AG, Ahold, Tesco, 
Kroger, Costo, ITM Enterprises, Albertson’s, 
and Edeka Zentrale
24% of US$ 3.5 trillion global 
market
Food & 
Beverage 
Processing
Nestle, Archer Daniels Midland, Altria Group, 
PepsiCo, Unilever, Tyson Foods, Cargill, Coca-
Cola, Mars Inc and Groupe Danone
24% of an estimated US$ 
1.25 trillion global market of 
packaged food
Source: Based on ETC-group (2005, pp 1-10) 
To achieve food security, it is also essential that basic human rights are respected. 
In a place where there is no repressive regime, people can organise themselves 
and demand food or other basic facilities from the state. In such a place, the media 
can report on impending problems like famine. There will be public pressure to 
take decisions and steps taken to solve problems. However, these political actions 
are not possible in dictatorial or undemocratic countries. For example, famines 
have drastically declined in India since independence (Dreze & Sen 1990). The 
main reason for this, as argued by the authors, was the lack of political or public 
action taken during colonial times. Moreover, the colonial government destroyed 
the agricultural system and resource base that supported the food security of the 
people.
The growing realisation of the ‘right’ to food security has also been impacting on 
the policies of nation states, including Nepal. After the April 2006 revolution, social 
activists promoted the ‘right to food’ approach, in which the state is generally made 
responsible for protecting its citizens’ right to food/food security. Generally, the 
state’s role is to respect, promote and protect the right to food security of each and 
every citizen in the country. Accordingly, Nepal’s Interim Constitution 2007 has 
enshrined this right and it is reflected in the Interim Three Year Plan (2008–2010) 
of the Government. This makes the Government of Nepal responsible or liable 
(theoretically) if there is any individual who is food insecure.
4.6 Globalisation, food sovereignty and food security
Globalisation has made food security a complex problem. Its consequences can be 
seen in many different forms. Recent globalisation, aided by information technology 
and bio-technology, has led to the corporatisation of agriculture, which means the 
whole food chain has been increasingly controlled by the corporate sector. This 
has slowly destroyed local food systems. Firstly, because of globalisation, food 
systems have been increasingly controlled by TNCs (here TNCs and MNCs are 
taken interchangeably) through their direct control over resources like seeds and 
inputs (see Table 4.1) and through their farming (direct or through contracts) in 
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developing countries. Through this process, TNCs seem to control valuable 
resources like productive land and water. This production is targeted mainly at 
exports and cash income, which often compromises local food security. Secondly, 
the vulnerability of local farmers in developing countries is increasing as they are 
more exposed to, or affected by, the decisions taken in the world’s city centres, 
which control information, finances and political power and which are also the seats 
of international organisations and TNCs. These agencies are not accountable 
for the adverse impact they create as they themselves do not bear the burden 
of their decisions (for details see Yamuna Ghale's chapter in Adhikari & Ghimire 
2006 [2063 BS]). Different features of globalisation, like changes in food habits, 
the media and advertising, the development of technology, which favours the 
wealthy, state subsidies that support wealthy farmers and the corporate sector in 
a hidden manner, fashions and fads discouraging local products and the like, are 
also linked to the food insecurity of poor people. As a result of all these changes, 
the 'terms of trade' for products from the agricultural sector in developing countries 
are declining, as compared to those products from developed countries. In general, 
developing countries, including Nepal, have become increasingly dependent on 
developed countries for food. In particular, Nepal’s dependency on India for food 
is growing. As the food brought from India is cheaper because it is subsidised, it is 
also contended that it has been helping the food security of the poor. However, this 
chapter argues that such a dependency is detrimental to food security in the long 
run. When global food prices increased in early 2008, India imposed restrictions 
on the export of food to Nepal. The restriction was imposed because of declining 
production and food shortages in India. This clearly demonstrates that dependency 
on other countries for food is not beneficial in the long run. Hence, the concept of 
'food sovereignty' has been promoted, under which it is argued that a country should 
have the right to decide on the total food system and food security mechanisms. 
Total control over food production, resources (like seeds and inputs), processing 
and trade should remain within the country. Unless there is food sovereignty, the 
food security situation will not improve in a sustainable way. The focus on the right 
to food security must be combined with the right to feed oneself.
Globalisation has also led to the promotion of neo-liberal economic principles, 
in which the market is given a free hand and the larger corporate world is 
promoted. Under such policies, trade is expected to provide food security and the 
self-sufficiency of a country in terms of food production is not considered to be 
important. Most bilateral and multilateral agencies like World Bank, FAO and WTO 
now promote 'trade' as the main mechanism for meeting food security needs. As a 
result, liberalisation policies have been followed in the agricultural sector in Nepal, 
as is evident in the Agricultural Perspective Plan (APP). However, civil society, 
including NGOs and community based organisations (CBOs), now feel that trade 
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alone is not sufficient to ensure food security, and the concept of 'comparative 
advantage' does not hold good, at least not in the food sector, because it is related 
to people's lives. The following reasons have been put forward to argue against the 
principle that trade is the best way of solving food security problems.
x If a country depends on the international market for food, what will 
KDSSHQLQDVLWXDWLRQRIZDUDFFLGHQWVDQGDUWL¿FLDOVKRUWDJHVFUHDWHG
by businesspeople?
x Dependence on the international market for food means that people 
will lose the culture of farming and skills and knowledge about genetic 
and other resources (like seeds, terraces, irrigation, etc.). This culture 
or resources cannot be developed in a short span of time or when 
they are immediately needed.
x The world is divided into two main groups in terms of food trade: food 
exporting countries (a few developed countries) and food importing 
countries (mainly poor and developing countries, which are many and 
where a large part of the world’s population lives). The ability of the 
later to produce food and export it has been consistently declining. 
The terms of trade for the products of these countries have also been 
declining. If this situation persists, these countries will become poorer 
and their food production capacity and food security will be further 
reduced.
x Food related local cultural patterns and biodiversity will be lost. The 
changes in food habits requiring food that is not produced locally will 
undermine food security.
For the above reasons, it can be argued that it is too risky for a country like Nepal 
to totally depend on the international market for food security. Internal food self-
sufficiency is also important. Some of the components of the local food system 
that assist in increasing food security – like community control over resources, 
the production of a variety of foods within the home farm or community, easy 
access to seeds, an integrated and diversified farming system, cooperation within 
communities for resource management, and social safety nets – help to reduce 
vulnerability during times of crisis and increase food security (Adhikari 2000).
Globalisation is also affecting food security by creating employment opportunities 
in certain locations, for example, in urban areas, and in certain countries. As a 
result, people are increasingly moving to these locations. In Nepal, and other 
countries in South Asia, it is mainly the males that move out for such employment 
opportunities. The farming is then left in the hands of the women. As a result, 
the feminisation of agricultural is occurring. At the same time, the marginalisation 
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of women is also slowly growing as their control over the household economy is 
declining. The agricultural sector has also lost its vibrancy and productivity, further 
marginalising women. Women have become more disempowered than before 
in a real sense because society and families in rural South Asia now see less 
use for women in terms of economic rationality. This is one of the reasons for 
the declining population of women in areas (especially in India) where the green 
revolution has been successfully implemented. Dreze and Sen (1989) and Sen 
(2000) have written extensively on these issues in the context of India. How far this 
is happening in Nepal is difficult to analyse, but the tendency to migrate, internally 
as well as internationally, is also growing in Nepal. This migration is again male-
specific. For example, the Nepal Living Standards Survey conducted in 2003/04 
revealed that urban wages are higher than rural wages; hence, those who are able 
to migrate to urban areas have been able to reduce their poverty level (CBS 2005) 
(Thieme 2003). Food insecurity is one of the primary reasons for this migration. 
This is particularly true in the Mid-Western and Far West Development Regions 
of Nepal, from where there is a large movement of people to India for temporary 
and seasonal work. Migration to the Gulf countries and Malaysia is also growing 
due to both push and pull factors. This type of foreign labour migration seems to 
generate about NRs.75 to NRs.125 billion (US $1 to 1.3 billion) in remittances 
annually (Adhikari 2005). How far such employment opportunities will sustain and 
be beneficial to the Nepalese people is yet to be seen. However, studies have 
revealed that the poor people, who have not been able to fulfil their food security 
needs, have also not been able to migrate for foreign employment (Seddon et al. 
2001). They go to India, instead (Thieme 2003), where they also do not find many 
remunerative opportunities. Their strategy is, again, basic livelihood security, rather 
than an accumulative strategy.
Out-migration, which globalisation has made easy, may be taken as a way of solving 
problems related to poverty and food insecurity. Nepal also seems to have benefited 
tremendously from remittances. For example, the Nepal Living Standards Survey 
of 2003/04 reported that there has been a reduction in the poverty rate by 11 per 
cent in a period of 8 years (from 42% in 1995/96 to 31% in 2003/04), mainly due to 
remittances from formal as well as irregular migrants. But this study also revealed 
that the poorest 20 per cent of households have not been able to benefit from this 
opportunity as they lack the various resources (money, social networks and the 
like) to migrate for employment. Some of the poorest people may have succeeded 
in migrating to India, but they, in all likelihood, have not generated remittances as 
they are also marginalised there. A large proportion of migrants to India use all of 
their earnings just to live (see Adhikari 2006b). Moreover, reducing poverty may 
be one way to increase food security, as previously poor people can have income 
if they are moved out of poverty, which may enable them to purchase food, if not 
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to produce it. The other way to improve food security in a sustainable way is to 
develop a sustainable food system, in which everyone has access to healthy and 
culturally/individually suitable food. This food system may benefit from links to the 
global system, but, at present, globalisation seems to pose more problems than 
solutions. The provisions in the WTO and the present trend of TNCs and MNCs 
controlling various inputs and technology, the denial of farmers' rights in developing 
countries, bio-piracy, the commercial use of the resources of poor farmers, and so 
forth are posing problems for the development of sustainable local food systems.
Nepal became the 147th member of the WTO in April 2004. The Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) in the WTO is contentious with regard to food security and 
agriculture in developing countries. Nepal will also have to abide by the AoA, 
which limits the domestic support that a member can provide to the agriculture 
sector, except for some exceptions like 'Green Box’ subsidies and support to low 
income resource-poor farmers. To date, Nepal has not been able to use the limit 
for domestic support to agriculture (i.e., the AoA provides that 10% of agricultural 
gross domestic product [AGDP] can be given as domestic support and Nepal gives 
only 1.3% of AGDP for this purpose); hence, there is an argument that this will not 
hinder agricultural development in Nepal (see ActionAid and SAWTEE 2004). AoA 
impacts can be seen in terms of the impacts and consequences of the opening 
of the domestic market, market access, and export subsidies. As 83 per cent of 
the population in Nepal are involved in farming for livelihoods, the question arises 
as to how to protect them from providing market access to products from other 
countries. Cheap imports of food (as there will be no barriers created by tariffs), 
in the absence of other meaningful employment or income earning opportunities, 
will endanger farmers' livelihoods. One can argue that Nepal can also benefit from 
market access in other countries; but there are so many other barriers (mainly non-
tariff barriers like quality requirements) to access to markets in developed countries 
that Nepal has not been able to take advantage of this. The subsistence nature of 
farming in Nepal and lack of competitiveness is clearly a disadvantage in the new 
WTO context. This is one of the most crucial factors that will hamper Nepal and its 
food security in the future. 
The overall impact of the AoA will be seen when the subsidies are removed 
from this sector in developed countries. This will mean increases in the price of 
food produced in developed countries, which will give developing countries such 
as Nepal an incentive to increase food production and sell it in the markets of 
developed countries. This will create employment and increase wage rates in the 
farming sector, which will also enable labourers to purchase food, even if food 
prices increase. However, this does not appear to be a likely scenario as there has 
been disagreement on this issue until now.
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The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
is another contentious issue within the WTO. TRIPS has violated many areas 
of farmers' rights in developing countries. Under intellectual property rights, the 
person or agency that develops a new idea (product, technology, etc.) has the 
right to use it commercially, and others must pay to use it. If this is implemented, 
developing countries and their farmers will have to pay to use technology (including 
seeds and other) developed in advanced countries or by any individual or agency. 
Moreover, some of the modern technology developed in agriculture, especially 
in relation to seeds and other inputs, comes from the traditional knowledge and 
resources (e.g., local seeds, genotypes or biodiversity) conserved by farmers for 
generations. This is a gross violation of their rights. It will also limit farmers’ access 
to and ability to use modern technology and, as they are already dependent on 
these technologies, this inaccessibility will displace them from farming. As they do 
not have other opportunities for income or employment, their food security will be 
threatened. This is a violation of basic human rights – the right to become a farmer 
and to feed oneself (ActionAid 2005).
The impact of TRIPS and the control of modern seeds by the corporate sector 
is now clearly visible in developing countries like India. In Nepal, the effect has 
been less visible as commercial farming has not been that extensive in major 
crops. In India, a recent report stated that more than 600 farmers in one district 
(Vidarbha) of Maharastra state committed suicide in a year (June 2005 to June 
2006) because of loans and use of modern GMO cotton seeds from Monsanto 
Company. In Maharastra state alone 4,100 farmers committed suicide in 2004, 
while government officials reported that more than 8,900 farmers did so in four 
states since 2001 (The Himalayan Times, 21 July 2006). The basic reason is that 
farmers were encouraged to grow GMO cotton using seed from Monsanto, and 
then, in one year, the seed price increased four times. Other costs also increased. 
Farmers took loans from banks and private sources to meet their expenses, but the 
price of cotton declined, which caused heavy indebtedness. In Nepal, the use of 
hybrid seeds is growing, mainly in vegetable production. Very recently, hybrid rice 
seeds have also become popular in the Terai. There are long queues of farmers 
desperate to buy these new seeds coming from India. Similarly, farmers also buy 
many other inputs like fertilizers and pesticides. They know that the yield of the 
paddy from this seed will be high, but the plants from this seed do not produce 
seeds. This essentially means that in a few years time, local seeds will be lost and 
farmers will be dependent on seeds from India. If seed prices increase, which is 
also very likely, the scenario seen in India could be repeated in Nepal.
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4.7 Food security in Nepal
4.7.1 Availability of food
For the past several years, Nepal has not been self-sufficient in food, as its 
production growth rate is slower than the population growth rate. This is also 
evidenced by the food balance sheets of the country, and the country's net import 
of food grains and food items. As a result, food insecurity is the prime problem of 
the country, but it has not received the emphasis it deserves. Several reasons have 
been identified for the lack of sufficient food production in Nepal. The productivity 
of the land, reflected in the yields of food grains, has declined for some crops 
(especially in the hills and mountains) and stagnated for most crops. This should 
be viewed in the context of increased use of fertilizers, pesticides and other inputs. 
Lack of proper infrastructure like irrigation facilities and roads is blamed for the lack 
of improvement in agricultural production, but there is also a social reason for this. 
Agriculture, as a profession, now receives the least prestige (Adhikari 2000). It is 
a job for those who cannot find other types of work. Lately, it has been the work of 
the elderly and uneducated. This has resulted in a lack of innovation in agriculture. 
Because of the lack of good returns and the backwardness of agriculture, educated 
people are not interested in this profession. People are also hesitant to invest in the 
development of the agricultural sector. The increased labour migration of young and 
able-bodied persons has also contributed to this situation (Seddon et al. 2001).
The subsistence nature of agriculture is also blamed for the lack of rapid growth in 
agricultural production. From the perspective of food security, there is no problem 
with subsistence production. Rather, this form of farming system is considered 
beneficial for sustainable food security as it is least affected by market failures 
and the vagaries of prices and marketing conditions. Therefore, subsistence 
production is somewhat proofed against these problems, which can led to food 
scarcity and death from hunger. But the problem with Nepalese agriculture is that 
it is not subsistence in the true sense. The subsistence nature of agriculture has 
been eroded, as it is not able to feed most households for more than six months of 
the year. This is especially so in the hills. Landlessness, fragmentation of land, lack 
of irrigation, the improper use of inputs and environmental degradation are some of 
the reasons for the decline or stagnation in production.
Political instability and disharmony in recent times is also one of the reasons for 
food insecurity in Nepal. Due to political conflict, food production has severely 
declined in the hills and some mountain areas. A large number of young people 
have been displaced from their place of origin, caught in the conflict. Most of the 
food insecure districts are also conflict-affected districts. These districts, being 
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the hilly and mountainous districts, have been facing food deficits for a long time. 
But other income/livelihood opportunities like the trading of products made from 
local resources (like herbs, woollen clothes and other handmade goods, forest 
products, dairy products and the like) and seasonal migration had been helping 
to offset the accelerating deficits in food production. In addition, the supply of food 
through government channels (through Nepal Food Corporation [NFC]) and other 
development projects) had also been increasing to some extent.
Another major source of local income for these people is the wage employment 
created by development initiatives. This income had helped some groups to 
increase their entitlements. In a peaceful environment, there were no problems 
with transportation; therefore, food was available in the market centres. But, with 
the Maoist insurgency and the possibility of being caught between the CPN (M) 
and the military and with the regular bandhs and road blockades leading to the 
disruption of movement of goods and commodities, the whole system of supplying 
food and increasing entitlement was disrupted. Even though no data is available 
in this regard, various newspaper reports support the fact that the food insecurity 
problem is particularly severe in conflict-affected districts in Nepal. In general, food 
insecurity is growing all over Nepal. 
Food insecurity in Nepal is not a new thing. It existed even when there was 
enough production. However, previously, insecurity was seen mainly in the form 
of malnutrition. Lately, it has been seen in the form of hunger deaths. There 
are several reasons for the decline in food security in Nepal. These include, 
among others, a decline in agricultural output per capita because of the growing 
population, limited supply of resources like land, lack of basic infrastructure like 
irrigation and transportation facilities, and limited research and other services from 
the Government. A country which was a net exporter of food until the early 1980s 
now imports food. At present, it is estimated by the World Food Programme (WFP) 
that Nepal can meet only about 80 per cent of its food requirements. However, 
the Government estimates that food production in Nepal can meet the basic 
requirements of food for its population (see discussion below). Food production 
fluctuates depending upon the weather situation, and it has become a cause for 
concern. Lately, increased incidence of drought is leading to severe food insecurity. 
In early 2009, it was estimated by WFP that about 2.2 million people in Nepal, 
particularly in the Far Western and Mid-Western Regions, will face food problems, 
mainly because of the drought. Agricultural productivity has also been declining 
because of the unbalanced use of chemical inputs. On top of this, the conflict 
has exacerbated food insecurity in villages as it adversely impacted on both the 
production and distribution of food.
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Extent of deficit in food production
Nepal was considered a food secure country until the mid-1980s. This conclusion 
was drawn because food self-sufficiency was considered a criterion of food security 
by policymakers and planners in the past.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the proportion of the population experiencing 
food deficit has grown rapidly. Koirala (1992) estimates that 47 per cent of the 
population in the hills was under supplied (Koirala 1992): 23 per cent in the Terai 
and 31 per cent in the mountains. The high population density and the degradation 
of land and forest resources were considered as the main reasons for food deficits 
in the hills.
In 2002/03, government records on food balance by district showed that 43 of the 
total 75 districts of Nepal were not able to produce sufficient food to meet the 
minimum requirements of the people in these districts (Table 4.2). This shows 
that food production is a general problem. During this time, food insecurity was 
exacerbated by the conflict, especially in remote districts like in the Karnali zone 
(Adhikari 2008). Inaccessibility means that food prices are much higher, normal 
marketing channel non-existent and transportation often extremely difficult in 
these remote districts. During the armed conflict, the food security situation 
further deteriorated as food availability was obstructed due to restrictions on food 
transportation and distribution. The decline in availability caused an increase in 
food prices. The conflict resulted in a 30 per cent increase in the normal prices in 
the Karnali (Adhikari 2008). 
Food deficits are high in Nepal in the mountain districts and the Mid-Western and 
Far West Development Regions. These regions are also the traditionally food deficit 
districts. Out of 16 districts in mountainous regions, 13 were food deficit in 2002/03. 
In the hilly regions, 24 out of 39 districts were food deficit. In the Terai, there are 
20 districts, and only six were food deficit. This shows that food deficiency is most 
severe in mountain regions, followed by the hills (Table 4.2). The average amount 
of food deficiency is also highest in the mountain regions, where it is estimated 
that in 2002/03 the region suffered a food deficit of 39 kg per capita. In the hills, 
this figure came to about 24 kg per capita. In Terai, overall, food was produced in 
surplus (of 34 kg per capita (Table 4.3). The impact of conflict was also high in the 
mountain region, where local food production is generally not sufficient.
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Table 4.2 Food deficit districts in 2002/03
Ecological belt Eastern region
Central 
region
Western
region
Mid-
Western
region
Far West 
region Total
Mountain 1 (3) 2 (3) 2 (2) 5 (5) 3 (3) 13 (16)
Hills 3 (8) 6 (9) 6 (11) 5 (7) 4 (4) 24 (39)
Terai 0 (5) 4 (7) 0 (3) 1 (3) 1 (2) 6 (20)
Total 4 (16) 12 (19) 8 (16) 11 (15) 8 (9) 43 (75)
Note: Figures in parenthesis are total districts in each region/belt.
Source: (DoA 2004, pp 189-191)
Table 4.3 Belt-wise food availability and requirement of                        
 cereals 2002/03  (in MT)
Ecological belt Total population Total available Total requirements Balance
Mountain 1,728,288 262,764 330,102 - 67,338
Hills 10,568,028 1,867,328 2,124,176 - 256,648
Terai 11,665,965 2,511,374 2,111,542 399,832
Total for Nepal 23,962,281 4,641,466 4,565,820 75,646
Source: DoA (2004, p 188)
Food production, requirements and deficits in Nepal from 1990/91 to 2004/05 are 
given in Table 4.4. Considering the five main crops in Nepal, food availability in 
edible form (which essentially represents production) was declining in comparison 
to food requirements until 1998/99. Accordingly, food deficits were occurring and 
growing until then. The food deficit as a percentage of requirements fluctuates 
as it is also dependent on climatic conditions. In some years, favourable climate 
conditions lead to a bumper harvest, and, in other years, unfavourable conditions 
lead to a meagre harvest. Even in the past, when Nepal was a net exporter of food 
grains, it used to suffer from occasional food deficits. For example, in 1972 there 
was a severe drought, which led to very high prices for food grain. This happened 
again in the 1980s. This fluctuating production is another cause of food insecurity.
$V LV VHHQ LQ 7DEOH  WKH GH¿FLW UHDFKHG  SHU FHQW RI WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV
LQRUPHWULF WRQV)RRGGH¿FLWV LQ WKHHDUO\V WR
1994/95) were generally higher than in the latter half of the 1990s. On average, the 
GH¿FLWDVDSHUFHQWDJHRIUHTXLUHPHQWVGXULQJWKHSHULRGIURPWR
was 7.7 per cent, but from 1995/96 to 1998/99 it averaged only 2.8 per cent. For 
the years 1999/00 to 2004/05, there was a surplus production of 1.5 per cent to 4.4 
per cent. Again, favourable weather conditions are considered responsible for this 
increase in food production. 
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Table 4.4 Nepal's food requirements and production                                                
of edible food grain (in MT)
Crops 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99
Production 
Rice 1892105 1738013 1393697 1827110 1577820 1949761 2002747 2035725 2074193
Maize 877075 836564 1100452 837653 883267 929513 894779 940767 920094
Wheat 651956 603592 595998 687426 709304 786936 827438 806849 55647
Millet 190177 187700 194407 224958 219262 236478 236982 233764 238968
Barley 7642 7579 7572 7965 8107 11190 10641 10244 8710
Total 
production 3618955 3373448 3292126 3585112 3397760 3913878 3972587 4178077 4279491
Total 
requirement 3486776 3561838 3633724 3723722 3882915 3948229 4079135 4178077 4279491
Balance 132179 -188390 -341598 -138610 -485155 -34351 -106548 -150729 -181876
'H¿FLW
surplus - - 5.3 - 9.4 - 3.7 - 12.5 - 0.9 - 2.6 - 3.6 - 4.2
 
Crops 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
Production Rice 2259393 2356646 2294205 2271914 2455971 2358540
Maize 1007178 1001478 999831 1059751 1082455 1186840
Wheat 934559 914885 1008827 1069257 1105087 1151282
Millet 242331 231915 231714 231931 232373 237778
Barley 8478 8255 8472 8613 8485 8113
Total production 4451939 4513179 4543049 4641466 4884371 4942553
Total requirement 4383443 4430128 4463027 4565820 4671344 4779710
Balance 68496 83051 80022 75646 213027 162843
'H¿FLW + 1.5 + 1.8 + 1.8 + 1.6 + 4.4 + 3.3
Source: DoA (2006, pp 202–207) 
Even though recent trends (1999/00 to 2004/05) show improvement in food self-
sufficiency at the national level, the urban areas and food insecure areas continue 
to be dependent on Indian markets. In a study of urban food security, it is revealed 
that urban areas in Nepal (Kathmandu and Pokhara) depend heavily on Indian 
markets for all types of food grains, vegetables, fruits and other food products. 
Moreover, the distribution of food is controlled by a handful of businesspeople. The 
supply of food from government sectors in these towns where non-food producers 
live is almost negligible. Most people living in urban areas depend on income and 
employment for food security. For them 'income security' is most important, and 
there should also be the free flow and smooth marketing practices with regards 
to food. But, due to the current oligopoly in the control of food, food shortages 
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could also result from artificial shortages created by businesspeople. Kathmandu 
experienced such situations in 1982. Dependency on India for food may also 
make the urban population vulnerable to the vagaries of international politics and 
production conditions (Adhikari & Bohle 1999b; Adhikari 2006c). This was very well 
observed in Kathmandu when there was a strike in the Terai by Madheshi people in 
the second half of February 2008. On the other hand, the conflict-affected regions 
(like the Karnali) were impacted differently. There, the supply of food from outside 
was curtailed by the CPN (M) through the imposition of strikes and blockades and 
the extortion of both food and cash.
4.7.2 Access to food and its utilisation: Food consumption and nutritional 
status
One of the main features of food security, as discussed above, is the access to 
sufficient food by all people at all times. To examine whether this situation exists 
or not, surveys like health surveys, nutritional surveys or even food consumption 
surveys are conducted. The analysis of food consumption (or nutritional status) is 
more important than the analysis of food availability, as households not producing 
food may be consuming sufficient food through other exchange systems, like 
purchase, exchange of food for labour or other assets/property, member of a 
kinship group or other social groups having access to food, or by borrowing food or 
money to purchase food.
Various nutritional surveys conducted in Nepal reveal that the nutritional status of 
people, usually of children, has been deteriorating. A national survey conducted in 
1975 revealed that 48.1 per cent children suffered from chronic malnutrition and 
6.6 per cent children suffered from acute malnutrition. A survey conducted in 1995 
revealed that 63.5 per cent of children suffered from chronic malnutrition and 6 per 
cent from acute malnutrition. The Nepal Family Health Survey (NFHS) conducted in 
1997 revealed that 48.4 per cent of children suffered from chronic malnutrition and 
11.2 per cent from acute malnutrition. The Nepal Multiple Indicator Surveillance 
(NMIS) conducted in the same year found the figures to be even higher than this: 
53 per cent for chronic malnutrition and 16 per cent for acute malnutrition.
Nutritional surveys conducted in Nepal in 2001 and 2006 also reveal that nutritional 
status of people, especially of children, has been deteriorating. The recent surveys 
that are worth mentioning are the Nepal Living Standard Survey (2003/04) and 
Demographic and Health Survey, 2006. These identify the groups of people suffering 
from various problems related to food insecurity, mainly nutritional problems (see 
Table 4.5). Table 4.5 shows that about 40 per cent of people consume less than 
the required energy (2240 calories per day) in 2003/04. Stunting among children 
(below 5 years) remained more or less same in the period from 2001 to 2006, but 
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the incidence of underweight declined significantly, from 45 per cent to about 37 
per cent. However, the incidence of wasting grew significantly during this period. 
There is also a variation in the type of malnutrition according to ecological region 
and development region. In terms of calorie intake and stunting, Himal and hill 
regions suffer more. But in terms of wasting, the Terai seems to have the most 
severe problem. Similarly, the problem in Mid-Western and Far Western Regions is 
far more serious than in other regions.
Table 4.5 Poverty and food (nutritional) insecurity according to            
ecological and development regions  
Region Poverty 
Rate (%)
Population 
not 
consuming 
minimum 
calories 
(%)
Stunting among 
children below 5 
years (low height 
for age) (%)
Underweight 
among children 
below 5 years (low 
weight for age) (%)
Wasting (low 
weight for height) 
among children 
under 5 years age 
(%)
2001 2006 2001 2006 2001 2006
Nepal 30.8 39.9 50.4 49.3 45.2 38.6 9.6 12.6
Ecological 
zone
Himal 32.6 45.2 61.4 62.3 45.1 42.4 5.3 9.4
Hill 34.5 41.8 52.4 50.3 41.4 33.2 5.9 8.4
Terai 27.6 37.4 47.3 46.3 48.4 42.3 13.3 16.6
Development 
region
Eastern 29.3 37.6 47.6 40.3 43.4 32.9 9.1 10.1
Central 27.1 39.9 50.0 50.0 44.7 38.2 10.8 13.8
Western 27.1 37.2 50.1 50.4 43.4 38.5 8.9 10.9
Mid-Western 44.8 44.3 53.9 57.9 49.0 43.4 8.8 11.6
Far Western 41.0 44.9 54.0 52.5 48.9 43.7 8.8 16.7
Source: CBS, WFP & WB (2006); USAID, New Era, MoHP (2007)
The nutritional security or the status of nutrition among children is also dependent on 
many social factors, including the status of women and girls in society. This status 
is the accumulated effects of various other factors like violence against women 
and illiteracy, which in turn affect access to health and sanitation knowledge, the 
decision-making role of women, intra-household food distribution practices and 
fertility rates. The cultural practices that put women in a lower position reduce their 
empowerment within the family. Thus, they have less access to food and other 
resources. This leads to low health and food security for women. The children of 
such mothers also suffer from health and food insecurity.
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Poverty, food insecurity and their determinants
Poverty and food insecurity are interdependent. Poverty erodes entitlement to 
food, and, as a result, food insecurity may result, even if there is sufficient food. 
Employment and income opportunities can reduce the food insecurity of an 
individual. In the context of globalisation and free trade, income security is also 
considered important for food security. But the question arises as to whether or not 
trade is fair and free and whether or not there is a perfect market. Lack of free trade 
and various interventions in the market and its control by a few oligopolists have 
led to many unfavourable situations with regard to food security. Moreover, food is 
also a political weapon that can be used against a country that is not self-sufficient 
in food. 
Poverty in Nepal, measured by different indicators, is widespread, even though 
its concentration varies from one geographical region to another and from one 
group of people to another. Based on the data collected for the recent Nepal Living 
Standards Survey (2003/04) it is estimated that poverty has decreased by 11 per 
cent over a period of eight years (from 42% in 1995/96 to 31% in 2003/04), mainly 
due to remittances, increases in real wages in agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors, and urbanisation (CBS 2006; Table 5). However, it should be noted that 
remittances have been mainly enjoyed by wealthier households. The poorest 20 
per cent, whose income has not increased in recent decades, do not have access 
to remittances. Therefore, food security may not have improved for these poorest 
20 per cent of households. Between 1995/96 and 2003/04, the incidence of poverty 
declined by 8 per cent in rural areas (from 43% to 35%) and by 12 per cent in urban 
areas (from 22% to 10%). During this period, expenditure inequality widened. The 
income inequality between the rich and poor as measured by the Gini coefficient 
rose from 0.34 in 1995/96 to 0.41 in 2003/04. This indicates a sharp rise in 
inequality. The main reason for this growing disparity in income is the lack of access 
to remittances by the poorest 20 per cent of households, which is the main factor 
responsible for the overall increase in average per capita income of people, but 
which has happened due to a rapid increase in the income of wealthier households. 
The consumption expenditure of the bottom 20 per cent of people increased by 
only 22 per cent, whereas that of the upper 20 per cent of people increased by 64 
per cent. In 1995/96, the bottom 20 per cent of households constituted 8 per cent of 
total consumption expenditure, compared to 43 per cent by the upper 20 per cent. 
In 2003/04, these figures were 7 per cent and 49 per cent, respectively – revealing 
a growing gap.
The income poverty discussed above has many dimensions, including food 
insecurity. Food insecurity is the most common expression of poverty for the 
majority of households in Nepal. Despite the label of 'subsistence agriculture', most 
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households do not derive their full security from farming. Therefore subsistence 
farming and the consequent subsistence affluence is a myth in the context of 
Nepal. Food poverty is widespread in Nepal and reaches an annual peak during 
the 'hungry season' of April to July.
The spatial dimensions of poverty in Nepal also need attention. In line with the 
distribution of poverty, food security is also different in the different development 
regions. The most food insecure region in the country is the Far West Development 
Region, especially the Karnali zone, where hunger deaths in the late 1990s drew 
the attention of policymakers (1400 died during a famine in 1997). This incident 
also heralded the failure of development initiatives in the country. The districts, in 
which hunger deaths and food insecurity are chronic, also have the lowest human 
development index (HDI) in the country. As a matter of fact, there is a direct and 
rough correlation between food insecurity and HDI in the districts of Nepal.
Table 4.6 Poverty scale in Nepal in 1995/96 and 2003/04
Regions
 
Poverty headcount 
rate
Distribution of 
poor
Distribution of 
population
1995/96 2003/04 1995/96 2003/04 1995/96 200304
Nepal 41.8 30.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Urban 21.6 9.6 3.6 4.7 6.9 15.0
Rural 43.3 34.6 96.4 95.3 93.1 85.0
 
Kathmandu 4.3 3.3 0.3 0.6 2.6 5.4
Other urban 31.6 13.0 3.3 4.1 4.4 9.7
Rural western hills/mountains 55.0 37.4 32.7 23.6 24.8 19.4
Rural eastern hills/mountains 36.1 42.9 19.4 29.4 22.4 21.1
Rural western Terai 46.1 38.1 18.4 18.9 16.7 15.3
Rural eastern Terai 37.2 24.9 25.9 23.5 29.1 29.1
Development Regions
Eastern 38.9 29.2 21.0 23.4 22.5 24.7
Central 32.5 27.1 26.9 32.2 34.6 36.6
Western 38.6 27.1 18.7 16.7 20.3 18.9
Mid-Western 59.9 44.8 18.5 17.7 12.9 12.2
Far West 63.9 41.0 14.8 9.9 9.7 7.5
 
Ecological belts
Mountains 57.0 32.6 10.7 7.5 7.9 7.1
Hill 40.7 34.5 41.9 47.1 43.0 42.1
Terai 40.3 27.6 47.4 45.4 49.2 50.8
Source: CBS (2006)
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The determinants of poverty and food insecurity at the household level in Nepal 
vary, and they are also complex. In addition, these determinants do not act alone. 
The combination of these determinants may vary from one household to another 
and from one region to another. A study on the determinants of food security in 
rural Nepal revealed the following determinants (Adhikari & Bohle 1999a). 
x Access to resources: Access to land and water was the main factor 
affecting the risk exposure of households. Access to irrigated lowlands 
suitable for paddy cultivation was found to be most important. As the 
size of household landholdings is declining because of increases in 
population, and a large proportion of households already have small 
landholdings, other factors related to off-farm activities determine their 
ability to secure food.
x Ecological setting: The ecological setting determines the type of 
resources available in a certain locality. Harsh environmental conditions 
put people in a vulnerable position.
x Accessibility: Settlements in accessible areas have relatively better 
food security. Inaccessible areas face higher food prices. They were 
also found to be politically weaker, and, hence, unable to put pressure 
on the government and media for relief measures when faced with 
ODQGVOLGHVDQGÀRRGV
x Marketing opportunities: In areas where marketing opportunities 
exist to sell or exchange things that villagers produce, food security 
was comparatively better.
x Availability of common property resources: Common property 
resources like forest and pasture helped poorer households to derive 
a livelihood. In areas where common property resources existed, 
people were less vulnerable to various external and internal shocks 
OLNHÀRRGLQJODQGVOLGHDQGIDPLQH
x Family size and composition: Family size is strongly correlated with 
the consumption of food. Families with proportionately more children, 
and with sick and elderly people, were found to be in a more vulnerable 
position, i.e., consuming less food.
x Ethnicity: Particularly members of the occupational caste (Dalits) 
were found to be in a vulnerable position as they face discrimination, 
not only in their work, but also involving food preparation and access to 
resources.
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x Gender: Various cultural and political practices were found to make 
girls and women vulnerable to food insecurity. Lack of mobility, lack 
of access to education and family property, and customs those place 
women in a lower position than men make them vulnerable to food 
insecurity.
x Social network: Families without membership in well-to-do households 
are particularly vulnerable. Social networks were found to be important 
for obtaining relief during times of distress, and for access to off-farm 
job opportunities, both within and outside the country.
x Education: People with higher educational level were found to be 
relatively secure in food as they know about food and its availability, 
have knowledge about health and sanitation, and have information 
about the political process for obtaining food. Education was also 
found to increase the income of people and they had greater resilience 
to shocks and risks because of their knowledge and access to 
information. 
x Political assertiveness: Areas with high level of political assertiveness 
were found to receive various facilities from the government and were 
relatively food secure.
Even though the above determinants were directly related to food security at the 
household level, they are also the result of the national economic, social and 
political conditions. At the national level, economic growth rates have been rather 
slow to generate employment and income opportunities for poor people. Whatever 
has been generated has been mainly taken by higher-class people. During the 
period from 1976/77 to 1995/96, the overall growth rate (GDP) was about 4 per 
cent, a rate that only marginally exceeded the population growth rate of 2.37 per 
cent. During the same period, the growth rate in the agricultural sector was even 
smaller, less than 2.5 per cent and over the years has shown very inconsistent 
behaviour (Sharma 1994). However, it should also be noted that growth rates in 
total GDP and in agriculture have not been consistent. For instance, in the 1990s, 
the annual growth in real GDP varied from a low of 2.72 per cent in 1997/98 to a 
high of 7.90 per cent in 1993/94 (Ibid). But in 2001, GDP grew by only 0.8 per cent. 
While the growth of the non-agriculture GDP (NGDP) always remained positive, 
less variable and greater than the population growth rate, until 2000; negative 
growth rates have been recorded since then. This is partly linked to the political 
unrest created by the Maoist insurgency. The decline in the export opportunities 
for carpets and readymade garments is also equally responsible for this sorry 
state of affairs. Growth rates in agriculture GDP (AGDP) were negative in three 
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out of eight years in the period 1993 to 2000, and had a higher variability and 
were less than the population growth in five out of these eight years. Growth rates 
in agriculture vary because it is influenced by rainfall patterns, and a large area 
still lacks year-round water supply. The low and declining productivity of the land, 
the high population growth rate, and deteriorating environmental conditions are 
other reasons for the slow growth rates in agriculture. Despite these problems, the 
income from remittances has been propping up village economies. This income 
has acted as a main force to balance the current account deficit of the country. The 
income from remittances is estimated to contribute from 15 to 25 per cent of GDP, 
and, in 2001, approximately NRs.77 billion to NRs.110 billion is estimated to have 
entered Nepal (Graner & Seddon 2004, pp 29-54). But the conflict led to a lack of 
economic activities within the country, leading to the unemployment of many young 
people. Overall, the decline in agricultural production activities, transportation 
blockades, restrictions on trade, the restricted movement of food from one part of 
the country to another, blockades on selling village products to the cities leading 
to a lack of income for poor and marginal farmers, unavailability of food, increases 
in the prices of food, and the like were the results of the conflict that are directly 
related to food security.
Wage rates and food security
The wage rate in relation to food prices is one indicator of food security. As argued 
by Sen (1981), falling wage rates in comparison to food prices put wage earners 
and marginal farmers not producing enough food in a vulnerable position. These 
people now dominate Nepali society. Therefore, it is important to examine wages 
rates in relation to food prices and inflation.
In 2008, prices of food increased tremendously all over the world. It was a global 
crisis. Prices of food also increased at a high rate in Nepal. Prices of basic food 
items like rice, wheat flour and cooking oil skyrocketed. The price of cooking oil 
increased by about 50 per cent and the price of rice by 30 per cent in this period. 
As the poor already spent more than 75 per cent of their income on food, the 
increase in price directly reduced the amount of food and other non-food essentials 
they could purchase. As the expenditure on food increased, poor households had 
less to spend on other activities like healthcare and children’s education (Adhikari 
2008, p 4).
At the same time, the wage rate did not increase. Instead it fell because of 
unemployment and surplus labour. Because of this, people could buy less food. 
This increased the burden on elderly and children, which was seen in the form of 
their participation in workforce to generate extra income for food purchases. Poor 
parents took their children out of school to take part in income earning activities. 
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One of the reasons poor households felt the immediate impact of price rise was that 
they did not have the capacity to stock food. As a result, fluctuations in the price of 
food affected them. 
During the conflict (1996-2006), a similar kind of impact was seen. The conflict 
resulted in the increase of the prices of food because it imposed many risks on 
transportation. Businesspeople added all the potential risks and actual losses (like 
looting of food, taxes on trade imposed by Maoists, forced donations, etc.) onto 
the price of food. In the Karnali region, the prices of food were estimated to have 
increased by 30 per cent. At the same time, because of unemployment, in many 
places, the wage rate, in fact, declined absolutely. 
Even at present (2010), inflation of food prices continues in Nepal, even though it 
has declined drastically in other countries like India. Nepal faced a whopping 13  per 
cent increase in food prices in the first half of 2009. But wages have not increased 
at the same rate. Except for the minimum wages imposed by the Maoist’s trade 
union, wage rates have not increased significantly. In the informal sector, wages 
have not increased at all. As a result, most people complain about food being 
expensive in the market; the food crisis seems to be growing. 
4.8 Impact of conflict on food insecurity in Nepal
The armed conflict in Nepal, which took place from 1996 to 2006, led to the 
destruction of basic infrastructure, the internal displacement of people; the death 
of about 15,000 people; regular strikes (bandhs) and blockades of transportation, 
schools, offices, industry and trade; restrictions on the movement of people, goods 
and commodities; the extortion of money, food and other things from individuals and 
businesses, and the conscription of young people to serve in the rebel army. The 
main targets of the insurgents (people on whom these difficulties were imposed) 
were, of course, their political opponents, who were generally the wealthy/ruling 
class (class enemies). But as the conflict was guided by political ideology, the 
victims were all those who opposed their political thinking or those who did not 
support the rebels or the CPN (M) party (now the UCPN [M]). Even though, the 
‘revolution’ was meant to benefit, in theory at least, the poor or the working class, 
it seems that they also suffered much in the process. The severity of the problems 
experienced differed for different groups and regions. As the areas most affected 
by the conflict were already food insecure areas, it is difficult to separately evaluate 
the impact of the conflict. Nepalese society has always been impacted by violence 
of different types including gender violence, caste violence and other violence 
ingrained in the society (i.e., structural and cultural), which adversely impacts on 
food security, particularly of women, children and so-called lower caste groups. 
The different types of conflict and violence were working together, even during 
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the armed conflict. However, attempts have been made to identify the problems 
added by the armed conflict with regard to food security. Nepal suffered from food 
insecurity, even before the armed conflict. The added impact of the conflict on food 
insecurity is primarily discussed here.
There is only scant information on the consequences of the conflict on food security. 
Anecdotal evidence and observations made during visits to rural areas reveal some 
trends with regard to food insecurity. The primary information presented here is 
mainly drawn from author’s visits to rural areas during the conflict. The districts 
covered were Chitwan and Ramechhap (in Central Nepal) and Dailekh and Banke 
(in Western Nepal). The secondary information used here comes from various 
reports published in newspapers in the form of reports from the field.
Even though all seem to suffer from the conflict, it is mainly the poor, indigenous 
people (ethnic groups), elderly, children and women, and people in remote areas, 
especially the Mid-Western and Far West Development Region, who suffered the 
most from the conflict. Food insecurity caused by the conflict affected these people 
disproportionately. There was a variation in the intensity of the conflict from one 
region to another. Especially the hill and mountain villages in the Mid-Western and 
Far West Development Regions were adversely impacted as the rebels established 
their centres there. There is also a hypothesis that more Dalits and Janajatis were 
killed then other groups largely because their participation in People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) was disproportionately high as compared to other ethnic/caste groups. 
The counter insurgency unleashed by the Government security forces also 
adversely affected these regions. In general, urban areas suffered less because 
the rebels had no base in these areas, and they were also not in direct contact with 
the people in urban areas. However, cases of cash extortion were numerous in 
urban areas. In rural areas, people had to provide shelter, food and labour for the 
rebels. The armed conflict affected food security in a number of ways including: 
x Decline in production
x Decline in income and employment opportunities
x Loss of household members or their productivity
x Displacement
x Decline in food stock and other assets
x Reduced mobility of people, goods and services, and increases in food 
prices
x Increase in child malnutrition 
x Destruction of infrastructure and reduced basic services
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x Decline in natural assets and income from common resources 
x Decline in community trust and social safety net
x Reduced access to food and services from government and non-
governmental agencies
These impacts are discussed in the following sections.
4.8.1 Decline in production
Food production in Nepal has declined for various reasons related to the armed 
conflict. Direct threats and attacks (by the CPN [M] or the security forces), insecurity, 
and diminished access to land and other inputs have reduced the ability to undertake 
normal farming activities and have led to involuntary migration. Estimates of 
internally displaced persons vary from 50,000 to 400,000. It can be assumed that 
the land they left behind is underused, if not left fallow. Reduced availability of 
inputs and the increased cost of inputs have also reduced the production of food. 
Similarly, livestock production has also declined substantially due to the conflict. 
A study (sample study of displaced persons from different regions of Nepal) 
estimates that there has been a drop of 35 to 60 per cent in production on bigger 
farms and between 5 and 30 per cent on smaller farms since the conflict (Dixit & 
Sharma 2003, p 29). The same study revealed that 31 per cent of the khet (lowland, 
paddy land) was left fallow by displaced persons, whereas no khet was left fallow 
during peaceful times. Regarding khet (wet land), 46 per cent of displaced persons 
left khet to remain fallow, whereas in peaceful times only 1 per cent did so. With 
regard to pakho (dry land), 58 per cent of displaced persons left it fallow, whereas 
before only 0.2 per cent did (Ibid, p 22 and 23). Before displacement, 89 per cent of 
households raised cows, 80 per cent raised buffaloes, 44 per cent raised oxen and 
70 per cent raised goats. After displacement, this number reduced to 29 per cent, 
30 per cent, 13 per cent, and 24 per cent, respectively (Ibid, p 25). Similarly, there 
has been decline in agro-industries by almost half since the conflict. In Chitwan 
district, which is known for commercialised farming, regular bandhs and blockades 
made it difficult to transport goods to the market. Bandhs or blockades sometimes 
lasted weeks and there were a number of instances where farmers spilt their milk 
and a large volume of vegetables on the road in protest and in desperation. Poultry 
production was also severely damaged by the conflict. Once, when there was a 
long blockade in Chitwan, the price of chicken meat and eggs fell substantial in 
the local market. As Chitwan normally supplies these products to many places 
throughout the country, local demand alone was not sufficient to consume all of the 
produce. In Ramechhap district, farmers stopped doing various farming activities 
like weeding and hoeing for maize crops, because of labour shortages, as many 
young people had fled the villages. In Kailali and Bardia district, for example, the 
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CPN (M) captured more than 1500 bigha of land, which they allowed squatters to 
cultivate. But the squatters were too afraid to actually cultivate the land because 
they feared that the security forces might take action against them believing them 
to be CPN (M). As a result, this land has been left fallow (Chaudhary & Bhandari 
2005, p 18). 
4.8.2 Decline in income and employment opportunities
Because of the conflict, there has been a general decline in income and employment 
opportunities. Regular blockades, which prevented food supplies from reaching 
markets, especially district headquarters, reduced marketing opportunities, lack 
of mobility for trade and wage employment during farm off-seasons, reduced 
developmental activities, and reduced construction of infrastructure and houses 
has meant a decline in income and employment opportunities. The study conducted 
by Dixit and Sharma on displaced persons revealed that, on average, before the 
conflict, respondents employed farm labourers for 25 labour days (13 male and 
12 female) in a normal year. After they were displaced, respondents employed 
only 5 labour days (2 male and 3 female). This means that displaced landowners 
reduced labour employment by 20 labour days a year (Dixit & Sharma 2003, p 
17). The study reports that 67 per cent of the agricultural workforce had become 
jobless in the Far West Development Region and 10 per cent in the Mid-Western 
Development Region. Because of the high presence of Maoists in the Mid-Western 
and Far Western Development Region, labourers had cultivated the land (in the 
absence of landowners and often forced) and paid half of production to the local 
office of CPN (M) (Ibid, p 19). Before displacement, 78 per cent of landowners 
paid wages in cash, but after the conflict and displacement, only 32 per cent of the 
displaced paid wages in cash (Ibid, p 19). This essentially means a reduced ability 
to purchase food.
Wage employment opportunities have declined in general because of the decline 
in investment in agriculture, trade and commerce, development projects and 
infrastructure. As young men move away from the villages (IDPs are usually men), 
it is the women who have had to look after the children, run the farms, and deal 
with the problems created by the CPN (M). In some cases, women have had to 
voluntarily donate labour to the CPN (M) cause. Even those people who were not 
directly targeted by the rebels as ‘class enemies’, had to donate labour in the form 
of carrying goods and arms, and for development related works like road building.
For the poorest of the poor (who usually have no assets including land or who are 
marginal farmers), employment-based entitlements are the main source of food 
security. These entitlements in rural Nepal come mainly from farming. As farming 
112
were disrupted during the conflict, such employment opportunities have declined. 
Farming, as a whole, also declined because of external factors like international 
trade. On the other hand, even those who were carrying out farming as a way to 
utilise resources, reduced farming activities in the face of conflict and violence. 
4.8.3 Loss of household members or their productivity
The death of about 15,000 during the conflict, most of whom were income-earning 
adults, is a big setback for their households. In addition, the number of disappeared 
and injured has increased the dependent members in a household. Those widowed 
and orphaned by the conflict must have experienced significant personal trauma, 
as well as threats to their livelihoods. Households with this problem not only lose 
income, they also have to shoulder the additional burden of looking after the sick 
and injured. In 2004, the author conducted a study on the impact of the conflict on 
general livelihoods in Ramechhap district. It was reported that there were more than 
300 women widowed by the conflict. In general, widows (conflict related widows are 
generally young) were found to leave their husband house after some time. They 
face problems related to farming, child welfare and the inheritance of property. 
Family property generally goes to the son, and, if the son dies, to his widow. 
However, especially young widows find it difficult to assert their rights over the 
property of their husbands. Although she is legally entitled to her husband’s share 
of the family property, other family members fear that young widows might remarry 
and take their share of the family property to another man. Therefore, other family 
members create problems in sharing the family property. To escape this, young 
widows usually go back to their parent's family, if they have parents. But here they 
also cannot remain for long because the families of her brothers may not like her 
or may see her as a burden. There is also the possibility that these young widows 
may bring perceived shame to their parents and kin members by developing extra-
marital relations. Because of all these problems, these conflict-affected women 
often run away from their families and communities to live in places where they 
are not known. They usually end up in Kathmandu working in some degrading job, 
especially in the 'entertainment’ industry, for which no skills are required.
4.8.4 Displacement
The conflict has led to the displacement, not only of landlords (usually from the fear 
of CPN [M]), but also of poorer people (caught between the Government security 
forces and the Maoist). These include both families and individuals (usually male 
and politically active). The total number of internally displace persons (IDPs) is 
unknown, but some estimates suggest very large numbers indeed – possibly as 
many as 400,000 (e.g., Dixit & Sharma 2003) – and anecdotal evidence suggests 
that thousands a day crossed the border into India through checkpoints in the 
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mid western and far western Terai in 2002. These figures seem exaggerated, but 
there is no basis for reliable estimates (Seddon & Adhikari 2003). The scale of the 
phenomenon is such, however, that it must have had some impact on farming in 
the areas, districts and villages from which these internally displaced/involuntary 
migrants have come.
Box 4.1 Internally displaced families in Nepalgunj
Kitthe Lohar, a blacksmith of Khamle-2, Mugu, was asked by the CPN (M) to leave his sick wife at 
KRPHDQGZRUNIRUWKHP7KLVZDVDERXWQLQHPRQWKVDJR.LWWKHÀHGWKHYLOODJHFDUU\LQJKLVVLFN
wife (in a bamboo basket) on his back and a child on his chest. Walking eight days he reached 
Mangalsen and then went on to Nepalgunj. Now living in a hut, he is still facing the problem of his 
wife’s illness. The child does not eat anything. He had left behind two cows, two oxen, a buffalo and 
D¿HOGSURGXFWLRQRIDIHZ0XULVSDGG\1RZKHGRHVQRWKDYHDQ\WKLQJWRHDW+HGRHVQRWNQRZ
how to treat his wife. His loan has amounted to NRs. 1,370.
There are 216 families displaced from the Bheri-Karnali that are now (2005) living in Nepalgunj. 
Most of them have no means of feeding their families. Among them is a 65-year old lady Nandakala 
Budha who escaped with her son by walking at night. Most of these families are not able to secure 
their basic food requirements. Somewhat earlier, the Nepal Red Cross Society had distributed 135 
quintal of rice to 141 families living there.
Among these 216 displaced families, 73 are from Mugu, 63 from Dailekh, 40 from Jajarkot, 23 from 
Surkhet, 9 from Kalikot, 4 from Jumla, 2 from Humla, 1 each from Salyan and Bajura. Among them, 
PRYHGRXWDVDGLUHFWUHVXOWRIWKHFRQÀLFWDQGEHFDXVHRIVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFSUHVVXUH
DQLQGLUHFWUHVXOWRIWKHFRQÀLFW7KH1HSDO5HG&URVVLVRIWKHRSLQLRQWKDWWKHVHGLVSODFHGSHRSOH
should be returned to their original villages instead of giving incentives to live in displaced camps. 
Because of the rumour that one can live in the camp with free meals, more and more people are 
coming to live in the camps. But the displaced persons say that they will be killed if they return. They 
do not believe that there will be peace in the villages (Gautam 2005, p 1).
Displaced people have also been fleeing to India, where they have created effective 
competition among themselves. As a result, they have had difficulty in getting 
employment. Wage rates are said to have dropped by about 25 per cent because 
of the competition. Moreover, most displaced Nepalis end up in slums, where there 
are already so many problems.
Displacement coupled with migration has adversely affected farming in the villages. 
The displacement and migration induced by the conflict is male specific, because 
it is politically targeted. As it was mainly men who were politically active, it was 
mainly men who had to leave the village because of the conflict. This resulted in 
the feminisation of farming. From time to time, there are reports of women doing 
farming activities that are ritually denied to them or that had been considered too 
hard for women. For example, ploughing (culturally considered to be a man’s job) 
or roofing the house (which is physically difficult), and the like. Women have taken 
on these tasks out of necessity to grow crops for their family, the alternative being 
hunger.
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4.8.5 Decline in food stock and other assets
It is a common fact that the CPN (M) and the Government security forces have 
extorted food from households. Extortion by the Maoist was more common than by 
the security forces. CPN (M) not only demanded food grains from households, but 
also lived in family homes in large numbers. This caused the depletion of household 
food stores, leading to food insecurity.
4.8.6 Reduced mobility of people, goods and services, and increases in 
food prices
A major impact of the conflict was the reduced mobility of people; restrictions on the 
transportation of food and goods; and reduced availability of other services. The 
result has been a decline in income (as mobility for wage employment and trade is 
one source of income) and an increase in the price of food stuffs. The usual flow 
of imports into the rural areas, including, notably, imported food stuffs, has been 
hampered by restrictions of various kinds imposed by both the security forces and 
the CPN (M), and by general insecurity. The CPN (M) taxed the flow of commodities 
and, in some cases, looted food stuffs being transported. Both the Government and 
other public agencies (like NGOs/INGOs and international agencies) as well as 
private traders stopped or reduced supplies of food to conflict-affected areas, which 
also happened to be food deficient districts in normal times. These districts (mainly 
in the Far West and Mid-Western Development Regions, particularly the upper 
Karnali), which used to depend on imported foods, experienced severe problems in 
obtaining food from Government stores and shops.
In Ramechhap district, for example, the conflict caused food insecurity. There 
were constant blockades of the district headquarters to increase the pressure on 
the Government. During the blockades, goods could not be supplied to markets, 
particularly headquarters. Similarly, goods from the markets could not be distributed 
to customers in the villages. Because of this, farmers were not able to sell their 
goods from time to time. In this district, farmers had kept dairy animals (cows 
and buffaloes) for the production of milk, which was sold in a co-operative. The 
co-operative then supplied the milk to Kathmandu. But because of the frequent 
strikes, people could not sell raw milk to the co-operative. As a result, they started 
producing ghee from the milk, as ghee can be stored for a long time. Profit from 
ghee was low compared to that from the sale of raw milk. Similarly, small farmers 
and poor people have been discouraged from increasing the production of goats, 
vegetables and other produce because of transport strikes. In Ramechhap, strikes 
and blockades were more frequent than in other places. The CPN (M) did not have 
good relationship with the only transport company that ran in the area, which failed 
to meet the CPN (M’s) demands for donations. This resulted in frequent blockade 
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and the destruction of vehicles. It is reported that the CPN (M) demanded NRs. 
1 lakh per vehicle per year, which was considered too high by the company. It 
is mainly because of the conflict that prices of food grains increased. The WFP 
monitor in Ramechhap reported that 18 of the 55 VDCs in the district have faced 
chronic food insecurity. These monitors also record food prices. At the time of the 
survey, food prices had increased in Ramechhap because of blockades in Sindhuli, 
which supplied food to Ramechhap. For example, the price of rice was NRs.115 
per pathi (normal price was NRs.80-90), maize NRs.60 per pathi (normal price 
was NRs. 35-40), wheat NRs.40 per pathi (normal price was NRs.25-30). A similar 
situation was also seen in Dailekh. At one time there was a continuous blockade 
for two-months, which led to significant price increases. At that time, the price of a 
30 kg bag of rice increased to NRs.840 from NRs.640; dhal to NRs.60 per kg from 
NRs.35; kerosene to NRs.50 per litre from NRs.25 per litre; and sugar to NRs.45 
per kg from NRs.35 per kg. The blockades also caused problems in the supply of 
products from villages to markets like Dailekh bazaar. Farmers were not able to 
sell perishable products like vegetables and milk. As food could not go from the 
bazaar to the villages, there was no option except to buy food from local landlords. 
From time to time, the Government security forces also imposed restrictions on the 
supply of goods to the villages. A villager could only take a pair of batteries and 15 
kg of food to the village. This was done to curtail supply to the CPN (M), but it also 
created shortages.
Box 4.2 Food shortages in Diktel
Diktel residents have not been able to come to terms with the attack on the headquarters of Khotang 
district. They fear another attack by the CPN (M). Residents also fear food shortages and the high 
prices of commodities. Now (2005) the CPN (M) do not let them bring foods and other things 
from the villages to the headquarters and there are problems in transporting goods and food, it is 
done only by porters as there is no road from Gaighat. Thus, food is becoming scarce. The Nepal 
Food Corporation has not been able to supply enough food to the people. Those who come to 
the headquarters with a gunny bag for the collection of food, return home empty handed. There 
is famine in the village. It is expensive to buy food. The Government quota is just wishful thinking. 
Nowadays, people from the villages do not come to town, and even if they do come, they don’t stay. 
7KHUHDUHQREXVLQHVVDFWLYLWLHVDVLQWKHSDVW1RZLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRVXUYLYH7KHWRZQLVGHSRSXODWHG
as entrepreneurs and businesspeople have deserted it. There are only four telephone lines from 
which one-way communication is made. Very occasionally helicopters come. There are about a 
thousand porters and eight hundred donkeys for transportation. They are also stopped on and off 
by the rebels. As a result, food has become expensive. The price of food (NRs. per kg): rice – 80, 
maize, millet and wheat – 35, dhal – 90, salt – 30, mustard oil – 120, and kerosene – 70. At present 
only about 15 per cent of the food is being transported, compared to normal times.
Source: Magar & Rai (2005, p 1) – an article in Kantipur Daily, 20 July 2005
4.8.7 Child malnutrition
Nutrition experts have been concerned that the conflict has worsened the state of 
child malnutrition. The constant migration and displacement of villagers has made 
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the problem worse. The children of displaced people need to cope with new food, 
and it is difficult for them to adjust. Displaced people are generally not able to 
afford green vegetables or enough rice and feed their children dry, non-nutritious 
foods lacking vitamins and protein. In conflict-affected areas, food insecurity and 
deficit consumption has adversely affected children. It is reported that about 90 per 
cent of children in conflict-affected areas (i.e., defined by the government as areas 
intensively affected by the armed conflict) suffered from chronic malnutrition. The 
problem got worse because whatever nutrition projects were operating in conflict 
areas were gradually phasing out as more organisations shifted towards conflict 
related humanitarian and relief work (Newar 2005, p 11). In Nepal, 70 per cent 
of child deaths are indirectly a result of malnutrition. Protein-energy malnutrition 
affects 63 per cent of Nepali children, which means they do not get enough food 
to maintain normal physical and mental functions. More than half the children 
have stunted growth (see Table 4.5). These children may also suffer from learning 
disabilities. A report indicates that the above stated problems, along with other 
problems like underweight among the children had increased among the conflict-
affected families (Newar 2005, p 11).
4.8.8 Destruction of infrastructure and reduced basic services
During the armed conflict, infrastructure like bridges, community buildings 
(especially VDC buildings), and government offices were destroyed. Government 
staff providing services to the people were displaced to district headquarters. 
Banks and financial institutions closed their operations in rural areas and moved 
to urban areas. Villagers were then deprived of all types of services – financial, 
health, security, agricultural extension, veterinary services and the like. As the 
moneylenders were also displaced, loans were not available in rural areas. People 
in general did not extend loans. The lack of services caused problems for many 
people. For official work (e.g., to meet the VDC secretary), one had to travel to 
the district headquarters, which meant spending one or two days and staying in a 
hotel. This increased the burden on people. Money which could have been used 
for food was diverted to such wasteful activities. It is difficult to objectively verify 
how much these things happened, or estimate the cost of such inconveniences 
and hardships. Some attempts were made in the past to measure the economic 
cost of the infrastructure damage. Karki and Bhattarai have estimated that about 8 
to 10 per cent of GDP has been lost (Karki & Bhattarai 2003, p xiv). This could be 
roughly US $ 694.44 million. Another estimate revealed that the cost of repairing 
infrastructure damaged during the 15 months of the emergency alone is about US 
$ 30 million (Grosney 2003). Still another estimate claimed that the conflict or the 
‘people’s war’, as it is generally called, led to loss of 2 per cent in economic growth 
rates. 
Food insecurity, conflict and livelihood threats in Nepal
117
Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal
4.8.9 Decline in natural assets and income from common resources
During the armed conflict, the condition of community forests declined. This was 
driven by both the rebels and the Government security forces. The rebels disturbed 
the activities of community forestry by forcefully taking the income from forests. 
Many community forest groups were pressured by the rebels to fell trees and the 
income would go to the rebels. The Army also destroyed the forest so that they 
could have a better view of the rebels. In areas where Army camps were located, 
the Army feared that the forest in the vicinity would provide shelter for the rebels, 
so they destroyed the forest. Again, this is based on anecdotal evidence and 
observation; there is no objective data to support this fact.
The other common process through which poor people, especially in the hills and 
mountains, suffered is due to the rebels’ control of non-timber forest products 
(NTFPs), especially herbs. The rebels either collected valuable herbs by themselves 
or charged a heavy duty on the collection of herbs by the people. Access to herbs 
had been a source of ‘exchange entitlements to food’ for the people, but this was 
reduced tremendously during the armed conflict. NTFPs were one of the main 
sources of income for the rebels. In districts like Mugu, Dolpa, Jumla, Bhajhang 
and Humla where NTFPs were available, the rebels’ main concern was to control 
NTFP collection and trade.
4.8.10 Decline in community trust and social safety net
The activities of the rebels, and their indoctrination about class interests led to 
the decline of many forms of community based cooperation and social safety net 
mechanisms. The traditional moral economy was largely seen as a mechanism 
to exploit the underclass. There was suspicion about who was working for the 
rebels and who was working for the Army. This suspicion was the main reason 
for the decline in cooperation. As a result, the maintenance of traditional irrigation 
channels, trails, water sources, forests and pastures was not done. Villages started 
to look deserted. Landlords stopped traditional relations of bista (long-term labour 
employment relations). The micro-credit associations stopped functioning. People 
divided what was saved and the co-operatives were dissolved.
4.8.11 Reduced access to food and services from the government and non-
governmental agencies
The conflict-affected areas were also food insecure areas even before the conflict. 
There were a number of programmes to help people secure food and improve 
nutritional standards. The Government’s main institution for supplying food to 
people was the Nepal Food Corporation (NFC). Since the 1990s, it had continued 
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providing transportation subsidies in remote districts not touched by roads. Even 
though its activities were reduced due to the Government’s economic liberalisation 
policy, it had continued to supply some food to these areas. But the conflict led to 
the ceasing of its operations in these areas. Food was transported to the target area 
through local means (such as porters or pack animals like donkeys) and surface 
transportation. This was cheaper than airlifting the food. The general practice was to 
transport food by vehicle as far as possible and then use either porters or donkeys. 
But this system was vulnerable to hijacking by the rebels. After a few cases of food 
looting by the rebels, the Government started to airlift food. This increased the 
cost of food supply, and, thus, reduced the total volume of food supplied to remote 
areas. This was also the case with the various programmes launched by NGOs, 
INGOs, donors and UN agencies. When the staff of such agencies were killed 
or tortured, these agencies pulled their programmes from conflict-affected areas. 
In general, many donor agencies reduced their programmes in the conflict zones 
because of the risk to personnel working in such areas. This reduced the services 
and support (including food) available from government and other agencies. As a 
result, people’s entitlements to food declined.
4.9 Government responses to food security needs
The concept of food security has only recently been introduced in government 
policies and programmes. This lack of emphasis on food security is linked to the 
assumption held until recently that food production would lead to food security. 
Accordingly, policies in the past aimed at increasing the production and productivity 
of crops. Accordingly, until the 1970s, the words ‘food security’ do not appear in the 
government reports and documents. In the late 1970s, Nepal adopted a policy of 
providing basic needs to the people. Since the 1980s, the concept of food security 
has gained momentum. It is now increasingly used in development discourse and 
in practice. But, at the same time, the liberalisation policy adopted in the mid-
1980s and emphasised since the 1990s reduced the scope of some of the public 
food distribution mechanisms (i.e., NFC) for food security. This seems against the 
spirit of the 1990 Constitution, which envisions Nepal as a welfare state, and in its 
directive principles the Government of Nepal is supposed to work for the welfare 
of people, which also includes meeting their food security requirements. During 
WKHDUPHGFRQÀLFWWKH*RYHUQPHQWKDGQRVSHFLDOSODQWRPHHWWKHIRRGVHFXULW\
QHHGVRIFRQÀLFWYLFWLPV7KHUHZDVVRPHVXSSRUWIRULQWHUQDOO\GLVSODFHGSHRSOH
but this again went to the politically powerful. The Government was wary of the fact 
WKDWIRRGVHFXULW\SURJUDPPHVLQFRQÀLFWDIIHFWHGDUHDVJDYHWKHUHEHOVDFFHVV
WRIRRG$VDUHVXOWWKHUHZHUHUHVWULFWLRQVRQWKHWUDQVSRUWDWLRQRIIRRGWRFRQÀLFW
DUHDV(YHQGXULQJWKHFRQÀLFWWKH*RYHUQPHQWFRQWLQXHGZLWKWKHOLEHUDOLVDWLRQ
policy pursued since the early 1990s.
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The full impact of liberalisation principles can be seen in the Ninth Five Year Plan 
(1997-2002), which embraced the APP as the strategy for agricultural development 
and food security. This plan aimed to bring about a broad-based growth in the 
economy and to reduce poverty and food insecurity. The long-term concept 
of the Government in the Ninth Five Year Plan regarding food security through 
government support includes: 
x To create an environment for the regular, adequate and accessible 
supply of essential goods
x To monitor the quality, availability and price of essential goods to 
protect consumers’ rights
x To make arrangements for food security through maintaining the buffer 
stock of food at the regional level
x 7R SUHYHQW EODFN PDUNHWLQJ FUHDWLRQ RI DUWL¿FLDO VKRUWDJHV DQG
SUR¿WHHULQJ RQ FRQVXPHU JRRGV LQ JHQHUDO DQG HVVHQWLDO JRRGV LQ
particular
The policies adopted in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007) seem to be a 
continuation of the Ninth Five Year Plan. The main objective of this plan is to 
reduce poverty through broad-based economic growth. In agriculture, this has been 
emphasised by following the APP. Apart from mentioning that the Government would 
continue to supply food, salt and sugar to remote areas, there is no specific policy 
related to food security. Similarly, this plan aims at reducing the burden of subsidies 
in remote areas by improving agricultural production, resource management, skill 
development and employment opportunities. The Government also has a plan to 
encourage the establishment of cheaper stores through people's co-operatives.
Despite a clear lack of an action plan, there are, however, some governmental and 
non-governmental programmes to provide some targeted food security measures. 
These are discussed here below.
4.9.1 Transport subsidy are food grains for people in remote areas
The NFC is mainly responsible for providing food to remote food deficit areas. 
The Government provides a transport subsidy for this work. NFC was developed 
from an institution created to supply food to the security forces; later, it supplied 
cheap food to civil servants. In 1972, when there was famine in the Karnali region, 
this institution (under a different name at that time) was given the special task of 
airlifting and distributing food in that region. In 1974, the NFC was created and the 
task of supplying food (with transportation costs subsidy) was expanded to other 
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food deficit districts. The Government earmarks part of the budget every year to 
NFC (via the Ministry of Supply) to provide transport subsidies. Until now, the NFC 
has been providing food (subsidised) to 38 remote districts. The main concern with 
the NFC is that it is neither cost effective nor do its services reach the neediest 
people. The liberalisation policy adopted since the 1990s has also reduced the 
scope of the NFC’s work. 
4.9.2 Food-for-work programme
The Rural Community Infrastructural Works (RCIW) programme is a major 
programme that provides food for labourers working to develop infrastructure 
required for the community. The RCIW helps in creating seasonal employment 
for villagers. Beneficiaries are employed in developing sustainable infrastructure 
identified as necessary by the communities themselves, particularly the poor and 
women. Literacy and other social activities are also carried out in order to empower 
people and improve the management of infrastructure. This is done to improve the 
participation of people, because it is generally felt that food-for-work is a service 
delivery programme. It is estimated that every year about 30,000 unskilled labourers 
participate in this programme. They are paid food rations and some cash for the 
work performed. About 10,000 metric tons of food is provided annually through 
this programme. This programme is being implemented in 25 districts. In recent 
times, some donors (particularly DFID) have withdrawn support for the Food-for-
Work programme, claiming that the infrastructures developed by local people are 
generally of poor quality. As a result, the coverage of this programme has been 
reduced.
Even though the Food-for-Work programme is primarily helpful in meeting short-
term food deficits, like that of the NFC's food supply, the RCIW also assumes that 
its programme will lead to long-term food security. Increases in accessibility due 
to road construction, conservation of resources like prevention of river cutting, the 
protection of land and the like, will lead to food security in the long run. Even though 
the programme is criticised for undermining self-help initiatives, it provides a useful 
service to the poorest of the poor who basically become paid volunteers under the 
programme.
Other programmes incorporating the principle of 'food for work', whether paid in 
cash or in food, have been implemented in the country. They are, in general, small 
and scattered in different places. A few programmes of this nature have also been 
implemented in conflict-affected areas, but their impact and coverage has been 
minimal.
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4.9.3 Other programmes
Programmes like 'school feeding' and 'relief and emergency operations' have been 
implemented as a part of food security for children and to reduce vulnerability 
during the crisis in Nepal. The World Food Programme provides support for the 
school feeding programme in 12 food deficit districts, in which the Government is 
also implementing the Basic and Primary School Programme. During emergencies 
created by natural disasters, food is also provided to the victims under the 'relief 
and emergency operations' programme.
There was no specific programme to help improve food security in conflict-affected 
areas. Rather, the conflict became an excuse to reduce programme activities. For 
example, international agencies suspended supplying food to the areas because 
the CPN (M) looted their supplies. The Government turned a blind eye to the food 
insecurity problems caused by both sides of the conflict (the security forces and 
CPN [M]). Programmes designed for normal circumstances faced problems in 
reaching needy people during the conflict. The food distributed often did not reach 
the target groups. If targeting is not good, there are problems in improving access 
to food. Targeting can be done at different geographical levels – from the region 
and the district to the VDC and settlement levels. Different indicators need to be 
developed and regularly updated to target different food insecure geographical 
units. At present, the NFC uses the accessibility criteria for targeting. In accessible 
areas (by road), the NFC does not provide any subsidy for transportation. In 2007, 
WFP developed a programme to improve food security in areas previously affected 
by the conflict. 
Increasing food production by marginal or landless farmers has also been one of 
the approaches to reducing food insecurity. This production could be for home 
consumption or for sale. There are different programmes in Nepal aimed at achieving 
this. These programmes include the APP-SP (Agriculture Perspective Plan-Support 
Programme) and activities to increase access to land initiated by various INGOs 
and NGOs like Plan International and the Government’s Poverty Alleviation Fund 
(PAF), Community Self-Reliance Centre (CSRC). PAF has received support from 
various bilateral and multilateral organisations like the World Bank. In the APP-SP, 
small and marginal farmers are organised into groups and grants are given for 
small infrastructure and support. Similarly, other programmes help women, poor, 
and marginal and landless farmers to form groups and lease land and provide 
other support for farming, mainly vegetable farming. Various NGOs have also been 
implementing these types of activities. However, these activities have not achieved 
much success because the land they lease is not their own so they do not want to 
invest in it.
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4.9.4 New emphasis on food security, especially for conflict victims
Since the Jana Andolan in April 2006, the popular revolt that led to political change 
and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government 
and the rebels in November 2006, more emphasis has been given to food security. 
The increase in the influence of civil society in policy making and the Government’s 
commitments in international agreements to recognise food security as a basic 
human right have effected a policy change in this area. ‘Food security’ is now 
considered a basic human right. The Interim Constitution 2007 and the Interim 
Three Year Plan 2008-2010 have given priority to food security. The Interim Three 
Year Plan aims to meet the food security targets envisaged in the Millennium 
Development Goals, i.e., reduce the number of food insecure people by half in 15 
years (by 2015). This Plan has called for an increase in investment in food security. 
However, there is still no concrete action-plan and resource allocation to meet this 
target. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the international 
community (and in particular the WFP) has also shown concern to meet the food 
security needs of conflict-affected people. 
One of the main aims of donor activity in food security is to meet short-term needs 
related to food. This approach generally avoids the ‘livelihood approach’ to meeting 
food security. This means that sustainability in food security in conflict-affected 
areas (which are also traditionally food insecure areas) is still in question. The 
short-term concern of the donor agencies is not helping the sustainable food 
system; as a result, food deficit area’s dependency on external food aid is growing. 
At the same time, more and more people are now facing food security problems. In 
2009, about 2.2 million people were reported to be facing food security problems 
(The Kathmandu Post 3 June 2009, p 1 and 25 May 2009, p 7). 
4.10 Conclusion and recommendations
Food insecurity has been a major problem in Nepal, even before the armed conflict. 
The structural violence rooted in Nepalese society has put people from certain 
geographical areas, women, Dalits (so-called low caste), and some indigenous 
peoples in a vulnerable position. The conflict accelerated the food insecurity 
already existing in the country and among insecure groups. Even though the rebels 
intended to create problems only for certain groups, especially those considered 
to be ‘class enemies’ and those not supporting rebels activities, the conflict also 
impacted directly and indirectly on already food insecure groups. These groups 
became more vulnerable during the conflict. In addition, new groups who were 
previously relatively well off in terms of food security, became vulnerable and food 
insecure during the conflict. Moreover, the conflict had a disproportionate impact on 
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different geographical areas. The impact was more severe in remote and isolated 
areas (like the Mid-Western and Far West Development region, where the Maoists 
had their stronghold), as compared to urban and more accessible areas. 
The chapter concludes that there is insufficient empirical information and 
theoretical understanding to explain food security/insecurity during the armed 
conflict. The ‘livelihood approach’ seems useful as it focuses on both short-term 
(risk to lives) and long-term (risk to livelihoods) vulnerabilities. But this approach 
is also incapable of understanding food security during the armed conflict as it 
does not adequately take into account illegal activities and changes in people’s 
entitlements due to changes in their social-political and economic positions. In such 
a situation ‘vulnerability’ is better understood in terms of which individuals or groups 
have entitlements at a particular time. Conflict also increases risks generally and 
different groups bear these risks differently. Accordingly, their entitlements are also 
affected according to the risks they bear. But conflict periods also fluctuate widely, 
and this requires constant monitoring of the entitlement situation. Accordingly, 
‘food aid’ should target those who lose entitlements. Asset position or ownership 
of assets may not be sufficient criteria for targeting the beneficiaries of such aid. 
However, asset position may be a good indicator of who may be able to cope with 
and recover from the shocks of conflict once the conflict is ended, i.e., when people 
are capable of using their livelihood assets. In normal conditions, however, the 
‘livelihood approach’ of focusing on improving the livelihoods of people is valuable. 
Improved livelihood conditions reduce vulnerability and, thus, lead to sustainable 
food security.
Food security is a complex phenomenon, and it is essential to pay attention to the 
different dimensions of food security. Accordingly, there is no single solution to the 
problem of food insecurity. In Nepal, food security has been adversely affected by 
a host of interrelated factors, of which the armed conflict was one. Its impacts are 
still seen today, even though the conflict has ended. However, there are other types 
of conflict and violence ingrained in Nepalese society. Food security will continue 
to be affected by other types of conflict. Therefore, an understanding of how to 
work for food security during times of conflict is necessary. With regard to Nepal, 
other factors also need to be understood. At present, both agricultural production 
and food security are affected by events and processes at the international level. 
This is the result of globalisation. Local food systems that use diverse technical, 
social and economic resources need to be reinforced to improve the availability 
and accessibility of food produced on a sustainable basis and to ensure that it 
is distributed to all as a part of the 'right to food’ and ‘right to life'. There is also a 
need to interlink these local food systems at the global level, in a way so as not to 
abolish local systems, but to mutually support each other. Citizens should be able 
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to participate in shaping the food system and ways of consumption of food so that 
it expresses family and community values and culture. Accordingly, the following 
steps need to be taken for food security.
x 'XULQJ WLPHV RI FRQÀLFW ULVNV WR HQWLWOHPHQWV LQFUHDVH GHSHQGLQJ
XSRQVRFLRHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOFRQ¿JXUDWLRQV$VDUHVXOWJURXSV
seemingly food secure because of their asset position may also 
become vulnerable. Therefore, the entitlement position of all groups of 
people needs to be monitored and those at risk should be supported 
by various means. Food aid meant to help vulnerable people is also 
GLVUXSWHGGXULQJWLPHVRIFRQÀLFW0DNLQJIRRGVHFXULW\DEDVLFKXPDQ
ULJKWWREHUHVSHFWHGE\DOOSDUWLHVGXULQJFRQÀLFWZRXOGKHOSLQSURYLGLQJ
food aid.
x During normal times, the sustainability of food security depends 
upon improved livelihoods. In this situation, the livelihood approach is 
important in analysing the status of livelihoods. Existing food security 
programmes in Nepal, especially those of the donors, take a short-
term ‘risks to lives’ approach. This is a temporary, stop-gap approach. 
Emphasis needs to be given to improving the overall livelihoods of 
people. This also means adopting mechanisms to reduce vulnerability 
and increase the ability to cope with the risks. While short-term solutions 
are important during crisis periods, they should be complemented 
with, or backed by, programmes aimed at livelihood improvement 
and creating social, economic and physical infrastructures helping to 
produce more and distribute food to the needy. Measures like local 
social safety nets may provide a solution in situations where there 
are ‘risks to lives’ or a short-term mechanism to avoid crisis. Food 
banks (indigenous systems like dharma bhakari or formal institutions 
like food banks) and other community assistance programmes should 
be developed and used as emergency measures. In Jumla in the 
Karnali zone, traditional dharma bhakaris were established and every 
household used to donate food on moral grounds depending upon 
their capacity. This food was distributed to households and individuals 
suffering from food crisis. It should be noted that the Karnali zone had 
(and has) a high vulnerability to food insecurity, partly due to climatic and 
geographic reasons. The formal forms of these traditional institutions 
could be food banks. These banks can help low-income consumers 
and distribute surplus food in the community. Structural measures (like 
land reform or guaranteed employment and increased access of poor 
and marginalised to resources) are needed to provide long-term food 
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security. Similarly, to increase the access of women, children and the 
elderly within households, and to increase the role of women even in 
changed political context, gender empowerment, equity and equal 
access to resources and property are important. These long-term aims 
improve the livelihoods of vulnerable groups.
x To reduce the adverse impact of globalisation on agricultural production 
and food security, it is important to reinforce or develop local food 
systems that interlink all the resources available within the region or 
locality. The food produced and distributed from such a system is 
hygienic, fresh and culturally acceptable. The employment or the work 
generated by such a system increases or retains the income within 
the locality. The local biodiversity and ecosystem is preserved by this 
system, providing more choices of food to all, including the poor and 
marginalised. Moreover, such a local food system also increases the 
control of a community or household over resources, including seeds, 
and is helpful in using existing local knowledge. The power of MNCs 
and TNCs is also reduced by promoting local food systems. The 
problem of food unavailability will also be less in times of crisis (like 
FRQÀLFW LID ODUJHSURSRUWLRQRI WKH IRRGQHHGVDUHPHWE\ WKH ORFDO
production system. 
x A strong research base is required to examine and analyse new risks 
DQGSRWHQWLDOFRQÀLFWVWKDWFRXOGKDSSHQIURPWLPHWRWLPH$WSUHVHQW
climate change is also emerging as a new risk and a factor in new 
W\SHV RI FRQÀLFW &OLPDWH FKDQJH LV H[SHFWHG WR KDYH DQ LPPHQVH
impact on food security and the displacement of people. Research-
based policies are important to enable us to act proactively to face 
WKHVHQHZULVNVDQGFRQÀLFWV
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Abstract
This chapter deals with hunger and livelihood insecurity in the face of corporate 
globalisation. It argues that hunger and livelihood insecurity are a manifestation of 
structural causes that determine access to and control over means of production 
and participation in decision-making processes. It specifically argues that hunger 
is an even more complex phenomenon, determined not only by the availability, 
access and affordability of food, but by the meaningful participation of producers 
in production, value chain and decision-making processes, and influenced by the 
socio-political context and global economic forces. The concentration of resources, 
knowledge and power in the hands of multinational corporations as part of 
corporate globalisation is posing new challenges in the fight against hunger and 
livelihood insecurity, as well as threatening national food sovereignty. In addition, 
climate change and the promotion of bio-fuels worldwide have implications for food 
availability and an inherent relationship with trade and food prices, also affecting 
hunger, livelihood security and national food sovereignty. These issues have the 
potential to impact on the effective implementation of the Millennium Development 
Goals. 
The right to be free from hunger is enshrined in various international instruments. 
However, corporate globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation have drastically 
altered the dynamics of the food production system and market processes. Hunger 
and food security in developing countries is impacted by global forces. Developed 
countries and international financial institutions, therefore, have a role to play in 
assisting developing countries to meet their international obligations to provide 
food security by increasing both technical and financial support.
Among the food insecure groups, economically poor and socially excluded groups 
are the most vulnerable. Hunger and livelihood insecurity have to be looked at 
within a broader framework of a livelihoods approach to ensure that vulnerable 
groups are protected. Developing countries such as Nepal must take advantage 
of the opportunities presented by international trade agreements, while protecting 
against threats posed by such agreements. In particular, farmers’ rights must be 
131
132
protected to ensure the establishment of equitable and just production relations, 
and to promote conservation and the sustainable utilisation of natural resources, 
while at the same time promoting bio-prospecting, fair trade and the equitable 
sharing of the benefits of bio-prospecting through effective and inclusive policies 
and programmes.
Hence, it is clear that hunger and livelihood insecurity have multiple dimensions. 
These dimensions require closer analysis and commitment to understand the 
causes, contexts and implications of hunger and livelihood insecurity. If ignored, 
persistent hunger can result in starvation and even political and economic 
destabilisation.
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter establishes a relationship between corporate globalisation and hunger 
and livelihood insecurity, and examines these issues in the Nepalese context. 
Corporate globalisation, for the purpose of this Chapter, is looked at within the 
broader framework of economic, political and ecological aspects.
The conventional school of thought on hunger focuses on short-term measures 
to facilitate and alter the state of hunger and livelihood insecurity, emphasising 
service delivery as a response to the ‘symptoms’ of hunger. This school of thought 
is prevalent in the policies and practices of developing countries. However, there 
is a new school of thought that sees hunger as a political issue caused by the 
structural denial of access to and control over means of production within a feudal 
socio-political context, compounded by economic deprivation. The persistent 
denial of access to and control over means of production paralyses the production 
and purchasing capacity of people, especially of disadvantaged groups (DAGs1). 
Advocates of the right to food and livelihood around the globe are demanding 
the unconditional implementation of the state’s responsibility to adhere to basic 
principles to respect, protect and fulfil, and to realise its citizens’ right to food. 
These principles secure people’s right to organise themselves, to make informed 
choices, and to mobilise resources for sustained food sovereignty, and enable 
people from socially and economically disadvantaged groups around the globe to 
earn a dignified livelihood (AAI 2005).
Livelihood insecurity, for the purposes of this Chapter, refers to hunger, food 
insecurity, and the overall exclusion and denial of an individual’s need for and right 
to a dignified life. The term ‘livelihood’, in contemporary development discourse, 
has strong inter-linkages with physical, natural, socio-political and financial assets, 
1  Groups those are economically poor and socially discriminated.
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as well as an interface with human capital. Over two billion people around the 
world are engaged in agriculture for their livelihoods, but the majority of small 
producers and those dependent on the agriculture sector are systematically denied 
access to and control over means of production, excluded from decision-making 
processes, and, thus, rendered largely powerless. As a result, small farmers and 
disadvantaged groups are the hardest hit by hunger and livelihood insecurity in 
Nepal, and worldwide. Resource politics and the increasing influence of the global 
market economy pose new challenges and opportunities in promoting livelihood 
security for these groups. Hence, the central focus of this Chapter is on hunger and 
livelihood insecurity and their relationship with the structural causes of resource-
based discrimination and unjust production relations. This Chapter analyses the 
causes and effects of hunger and livelihood insecurity to contribute to meaningful 
discourse in order to change societal attitudes and public policy for socio-economic 
transformation.
5.2 Corporate globalisation, hunger and livelihood insecurity: A 
conceptual framework
5.2.1 Corporate globalisation
Globalisation promotes the greater integration of national economies into the 
global system through the free movement of goods, services and capital. There 
is no agreement on what globalisation means or when it started; however, the 
first expansion of European colonialism in the 15th Century is generally considered 
the first period of globalisation. The roots of globalisation go back to the style of 
mercantilism practised in the 15th Century, which lasted until the 19th Century. 
Privatisation and liberalisation, based on classical economic theory (e.g., the 
theories of David Ricardo and Adam Smith), which firmly believe in economic 
growth-based poverty reduction, are leading the globalisation process today 
(Jawara & Kwa 2003). Friends of the Earth, an international organisation working 
on environmental issues for a healthier and more just world, considers ‘economic 
globalisation’ as a form of corporate globalisation that promotes the free movement 
of capital, the growth of multinational corporations (MNCs) and the integration of 
national economies into the global system. The threat of corporate globalisation 
is seen as its influence over state policy and people’s autonomy due to its large 
and expanding stake in national economies. It is feared that control by MNCs over 
the free trade system will lead to greater inequality between and within nations, 
worsening the livelihoods of the poor both in terms of assets and activities, and to 
the massive depletion of the natural and social environment (Friends of the Earth 
2003). Globalisation, with its focus on economic reform through privatisation and 
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liberalisation, is further criticised by those working in the fields of food security, 
agriculture, the environment and human rights, who interpret globalisation as a 
capitalist process that is unreasonably dominated by corporations and banking 
institutions, and which is largely unaccountable to democratic processes and 
national governments.
The process of globalisation is largely driven by the understandings and 
agreements made by the World Trade Organization (WTO). In principle, resource-
poor member countries of the WTO are granted special and preferential privileges 
based on their ‘non-reciprocity value’2, in acknowledgement of their resource-poor 
condition, weak economic status and low trade competence. Non-reciprocity is 
one form of acceptance by developed countries of the need to support resource-
poor countries to enhance their trade competence and to create a level playing 
field. This principle is believed to benefit all member countries of the WTO and 
other trade agreements by facilitating the free movement of goods, services and 
capital. However, globalisation today, which is predominantly led by corporate 
motives, controls global trade, the movement of goods, services, information, 
and technology, and the process of intellectual property rights. In the process of 
liberalisation and privatisation, unfair competition is escalating, and there is little 
possibility of equitable benefits to countries with poor economies.
In development discourse, there are many critiques of corporate globalisation due to 
its functioning mechanisms and negative impacts on the livelihoods of economically 
poor and socially discriminated people. The domination by corporations of the 
production and consumption of goods and services weakens state power and 
marginalises people’s rights. In this process, the one-size-fits-all concept of 
profit-making corporate globalisation through liberalisation and privatisation has 
gradually encroached on basic services such as drinking water and health, and on 
food production, the value chain and marketing system. Farmers’ organisations, 
civil society and environmentalists are urging nation states to be more cautious 
in regulating MNCs and to ensure that MNCs are accountable to the people and 
environment. The concept of corporate social responsibility is, thus, introduced as 
a way of mitigating environmental damage and to ensure improved livelihoods for 
poor and disadvantaged people. However, due to the voluntary nature of corporate 
social responsibility, many corporations still remain unaccountable to the people 
and society. Farmers’ and land rights movements such as Via Campesina claim 
that economic globalisation driven purely by economic motives is undermining local 
2 Part IV of GATT under enabling clause there are three major provisions: i) preferences will be granted to developing 
countries, ii) can grant extensive and deeper preferences to LDCs, iii) S&DT provisions are hortatory not legally 
enforceable.
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and national sovereignty. Organisations like Via Campesina claim that production 
factors and the system should be controlled by local people and the state, rather 
than profit-oriented corporations. The seven principles of food sovereignty adopted 
by Via Campesina are presented in Box 5.1.
Box 5.1 Seven principles of food sovereignty adopted by Via Campesina
1) Food: A basic human right
Everyone must have access to safe, nutritious and culturally appropriate food in sufficient quantity 
and quality to sustain a healthy life with full human dignity. Each nation should declare that access 
to food is a constitutional right and guarantee the development of the primary sector to ensure the 
concrete realization of this fundamental right. 
2. Agrarian reform
A genuine agrarian reform is necessary which gives landless and farming people – especially women 
– ownership and control of the land they work and returns territories to indigenous peoples. The right 
to land must be free of discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, race, social class or ideology; 
the land belongs to those who work it.
3. Protecting natural resources
Food sovereignty entails the sustainable care and use of natural resources, especially land, water, 
and seeds and livestock breeds. The people who work the land must have the right to practice 
sustainable management of natural resources and to conserve biodiversity free of restrictive 
intellectual property rights. This can only be done from a sound economic basis with security of 
tenure, healthy soils and reduced use of agrochemicals.
4. Reorganising food trade
Food is first and foremost a source of nutrition and only secondarily an item of trade. National 
agricultural policies must prioritize production for domestic consumption and food self-sufficiency. 
Food imports must not displace local production nor depress prices. 
5. Ending the globalization of hunger
Food sovereignty is undermined by multilateral institutions and by speculative capital. The growing 
control of multinational corporations over agricultural policies has been facilitated by the economic 
policies of multilateral organizations such as the WTO, World Bank and the IMF. Regulation and 
taxation of speculative capital and a strictly enforced Code of Conduct for Trans-national corporations 
is therefore needed.
6. Social peace
Everyone has the right to be free from violence. Food must not be used as a weapon. Increasing 
levels of poverty and marginalization in the countryside, along with the growing oppression of 
ethnic minorities and indigenous populations, aggravate situations of injustice and hopelessness. 
The ongoing displacement, forced urbanization, repression and increasing incidence of racism of 
smallholder farmers cannot be tolerated.
136
7. Democratic control
Smallholder farmers must have direct input into formulating agricultural policies at all levels. The 
United Nations and related organisations will have to undergo a process of democratization to 
enable this to become a reality. Everyone has the right to honest, accurate information and open and 
democratic decision-making. These rights form the basis of good governance, accountability and 
equal participation in economic, political and social life, free from all forms of discrimination. Rural 
women, in particular, must be granted direct and active decision making on food and rural issues.
Source: http://www.viacampesina.org/
The threat to people’s rights and national sovereignty, as outlined above, is ever 
increasing. Global trade forums, like the WTO, and regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) are being used to promote privatisation and liberalisation based globalisation. 
Therefore, it is important to analyse how corporate globalisation affects smaller 
economies through the accumulation of resources, monopolisation of knowledge 
and concentration of power (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1 Encroachment of corporate globalisation on resources, knowledge and power
Resource concentration
The liberalisation and privatisation of goods and services requires a reliable and 
regular supply of primary resources and an adequately skilled workforce. It also 
requires a favourable policy framework and effective implementation mechanisms. 
In theory, privatisation does not necessarily imply that all MNCs are profit motivated. 
The process of globalisation can be regulated in a more inclusive and equitable 
manner to ensure the efficient provision of services, without losing the economic 
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value of investors. However, in practice, this has not been the case. Concerns 
have been raised about the equitable distribution of resources, the existence of 
opportunities for all global trading partners and about the ability of benefit sharing 
mechanisms to deliver equitable benefits. The increasing concentration of power 
over market forces through the acquisition and merger of corporations at the 
international level impact on the ability of states to regulate trade and jeopardise 
local and customary practices in relation to resource distribution, governance and 
mobilisation. Economically weak countries face a dilemma as to how to reap the 
benefits of globalisation. Likewise, regional trading forums have not been effective 
in addressing the needs and concerns of developing countries, and specifically least 
developed countries (LDCs) and land locked developing countries (LLDCs). Despite 
the emergence of global trade forums like the WTO, Regional Trade Agreements 
are increasingly being activated in recent decades. According to the United Nations 
Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), there were almost 300 Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) in existence in 2008, and an increasing proportion of 
world trade is governed by these agreements (UNCTAD 2005). FTAs heavily affect 
the agriculture sector, which is the basis of the livelihoods of rural poor in many 
developing countries. Commercial agriculture increasingly demands the intensive 
use of external resources to be competitive enough to meet national requirements 
and for export. This has led to the consolidation and concentration of productive 
land, privatisation of water resources, and the establishment of monopoly rights 
over genetic resources. In the same way, research and development priorities are 
determined by the interests of investors, who mostly prefer to promote lab-based 
technology development on market-led products. The sustainability of production 
resources is being encroached upon and threatened by the accumulation of 
bio-resources, the development of genetically modified plants, land acquisition, 
corporatisation and a high level of investment in profit-oriented crop development, 
processing and marketing, which is almost exclusive promoted by developed 
countries.
Knowledge concentration
The majority of people in developing countries still adopt agriculture as their 
livelihoods strategy. They possess a vast amount of associated traditional 
knowledge and skills in conserving, promoting and using bio-resources. Centuries-
old customary rules and practices help in maintaining the balance between 
cultural values, social norms, livelihoods options and the sustainable use of bio-
resources. 
Investment patterns in the agriculture sectors of developed and developing countries 
vary greatly. Recently, there has been a steady trend of huge investment in 
agriculture sector protection and technology enhancement in developed countries. 
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Unfortunately, technology transfer mechanisms for the benefit of developing 
countries are either not in place or not effectively implemented. Developing 
countries are still struggling to develop crop varieties and livestock breeds within 
their public research systems. While there has been significant investment by 
private corporations in research and development in the food and agriculture 
sector, it has been of limited benefit to developing countries. Today’s corporate 
globalisation is highly concentrated on high-tech information and technology, 
which carries a high risk of knowledge accumulation at resource rich laboratories. 
This has contributed in creating dependency in developing countries on resource 
rich countries and corporations. The trend of growing genetically modified (GM) 
crops is an example of how life science companies in the developed world are 
controlling resources and production systems. The cultivated area for GM crops 
is greatly increasing in developing countries, without understanding the long-term 
implications. According to International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech 
Applications (ISAAA), who is monitoring the GM coverage worldwide, the number 
of countries growing GM crops rose from 6 in 1996, to 25 countries and covering 
2 billion accumulated acres by the end of 2008 worldwide. It also predicts that the 
cumulative coverage of GM crops will increase to 4 billion acres by 2015 (FOCUS 
2006)3. The GM crop promoting companies such as Monsanto, Dupont, Syngenta 
and Bayer Crop Science claim that consumers demand high quality nutritious food, 
the provision of which is possible only through GM technologies. 
With the increase in GM crop production, biosafety is becoming an issue of great 
concern. Risks include possible gene pollution, and adverse effects on human safety 
and wellbeing, and on environmental health. Consumers have a right to information 
about the gene content of GM food crops. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties (CoP) to the CBD on 29 January 2000, with 187 parties and 103 signatories 
to date. The Parties to the Biosafety Protocol have an obligation to follow biosafety 
regulations, including those regarding the transboundary movement of GM 
products. According to Articles 7, 8, 9 and 11 of the Cartagena Protocol, recipient 
countries should be informed in advance of the shipment of GM crops; this is yet to 
be internalised and implemented (Focus 2006). To deal with the implications of GM 
regulation, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) have a mandate to support the development of national 
safety regulations. Similarly, the UN Codex Alimentarius has a mandate to regulate 
food safety, which covers GM food, and the WTO deals with trade in GM crops. 
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement of the WTO is part of trade 
measures to deal with human, plant and animal health. The SPS clearly depicts 
3  For additional information, also visit www.isaaa.org.
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the complexity of GM regulations and their wider application. The European Union 
is taking precautionary measures in relation to the commercialisation of GM crops 
by demanding the labelling of food with more than 0.9 per cent genetically modified 
components. However, the United States of America regards these precautions as 
a barrier to technology and trade (Focus 2006). 
The increasing merger and concentration of life science companies and their interest 
in engaging in crops with commercial potential has led to a gradual decrease in 
investment in traditional crops and varietal improvement processes. This has 
directly eroded the diversity of local gene pools and the associated knowledge 
of small farmers in developing countries and created further dependency on the 
market to secure source seeds for next generation production. It has also seriously 
undermined the potential use and promotion of indigenous knowledge, practices 
and skills of women and indigenous people. 
The increasing use of mono-cropping and consequent loss of diversity has created 
the risk of crop failure due to an increased incidence of insects and pests, as well 
as lack of proper knowledge and information from seed sellers. Such crops are 
also often uncompetitive due to the high cost of production, all of which affects the 
profit margin to producers and negatively impacts on food security. It is estimated 
that the top 10 seed corporations around the globe hold 49 to 51 per cent of the 
commercial seed market, and the top 10 agro-chemical corporations control 84 
per cent of the agro-chemical market. Similarly, all GM seeds are bio-patented 
by multinational corporations: 13 commercial corporations own 80 per cent of the 
GM food market (Voice of Irish Concern for the Environment 2009). Countries with 
vulnerable economies are becoming dependent on imported seed and associated 
technologies. 
The use of imported seeds, mostly for commercial farming, has led to mono-
cropping; this is an increasing phenomenon even in rural Nepal. In countries like 
Nepal, other means of support for agricultural productivity and marketing structures 
are not yet well established. Consequently, the open market and free flow of 
imported seeds has created dependency, led to the deterioration of indigenous 
knowledge and required farmers to deal with competitive markets. Additionally, the 
use of imported seed and food items in the form of relief support after natural or 
human induced disasters is becoming an entry point for market-led seeds, which 
creates further dependency on the market. There is much speculation about the 
impact of the use of GM foods in developing countries as part of food aid. Concerns 
include the displacement of local seeds and associated knowledge through the 
promotion and dissemination of hybrid or genetically modified seeds either in the 
form of seed or processed food. The use of GM products in food aid has also been 
frequently questioned on ethical grounds. Risks are associated with diminishing the 
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local knowledge and resource base, promoting monoculture, the use of imported 
seeds and inputs, and control over the knowledge system. In the long term this can 
be a threat to sustainable agriculture and food security.
Increasing knowledge concentration is not only a threat to the farming system in 
developing countries, but also to the sustainable food security of the local people 
and the sovereignty of the country of origin over bio-resources.
Power concentration
Globalisation led by the WTO regime and free trade campaign is a process of 
integrating the free market into global development processes. In principal, all 
member countries, irrespective of their level of economic development, have an 
equal right to share power in the global trade forum. However, lack of access to 
resources, weak institutional framework and human resource base, poor investment 
competence, and poor bargaining capacity restricts the participation of developing 
countries. As a result, they are constantly marginalised. Due to the different nature 
of the vulnerability of developing countries, particularly LDCs4, they are entitled 
to receive special and differential treatment (S&DT) from developed countries 
and international financial institutions (IFIs) under the framework of the WTO to 
compensate for structural asymmetries. However, many LDCs cannot fully enjoy 
S&DT due to political instability and weak bargaining power, as well as lack of 
commitment by developed countries and IFIs. Likewise, market access by developing 
countries is restricted due to stringent requirements imposed by developed 
countries such as (i) maximum residue limit (MRL), (ii) packaging materials, and (iii) 
transit treaties and conditionality. The WTO has envisioned and acknowledged the 
vulnerability of LDCs in specific agreements, and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) 1994 (the predecessor of the WTO) contains at least 16 different 
agreements on S&DT to enhance the trading capacity of LDCs.5 The main thrust of 
these agreements is pro-LDCs in all aspects of economic growth, the development 
of human resource and per capita income growth. Unfortunately, so far, these 
agreements have not been fully implemented. The major provisions specifically 
in favour of LDCs are in the Marrakesh Agreement, establishing the WTO, which 
mentions the special need to respond to the vulnerability of LDCs created through 
market distortion and instability in the world market. Similarly, acknowledging the 
weak trading capacity of LDCs, it contains provisions for support to LDCs through 
technical and financial assistance and by enhancing trading capacities. For 
example, international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank (WB) and 
4  LDCs are group of countries identified based on three main criteria; i) gross national income per capita, ii) Human 
Asset Index, and iii) Economic Vulnerability Index. There are currently 49 members and Nepal assumed chair of LDCs 
from December 2009 for four years.
5  The details of the World Trade Agreement 1994 (establishing the WTO and including GATT Uruguay 1994) can be 
found at www.wto.org (accessed 5 January 2010).
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have provisions to provide financial support 
to compensate for the negative impacts caused by trade asymmetries such as, for 
example, the increased food import bill of LDCs.
Similarly, there are provisions for an exemption in relation to the provision of subsidies 
on production inputs to low input resource poor (LIRP) farmers of developing 
countries and LDCs, which is calculated based on Aggregated Measure Support 
(AMS). Similarly, GATT Part 4 on trade and development includes a provision for 
special and preferential privileges based on the principal of non-reciprocity and on 
S&DT to enhance the production and trading capacity of LDCs and LLDCs.
Another important area of debate and contention is protectionism in the agriculture 
sector especially in developed countries, which receives substantial support 
through tariff protection and by way of direct and indirect subsidies. According to 
the WTO, for example, the developed countries were supposed to reduce their 
tariffs by 36 per cent by 2000 and developing countries by the same rate by 2005, 
unfortunately, these commitments were not met. In this process, six multilateral 
institutions, the WTO, WB, UNCTAD, IMF, International Trade Centre (ITC) and 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have created a common fund 
referred as the ‘integrated framework’, which can be mobilised for demand driven, 
ownership oriented and resource efficient support to vulnerable economies. 
However, developing countries most often receive support for policy development 
rather than for institutional and human resources capacity and infrastructural 
development. At the same time, developed countries are constantly providing farm 
subsidies to their farmers. However, both bilateral and multilateral development 
assistance in the agriculture sector has been steadily decreasing since the early 
nineties (FAO 2009), which can be seen in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 Share of Official Development Assistance in agriculture sector
Source: Adapted from WFP and FAO (2009) 
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Farm subsidies in developed countries are constantly been criticised as a trade 
distorting factor in the global trade regime. In recent decades, the redirection of 
subsidies in the agriculture sector by developed countries, either in the name of 
bio-fuel production or to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change, has 
received much attention. Subsidies in developed countries play an important 
role in the substitution of local products and production systems in developing 
countries as the subsidies make such products and systems cheaper than local 
goods. Likewise, the volatile and unpredictable alliance of developing countries 
at the regional and global level does not put them in a good position to negotiate 
with developed countries on subsidy issues. Global and regional trade forums are 
constantly being used as platforms by economically powerful countries from which 
to exercise power, rather than to create a level playing field for all member countries. 
The overall trend of resource concentration linked to knowledge accumulation and 
power pose a threat to developing countries, specifically LDCs and can have a 
detrimental impact on hunger and livelihood security. 
5.2.2 Hunger and livelihood insecurity
Hunger and livelihood insecurity are complex phenomena. They are the manifestation 
of denial of access to means of production, lack of participation and representation 
in decision-making processes, weak purchasing power and lack of reliable survival 
options. The level of vulnerability associated with hunger and livelihood insecurity 
differs at the individual, household, national, sub-national and international levels, 
as defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). At the individual level, 
vulnerability might be limited to food consumption and utilisation patterns, further 
compounded by other important factors such as water consumption. The context 
becomes more complex when linked to macro issues such as availability, stability 
and access, which are largely determined by socio-economic conditions and the 
institutional, cultural and natural environment. The dynamics that determine hunger 
and livelihood insecurity are further linked to policy, which is governed by national 
governments and international commitments. Therefore, dealing with hunger and 
livelihood insecurity requires multiple efforts by different actors at different levels. 
Likewise, the commitments made by heads and or representatives of nation states 
during the World Food Summit (WFS) and to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) have brought the issue of food security forward. These international 
instruments deal not only with aspects of the immediate situation of hunger, but 
also with long-term and interrelated issues, such as access to means of production, 
enhancing competitiveness and market potential, the role of developed countries 
and IFIs in supporting countries with weak economies, and opportunities for south-
south trade, and so forth. The hunger index adopted by FAO and the MDGs deals 
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with production factors and market dynamics, as well as the interdependence 
between countries at various stages of economic development (i.e., strong, 
newly emerging and weak economies). However, the recent trend of corporate 
globalisation, directly and indirectly impacts on immediate market relations leading 
to changes in food basket composition, an increase in malnutrition, and a risk 
of external shocks due to trade imbalances and emergencies; these are serious 
threats to developing countries. 
These invisible causes of hunger and livelihood insecurity have been largely 
overlooked in economic development discourse, especially since the establishment 
of the WTO in 1995. The repercussions of failing to address systematic issues in 
trade governance are great and costly in the long run. Various studies have shown 
that the current state of hunger and livelihood insecurity is further deepened by the 
lack of ability of developing countries to adjust properly to the global economic and 
technological developments. For example, the import of cheap chickens from the 
European Union to the Philippines has destabilised the local production of poultry. 
Similarly, the import of cheap chickens from the US to Mozambique has jeopardised 
the local system (AAI 2005; OXFAM 2005).
The liberalisation and privatisation of means of production and processes has 
brought substantial change to agrarian production processes. It has resulted in 
the displacement of rural producers from subsistence agriculture to urban areas in 
search of better livelihood options, as subsistence farming is no longer providing 
a sufficient livelihood. The weakening of production processes and the increasing 
consumption of imported foods has drastically altered the food system in many 
developing countries. A study carried out by Jagaran Media Centre in Nepal found 
that only 26 per cent of people in Nepal are food self-sufficient. The study also 
highlighted that there are around 90 national food industries in Nepal, which account 
for 19.5 per cent of the total industries. This confirms that packaged foods produced 
locally or imported are becoming an inherent component of the food system in Nepal 
(Basnet & Darnal 2007). The paradigm shift in understanding hunger and livelihood 
insecurity has opened alternative avenues of response to the new challenges and 
opportunities presented by corporate globalisation. The concept and state of visible 
hunger has been transformed into a more invisible and complex form of hunger that 
is beyond the control of nation states and communities. The dynamics of hunger 
and livelihood insecurity are becoming more complex and increasingly controlled 
by market forces, and the role of the state is weakened. 
Defining food security and livelihoods and opting for the best possible options at 
both micro and macro levels is vital. In the changing context in which food security 
is recognised as a right, and to respond to the increasing threat of market control 
over the food chain, the concept of ‘food sovereignty’ is gaining momentum. It 
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is important to note that ensuring individual food security leads to national food 
security, but the converse is not necessarily true: individual food security is not 
guaranteed by national food security. 
Ensuring food security is a complex task. It requires adequate and equitable 
allocation, ownership and utilisation of productive resources; access to safe drinking 
water; a balanced mix in the food basket; proper cooking and utilisation methods; 
and the knowledge and skills to appropriately deal with market forces. Adequate 
and timely irrigation, combined with the use of improved seeds, fertilizers and other 
technologies can enhance crop production by up to 30 per cent. However, most 
rural agriculture in the developing world still relies on rainfall for irrigation, which 
puts farmers at risk of crop failure or poor harvests. Although only one sixth of the 
world’s farmed area is irrigated, these farms produce 40 per cent of the world’s 
food (Rijsberman 2008). Today, water scarcity is becoming a global concern, but 
water privatisation is a lucrative sector for profit-oriented investment. Therefore, 
access to and the equitable distribution of water resources for irrigation and safe 
drinking water is a vital part of ensuring human rights and essential to increase 
agriculture production and improve food security. The recent trend of privatisation 
of basic services including water resources is a threat to people’s right to water. For 
example, the privatisation of drinking water in Ghana raised the price of drinking 
water to 3,000 Cedis (US$ 1) for 10 buckets of water, when the per capita daily 
income was 7,000 Cedis. Likewise, water privatisation in Bolivia increased the cost 
of water by 200 per cent and in South Africa by 140 per cent. In India, 60 per cent of 
the water is polluted with insecticides and pesticides (Navadanya 2003; IPS 2005). 
This illustrates how the privatisation of water has introduced complexity into the 
production chain and food consumption patterns, and increased the risk of denial 
of access to safe drinking water and water for irrigation. 
Among the poor, women in particular suffer more from the privatisation of water as 
high water costs force women and girls to spend more time collecting water from 
local sources, sometimes at a great distance. Similarly, expensive water limits the 
affordability of water for basic necessities. Nepal made a commitment to open 11 
service sectors and 76 sub-sectors to privatisation (Bhandari et al. 2005) as part of 
its accession to the WTO; this has opened up the possibility of water privatisation. 
As Nepal is a water resource rich country, privatisation could further limit access 
to safe drinking water and irrigation, especially for resource poor farmers. In this 
context, initiatives like Water Vision-Pakistan, which prepare a long-term framework 
in coordination with different stakeholders, are crucial. This initiative has identified 
the gaps and advocated for the effective conservation of water, enhancement of 
water efficiency, equitable distribution of water, establishment of effective pricing 
policies, good governance and the development of investment systems (Bengali 
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2003). Such initiatives provide a strong basis for resource specific analysis and can 
lead to the adoption of appropriate measures to contribute to eradicating hunger 
and poverty. 
The agriculture sector has a multifunctional character linked with food, culture, 
environment and economy. This makes agriculture one of the most important 
sectors in relation to hunger and livelihood issues. However, the tendency to 
deal with hunger and livelihood issues from a sectoral perspective is one of the 
major obstacles to a consolidated solution to address the root causes of hunger 
and livelihood insecurity. Understanding and dealing with starvation, hunger 
and livelihood insecurity requires different and informed approaches. Starvation, 
in general, is a lack of enough food to eat over a particular time period within a 
particular context. It is important to realise that hunger can and does persist in the 
absence of starvation (FAO & UNDP 2008). Hunger is a deeper, systematic, and 
more complex phenomenon, which has been ignored by policymakers for many 
years. Dealing with persistent hunger, thus, requires understanding of the problem 
and systematic efforts by different actors. 
In this context, it is important to understand the different forms of hunger presented 
below. 
Acute or transient hunger
This form of hunger is caused by immediate circumstances such as a natural 
disaster (drought or flood), market disruption, or an ineffective supply chain at the 
local level. These circumstances can have a direct impact on physiological state 
and immediate access to food and production resources, which can lead to famine 
in certain localities at a particular time and to health problems such as influenza 
and diarrhoea if not addressed properly and in a timely manner.
Chronic hunger
According to FAO, people who have access to less than 1710 to 1960 kcal per 
day are considered to be chronically hungry. This form of hunger is generally a 
manifestation of the systematic denial of access to productive resources and weak 
purchasing power. This form of hunger can inflict permanent damage on human 
life due to sustained uncertainty about access to productive resources and other 
means of livelihood. In the long run, it can cause malnutrition and poor health, 
which can affect the attainment of improved livelihoods.
Hidden hunger
This form of hunger is complex and remains invisible in many instances. It is 
generally triggered by macro-level economic alignment and structural adjustment 
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processes. Sometimes, the economic processes undermine the leverage and 
space for developing nation states to challenge the negative implications of macro-
economic reforms. The influence can be seen in the production system, changes 
in food habits and the food basket composition, capture of the food supply chain by 
corporations, and the commodification and privatisation of productive resources. 
Corporate control ultimately creates dependency and paralyses the purchasing 
capacity of people. In the long run, food can become a political weapon, altering 
power relations and threatening national sovereignty. 
In this scenario, the victims of chronic and hidden hunger are often the poor and 
disadvantaged people. This group of the people usually do not have an organised 
voice, access to information, representation in decision-making processes or political 
power to alter the rule of the games. The consistent ignorance of policymakers of 
persistent hunger and weak political commitment can lead to transient or acute 
hunger. The cost of recovery at that level, including rebuilding the local production 
system and adopting resilient measures, can be very high. 
5.2.3 Right to food and livelihoods
Food is the basic necessity for human survival. Therefore, the right to food 
is considered to be akin to the right to life. Many international provisions have 
enshrined the right to food and livelihood as basic tenets of the right to life. 
In 1948, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UNDHR) in Article 25 
adopted the ‘Right to Food’ for all, with special attention to widows, children and 
the elderly. Many other instruments, such as the Convention on Eradication of all 
forms of Domestic Violence Against Women (CEDAW), Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have also 
amply recognised the right to food and the right to access to means of production. 
These international instruments focus on the state’s obligation to take into account 
the concerns of special categories of people such as children and women.
The concept of food security is a fundamental element of understanding hunger. 
FAO adopted the following definition of food security in 1996 during the World 
Food Summit: "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical 
and economic access to sufficient, safe, nutritious and adequate food to meet their 
dietary needs for an active and healthy life” (FAO 1996). FAO considers the right 
to food as a basic right and adopted it in an information paper on ‘Safety Nets and 
the Right to Food’. This paper considers hunger and livelihood security as part of 
a food and social safety net and highlights the importance of access to means of 
production; it also sets out the requirements of the safety net (FAO 2004). The 127th 
Corporate globalisation
147
Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal
Session of FAO adopted the Voluntary Guideline on Right to Food in 2004. This 
guideline categorically defines the role of the state as to respect, fulfil and protect 
and to realise its citizens’ right to food. The Guideline provides very pragmatic 
options that can support nation states to formulate necessary policy measures and 
programmes as required.
Global commitments envisage nation states as having the primary responsibility 
for ensuring food security. Similarly, nation states are also responsible for ensuring 
access to means of production, creating enough opportunity to enhance people’s 
purchasing capacity, and eliminating gender, class and caste-based discrimination 
to fight against hunger and livelihood insecurity. In this endeavour, the role of the 
international community is specified as to enhance the competence of countries 
with weaker economies through technical and financial support.
5.2.4 Myths about hunger and livelihood insecurity
Hunger and livelihood insecurity are relative terms. Different levels of progress 
in economic, political and social development in the world have shifted our 
understanding, interpretation and way of dealing with hunger and livelihood 
insecurity. Free market theory based on corporate globalisation promotes the 
dominant role of economic growth in poverty reduction. In this context, food is 
perceived as a tradable commodity and means of production are being increasingly 
privatised. This trend has sparked concern over the control of food systems by 
profit-oriented private companies. Since the production system is guided by 
commercial interests and productive resources are increasingly being privatised 
and private monopolies extended, the gap has widened between resource rich 
and poor countries. Experiences around the world have not yet shown equitable 
and tangible benefits of free trade to developing countries. For example, of the 
total GM seed market, 80 per cent is under the control of 13 MNCs, which limits 
resource poor people’s choices associated with new seeds, advanced knowledge, 
technology and information. There are many myths about globalisation, hunger and 
livelihood insecurity, which we will take a closer look at here.
Myth 1: Food security can be enhanced through free trade
The promoters of corporate globalisation firmly believe that economic growth 
accelerated through free trade can ensure food security and livelihood promotion 
(Jawara & Kwa 2003). Another school of thought advocates that food is the basic 
means of survival and that economic issues should not be given primacy over 
human rights. In today's world, enough food is produced. However, 24 per cent 
of people in Sub-Saharan Africa and 61 per cent in Asia and the Pacific were 
undernourished in the period from 2001 to 2003 (FAO 2008). Similarly, in Nepal, an 
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agriculture-based economy, 40 districts out of 75 are categorised as food insecure 
and the trade deficit is 165 billion, 330 million. Nepal adopted a liberal economic 
policy in the early eighties and has been a Net Food Importing Developing Countries 
(NFIDC) since that time. Nepal’s massive trade deficit is a clear indication that 
free trade is not the only, or even the best, solution for dealing with hunger and 
livelihood insecurity. To ensure food security for all, it is necessary to understand 
the dynamics of food production and availability, and the distribution mechanism. 
Myth 2: Free trade facilitates economic growth and reduces poverty
Economic globalisation can bring remarkable growth at a macro level and profit 
for competitive multinational companies and, hence, for developed countries. 
However, it exacerbates inequality between and within nation (Friends of the Earth 
2003). Due to weak economic power, unpredictable alliances among likeminded 
nation states and the institutional vulnerability of developing countries, local and 
small producers in developing countries are not competitive enough to reap the 
benefits promised by economic growth theory. Developing countries, on the other 
hand, are under constant pressure to fulfil the additional commitments beyond the 
originally agreed provisions of the WTO, which makes them more vulnerable. The 
increasing budget in the agriculture sector in the developed world and the dumping 
of their surpluses or cheap subsidised products has further widened the gap, 
between developed and developing countries trade potentials, rather than reducing 
inequality and poverty. A study carried out by Action Aid Nepal on the surge in rice 
imports showed that India’s share of Nepal’s total rice imports fluctuated between 
93 to 100 per cent between 1996/97 and 2003/04 (AAN 2005). It shows the 
vulnerability of Nepal’s rice market and the impact of the dumping of Indian rice on 
the local market. Hence, free trade and classical economic policy are not the most 
effective way for developing countries to increase economic growth and reduce 
poverty, or for reducing the gap between developed and developing countries. On 
the contrary, free trade can have a negative effect on economic growth and poverty 
in developing countries.
Myth 3: Free trade gives consumers access to quality and cheap products
In principal, economic liberalisation can facilitate free trade, irrespective of 
geographical boundaries, and can enhance people’s access to a wide range of 
consumable goods and services. However, increasing imbalanced trade can lead 
to fiscal imbalances in developing countries, which can affect both short and long-
term coping strategies. The privatisation and liberalisation of both agricultural and 
industrial sectors in developing countries has brought these industries to the verge 
of extinction due to global competition. It has increased the vulnerability context. 
Privatisation and liberalisation has reduced the pool of human resources available 
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in developing countries by displacing unskilled and low-skilled workers who are 
attracted to work in other job markets, reducing developing countries’ production 
potential. Therefore, cheap products do not necessarily ensure sustainable 
income and or increase people’s ability to cope with external shocks created by 
international market dynamics. If not well consider or managed in a timely way, 
privatisation and liberalisation can create an external dependency and contribute to 
livelihood insecurity. Currently soaring global food prices are also a manifestation 
of the imbalance between investment priorities, resource management and the 
sharing of benefits. According to World Bank estimates, global food prices have 
risen 83 per cent over the last three years due to the increasing use of arable land 
to produce crops for bio-fuel, the relative inelasticity of supply, and low speculative 
investments, and food prices are predicted to rise by another 50 per cent by 2030 
(Chatham House 2008). Nine remote districts of Nepal surveyed evidenced an 
increase in food prices by up to 40 per cent, from July to December 2008 compared 
to the same period of study in 2007 (MoAC & WFP 2008). 
Myth 4: Promotion of biotechnology such as genetic engineering is the best 
way to overcome hunger and poverty
The promotion and transfer of technology is an important factor in global food 
production and the global distribution chain. However, the recent trend of genetic 
engineering through the transfer of transgenic genes and the granting of monopoly 
rights over processes and products restrict farmers’ rights over genetic resources. 
This can create a dependency on life science companies for the use of genetic 
resources and production inputs. It can also erode the gene pool and have a 
negative impact on human health and the environment through gene pollution and 
the excessive use of external chemical inputs. The technologies promoted through 
biotechnology may not necessarily ensure easy and equitable access and are not 
necessarily compatible and affordable for small farmers in developing countries. 
Likewise, developing countries that are rich in natural resources do not have the 
capacity to invest in research and development of new varieties of plants, animal 
breeds and innovative technologies. In Nepal, 66 per cent of people are engaged 
in agriculture for their livelihoods, but the total budget allocated to the agriculture 
sector is limited and insufficient. There is a clear gap between sectoral prioritisation, 
resource allocation, programme implementation and expected outputs. There 
is also a need to invest more in the promotion of indigenous knowledge and 
technology-based innovation. Such investment is a more effective and sustainable 
solution to the problem of hunger and livelihood insecurity than reliance on imported 
biotechnologies promoted by commercially motivated companies.
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Myth 5: Free trade regulates the global market
The promoters of globalisation believe in letting the market operate global trade. 
However, there are no laws or regulations requiring corporations to be responsible 
towards the people and societies in which they function. A free but unregulated 
market can undermine people’s autonomy and weaken state functioning through 
encroachment on the production chain, and even on the policy and regulatory 
domains. The role of bilateral agreements in this cannot be denied. For example, 
the Nepal-India Trade Treaty allows duty-free trade in primary agricultural products 
between Nepal and India. However, to date, the benefit of the 1700 km of open 
border between Nepal and India has been enjoyed mostly by India. Nepal has not 
received the same benefits for many reasons. For example, the huge concentration 
of rice mills in the Terai belt on the Nepal side of the border are shrinking, and the 
capacity of the mills has been reduced as the import of rice to Nepal through both 
formal and informal channels has undercut local producers (AAN 2005). The trade 
potential of Nepal has been increasingly limited as the Government of Nepal, for 
many socio-political reasons has not been able to negotiate and take full advantage 
of provisions in the bilateral treaty with India, other regional trade agreements and 
the various global trade platforms. This alarming situation can exacerbate the gap 
between trading partners. Therefore, free trade should be considered as only one 
of many vehicles for promoting economic growth. The primary concern should be 
to share the benefits of trade and growth equitable based on principles of social 
justice.
Myth 6: Multilateral trade forums are good for economically poor countries
In principle, all the member countries of multilateral trade forums, irrespective of 
their share in global trade, should have equal status and an equal right to participate 
and table their concerns. With the expectation of receiving equal space and that 
their voices will be heard, many developing countries, including LDCs have been 
motivated to join global trade forums like the WTO. Likewise, aligning with regional 
trade agreements is also an increasing trend. These forums give developing 
countries hope of enhancing their trade competence and becoming equal trading 
partners. However, developing countries, especially LDCs, are increasingly being 
excluded from mainstream negotiation processes and their interests ignored, 
raising concerns over the motives of economically powerful trading partners. 
Similarly, negotiations in relation to bilateral trading arrangements are based on 
unequal power relations and often guided by political interests. Subtle pressure 
is exerted on politically unstable and economically vulnerable countries to align 
themselves with regional and multilateral trade regimes. For example, Nepal was 
pressurised by some of the developed country members of the WTO to adopt the 
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Plant Variety Protection Act in line with the Union for Protection of Plant Varieties 
(UPOV) in its last accession specific negotiations held in Geneva in 2003. This is a 
clear example of WTO-plus conditionality. Likewise, increasing demands to adopt 
reciprocal measures has seriously hampered Nepal’s autonomy. At times, Nepal 
has given in to such pressure simply due to in adequate preparation/homework on 
the issues, lack of trained human resources, weak political commitment and lack 
of policy space for poor countries in different trade forums. Organising developing 
countries on common agendas improves their internal governance, and promoting 
south-south trade and asserting rights to receive both technical and financial 
resources to improve the trade potential of developing countries is important to 
minimise the risks and optimise the benefits of membership of multilateral trade 
forums.
5.2.5 Global situation of hunger and livelihood insecurity
FAO data shows that the food available in the world is enough to provide 2,760 
kcal per person for the existing population of the world. However, an estimated 
854 million people worldwide are undernourished, which is quite alarming and 
also makes meeting the MDGs a challenge. People who consume food less than 
1,710 to 1,960 kcal per day are considered to be chronically hungry. Of the total 
undernourished people in the world, about 800 million live in developing countries, 
and most are poor and small farmers (FAO 2008). Approximately one third of the 
hungry and micronutrient deficient people of the world live in Asia and the Pacific. 
Similarly, despite their huge contribution to agriculture, women are most vulnerable 
to hunger constituting 60 per cent of those living in hunger. According to FAO 
estimates, global food production will rise by 1.6 per cent by 2015. Hence, there 
is much speculation about how current rates of food production in the world will 
meet trade and fiscal imbalances. If the current rate of progress remains, it will 
take at least 120 years to reach the target of the first Millennium Development 
Goal and World Food Summit commitment: to halve hunger by 2015 (FAO 2005). 
This proves that production is not the only factor that determines food security at 
the micro and macro level and illustrates the importance of dealing with different 
pillars of food security such as production, availability, accessibility, affordability 
and utilisation patterns. To achieve the MDG target of halving hunger by 2015, we 
must overcome fundamental problems associated with access to and control over 
means of production; improve availability of food and develop effective distribution 
mechanisms; provide alternative employment opportunities to enable people 
to meet their basic requirements; and develop systematic responses to disaster 
induced situations. In the changing context of globalisation, food is considered a 
tradable commodity and is becoming inaccessible to economically and socially 
disadvantaged groups, especially women and children. The global agricultural trade 
scenario shows that 71 per cent of exports and 75 per cent of imports are governed 
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by developed countries; in comparison, the least developed countries’ agricultural 
exports grew from 0.4 of world trade in 1994 to 0.8 in 2004 but imports grew faster 
from 0.4 to 1.1 (OECD 2005). This highlights the complexity of the global food 
system and the increasing vulnerability of economically resource poor countries. 
Hence, a multi-pronged and holistic approach is needed to tackle the causes of 
hunger and livelihood insecurity. It is important to develop a deeper understanding 
of hunger and livelihood insecurity and to analyse the inter-linkages between 
different factors in order to adopt a progressive approach to dealing with the issues 
within a broader framework. The right to food, including safety net measures, is 
explicitly acknowledged by FAO in an information paper on Safety Nets and the 
Right to Food (FAO 2006). 
Hunger is increasingly being understood as a political phenomenon within the larger 
framework of food sovereignty. Different international organisations such as Action 
Aid International, Green Peace, OXFAM, Third World Network, Friends of the Earth, 
Pesticide Action Network, Via Campesina, various Swiss NGOs and others believe 
that access to and control over productive resources such as land, water, credit 
and knowledge are prime factors that determine the food and livelihood security of 
small farmers, fisher folk and indigenous communities. Access to nutritious food is 
necessary to be able to remain productive in terms of access to education, health 
services and improved income. In this context, the risk associated with the free 
flow of GM seeds and food is high on the agenda of different farmers’ organisations 
and likeminded networks. These organisations urge developed countries and 
commercial life science companies to provide scientific evidence of the safety of 
GM products for human kind and the environment before commercially supplying 
GM products. The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) 
considers the establishment of effective regulatory mechanisms to ensure secure 
and sustainable technology promotion as of the utmost importance. In the Swiss 
referendum of 2005, voters approve a five-year moratorium on GM foods with 
due consideration of biotechnology-based research and GM food import (Focus 
2006). The constant promotion of GM can undermine people’s right to access to 
and control over means of production and to safe food, as well as the need for 
a safety net to ensure that disadvantaged communities have a secure livelihood 
options. Therefore, hunger must be dealt as a political issue. 
The dynamics of the global food system have been dramatically altered in recent 
years due to the increasing promotion and consumption of bio-fuel. Soaring 
food prices have been understood and interpreted differently by politicians and 
economists. The decision to invest in bio-fuel, the changing production patterns, 
investment in research and development, and the links with global trade have all 
received increasing attention lately due to global price hikes. The promotion of 
alternative energy to reduce dependency on fossil fuel and also as a response to 
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climate change to reduce carbon emissions has directly affected not only global 
trade, but also the food security and safety of many vulnerable communities in 
developing countries. Various studies have shown that climate change will alter the 
global production system. For example, 11 per cent of the land in Southern Africa 
will be unsuitable for growing crops by 2080, whereas land suitable for growing 
cereal in North America could increase by 40 per cent (IDS 2008). This model 
clearly evidences the possible increment of crops produced for bio-fuel, which 
could affect food security through its impact on food availability and prices, as well 
as making less food available for food aid worldwide.
Resource rich countries have already implemented measures to protect their 
agriculture sectors, as well as improve bio-fuel production targets. The cattle feed 
industry in the USA increasingly uses maize for ethanol production and produces 
cattle feed from the residue. The EU has realised the implications of the cereal 
shortage and adopted measures to set-aside agriculture land to produce around 
10 to 15 million tons of extra grain to meet its internal requirements. China has 
discontinued the use of agriculture crops for bio-energy to ensure food sufficiency 
(Skimma 2008). At the same time, some countries have increased their investment 
in food aid to support the countries hardest hit by the soaring food prices. For 
example, the US congress approved US$ 770 million, Japan US$ 100 million, the 
UK US$ 59 million and Canada US$ 50 million for food aid. The support system 
benefits resource poor countries in terms of short-term relief, but it is equally 
important to understand the long-term implications of global trade negotiations and 
the diversion of resources in the form of subsidies, against the provisions of the 
WTO. 
5.3 Role of trade in achieving the Millennium Development Goals
In 2000, the world leaders made a firm decision to tackle poverty and address 
inequality and exclusion through the Millennium Development Goals. The eight 
goals of the MDGs are given in Box 5.2. 
Box 5.2 Eight Millennium Development Goals
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health 
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development 
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All the MDG goals have either a direct and or indirect role in ensuring the right of 
every citizen to be free from hunger and to adopt sustainable livelihood measures. 
The target of halving poverty and hunger by 2015 envisages trade as playing an 
important role from the micro to the macro level. With corporate globalisation, trade 
plays an unavoidable role in poverty and hunger. It has altered the dynamics of 
trade and ‘aid for development’ is gradually being shifting to ‘aid for trade’ in global 
development discourse (GCAP 2005). With the increasing realisation that hunger 
is a political issue, a worldwide movement is taking place to make poverty history 
and create a just and dignified society in which everyone can enjoy their basic 
rights without compromising their culture and national interests. However, the real 
challenge is to ensure the faithful implementation of the commitments made by 
nation states and IFIs to accelerate just and viable economic growth. 
The disparity in benefits received from trade by different global trade partners is 
becoming more and more evident. The continued protection in the agriculture sector 
and non-cooperation by developed countries towards their commitments to support 
developing countries are major obstacles to fair trade. Cheap imports from developed 
countries have displaced people from local job markets in developing countries. 
On the export side, access to markets by developing countries is also limited by 
trade barriers such as the tariff formulation process, the ineffective implementation 
of tariff reduction, and by various non-tariff measures such as quality standards, 
which have hampered the trade potential of developing countries. Tariff escalations 
(charges that increase with the stages of value addition), tariff peaks (high levels 
of tariffs on certain sensitive products) and tariff dispersion (an increase in tariffs 
within the bound level when there is a high production of certain farm products) 
are major barriers to agriculture trade. In South Africa, the elimination of tariffs 
and subsidies hit maize producers and the farm workforce fell by 14 per cent (AAI 
2005). Hence, developed countries are reluctant to reduce tariffs and subsidies, 
despite commitments to do so under the various WTO provisions.
Among global trade, the share of agricultural from developing countries was 13.3 
per cent in 2004, of which LDCs contributed less than 0.5 per cent (UNCTAD 
2005). Of the 4,162 products exported by LDCs to 30 major trading partners, 
127 products account for 90 per cent of the export trade, showing a clear lack 
of product diversification. One-third of LDCs are landlocked and, therefore, have 
to overcome transit hurdles to access international markets. LDCs are motivated 
to integrate their economies with the global trade system in hope of better and 
quality investment, technology transfer, and of increasing their trade potential in the 
international market to improve trade and fiscal imbalances and reduce poverty. 
However, the concerns of LDCs and LLDCs are heightened as they have still not 
received substantial technical assistance, capacity building and trade facilitation for 
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market access for LDC products. LDCs and LLDCs are generally characterised by 
underdeveloped infrastructure, a weak industrial base, high dependence on foreign 
assistance in national development planning and limited possibilities for economic 
diversification, as well as by exposure to associated environmental risks.
The potential of south-south trade has been recognised and emphasised by 
UNCTAD as a way of improving trade efficiency with little investment and low 
transaction costs. Primary commodities play an important role in south-south trade, 
more so than in south-north trade (UNCTAD 2005). Recognising this, and with a 
consistent understanding of the hunger that exists in the region, the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is working to address these issues 
from a regional perspective. The SAARC Plan of Action on Poverty Alleviation 
focuses on land administration, the provision of a safety net in the form of food 
assistance to vulnerable groups, and faster progress in negotiations within the 
South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) as a regional effort. It is also working 
towards the development of a joint position before international institutions like the 
WTO. Likewise, SAARC has highlighted the removal of tariff and non-trade barriers 
and protectionism as important external policy measures. There has also been 
agreement among SAARC members for a regional Food Reserve containing wheat 
and rice stock of no less than 125,000 metric tons for use by member states in 
case of natural and human induced calamities, and to be replaced by recipient 
member states within not more than one calendar year of use (SAARC 2005a & b). 
Nepal committed to contribute 3600 metric tons by January 2002, and ultimately 
contributed 4000 metric tons. Therefore, SAARC members need to assess the 
production as well as trade potential of each member countries within SAARC to 
make provisional arrangements in responding to hunger and food insecurity. 
Unfortunately, there has been constant non-cooperation by developed countries 
in formalising and implementing the Special & Differential Treatment (S&DT) for 
LDCs, including provisions for food aid. In addition, developed countries have 
failed to honour commitments to reduce subsidies for agriculture, which is one 
of major trade distorting factors. Market access for LDC products is another 
alarming issue. On this front, the EU had made a liberal offer to accept agricultural 
products from LDCs in their market within the framework of ‘Everything but Arms’ 
(EBA). Likewise, developing countries and LDCs made further proposals to 
receive support in protecting some of the crops with importance to food security, 
livelihoods and rural development in the local context. However, the counter-
proposals from developed countries, including the list of sensitive products, have 
made the negotiations more complex and further restricted market opportunities for 
developing countries and LDCs in particular. Similarly, before making any formal 
commitment to provide technical or financial support to LDCs, developed countries 
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have demanded that developing countries open up their domestic sectors; this is 
a reciprocal demand, which is against the spirit of the Marrakesh Agreement. The 
Sixth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Hong Kong in December 2005 limited 
the LDC market to 97 per cent of tariff lines, and many speculate that the remaining 
three per cent may cover all potential exportable products of LDCs. Likewise, one 
of the major demands of LDCs under Mode 4 of the General Agreements on Trade 
and Services (GATS) is for the movement of unskilled and low-skilled persons to 
the markets of developed countries, but the proposals are not dealt seriously in 
any of the subsequent negotiations. This has raised doubts about the multilateral 
platforms and negotiation processes as developing countries, which account for at 
least two-thirds of the members of the WTO, have not received much benefit. 
In the global trade scenario, the WTO has a meaningful role to play in facilitating 
global trade. As per WTO provisions, resource poor farmers in developing countries 
are entitled to receive agricultural subsidies. However, such subsidies have 
remained elusive due to non-cooperation by developed countries and IFIs in terms 
of providing meaningful support. The concerted efforts of developing countries and 
civil society made it possible to agree on the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
in the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in November 2001. But the spirit 
of the Doha Development Agenda was diluted by the July Package. The July 
Package was developed after the inconclusive closure of the Fifth Ministerial in 
Cancun, Mexico in 2003, which set the tone of the Sixth Ministerial in Hong Kong 
in 2005. The WTO Ministerial has not been able to accommodate the concerns of 
LDCs. Instead, developed countries have been able to continue to make empty 
promises about tariff reductions, without committing to any timeframe. At the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Conference it was agreed to apply tariff reductions and or zero 
tariff access to European markets for LDCs products for 97 per cent of export 
items. However, developing countries and civil society organisations speculate that 
the remaining three per cent tariff lines might cover almost all potential tradable 
commodities of LDCs. Similarly, the Mini-Ministerial held at Dalian in China in July 
2005, which was attended by around 20 ministers from the developed world, did 
not rate the importance of LDCs’ concerns on Mode 4 of the General Agreement 
on Trades and Services. There were also heavy critiques of the LDC Ministerial 
Declaration of Livingstone, in Zambia on 25 to 26 June 2005, at which the ministers 
could not concretise their strategy to enhance the trading potential of LDCs. In 
addition, a new form of power play has appeared through the formation of the Five 
Interested Parties (FIPs). The majority of developing countries and civil society 
organisation are not satisfied with the leadership taken by India and Brazil due to 
their biased focus on market access, which is mainly in the interests of India and 
Brazil. The process and focus has completely sidelined other issues of concern to 
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LDCs. Similarly, several rounds of negotiations in the General Council between 
the Ministerial Conference deliberately excluded LDCs and developing countries. 
The constant exclusion of almost two-thirds of its members cannot be taken as 
participatory, resulting in heavy criticism of the governance of the WTO by civil 
society organisations. Interestingly, civil society participation was restricted in the 
subsequent Ministerial of the WTO. 
Nepal, as a party to the MDGs, has made an effort to meet the MDG targets. The 
Government of Nepal (GoN) claims that the policy reforms of the mid-eighties have 
produced dividends. As a member of the WTO since 2004, Nepal sees significant 
scope for effective integration into the global economy. Towards this, Nepal 
requires policy reform, effective institutions, improved infrastructure and a reliable 
governance system. The GoN has adopted 'A Poverty Monitoring and Analysis 
System' (PMAS) to track the progress of the MDGs. Its sees the potential to halve 
the number of people living in poverty and those suffering from hunger, but admits 
that the existing supportive environment is weak. The GoN estimates that there 
is a financing gap of US$ 7.6 billion for the period 2005 to 2015 (NPC 2005a), of 
which 64 per cent of resources are expected to be invested in the agriculture sector 
to meet the MDG targets. In this context, the role of migration and the contribution 
of remittances to reducing hunger and poverty in Nepal are well recognised by 
the state. It is estimated that almost 1.5 million people are currently working 
abroad and remittances contribute almost 20 per cent to national gross domestic 
product (GDP). The proportion of households receiving remittances has increased 
from 23 per cent in 1995/96 to 32 percent in 2003/04. According to the Nepal 
Living Standard Survey (2003/04), 53.3 per cent of remittances are received from 
abroad, 23.3 per cent from India and the rest from within Nepal. The receipt of 
remittances is increasing. In 1992/93 remittances of two billion in Nepali currency 
were received, and this figure is expected to rise up to two trillion rupees for the 
fiscal year 2008/09. However, class-based migration and differences in remittance 
potential have increased inequality between different castes and genders. Similarly, 
the out-migration of men has led to the feminisation of rural agriculture, which has 
increased the workload of women and negatively impacted on productivity and the 
food security of households. The lack of investment of remittances in productive 
sectors and the lack of reintegration support for migrants after their return hinder 
the optimal utilisation of remittances to improve living conditions. It is estimated 
that almost 80 per cent of remittances are used to buy land and houses. Figure 
5.3 shows the targets set by the GoN to meet the targets of MDG 1: to eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger. 
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Figure 5.3 Population below poverty line
Source: NPC (2005a)
The Government of Nepal had set the target to reduce poverty and hunger from 
31 per cent as at 2005 to 21 per cent by 2015. The GoN has acknowledged the 
dominant role of the agriculture sector in achieving this target. The agriculture 
sector was anticipated to grow from three to five per cent per annum in the 
Agriculture Perspective Plan (APP). At the same time, policy reforms were planned 
in both agriculture and non-agriculture sectors, although the majority of reforms 
had already taken place in the nineties and before. However, progress against 
this target has not been satisfactory due to the decade-long armed conflict, weak 
political commitment and implementation failures. 
Dealing with hunger and livelihood security in Nepal has an intertwined relation with 
national targets and international commitments. It requires a minimum common 
understanding to realise and commit to resource sharing through trade and aid, 
depending on the circumstances. Mr Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of 
UN, called on developed countries to fulfil their commitment to provide aid at the 
rate of 0.7 per cent of GNP to help developing countries to meet the MDG targets; 
this is yet to be met by any developed country. 
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5.4 National situation of trade and its impact on hunger and 
livelihoods
5.4.1 Trade scenario in Nepal
Since the early 1990s, Nepal has adopted a liberal economic policy. Many services 
and production sectors have been opened up as part of the Government’s Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP). Nepal’s trade has been confined largely to India as 
part of the bilateral treaty of 1950. According to the Nepal Living Standard Survey 
(CBS 2004), 66 per cent of people in Nepal are engaged in agriculture for their 
livelihoods, the majority of whom are subsistence farmers with fragmented and 
very small per capita holdings of productive land. Access to and control over 
productive resources is highly skewed on the basis of class, caste and gender. 
Being sandwiched between two giant neighbours (China and India) with large 
and prominent economies, Nepal has decided to align its economy with global 
mainstream processes. Accordingly, Nepal was accepted as a member of the WTO 
by the Fifth Ministerial held in Cancun, Mexico on 13 September 2003 and Nepal’s 
membership was ratified through ordinance on 24 April 2004.
 
Photo: Y. Ghale, 2003
The then Director General of the WTO, Mr Supachai Panitchpakdi, handing over the accession 
protocol to the then Minister for Industry, Commerce and Supplies of Nepal, Mr Hari Bahadur Basnet, 
at the Fifth Ministerial of the WTO in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003.
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In the history of the WTO, Nepal is the first LDC to accede to the WTO through 
the formal accession process. Nepal faced tremendous challenges in meeting 
the conditions set by developed member countries (Bhandari et al. 2005). The 
accession process was rigorous and extensive, taking 14 years to complete, during 
which time Nepal was unable to enjoy the provisions made for LDCs mentioned in 
Article XI of the GATT. The space provided by the WTO for developing countries, 
and especially LDCs, is insufficient and the S&DT provisions have not been 
consistently applied. Sincere support is needed from developed countries and 
effort from LDCs to ensure that the provisions for S&DT, which are supposed to be 
enjoyed by all LDCs, are applied. 
How much Nepal can benefit from the WTO and other regional trade forums 
depends on how proactive it is in analysing its national potential in partnership 
with different stakeholders at the national level, and also how successfully it can 
ally itself with likeminded groups at regional and international levels to enhance its 
trade potential. 
Agricultural trade in Nepal is largely with India. Of the total agricultural products 
imported by Nepal, about 80 per cent come from India. There are many reasons for 
the trade imbalance between Nepal and India. Nepal has been unable to effectively 
use tariffs to protect its domestic market due to its preferential trade agreement with 
India under which primary agriculture products from India face zero or little tariff 
barriers. Nepal has the flexibility to promote domestic agro-processing industries by 
applying higher tariffs to processed products (tariff escalation). However, Nepal’s 
applied average tariff on agriculture products, which is around 10 per cent, is well 
below the bound rate. Likewise, Nepal has not been able to enjoy its entitlement 
as a member of the WTO to support for resource poor farmers to enhance their 
trading capacity.
Nepal has a limited export market to countries other than India, with products 
concentrated in carpets, textiles and agriculture. According to FAO, there have 
been at least three import surges of milled paddy in Nepal: 17.4 per cent in 1994, 
55 per cent in 1996 and 79.8 per cent in 2000. A study by Action Aid Nepal revealed 
that import surges in milled rice have been substantial and surges were recorded 
during the period from 1991 to 2000 in Nepal. The Department of Customs recorded 
rice import surges in 1998/99 of 24.7 percent and in 1999/00 of 92.9 per cent (AAN 
2005). The major reasons for these import surges are high production costs, lack 
of competitiveness of Nepalese producers and support for the agriculture sector 
by the Government of India. Imports as a result of south-south trade to Nepal rose 
from 21.2 per cent to 52.5 per cent 1990 to 2003 (UNCTAD 2005). This shows an 
increasing dependency on imports from other developing countries and reflects 
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the fact that Nepal has not been able to tap opportunities presented by multilateral 
trade forums.
Trade and financial imbalances, global forces such as international trade regulations 
and emerging issues like climate change have a direct impact on consumers. At 
the macro level, policy regulations and the development priorities of resource poor 
governments and weaker economies are usually guided by the technical and financial 
support of IFIs. In this process, a lack of proper assessment of the micro situation 
and inadequate policy space for poor and small farmers, especially women, remains 
one of the limiting factors. With the worldwide food crisis, IFIs have published a list 
of ‘do’s and don’ts’ that determines the policy measures of developing countries. 
Under the ‘do’s’, IFIs have urged developing countries to scale up social safety 
nets, eliminate tariffs on key food items, and introduce temporary subsidies on food 
items vital to poor and inputs for poor farmers such as fertilizers. Likewise, on the 
‘don’t’ side are items related to export controls, price controls and general subsidies 
(Woods 2008). All these measures are in some way linked to production and the 
value chain process. These measures also direct production process and market 
dynamics. Such processes require adequate technical and financial resources to 
respond to immediate needs without undermining the sustainable use of resources 
and the autonomy of producers and consumers.
5.4.2 Food security and livelihoods in Nepal
In Nepal, 31 per cent of people still live below the poverty line. Poverty is compounded 
by multiple factors such as deprivation, denial and exclusion. The structural causes 
of denial, exclusion and injustice are an expression of the incompatibility of the 
socio-political and economic system with the aspirations and needs of the people. 
The five basic livelihood assets (physical, financial, human, social and political) 
are inter-linked and crucial to holistic empowerment. Weak links between different 
assets, lack of political will, weak structural processes and exclusionary policies 
have led to poverty and deprivation in Nepal. Hunger is the primary and most visible 
form of livelihood insecurity in Nepal. According to the Nepal Living Standard Survey 
(NLSS 1996), in 1996, 51 per cent of households had less than adequate food and 
47 per cent of households had just adequate food; only two districts had more food 
than required. Food insecurity, leading to a large undernourished population, has 
resulted in low national productivity. Hence, the deteriorating status of food security 
and livelihoods in Nepal has larger implications for the national economy in the long 
run. Looking at the food production pattern in Nepal over a period of time, there is 
no significant improvement as shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 Food production in Nepal for financial years 1994/95 to 2003/04
Source: WFP & FAO (2006, p 16)
The food production pattern across the whole geographic region is quite skewed, 
reflecting poor management of resource distribution; lack of access to information, 
technology and production inputs based on geographical disparities; and the weak 
purchasing capacity of the people. This is evidence by the existence of 72 per cent 
of people living in hunger and poverty in the far west hills and mountain regions of 
Nepal.
Nepal, as an agricultural economy, is losing its production capacity and, since the 
eighties, has become a net importer of food. This has had a direct impact on the 
national economy due to the extremely poor nutrition levels as presented in the 
MDG progress report of the Government of Nepal.
Table 5.1 Nutrition situation of children
Indicators 1990 1995 2000 2005 2015 (target)
Percentage of population below minimum level of 
dietary energy consumption 49 NA 47 NA 25
Percentage of underweight children age 6-59 
months (>-2 SD) 57 47 53 NA 29
Percentage of stunted children age 6-59 months 
(>-2 SD) 60 54 44 NA 30
Source: NPC (2005b)
The gradual privatisation of productive resources has further increased the gap 
between resource rich and poor citizens in Nepal. Since time immemorial, the 
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majority of the people in Nepal, who live close to natural resources and adopted 
agriculture as their livelihood source, were denied legal title to productive 
resources. For example, Dalits were categorised as a service-providing group 
and systematically disassociated by resource-based politics and power. The 
privatisation process in Nepal (as part of the SAP) has created further disparities 
and resource-based inequality. After the establishment of multiparty democracy 
in 1990s, non-governmental services grew and many social movements started. 
Landless producers also became organised to claim their rights over the means of 
production so that they could enjoy social justice through legal access to productive 
resources.
In the late nineties, the Government of Nepal introduced the concept of a ‘land 
bank’ as part of land management, supported by the World Bank. The aim of the 
land bank is to promote a market approach to land management (Bhusal 2006) to 
reduce land-based discrimination and facilitate poor people’s, especially ex-bonded 
labourers’, access to land through the provision of loans. However, the land bank 
has not been properly implemented due to constant protests by land rights groups. 
The logic of the land rights groups is that they deserve to acquire land through 
land redistribution as part of land reform and management, rather by taking a 
loan to purchase it, as they were victimised for generations through the bonded 
labour system. Although it is agreed that land is of prime importance in establishing 
social justice, economic transformation and increasing agricultural productivity, the 
process of land reform has been jeopardised by weak political commitment and the 
process of privatisation. The Government tends to commodify land as a lucrative 
sector for privatisation and a way of promoting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for 
other purposes such as the establishment of industries for merchandise trade. 
Skewed land distribution and the system of land-based resource entitlement is a 
dominant factor in controlling the food production and consumption cycle in Nepal. 
Among the total land holding in Nepal, about 21 per cent is under cultivation, with 
an average holding size of 0.96 ha, and 32.1 per cent of households are landless 
(CBS 2002). Ensuring food security for individuals requires – if no alternative 
income opportunities are available – self-sufficiency at the local level, for which 
access to and control over means of production is necessary. It has been evidenced 
that households headed by wage labourers have a higher incidence of poverty 
(46%), followed by households headed by someone self-employed in agriculture. 
Among the total population of Nepal, only 10.83 per cent of women have any land 
entitlement, and female-headed households have a higher incidence of poverty 
due to their increased engagement in subsistence agriculture, without any reform 
in tenureship patterns. Among Dalits, 23 per cent are landless and the majority of 
the rest have minimal access to land; Dalits have a 15 per cent higher incidence of 
poverty than the national average (NPC 2005b). 
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Similarly, the transfer of technology plays a significant role in innovation and 
dissemination for development and prosperity. However, research and development 
has not been a priority for the Government, and so sufficient resources have not 
been allocated. Another important and contentious area is protectionism in the 
agriculture sector in developed countries through tariff protection and subsidies. 
The present level of domestic support for the agriculture sector in Nepal is around 
1.3 per cent of Agriculture Gross Domestic Product (AGDP).
Reducing the prevalence of hunger and poverty is a daunt task for the Government 
of Nepal and one that requires massive agrarian reform to ensure access to and 
control over the means of production, substantial investment in research and 
development, the promotion of value addition in the production chain process and 
marketing, and the creation of employment opportunities. It is equally important for 
Nepal to align itself with the global system by tapping potential opportunities and 
mitigating the negative aspects of globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation. 
5.4.3 Threats to Nepal from corporate globalisation
Nepal has gained both advantages and disadvantages from its membership of the 
WTO. On the one hand, there is potential benefit to be gained from access to outside 
markets. On the other hand, Nepal must be careful to protect its domestic market, 
and particularly its small and poor farmers. WTO membership generally deals with 
trade policies and procedures. However, many of the trade policies and processes 
deal with agriculture, biodiversity and natural resources, which have a direct impact 
on food security and the livelihoods of many small and poor farmers. Some of the 
major agreements that have direct implications for Nepal and that directly impact 
on food security and livelihoods are the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and Technical Barriers on 
Trade and Sanitary and vhytosanitary (SPS) Measures. 
Sixty six per cent of Nepalese are engaged in agriculture, the majority of which 
are women and people from disadvantaged groups. Therefore, trade policies, 
procedures and structures have a direct relationship to the food security and 
livelihoods of these groups. As Nepal is still a subsistence-based economy, the 
possibility of exposure to external shocks created by international and regional 
trade policies and provisions cannot be denied. Since, corporate globalisation has 
implications for biodiversity, farmers’ rights and market access, which in turn affect 
food and livelihood security, the potential implications of changes in global, regional 
and national level trade regimes have to be looked at in detail. 
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Biodiversity
Biodiversity is closely associated with resources for human survival in developing 
countries. It has economic, environmental and social value. The prosperity of 
biodiversity is, to a large extent, based on the efficient use of biotechnology. In 
developing countries, farmers use plants as a source of food, for medicinal 
purposes and as cultural symbols. However, the green revolution promoted in the 
seventies introduced high yielding varieties requiring chemical inputs to increase 
production. There is evidence that the genetic resource base has been greatly 
affected and narrowed as a result. For example, in India, by the end of the 20th 
Century, 75 per cent of India’s rice production came from a mere ten varieties 
of rice, whereas India was once home to 30,000 varieties (Downes 2003). This 
phenomenon has both short-term and long-term implications for food security. The 
short-term implications are that farmers have to buy seeds every year as hybrid 
seeds cannot be reused. This increases the cost of production and results in loss 
of knowledge and skills associated with biodiversity, creating dependency on large 
seed companies. Likewise, the commercialisation of agriculture and, in particular, 
mono-cropping, has negative implications for food security in times when crops 
are affected by disease or pests. Therefore, it is important to widen the biodiversity 
base for better food security and livelihood options. 
In the long run, the narrowing of the genetic resource base can have large 
implications for the national economy, environment and national sovereignty. 
The majority of developing countries are still very rich in biodiversity and their 
livelihood systems are widely supported by these resources. There are plenty of 
opportunities for bio-prospecting and to generate employment and income from the 
bio-resources of developing countries. This also promotes research and technology 
development and dissemination. However, laboratory-based innovation and its 
wider application, the use (and manipulation) of the biodiversity of developing 
countries by multinational companies and developed countries, and the expansion 
of monopolies over these resources threaten the food security and livelihoods of 
people in developing counties. Bio-patents over life forms and monopolies over 
genetic resources thus prevent farmers from exercising their generations-old 
practices and remove their right to use, save and reuse the resources that they 
have conserved and promoted for centuries. Appropriate policies and procedures 
must be developed to ensure technology transfer and the sharing of benefits 
generated by the use of bio-resources with the country of origin, and resource poor 
countries should be assisted to conduct research and development, to enhance 
their productivity and trade competence. 
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Farmers’ rights
According to the recent estimate of FAO, 1.02 billion people are suffering from 
hunger and majority of them are from the developing world and are primarily 
engaged in agriculture for their livelihoods (Ghale 2009). The majority of poor and 
small farmers are also net consumers. Therefore, protecting farmers’ rights usually 
overlaps with protecting consumer rights. Globalisation and liberalisation has the 
potential to limit farmers’ choices. 
Farmers’ rights were explicitly defined by the FAO International Undertaking on plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture adopted in the 31st Session in November 
2001, as “rights arising from the past, present, the future contributions of farmers in 
conserving, improving, and making available plant genetic resources, particularly 
those in the centres of origin/diversity” (FAO 2001). These rights are vested in the 
international community as trustees for present and future generations of farmers 
for the purpose of ensuring full benefits to farmers and supporting the continuation 
of their contribution, as well as the attainment of the overall purpose of the 
International Undertaking on plant genetic resources for food and agriculture. This 
provision recognises the right of farmers to save, use and exchange seeds. Other 
instruments like the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 1992 acknowledge 
the sovereign right of states to utilise their resources according to their own policies 
for the protection of global biodiversity. The CBD also recognises the traditional 
knowledge of farmers and contains provisions for the equitable sharing of benefits 
arising from the use of indigenous knowledge, innovations and practices. 
Contrary to the provisions of the CBD, the WTO’s TRIPS agreement defines 
intellectual property rights as private rights. The TRIPS agreement restricts the 
right of farmers to save, use and exchange seeds, and to benefit from their role 
in preserving biodiversity. Although the concept of farmers’ rights was introduced 
in the 1980’s, it is still unclear as to what they actually are and how they can be 
reconciled with plant breeders’ rights. The debate on whether or not farmers’ right 
to be protected within an ownership or stewardship approach is currently a hot topic 
of debate (SAWTEE 2007). The outcome of this debate will greatly impact on food 
security and the livelihoods of farmers in developing countries. 
Market access
Developing countries including LDCs basically grow for their own consumption. 
However, they also have certain areas of potential for export. Some of the bio-
resource based enterprises in developing countries would be viable to develop 
if regional and international markets were flexible enough to accommodate their 
concerns and priorities. Developing countries also need support to enhance their 
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trading capabilities. These countries either have not been able to identify potential 
commodities and markets, or have not been able to invest enough resources to 
build their capacity to tap existing opportunities. The complexities are widening in 
successive meetings of the WTO, in particular, where firm commitments, especially 
to withdraw agriculture subsidies practised by developed countries, open market for 
products from developing countries and increasing development aid in agriculture 
and food security, are still to be achieved. 
The products of developing countries are usually unable to enter the international 
market due to high quality standards that are beyond their capacity to meet or 
due to other international rules. The quality standard system and practices are 
becoming a trade barrier to access to international market (Ghale 2005a). The 
product and process specific standards for both industrial and agricultural products 
remain a challenge to securing market access. In the case of Nepal, a technical 
committee under the Nepal Council of Standards (NCS) chaired by the Minister of 
Industry, Commerce and Supplies (MoICS) sets standards based on internationally 
defined parameters and national requirements. A total of 111 companies have 
received quality certifications for 32 products under this system including polythene 
pipe, biscuits, beer and noodles. Likewise, the provisions of the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement are intended to minimise the negative effects of 
SPS measures on international trade, considering the risks to human and animal 
health from food and animal or plant-borne disease, and to animals and plants 
from pests and diseases. The SPS is applicable to fresh fruits and vegetables, 
fruit juice and other fruit preparations, meat and meat products, dairy products and 
processed food products. 
The UN Codex Alimentarius regulates food safety by setting international standards 
for food production. These standards act as gatekeepers to international food 
markets effectively blocking imports of food from most developing countries. This 
has resulted for two main reasons: On the one hand, developing countries are not 
adequately represented on Codex’s committees and not actively involved in the 
standard setting processes of Codex. They, therefore, have to abide by standards 
that are predetermined by others and are often too high. On the other hand, LDCs 
like Nepal are usually not in a position to comply with SPS standards set by Codex. 
This means that products from LDCs like Nepal have limited access, if at all, to 
markets in developed countries. Interestingly, some recent Codex decisions reflect 
political compromises designed to promote international trade, not necessarily best 
science to protect consumers.
Nepal’s export basket of food and agricultural products contains, among others, 
medicinal herbs, ginger, brooms, resin, cardamom, cattle fodder, biscuits, noodles, 
vegetable ghee, raw jute, pulses, catechu, turmeric, black tea, other types of 
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fermented tea, sugar, spices, uncooked pasta, edible preparations of animal 
or vegetable fats, wheat, plants and beer. Given the country’s limited technical 
capability to meet internationally agreed standards, Nepalese products can have 
very limited access to export destinations. 
At the bilateral level, certain restrictions are also becoming an obstacle to regional 
market access. For example, India has the restricted the export of sensitive products 
to through only 7 of the 15 existing transit points. 
5.5 Efforts to mitigate hunger and livelihood insecurity in Nepal
5.5.1 National policies and programmes
The Government of Nepal considers food security as a matter of availability 
(production of food), access (economic and social access to food) and utilisation 
(proper processing of food items into food) (NPC 2005a). Over the years, the GoN 
has adopted various uncoordinated strategies to address the causes of poverty 
and hunger in Nepal. Since the fifties and the start of periodic development 
planning in Nepal, almost all plans have identified poverty as the main issue in 
underdevelopment in Nepal. All the periodic development plans have considered 
agriculture as an engine of growth and poverty reduction. Implemented in 1997, 
the APP is considered a milestone document with its long-term plan in compliance 
with Nepal’s WFS commitments of 1996. Likewise, the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Programme (PRSP), 2002, which is also known as 10th periodic development plan 
of Nepal, has clearly identified four areas of intervention, as seen in Figure 5.5. 
There are also several sub-sector policies that deal with production, processing 
and trade aspects of agriculture. In 2004, the GoN came up with an Agriculture 
Policy 2061, with comprehensive coverage of the agriculture sector. The last 
Three Year Interim Plan (2007/09) also focused on agriculture-based growth to 
address poverty and inequality. The Government of Nepal is currently focusing 
on the effective implementation of public private partnerships to meet its poverty 
reduction targets.
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Figure 5.5 Four pillars of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme
Source: NPC (2002)
However, civil society organisations like Action Aid International and OXFAM 
consider hunger and livelihood insecurity to be political issues created by lack of 
access to means of production such as land, credit, information, technology and 
markets, and by a lack of participation in decision-making forums. They believe 
that hunger can be mitigated through the promotion and adaptation of technologies 
to meet local needs, the creation of space for people to make informed choices 
and participate in decision making, and through the promotion of farmers’ basic 
rights. Therefore, it is important to consider people’s rights when implementing 
development approaches and to create connectivity between different sectoral 
interventions to bring about real change in the fight against hunger and livelihood 
insecurity. 
5.5.2 Opportunities offered by international trade rules
The weaker state of LDCs and LLDCs has been well acknowledged by global trade 
platforms. Accordingly, certain mechanisms have been developed to enhance the 
trading capacity of these groups. In the Marrakesh Agreement (establishing the 
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WTO), mention is made of the special need to respond to the vulnerability of LDCs 
created by market distortion and instability in the world market. Hence, provision is 
made for compensation for the negative impact of these on the food import bill of 
LDCs. At the same time, support measures also focus on enhancing the production 
capacity of LDCs through the establishment of a technical assistance framework. 
Under this framework, six multilateral institutions – the WB, IMF, UNCTAD, 
WTO, ITC and UNDP – have committed to create a common fund for technical 
and financial support. Likewise, the regional trade forums also acknowledged the 
weaker economic status of LDC member states and have made certain provisions 
to compensate for this. Some of these international and regional provisions are 
stated below:
1.  Part IV of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on Trade 
and Development provide for non-reciprocity for LDCs, and Article 3 of 
the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) also makes provision 
for the adoption of concrete preferential measures in favour of LDCs on 
a non-reciprocal basis. 
2.  The WTO provides for the exemption of subsidies on inputs and 
investment in relation to Aggregate Measures of Support (AMS) for Low 
Income and Resource Poor (LIRP) farmers from countries covered by 
the Agreement on Agriculture. 
3.  As per the WTO, developed countries are supposed to reduce their 
WDULIIVE\SHUFHQWZLWKLQ¿YH\HDUVDQGGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHVZLWKLQ
10 years from 1995, with the actual calculation base year of 1986/88. 
These commitments have not been met substantially. Likewise, Article 
7 of SAFTA requires tariff reduction by the Non-Least Developed 
Contracting States from existing tariff rates to 20 per cent and for LDCs 
to 30 per cent within 2 years from the date of the Agreement coming 
into force. 
4.  Acknowledging the weak trading capacity of LDCs, provisions have 
been made to support LDCs to enhance their trading capacities 
WKURXJKWHFKQLFDODQG¿QDQFLDODVVLVWDQFHZLWKWKHVXSSRUWRI,),VDQG
UN organisations. 
5.  SAARC’s provision for a regional food reserve for emergencies has 
the potential to ensure people’s access to quality food in situations 
of natural disaster in the region of a scale that requires a regional 
response. 
6.  The WTO provides for Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) to 
enhance the trade competence of  LDCs. SAFTA in Article 11 provides 
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that all Contracting States shall provide special and more favourable 
treatment to LDCs commensurate with their development needs and, 
recognising that it is necessary to progress beyond preferential trading 
arrangements, SAFTA envisages moving towards higher levels of 
trade and economic cooperation in the region by removing barriers to 
WKHFURVVERUGHUÀRZRIJRRGV
7.  There are no limits to ‘Green Box’6 subsidies. In addition, as Nepal is 
an LDC with more than 50 per cent of farmers holding an average of 
only 0.8 ha of land, most of Nepal’s farmers fall into the category of Low 
Income and Resource Poor. Article 6.2 of Agreement on Agriculture 
allows for the non-inclusion of inputs and investment subsidies in 
the Aggregate Measures of Support if directed to Low Income and 
Resource Poor farmers. Those areas for support include direct 
SD\PHQWVLQUHODWLRQWRSURGXFWVSHFL¿FVXSSRUWDQGJHQHUDOVXSSRUW
IRUQRQSURGXFWVSHFL¿FVXSSRUWVXFKDVUHVHDUFKDJULFXOWXUHURDGV
agriculture extension and development, domestic food aid, irrigation, 
improved seeds, chemical fertilizers, and so forth. 
5.5.3 Mainstreaming hunger and livelihoods: The way forward
The right to be free from hunger is enshrined in many international provisions. 
These instruments consider food security and livelihood security as a basic right. 
Similarly, every state has a responsibility to ensure that its citizens have access 
to means of production, and food and livelihood security. Food is not merely a 
tradable commodity; it is a matter of life and death. Hence, the Government of 
Nepal should prepare a list of sensitive products very carefully, especially when 
dealing with food and agricultural products for export destinations.
Meaningful public private partnerships, in which both the Government and the 
private sector are bound to ensure secure and healthy livelihoods for all people, 
especially vulnerable groups such as Dalits, women, children, the disabled and 
indigenous communities, are also an important way forward. In this scenario, multi-
pronged options have to be considered to address hunger and livelihood insecurity 
in the era of globalisation, without compromising national sovereignty. 
Securing food and livelihoods has to be considered a political issue requiring broad 
commitment at the national and international level to address. At the national 
level, the GoN should adopt proper policies and implementation mechanisms to 
6  Green Box subsidies are one of the measures of ‘domestic support’ provided under Annex 2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. Fixed payments are allowed to producers for environmental programmes, so long as the payments are 
‘decoupled’ from current production levels. Green Box measures i) must not distort trade or at most cause minimal 
distortion, ii) have to be government funded, and iii) must not involve any price support.
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ensure people’s access to means of production and viable livelihood options. The 
schematic diagram in Figure 5.6 presents the major aspects of addressing hunger 
and livelihood insecurity. 
Figure 5.6 Schematic diagram presenting the major aspects of addressing 
hunger and livelihood insecurity
Equitable access to and control over resources
The majority of people who are hungry and vulnerable to livelihood insecurity are 
from economically poor and socially excluded communities such as Dalits, women, 
the disabled, children and indigenous minorities. They have poor access to means 
of production and are struggling to deal with hunger and poverty, which they have 
been experiencing for centuries. Among the means of production, land is the prime 
asset, and has both social and economic value. In Nepal, 46 per cent of total arable 
land is held by only 17 per cent of the population – the so-called ‘elites’ – and 48 per 
cent of the people who work the land own only 15 per cent. A very discouraging fact 
is that, only 8.1 per cent of women in Nepal have legal ownership of land. Due to 
unequal and skewed distribution of land resources and the increasing feminisation 
of agriculture, agriculture productivity in Nepal is decreasing. In addition, entitlement 
to other support measures in Nepal, such as technology, credit and information, 
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is land-based. There is a lack of an assured fair market on which to sell goods 
produced. Consequently, farmers with prior commitments to meet (e.g., to their 
landlord) are often forced to sell their produce at very nominal prices, which can 
push them towards bankruptcy. 
The majority of farmers and small holders in Nepal are in need of an effective 
support system from the state including measures such as subsidies on irrigation, 
payment for power systems, the provision of seeds, and storage and export 
facilities for produced goods. The porous border with India and the expansion of 
the globalised market system are threatening small farmers. 
Policy formulation needs to protect the right of farmers to produce, save and sell 
farm-produced seeds. The seed inflow-outflow mechanism has to be restricted to 
protect against loss of endangered genetic resources and to prevent gene pollution. 
In addition, farmers need to have better farm prices and compensation mechanisms 
in case of crop failure due to irregularities in the market chain or natural calamity. 
Farmers and local communities have practised biodiversity conservation for 
centuries, which has contributed tremendously to natural resource management 
in Nepal. Therefore, farmers and local communities should have rights over the 
genetic resources that they have conserved and protected to use and reuse as they 
wish. As many bio-resources have trade potential, their trade value should be fully 
exploited. Farmers and local communities should also receive an equitable share 
of the benefits that arise from bio-prospecting. The basic principle of protecting 
local people’s autonomy over production process, engagement in value chain and 
ensuring access to an equitable share of benefits should be upheld. Local and 
national governments can play a critical role in this through effective public private 
partnerships.
With liberalisation and privatisation, vulnerable groups will be exposed to more 
uncertainty and become more vulnerable. Special protection mechanisms should 
be in place to protect the interests of these poor and excluded groups. There is 
the risk of direct encroachment on land resources and of the privatisation of water 
resources in the interest of profit-orientated corporations that wish to invest and 
privatise resources. This can negatively affect the livelihoods of people, especially 
vulnerable groups.
Informed participation in decision making
Information is power; it helps to develop an informed society and empowers citizens 
to claim their basic rights and fulfil their responsibilities. Countries with weaker 
economies are consistently being marginalised from the global discourse on trade 
and development and from participation in decision making. Investment in research 
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and development has been weakened and priorities shifted. As a result, weaker 
countries lag behind in developing their trade potential and in the proper analysis 
of long-term implications of undermining research on crops of high importance for 
food security, cultural identity, environmental protection and economic prosperity. 
In the long run, this weakens local and national institutions, knowledge system and 
their bargaining capacity to tap adequate resources for relevant sector development 
important for food security and livelihoods. Developed countries play the game of 
divide and rule, to the detriment of developing countries. Global international trade 
forums have been predominantly occupied and influenced by the agendas and 
interests of developed countries. Global trade has been continuously dominated 
by highly industrialised countries. During the Sixth Ministerial of the WTO in 
Hong Kong in December 2005, it was agreed to eliminate all forms of subsidies 
in agriculture by developed countries by 2013. But at the subsequent high-level 
meeting in Geneva, no positive indications or actual plans of action were shown to 
ensure this reduction. Similarly, the Sixth Ministerial decided to provide duty free 
and quota free market access for LDCs in relation to only 97 per cent of tariff lines. 
The coverage by the remaining three per cent of tariff lines is still undecided. Focus 
on Global South suspects that this 3 per cent will cover almost 330 tariff lines and 
may cover almost all tradable commodities from LDCs (Focus on the Global South 
2006). At the same time, the proposal by developing countries to protect the special 
products of LDCs on the ground of food security and livelihood security has not fully 
materialised. Hence, there are enormous doubts about the ethical implementation 
of provisions to promote the trading capacity of LDCs and ensure that they receive 
benefits from integration into the global trade system. 
Safety net measures
Safety net measures are vital for the immediate relief of hunger and livelihood 
insecurity, and can be built on through the participation of food and livelihood 
insecure groups as a means of empowerment. Where the equitable distribution of 
resources is not ensured and people’s informed choices are not guaranteed, safety 
net measures are even more critical. Short-term relief should not be confined to 
immediate support measures, but should focus on the process of empowerment 
and lead to access to resources in the long run. In many developing countries, 
resource distribution is skewed based on caste, class, religion and gender. In this 
situation, it is pivotal to have proper safety net measures for access to food and 
other means of livelihood. To secure better livelihoods, resource poor farmers of 
LDCs like Nepal are entitled to receive subsidies for the production process. As 
countries like Nepal cannot generate enough revenue to support agriculture and 
food security sub-sectors properly, international institutions have a role to play in 
mitigating poverty and improving livelihoods. However, global evidence has not 
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been encouraging on this front. Many Net Food Importing Developing Countries 
including Nepal are at risk of compromising timely and quality supply of food during 
times of emergency. The supply of GM food in food aid to some African countries 
has remained an international issue. Programmes like Food for Work, which was 
introduced in the mid-seventies; some primary school feeding programmes and 
food assistance programmes; and transport subsidies for transporting rice to 
remote areas are some of the safety measures in place in Nepal. However, the 
food transport subsidy has been criticised for being costly, ineffective due to the 
centralised distribution system, and for increasing the dependency of locals on 
subsidised rice, weakening the local production potential. Nonetheless, a minimal 
level of support, such as providing next season’s crop at times of crop failure from 
drought or flood and by waving interest or providing loans, is essential.
There are certain provisions that have been implemented by different countries that 
are commendable. The Indian Supreme Court’s order on the ‘Right to Food’ is a 
praiseworthy initiative that considers food as a basic human right and the duty of the 
state to provide. The public distribution system practised in India for people below 
the poverty line has facilitated poor people’s access to food and other basic items 
like kerosene at low prices. Likewise, the ‘Zero Hunger Programme’ announced 
by Mr Lula de Silva, President of Brazil, is another step forward in the fight against 
poverty and hunger. The Government of Thailand has promoted various food 
schemes in rural areas to improve access to food and livelihood options. There 
have also been certain regional initiatives, such as the establishment of the Food 
Reserve by SAARC, which is another good example. However, hunger and 
livelihood insecurity cannot be dealt with by single schemes operating in isolation. 
Short-term support and long-term political vision are needed to deal with this 
important issue.
5.5.4 Measures to be taken at different levels
International level
1. Cooperate with other likeminded groups to lobby the WTO for: 
x Duty free and quota free access for LDC products
x The phasing out of all forms of subsidies in developed countries, 
including export subsidies and trade distorting domestic subsidies 
x The removal of tariff escalation, tariff peaks and tariff dispersion 
measures
x The provisions of S&DT envisaged for developing and least 
developed countries to be made obligatory 
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x The dumping of any form to be discouraged 
x Patents on life forms to be removed 
x 3UHGLFWDEOHODERXUPDUNHWVDQGDFFHVVWRIDLUMREVDQGEHQH¿W
packages to be ensured as provisioned for LDC members in the 
WTO 
2.  International institutions to honour their commitment to provide 
PHDQLQJIXOWHFKQLFDODQG¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUW
3.  Maintenance of the trading space for LDCs as envisaged in the original 
agreement of the WTO and in regional trading arrangements. 
4.  Establishment of a food-aid scheme to meet the legitimate needs of 
developing countries in the form of grants.
5.  The removal of WTO-plus conditions in any form. 
6.  The international community should be responsible for mitigating the 
impacts of carbon emissions and potential threats posed by climate 
change. 
National level
1.  Promote public and private investment in research and development in 
agriculture to enhance the productivity of staple food crops and crops 
with export potential. 
2.  Build the capacities of government institutions and human resources to 
face the global challenges and to create a fair trade environment. 
 3URYLGH WDUJHWHG SURGXFW VSHFL¿F DQG JHQHULF VXSSRUWPHDVXUHV WR
Low Input Resource Poor Farmers. 
4.  Ensure farmers’ rights over plant genetic resources to save, reuse and 
sell their farm produced seeds. 
5.  Access to genetic resources by external parties should be restricted to 
the level of public research and it should be subject to prior informed 
consent. Where prior informed consent is granted, access should be 
on mutually agreed terms. 
 (VWDEOLVK IDLU DQG HTXLWDEOH SURYLVLRQV IRU WKH VKDULQJ WKH EHQH¿WV
arising from the commercial and other utilisation of genetic resources 
to the local community and nation state. 
7.  The knowledge and skill of indigenous communities and farming 
communities and women in relation to plants and plant genetic 
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resources should be protected and encouraged in line with the CBD 
and International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 169. 
8.  Adopt short and long-term measures to promote a sustainable 
production system to respond to the increasing food crisis and protect 
national food sovereignty. 
9.  Ensure a stable economy and good governance. 
10. Promote justice in production relations, respect the autonomy of 
producers over means of production and their representation in 
decision-making processes, and empower poor and small producers 
to change the rules of the game for social justice and improved 
productivity.
5.6 Conclusions
In the globalised world of today there has been progress on many fronts. Developed 
countries, with their strong economic prosperity and financial and technology 
based power, are leading the world. The majority of developing countries and, in 
particular, LDCs are trying hard to integrate their economies into the global trading 
system. Although efforts have been made, the majority of people in developing 
countries are still unable to fulfil their basic livelihood needs. Developing countries 
have abundant natural resources, and the knowledge and skill associated with it, 
but have not been able to exploit these resources for economic gain. The resource 
distribution pattern in developing countries is highly skewed based on class, caste, 
religion and gender. Due to their poor economic status, weak institutional and 
human resource base, and political instability, the bargaining capacity of developing 
countries is weak. As a result, billions of people go to bed hungry in the developing 
world. Worldwide increases in food prices and the trend by developed countries to 
invest in bio-fuel are posing new challenges. The efforts of international institutions 
and support from developed countries have not been able to make a substantial 
difference in the lives of the many poor and hungry people in developing countries. 
The international provisions enshrined in the many declarations, conventions and 
summits have remained an illusion. Developing countries have not been able to 
enjoy the global market principally because developed countries, while on the one 
hand offering access, are at the same time restricting the import of agricultural 
products from developing countries through process standards. In other words, 
even if the product is safe, it can be denied market access on the ground that the 
it can’t be ‘proved’ to be safe. In contrast, it is very difficult for Nepal to restrict the 
import of a product for which no international standard is available, as international 
agreements put the onus of proof on the importing country based on scientific 
evidence. Given Nepal’s limited scientific capacity, the required ‘proof’ may be 
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difficult if not impossible to produce. This is clearly unfair. The SPS and Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements broadly serve the interests of exporters from 
developed countries, particularly MNCs. 
Likewise, Nepal’s trade potential has not been further expanded especially in food 
and agriculture sectors. The surges in imports, which can take place against static 
or even declining export performance, are further increasing Nepal’s trade deficit. 
As a result, imports will be difficult to sustain. More importantly, cheaper imports 
from abroad may kill incentives to produce at home. Farmers and other small 
producers will no longer be motivated to remain engaged in food and agricultural 
production. This would negatively affect food security, in general, and household 
consumption of food products, in particular. Finally, cheaper imports will contributing 
to changing food habits, which will affect, in many cases, the nutritional status of 
food. Nepal’s traditional food items are rich in micronutrients. They may, however, 
lose out to the attractive-looking and ready-to-eat packaged food imported from 
elsewhere, even if they do not have the same nutritional value as home-grown 
products. Quality management, process control and documentation; cooperation 
with external partners; an enabling framework; market segmentation; collaboration 
with likeminded groups; and regional cooperation are some of the core areas to 
be developed for international trade regulation to benefit all. Some of the good 
initiatives like the SAARC Food Reserve can be promoted and fully operationalised 
for better access to food during difficult situations. 
Another important issue is the regulation of GM products. One of the core elements 
of GMO legislation would be a requirement to positively label. In other words, the 
labelling of GM foods to say ‘this product contains GMO’ would be mandatory. 
The alternative to such legislation would be a negative labelling (‘this product does 
not contain GMO’), which could be done voluntarily by suppliers. In view of the 
potential price premium on GM-free products (e.g., organic food), suppliers can be 
expected to do this voluntarily. However, a threshold limit will have to be worked out 
for a product to be labelled as ‘GM-free’.
Therefore, in order to eradicate hunger and ensure livelihood security for 
disadvantaged people a dual approach is needed: those in immediate need 
must be supported and ways of addressing structural causes that make people 
vulnerable must be sought. Immediate support, such as safety net measures, need 
to be taken as part of the process of empowerment, which ultimately relates to 
access to and control over means of production. Long-term measures have to be 
oriented towards enhancing the production and market potential of both agriculture 
and non-agriculture sectors for equitable growth and good governance. Only this 
can ultimately lead to dignified livelihoods and social justice.
Corporate globalisation
179
Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal
References
AAI [ActionAid International]. 2005. Trade Invaders, The WTO and Developing 
Countries’ Right to Protect. London: ActionAid International. 
AAN [ActionAid Nepal]. 2005. Import Surge in Nepal: A Case Study of Rice. 
Kathmandu: ActionAid Nepal. 
Adhikari J, Ghimire S. 2006. Changing Food Series [In Nepali]. Kathmandu: Martin  
Chautari. 
Adhikari R, Ghimire H. 2001. Integrating LDCs into the multilateral System: Rhetoric 
Galore. Kathmandu: South Asia Watch on Trade Economics and Environment. 
Adhikari R, Belbase N, Ghale Y. 2000. Seed of Monopoly: Implications of TRIPS 
Agreement on Nepal. Kathmandu: ActionAid Nepal and Pro-Public. 
Basnet P, Darnal S, editors. 2007. Politics of Privilege and Reservation [In Nepali]. 
Kathmandu: Jagaran Media Centre.
Bengali K, editor. 2003. The Politics of Managing Water. Islamabad: Sustainable 
Development Policy Institute (SDPI) and Oxford.
Bhandari S, Shrestha SM, Ghale Y. 2005. Nepal’s Accession to the WTO: Opportunities 
and Challenges. Kathmandu: ActionAid Nepal and Law Associates Nepal. 
Bhusal YR. 2006. Land Issues and the Role of Land Bank in the Context of Agriculture 
Perspective Plan and Poverty Reduction Strategy in Nepal. Paper presented 
in the workshop on The APP: From Vision to Action. 22-23 November, 2006. 
Kathmandu: National Planning Commission and World Bank. 
CBS [Central Bureau of Statistics]. 2004. Nepal Living Standard Survey 2003/04. 
Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics, Nepal.
CBS [Central Bureau of Statistics]. 2002. Pocket Book of Statistics. Kathmandu: 
Central Bureau of Statistics. 
Chatham House. 2008. Rising Food Prices: Divers and implications for development, 
&KDWKDPKRXVHEULH¿QJVSDSHU1R www.chathamhouse.org.uk 
(Accessed on 22 August 2008).
Clive J. 2005. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2005, Executive 
Summary. Brief 34. Webpage: http://www.isaaa.org.resources/publications 
(Accessed on 18 December 2005). 
Downes G. 2003. Implication of TRIPS for Food Security in the Majority World. Dublin: 
Comhlamh Action Network. 
ETC. 2005. Global Seed Industry Concentration, ETC Group Communiqué. September/
October 2005, Issue No. 90. 6 September 2005. Source: http://www.etcgroup.
org/documents/comm90globalseed.pdf 6 Sep, 2005 (Accessed on 29 
September 2008) . 
180
FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization]. 1996. Rome Declaration on World Food 
Security, World Food Summit. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of 
UN. 
FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization]. 1997. FAO Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization. 
FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization]. 2001. International Undertaking on plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture. Program held on 2-13 November 
2001, Rome, Italy.
FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization]. 2004. Right to Food Guidelines. http://
www.fao.org/righttofood/ (Accessed on 29 September 2008).
FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization]. 2005. The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World 2005. Food Security in the World 2005, Eradicating world hunger-key 
to Achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of UN. 
FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization], UNDP [United Nations Development 
Programme]. 2008. Combating Hunger: A Seven Point Agenda. Colombo: 
81'35HJLRQDO&HQWUHDQG%DQJNRN)$25HJLRQDO2I¿FHIRU$VLDDQGWKH
3DFL¿F
FOCUS. 2006. Biotechnology and Food Security. Info Resources. No. 1/06. Webpage: 
http://www.inforesources.ch/pdf/focus06_1_e.pdf (Accessed on 12 September 
2008). 
Food First. 2002. Food Sovereignty: A right for All. Political Statement of the NGO/CSO 
Forum for Food Sovereignty on 14 June 2002.Webpage: ZZZIRRG¿UVWRUJ
SURJVJOREDOIRRG¿QDOGHFODUDWLRQKWPl. (Accessed on 22 September 2008). 
Friends of the Earth. 2003. The World for Sale: An Introduction to Corporate 
*OREDOLVDWLRQ%ULH¿QJ London: Friends of the Earth. www.foe.co.uk/resource/
EULH¿QJVWKHBZRUOGBIRUBVDOHSGI$FFHVVHGRQ'HFHPEHU
GCAP [Global Call to Action Against Poverty]. 2005. Global Call to Action against 
Poverty. http://www.whiteband.org/about-gcap/what-is-gcap (Accessed on 20 
December 2009).
Ghale Y. 2009. World Food Summit 2009: Can the renewed commitments eliminate 
hunger? http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/-guestcolumn/2587-world-
food-summit-2009-can-the-renewed-commitment-eliminate-hunger.html. 
(Accessed on 20 December 2009).
IDS [Institute of Development Studies]. 2008. Agriculture; Research Findings for 
Development Policymakers and Practitioners. www.id21.org. (Accessed on 22 
September 2008). 
Corporate globalisation
181
Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal
ITCSD [International Centre for Sustainable Trade and Development]. 2006. Bridges 
between Trade and Sustainable Development. Year 10. No.1. January-
February, 2006. Geneva: International Centre for Sustainable Trade and 
Development. 
Jawara F, Kwa A. 2003. Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of International 
Trade Negotiation. London: Zed Books and Bangkok: Focus on the Global 
South. 
MoAC [Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives], WFP [World Food Programme], 
FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization]. 2009. 2008/09 Winter Drought 
in Nepal Crop and Food Security Assessment: Joint Assessment Report. 
Kathmandu: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, World Food Programme, 
Food and Agricultural Organization.
MoAC [Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives], WFP [World Food Programme]. 
2008. Report on Rapid Emergency Food Security Assessment; Far and Mid-
West Hills and Mountains. Kathmandu: Government of Nepal and United 
Nations World Food Programme. 
Navadanya. 2003. WTO and Water Privatisation: Defending Water as Public Good: 
Indian Movements Resist Water Privatisation as a Solution to Water Stress and 
Water Pollution. Delhi: Navadanya. 
NPC [National Planning Commission]. 2005a. Millennium Development Goals 
Progress Report. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission. 
NPC [National Planning Commission]. 2005b. Nepal Millennium Development Goals 
Report. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission. 
NPC [National Planning Commission]. 2005c. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
Second Progress Report. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission. 
OECD [Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development]. 2005. Tackling 
Trade in Agriculture. OECD. Paris: Organizations for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. 
OXFAM. 2005. Make Extortion History: The Case for Development-Friendly WTO 
Accession for the World Poorest Countries. London: OXFAM. 
Rijsberman FR. 2008. Water for food: Corruption in irrigation systems. In: Transparency 
International. Global Corruption Report 2008. The Global Coalition against 
Corruption. Berlin:: Transparency International, pp 67-84. 
SAARC [South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation]. 2005a. Agreement on 
Establishing the SAARC Food Security Reserve. Kathmandu: South Asia 
Association for Regional Cooperation Secretariat. 
SAARC [South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation]. 2005b. Declaration, 
Twelfth SAARC Summit. Islamabad, 4-6 January, 2004. Kathmandu: South 
Asia Association for Regional Cooperation Secretariat. 
182
SAARC [South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation]. 2004. SAARC Plan of 
Action on Poverty Alleviation. Kathmandu: South Asia Association for Regional 
Cooperation Secretariat. 
SAWTEE [South Asia Watch on Trade Economics and Environment]. 2007. 
Protecting Farmers’ Rights in the Global IPR Regime: Challenges and Options 
for Developing Countries. Policy brief no. 15. Kathmandu: South Asia Watch on 
Trade Economics and Environment. 
Sikkema A. 2008. Biotechnology/a Growing Market in Need of Direction. Wageningen: 
Wageningen UR update No. 1. 2008, pp 8-11. 
UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development]. 2005. Trade 
and Development Report. Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. 
Via Campesina. 2003. What is food sovereignty? International Peasant Movement. 
Website: www.viacampesina.org/en/index (Accessed on 23 November 2007). 
Voice of Irish Concern for the Environment. 2009. Bio-patents controlling life. http://
ZZZYRLFHEX]RUJELRSDWHQWLQJOHDÀHWKWPl (Accessed on 26 April 2009)
WFP [World Food Programme]. 2008. Nepal Staple Food Market Review and Outlook 
for 2009, Food security monitoring and analysis system, Nepal. Kathmandu: 
World Food Programme.
WFP [World Food Programme], FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization]. 2009. 
The State of Food Insecurity in the World: Economic Crises- Impacts and 
Lessons Learned. Rome: World Food Programme Food and Agricultural 
Organization.
WFP [World Food Programme] and FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization]. 
2006. Food and Agriculture Markets in Nepal. Kathmandu: World Food 
Programme. 
Woods B. 2008. Agribusiness vs. Food Security: The Food Crisis and the IFIs. Bretton 
Woods update No. 61. London: Bretton Woods Project. 
Corporate globalisation
Chapter
6
A critical reflection on the 
sustainable livelihoods 
approach and its application 
to Nepal's community forestry
Bharat  K  Pokharel
Abstract
This chapter looks at the Department for International Development’s Sustainable 
Livelihoods Approach, together with its components and framework. It also 
introduces four other livelihoods approaches promoted by various development 
agencies: the Rural Livelihood System and the livelihoods approaches used by 
UNDP, CARE and OXFAM. The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach is then applied 
to analyse community forestry in Nepal. The approach is found to be a useful 
tool for understanding of the elements of livelihoods. However, the approach is 
criticised for its inability to provide a framework for political transformation and wider 
social change. While the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach does acknowledge 
the importance of the transformation of ‘policy, institutions and social processes’, 
and of capital formation, it does not offer any explicit clues as to how such a 
transformation is to take place or how people can increase their capital and reduce 
vulnerability. The approach is silent about the factors and the means of political 
change to influence the policy change, such as gradual change or change through 
a civil or political movement. Despite its limitations, this chapter demonstrates the 
value of the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach as a tool for analysing development 
programmes such as Nepal’s community forestry programme. Although the chapter 
portrays the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach as a widely-practised and useful 
approach to development, suggestions are made as to how to capitalise on its 
strengths and overcome its weaknesses by incorporating the human rights based 
approach to development. The human rights based approach to development is 
stronger in its focus on political and civil rights than the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Approach, and treats livelihood needs as human rights and ‘beneficiaries’ as ‘rights 
holders’ who could achieve the outcome of poverty reduction if their rights and 
responsibilities are recognised. 
6.1 Introduction to the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach
What is the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA)? Is it just more donor jargon, 
or does it actually have value in practice? How can it improve the lives of the poor? 
What are its advantages over other approaches? How is it applied? What are the 
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expected benefits of the approach? These are some of the questions asked by both 
academics and development practitioners about SLA. This chapter will attempt to 
answer some of these questions. 
Most simply stated, a 'livelihood' is a way of making a living or obtaining the 
necessities of life. Chambers and Conway (1992, p 7) define livelihood as:
…compris[ing] the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) 
and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable and 
can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its 
capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihoods opportunities for 
the next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at 
the local and global levels and in the long and short term. 
The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach is both a tool for analysis and a school 
of thought. It is a conceptual framework through which to better understand the 
problems embedded in the daily lives of people and, based on that understanding, 
it is a tool with which to design interventions. The SLA and its application have been 
well documented in recent years. Chambers and Conway (1992), Carney (1998), 
DFID (1999), Carney (1999), the IDS livelihoods website (http://www.livelihoods.
org), Ellis and Biggs (2001) and Sunderlin (2005) are the main writers on the 
topic and give a comprehensive overview of the approach, framework, methods 
of application, tools and techniques, as well as practical experiences worldwide. 
This chapter is basically a synthesis of these writings, together with an analysis 
of the contribution of community forestry to people's livelihoods in Nepal using the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (also see Pokharel 2001; Pokharel & Nurse 
2004).
The SLA builds on the experiences and learning of most of the approaches of the 
past, such as the Integrated Rural Development Approach (IRDA) or Integrated Area 
Management; Sector-Wide Approach (SWAP), participatory approaches and other 
livelihoods approaches; it also incorporates key concepts such as sustainability 
(including environmental sustainability), gender equity, planning through objectives, 
the use of logical frameworks, policy support, institution building, and so on (DFID 
1999; Carney 1998). The SLA takes a holistic view of development and highlights 
the need to check cross-sector, geographical and institutional links. It focuses on 
identifying the opportunities and constraints, multiple objectives and various factors 
that affect and characterise people's lives. It recognises that people are dynamic 
and diverse beings. Their diversity stems from differences in race, gender, age, 
class, beliefs, religion or value systems and prejudices, and is, therefore, not easy 
to model. Different people will certainly undertake different activities, adopt different 
strategies and pursue different objectives. 
A critical reflection on the sustainable livelihoods approach
185
Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal
The SLA is a way of thinking about the objectives, scope and priorities of 
development (DFID 1999). It is a way of putting people at the centre of development, 
thereby increasing the effectiveness of development assistance. Adopting the 
SLA improves the identification, appraisal, implementation and evaluation of 
development programmes so that they better address the priorities of poor people, 
both directly and at a policy level. This approach differs from other approaches in 
that it recognises the multiple dimensions of poverty as expressed and defined by 
the poor, in whatever way, and using whatever indicators. Under this approach, it 
is the poor themselves who identify the baselines.
The SLA is necessarily flexible in application, but it is based on certain core principles 
that cannot be compromised (Carney 1998), such as: people-centred, holistic, 
dynamic, building on strengths, macro-micro links and sustainability in terms of 
environmental, economic, social and institutional aspects of sustainable systems. 
Although the core principles remain the same, different development agencies have 
used the approach in different ways and gained operational experience in different 
fields and locations. Agencies such as DFID, OXFAM, CARE and UNDP have 
conceptualised, developed and implemented their own livelihoods approaches, 
which are also described briefly in this chapter, and compared with the SLA. All 
of these agencies are guided by the work of Chambers and Conway in the early 
1990s, and most agencies adopt the Chambers and Conway definition of livelihood 
given above. 
6.2 DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Approach compared to other 
development approaches 
The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach enters an already crowded conceptual and 
operational development landscape (DFID 1999, p 9). Although it is not within the 
scope of this chapter to analyse the details of all approaches to development, an 
understanding of the links between different development approaches is essential to 
avoid confusion. A brief overview of the conceptual and methodological similarities 
and differences and of the links between the various approaches is given in this 
section.
The SLA is not effective unless operationalised in a ‘participatory’ manner. Hence, 
the approach incorporates and builds upon existing participatory approaches. 
Similarly, the SLA and the SWAP are broadly complementary. For example, the 
SLA emphasises an understanding of the public structures and social processes, 
which are also the main elements of the SWAP; these elements govern people's 
access to assets and their choice of livelihoods strategies. One of the criticisms of 
the SLA is that it is too similar to the failed Integrated Rural Development Approach 
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(IRDA) of the 1970s. However, the SLA endeavours to build upon the strengths of 
the IRDA, while avoiding the traps that caused IRDA’s downfall by not aiming to 
establish integrated programmes in rural areas. Table 6.1 summarises the main 
points of difference.
Table 6.1 Differences between the SLA and IRDA
Elements Integrated Rural Development Approach (IRDA) (1970s)
Sustainable Livelihoods 
Approach (SLA) (late 1990s)
Starting point Structures, areas People and their existing strengths and constraints
Conceptions of poverty Holistic, multi-dimensional
Multi-dimensional, complex, local, 
embraces the concepts of risks 
and variability
Problem analysis
Undertaken by planning unit in 
short period of time, viewed as 
conclusive
Inclusive process, iterative and 
ongoing
Sectoral scope Multi-sectoral, single plan sector involvement established at outset
Multi-sectoral, many plans, small 
number of entry points, sectoral 
involvement evolves with projects
Level of operation Local, area based %RWKSROLF\DQG¿HOGOHYHOFOHDUlink
Partner organisations National and local governments
National and local governments, 
NGOs, civil society organisations, 
private sector
Project management 
structure
Dedicated project management 
unit, external to government
Project managed by partner 
organisation
Coordination between 
sectors Integrated execution (donor driven)
Driven by shared objectives, 
EHQH¿WVRIFRRUGLQDWLRQLGHQWL¿HG
by those involved
Sustainability Not explicitly considered Multiple dimensions considered
Source: Carney (1998, p 19); DFID (1999, p 11)
The human rights based approach (HRBA) and the SLA are complementary 
approaches that seek to achieve many of the same goals (for example, to empower 
the most vulnerable and strengthen the capacity of the poor to secure livelihoods). 
The primary focus of the SLA is on the linkages between public institutions and civil 
society, and particularly on how to increase the accountability of public institutions 
(duty bearers) to all citizens (rights holders). The SLA recognises the importance of 
these links and of enhancing accountability, although it takes as its starting point a 
need to understand the livelihoods of the poor within a wider political and economic 
context. From this starting point it then tries to identify the specific constraints that 
prevent the realisation of people's rights and, consequently, the improvement of 
their livelihoods on a sustainable basis (Carney 1998; DFID 1999). The human 
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rights based approach to development is unique in bringing all covenants, bills and 
declarations on various aspects of human rights into operation. This approach, 
unlike others, does not start with a needs identification, but focuses on 'rights' 
(which rights are being affected and the specific elements of such rights). This is 
followed by a ‘vulnerability’ or ‘rights holder analysis’ to identify the most vulnerable 
groups, together with an analysis of obstacles to the realisation of rights and the 
existing capacities of the vulnerable groups (their strengths and weaknesses). An 
‘accountability’ or ‘duty bearer analysis’ is also an important part of the HRBA, 
mainly to identify the roles and responsibilities of duty bearers who are responsible 
for the realisation of rights. Consideration of the capacity and resources to fulfil 
the defined obligations of duty bearers, such as state instruments at different 
levels, society and family, are also critical elements of the HRBA. The strength of 
this approach over others, including the various livelihoods approaches, is that it 
considers the rights that are less fulfilled than others; rights will serve as a foundation 
and catalysts towards the fulfilment of other rights, needs and obligations (Upreti 
& Timsina 2008).
Similarly, the Rural Livelihood System (RLS) (which will be described later) fills 
in the gaps in the SLA by considering a number of factors, forces and effects by 
which an individual is affected. These factors go far beyond the narrow bundle 
of assets and the policies, institutions and processes (PIP) identified by the SLA 
(Baumgartner 2006). 
6.3 DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
First conceptualised in 1998, DFID’s Sustainable Livelihoods Framework considers 
access to assets and transforming structures and processes as a starting point. 
It views people as operating within a context of vulnerability. Within this context, 
they have access to certain assets and resources or capital. Access affects, or is 
affected by, the prevailing social, institutional and organisational environment. This 
environment also influences the livelihoods strategies – ways of combining and 
using assets in order to meet livelihoods objectives – of individuals. The approach 
identifies five assets (human capital, social capital, natural capital, physical capital 
and financial capital) as the main livelihoods means.
The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework was developed to help understand and 
analyse people's livelihood situations. It also helps in assessing the effectiveness 
of existing development efforts in improving livelihoods. The level of understanding 
of the framework among top DFID personnel and among consultants is found to be 
high, but ownership of the framework and application of it by rural communities is 
yet to be seen. The main strengths of the framework are that it builds upon existing 
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experiences and lessons learned, and offers a practical way forward in a complex 
environment.
To understand DFID's Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, it is necessary to have 
D FOHDU DQDO\VLV RI WKH ¿YH FRPSRQHQWV RI WKH OLYHOLKRRGV IUDPHZRUN DQG WKHLU
relationship to each other. These components are: 
x Vulnerability context
x Livelihood assets
x Institutions, policies and processes
x Livelihood strategies
x Livelihood outcomes
Figure 6.1 DFID's Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
Vulnerability context
The vulnerability context frames the external environment in which people exist. 
This includes things like trends, shocks and seasonality, over which people have 
limited or no control. Table 6.2 provides the elements of the vulnerability context.
A critical reflection on the sustainable livelihoods approach
189
Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal
Table 6.2 Elements of vulnerability context
Trends Shocks Seasonality
Population trends Human health shocks Of prices
5HVRXUFHWUHQGVLQFOXGLQJFRQÀLFW Natural shocks Of production
National/international economic trends Economic shocks Of health
Trends in governance (Including 
politics) &RQÀLFW
Of employment 
opportunities
Technological trends Crop/livestock health shocks
Source: DFID (1999)
Livelihood assets 
The asset pentagon in Figure 6.2 is the core part of the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Framework within the vulnerability context. The SLA is based on the assumption 
that people require a range of assets to achieve their livelihood goals (referred to 
as outcomes in the framework). The five types of assets defined in the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Framework are given in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2 Five livelihood assets
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%R[)LYHOLYHOLKRRGDVVHWVGHÀQHG
Natural capital: Natural resources such as land, forests, water, pastures, wildlife, biodiversity and 
wider environmental resources
Physical capital: Privately owned assets such as houses, farm animals, tools, machinery, 
and vehicles; publicly owned economic infrastructure such as roads, transport, water, energy, 
communications and electricity supply; and social infrastructure such as schools and hospitals
Financial capital: Cash income and savings, readily convertible liquid capital, supply of credit, 
remittances, pensions, and wages
Human capital: Health, nutrition levels, educational standards and skills, knowledge and ability to 
SXUVXHLQÀXHQFHDQGZRUN
Social capital: The set of social relationships on which people can draw to expand livelihoods 
options: e.g., kinship, friendship, patron-client relations, relationships of trust, reciprocal 
arrangements, membership of formal groups, membership of organisations that provide loans, 
grants and other forms of insurance
Source: Carney (1998)
Institutions, policies and processes 
The institutions, policies and social processes within the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Framework shape people's livelihoods. They operate at all levels, from the 
household to the international level, and in all spheres, from the most private to 
the most public. They also have a direct impact upon whether or not people have a 
feeling of inclusion and rights over resources. 
Table 6.3 Elements of institutions, policies and processes
Policies Legislation Institutions and structures Culture Power relations
Macro and micro 
level policies 
Special policies
Redistributive 
policies
Regulatory 
mechanisms
International 
agreements 
Domestic 
instruments/ 
legislation
Public, markets
Private/commercial 
and civil society 
institutions that 
LQÀXHQFHDFFHVVWR
assets
Rules of the game 
within structures
Social norms, 
values, 
traditions and 
beliefs
Power relations on 
the basis of age, 
gender, caste and 
class
Livelihood strategies
Livelihood strategies are the range and combination of activities that people 
undertake and choices that they make to achieve their livelihood goals, such as 
productive activities, investment strategies and reproductive choices. Farming, 
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fishing, migration, business and self-employment are some examples of livelihoods 
strategies.
Livelihood outcomes
Livelihood outcomes are the achievements or outputs of livelihood strategies. More 
income, improved food security, a feeling of inclusion, physical security and peace, 
a secure job, shelter, good health, and a feeling of self esteem are some examples 
of livelihoods outcome (see a more complete list in Figure 6.1).
6.4 Other livelihoods frameworks
6.4.1 Rural Livelihood System (RLS)
Based on intensive research in India, the Rural Livelihood System (RLS) 
was developed in 2004 by Baumgartner & Hoegger 2004. This approach is 
complementary to the SLA because DFID's Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
(Figure 6.1) does not offer an explicit platform for dealing with crucial elements of 
decision-making, such as people's individual orientations and collective worldviews, 
or their experiences and emotional attachments. It is clearly important to “consider 
these missing aspects and to use different tools to ensure that they feed into 
development planning and our overall understanding of the driving factors behind 
livelihoods and poverty reduction" (Baumgartner & Hoegger 2004; Baumgartner 
2006).
The Rural Livelihood System (RLS) is a heuristic tool and a framework for 
discovering the properties of a livelihood system. It emphasises the same core 
principles established by DFID. Its framework is represented by a nine-square 
Mandala with a rural house at the centre as a metaphor for livelihoods. Baumgartner 
and Hoegger (2004) use the analogy of a livelihoods house or Mandala, which is 
made up of three layers: foundation, walls and roof. According to Baumgartner 
and Hoegger (2004), each layer of the livelihoods Mandala represents the key 
elements of the RLS framework (base, space and orientation), with family at the 
centre (Figure 6.3).
192
Figure 6.3 Nine-square Mandala (RLS framework)
Source: Baumgartner (2006)
Foundations as livelihood base
The foundation of the house contains the three livelihood bases, namely, the 
emotional base of livelihoods (memories and attachments); knowledge base of 
livelihoods (experience, skills and technology) and the physical base of livelihoods 
(physical assets and natural resources).
Walls and rooms as livelihood space
The walls and rooms contain the three livelihood spaces, namely, the inner human 
space (integrity, identity, compassion and selfishness); family space (solidarity, 
gender relations) and socio-economic space (system of cooperation, community 
organisation).
Roof as livelihood orientation 
The roof contains the three livelihood orientations, namely, individual orientation 
(visions, aspirations); family orientation (ancestry, caste, social status) and 
collective orientation (religion, tradition, worldview, education). Table 6.4 describes 
the RLS Mandala in more detail.
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Table 6.4 RLS Mandala (a livelihoods framework)
Individual 
orientation
Visions, hopes, 
aspirations, fears, self-
image, respect, 'gurus', 
models
Family orientation 
Ancestry, caste, social status, 
aspirations to leadership, 
education, jobs, aspirations to 
power, wealth, social mobility
Collective orientation
Way of life, subsistence 
agriculture, food security, 
religion, traditions, common 
property resources, state laws, 
worldviews, school, capitalistic 
values, urban ideals and new 
prosperity
Inner human space
Integrity, identity, 
DZDUHQHVVVHO¿VKQHVV
compassion, 
responsibility, affection, 
curiosity, courage, anxiety
Family space
Gender relations, nutrition 
distribution, health, family 
planning, distribution of workload, 
solidarity
Socio-economic space
Production relations, system 
of cooperation, community 
organisations, government 
institutions, markets for goods, 
land, labour and capital, 
contractors, industry
Emotional base
Memories, attachments, 
feelings, boredom
Knowledge base 
Technology, agricultural pattern, 
experiences, skills, traditional 
knowledge, labour, crafts, 
services, modern professions
Physical base 
Natural environment (topography, 
climate), natural resources, 
animals, habitat, accumulated 
wealth
Source: Baumgartner & Hoegger (2004, p 47)
Comparing DFID’s SLA and RLS, the two approaches have certain similarities and 
certain differences. 
Similarities
Both the SLA and RLS offer conceptual inspiration and a framework for development 
efforts aimed at more sustainable livelihoods. Both are considered tools for 
exploring and analysing people's livelihoods. Both are governed by a similar set 
of guiding principles. Although both approaches can be integrated into project 
cycle management and are applied in designing and implementing development 
support for poverty reduction, they are not bound to project-based development 
efforts. Both approaches are a work-in-progress and not finished products. Neither 
replaces other development approaches in use, but is complementary to other 
approaches.
Differences
DFID’s SLA has a strong focus on policy, institutions and processes, within a 
vulnerability context, as the factors influencing capital asset formation for sustainable 
livelihoods. In comparison, the RLS emphasises decision-making processes and 
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livelihoods strategy development, with a focus on emotional characteristics such 
as integrity, identity, compassion and selfishness. Both approaches have many 
strengths; if blended they have added value. Table 6.5 compares the strengths of 
the two approaches.
Table 6.5 SLA and RLS compared
Strengths of SLA Strengths of RLS
Directs attention to forces and factors in the 
broader context of people’s livelihoods, such as 
risks causing vulnerability, policies, services, 
transforming institutions
Directs attention to the centre and the process of 
decision-making in people's livelihoods regarding 
role sharing and gender and power relations
Facilitates exploration of the composition and 
relevance of the differentiated asset portfolio of 
people's livelihoods
Facilitates consideration of the role of people's 
threefold value orientations in the process of 
strategy development
Clearly focuses on the links between the asset 
portfolio, livelihood strategies, and the livelihood 
outcomes that people aim at
Extends the focus from the outer to the inner 
reality of livelihoods, which ranges from 
emotional to physical livelihood needs 
Source: Baumgartner (2006) 
6.4.2 UNDP's approach to promoting sustainable livelihoods 
In 1995, UNDP developed a framework for formulating programming strategies, 
analysing strengths and assets, and assessing the coping/adaptive strategies of 
local people. Human, social, natural, physical, financial and sometimes political 
assets are analysed in this framework. For UNDP, this framework is one of five 
corporate mandates and an important approach for achieving sustainable human 
development. The main strengths of the framework are that it links micro-macro 
organisations, integrates poverty, environment and governance issues, and gets 
the most out of both communities and outsiders.
UNDP does not have a specific livelihoods framework as such; it largely uses 
the SLA in its programming cycle, which emphasises the assessment of coping 
(adaptive) strategies and the analysis of micro, macro and sectoral policies, 
together with the assessment of modern science and technology in the context of 
indigenous technologies that influence peoples livelihoods (see Figure 6.4).
A critical reflection on the sustainable livelihoods approach
195
Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal
Figure 6.4 UNDP's approach to promoting sustainable livelihoods
Source: Carney (1999) 
6.4.3 CARE's livelihoods model
In 1994, CARE focused its efforts on improving people’s capabilities, access to 
tangible and intangible assets, and the existence of economic opportunities. Three 
capital assets are identified, namely, human, social and economic. This model is 
used primarily as a wide programming framework. Household livelihoods security 
is the central focus of CARE's framework. The main strengths of the framework are 
that it is comprehensive yet flexible, improves sectoral coordination and increases 
multiplier effects. Unlike DFID's framework, CARE places less emphasis on 
policies, institutions and organisational factors. This is in line with CARE’s focus, 
which is mainly on local matters such as community mobilisation, and not so much 
on policy (see Figure 6.5).
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Figure 6.5 CARE's livelihood model 
Source: Carney (1999) 
6.4.4 OXFAM's livelihoods framework 
OXFAM was the first agency to use the concept of sustainable livelihoods. Since 
1993, OXFAM’s framework has emphasised enhancing people's capabilities, 
working towards equity, sustainability and ensuring links between policy changes 
and livelihood improvement. Like DFID’s framework, five assets are identified, 
namely, human, social, natural, physical and financial capital. For OXFAM, this 
framework has been an important tool for achieving poverty eradication, which 
is one of OXFAM’s five strategic change objectives. The main strengths of the 
framework are that it recognises participatory analysis and enables links to social 
and human rights approaches.
OXFAM's livelihoods framework is similar to DFID's framework and is, therefore, 
not described here in more detail. The framework is basically used as a checklist 
in project appraisal, planning and review. Unlike DFID’s framework, OXFAM uses 
this framework in a semi-formal way and there are no established guidelines and 
worksheets for applying the framework.
6.5 Strengths and weaknesses of livelihoods approaches
In the previous sections, DFID's SLA and other livelihoods approaches such as 
RLS and the approaches used by UNDP, CARE and OXFAM are described. 
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What is obvious is that these approaches have many points in common. All offer 
conceptual frameworks that put people at the centre, all have guiding principles that 
advocate for poverty reduction and livelihoods-focused methods and tools, all are 
complementary to other development approaches, including the HRBA. There is a 
need here is to look for synergies, and identify the added value of the UNDP, CARE, 
OXFAM and RLS approaches to DFID's SLA. For example, Haan and Zoomers 
(2005) provide information on the linkages among livelihood opportunities, decision 
making, power relations and access. Similarly, the RLS approach provides better 
analysis and understanding of the cultural and emotional aspects of livelihoods, 
and how a household's livelihood strategies are influenced by individual, family and 
collective orientations. In this section, the main strengths and weaknesses of the 
various livelihoods approaches are highlighted, with some emphasis on SLA.
Strengths
One of the major contributions of all livelihoods approaches has been the 
sensitisation of development actors to the need to extend development benefits to 
the poorest, putting people at the centre. ‘Supporting and enhancing capabilities’, 
rather than simply ‘meeting needs’ is the main conceptual driving force behind all 
the approaches described in this chapter. Making communities and households 
the central actors in development is the major thrust of all livelihoods approaches. 
These approaches demand enabling, inclusive and focused action for which multi-
stakeholder participation by civil society, government and the private sector is 
necessary. Their emphasis on macro-micro linkage promotes bottom-up planning 
and policy-making processes.
All livelihoods approaches are based on holistic or system thinking, as opposed 
to ad hoc or piecemeal approaches. They focus on researching relations between 
components and subsystems. They recognise the capacities of people in terms of 
various forms of capital as a starting point for local development (see Chambers & 
Conway 1992; Carney 1998; DFID 1999; Carney (1999). Livelihoods approaches 
also take into account the critical elements of the human development approach 
of Sen (1985).
Livelihoods approaches have provided a roadmap into some pretty complex issues, 
and are adaptable for use in practical ways to understand livelihoods. These 
approaches facilitate discussion and communication between people from different 
disciplines, who can then talk a common 'livelihood' language. 
Livelihoods approaches offer, at least in principle, a way to link poverty, at the level 
of the community, to actions taken by higher-level policy and decision makers, as 
well as to economic factors. This is a shift in approach in that it involves communities 
in their own needs assessment towards a process of involving communities in a 
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holistic analysis of their own way of living, assets and coping mechanisms, and of 
the factors affecting their livelihood means and strategies. Livelihoods approaches 
also offer a way to judge poverty, relatively (not in absolute terms) against other 
members of the same community, while avoiding quantification. 
The SLA provides development practitioners with a coherent and flexible framework 
for programming, while also trying to establish micro-macro linkages. The approach 
has some practical tools and methods, such as guidance sheets, which describe 
how to use the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, what information is needed 
and why, and how to go about obtain and analysing such information. It provides 
ingredients for the analysis of social, environmental, institutional, political, and 
policy issues, as well as options for livelihoods opportunities. 
The SLA offers communities a checklist for analysis, appraisal, planning and 
action. Concrete practical experiences in the implementation of the approach have 
now been documented, as have criteria and indicators of success and expected 
outcomes. These are useful in understanding SLA as a development approach. 
Conceptual and programmatic frameworks, which did not exist ten years ago, are 
also now available (also see SLLP 2000).
Weaknesses
Although the SLA has proved to be an important analytical tool for development 
practitioners, whether this approach has been able to solve the problems of the 
poor and improve their standards of living is yet to be confirmed by empirical 
evidence. 
Among many operational issues, SLA does not provide operational tools to identify 
the poorest of the poor, the socially excluded and the most vulnerable households, 
commonly called disadvantaged households (DAH). Even after identification, the 
most marginalised are usually beyond the reach of development aid, because they 
often live in remote places and do not participate in development activities. The 
most marginalised are not empowered to raise their voices to demand services and 
have limited capacity to make use of development aid. In practice, SLA is still very 
much project-based rather than community-based. SLA is a conceptual framework, 
not a practical operational methodology (SLLP 2000).
Moreover, very few agencies have applied the SLA in sectors other than natural 
resources management. Under the SLA, the poor are seen as active development 
partners who should be involved in livelihoods analysis, rather than simply passive 
recipients of development. Although the approach recognises local capacities and 
traditional mechanisms in analysing the livelihood opportunities of the poorest, 
in practice, traditional practices, mechanisms and power relations are important 
determinants of social and economic exclusion, and of the marginalisation of the 
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poor. Moreover, the SLA framework is complex and difficult for the poorest villagers 
to understand. To include them in analysis, appraisal, planning and action is, 
therefore, a daunting task. The SLA process demands multi-sectoral, decentralised 
planning. However, many development agencies tend to operate in narrowly focused 
sectors or disciplines. In principle, the exploration and use of locally available 
assets and field-level practical experience are considered to be pre-requisites for 
the successful application of SLA. However, theoretical ideas about SLA, concepts 
such as ‘holistic’, ‘dynamic’, ‘environmentally friendly’, ‘gender sensitive’ and so on, 
are generally put forward by Western academics. Researchers and practitioners in 
the ‘South’1 are barely involved in the conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
such concepts and approaches. Defining poverty, marginalisation and disadvantage 
in a diverse socio-economic context is also difficult. Poor people's involvement in 
this process of developing and applying SLA is still far away.
There is also scepticism about to what extent donor guided approaches, which 
are crafted to channel their funds, can challenge existing political systems, social 
structures and processes. These donor-funded programmes generally reach a 
particular ‘class’ and benefit certain power holders. If SLA is to be considered as 
a paradigm shift that aims at challenging the existing power structures and social 
relations, it could be seen as a political threat to the existing power holders for 
whom this kind of ‘development process’ is unacceptable. The key to long-term 
institutional sustainability lies in the successful transformation of institutions and 
their relationships. However, changes in power relations are difficult to bring about 
and can take strong civil or political movements. The SLA does not sufficiently 
consider power relations, entitlements or political transformation processes; the 
framework is silent in this regard. It tends to see the development process as 
neutral or apolitical. This is the weakest part of the SLA. Political transformation of 
local and supra-local political structures and processes are not within the scope of 
the SLA. Rather, the SLA, like other development approaches of the past, tends 
to promote ‘reformist’ ways and means of social and political and policy change. 
Although the term ‘transform’ is used in the framework in relation to transforming 
policy, institutions and processes, it is limited to ‘policy’ change, and does not 
seem to apply to ‘political’ change, which can ultimately lead to policy change. 
To increase livelihood opportunities for the most marginalised it is necessary to 
challenge power relations and promote redistributive systems of resource control, 
which is usually possible only though civil and political movements.
Some literature highlights the challenges and shortcomings of SLA, both at the 
theoretical and operational level (see for example SLLP 2000; FAO & DFID 2000; 
Haan & Zoomers 2005). It is particularly in relation to access, decision making, 
1 The ‘South’ is used by NCCR North-South to refer to Africa, Asia, and Latin America, as opposed to Europe (North).
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power relations, behaviour and structural factors that the SLA has not been able to 
provide adequate evidence of its contribution to altering the status quo. Similarly, at 
the project level, the SLA has been criticised as being used on the receiving side, 
basically to secure outside funding, and is not challenging the status quo of the 
political economy of development aid. However, the SLA does provide a conceptual 
framework for understanding livelihood assets in a coherent and systemic way 
and for understanding how they affect policies, institutions and processes, and 
livelihoods strategies, and vice versa. However, a weakness in the SLA lies in 
its focus on assets; not enough attention is paid to demand. This weakness can 
be overcome by a human rights based approach. The SLA can be criticised for 
placing too much emphasis on assets and the potential of individuals to reduce 
poverty themselves, thereby reducing the responsibility of authorities to respond to 
the demands of citizens. The HRBA, on the other hand, highlights power relations 
between citizens and authorities. The added value of integrating the HRBA with 
livelihoods approaches is the focus on both the empowerment of 'rights holders' 
and building the state to increase the capacity of 'duty bearers' (mainly government, 
non-government and private sector service providers) to respond to the demands 
of the rights holders/citizens (Carter 2007).
To quote Peron and Neil (2006, p 4): 
HRBA highlights the importance of state-citizens linkages, combining a focus 
on developing the capacity of states to deliver on human rights commitments 
with citizens’ awareness and capacity to claim their entitlements. Human rights 
are a source of legitimacy for state action, and put emphasis on the need for 
effective channels of accountability.
6.6 Beyond the SLA: The human rights based approach to 
development
Despite its wide application around the globe, the SLA has promoted reformist 
views of policy processes and social change through development interventions. 
This approach has hardly offered anything beyond people's subsistence livelihood 
needs. What is becoming increasingly clear is that, to ensure improved sustainable 
livelihoods, people’s civil and political rights need to be ensured. For this, radical 
structural changes are required that challenge existing power structures. In Nepal, 
it took a civil war to bring about institutional change and create an environment in 
which people’s civil and political rights are now on the agenda. Such change is 
only possible through political processes, not just development processes. This is 
to say that political transformation at the political level should take place first that 
is then followed by social and economic transformation process at a later stage. 
In this sense, an alternative approach to the SLA should be sought. The newly 
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emerged human rights based approach could be a step forward, and may build 
upon and improve the SLA. The HRBA aims to empower people to be involved 
in development and to optimise the benefits from it, using people's basic human 
rights as a foundation. The HRBA should be used in conjunction with the SLA and 
other approaches, as it fills some of the gaps that these approaches have been 
criticised for.
Rights based approaches to development take as their foundation the need to 
promote and protect the human rights that have been recognised by the global 
community and are protected by international legal instruments. These include 
economic, social and cultural, as well as civil and political rights, all of which are 
interdependent. Running through the rights based approach are concerns with 
empowerment and participation, and with the elimination of discrimination on 
grounds such as race, language, gender, religion, and so forth (Carney 1998; DFID 
1999). Under the HRBA, human rights are considered constitutive of the goal of 
development, leading to a new approach to development and requiring institutional 
changes. HRBA considers basic human needs to be human rights, i.e., the right to 
life; right to live in dignity; right to education and access to information; right to a fair 
trial; right to participate in the political process; freedom of thought, expression and 
religion; right to access to water; right to access to land and its entitlements; right to 
access to health care; right to non-discrimination and so on (Peron & Neil 2006).
Box 6.2 What is the human rights based approach (HRBA)? 
Under the HRBA, human rights are considered constitutive of the goal of development, leading to 
a new approach to development and requiring institutional changes. HRBA considers basic human 
needs to be human rights, i.e., the right to life; right to live in dignity; right to education and access 
to information; right to a fair trial; right to participate in the political process; freedom of thought, 
expression and religion; right to access to water; right to access to land and its entitlements; right to 
access to health care; right to non-discrimination and so on.
The United Nations’ common understanding of HRBA includes the following:
“All programmes of development cooperation, policies and technical assistance should further the 
realisation of human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
international human rights instruments”. 
Human rights standards contained in, and principles derived from, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and other international human rights instruments guide all development cooperation 
and programming in all sectors and in all phases of the programming process.
Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacities of 'duty-bearers' to meet 
their obligations and/or of 'rights-holders' to claim their rights.
7KH KXPDQ ULJKWV SULQFLSOHV LGHQWL¿HG DUH XQLYHUVDOLW\ DQG LQDOLHQDELOLW\ LQGLYLVLELOLW\
interdependence and interrelatedness; equality and non-discrimination; participation and inclusion 
and accountability and rule of law.
Source: Peron & Neil (2006)
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The HRBA attempts to integrate both livelihoods and human rights elements. It is 
now being used widely by various donors, I/NGOs and advocacy organisations. 
Some lesson have been learnt and documented in relation to the application of the 
approach (see for example: http://www.undg.org). However, a discussion of this is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
6.7 Nepal's community forestry programme
6.7.1 What is community forestry?
Community forestry in Nepal involves the devolution of power from the central 
government authority to local communities who protect, manage and utilise forest 
resources. Community forestry user groups (CFUGs) are local, independent, 
autonomous corporate bodies governed by Nepal's Forest Act 1993, which sets their 
Constitution and Forest Operational Plan (see Pokharel et al. 2006 for details)
Box 6.3 Key features of CFUGs
The following are some of the key features of CFUGs in terms of their independent status, autonomy 
DQGDXWKRULW\WKDWDIIHFWWKHIRUPDWLRQRIVRFLDOQDWXUDO¿QDQFLDODQGSK\VLFDOFDSLWDO
1. Social capital
x CFUGs can elect, select or change their executive committee at any time.
x CFUGs can impose penalties on members who break their rules.
x Community forest boundaries are not restricted to existing administrative or political 
boundaries.
x CFUGs can amend or revise their constitution at any time.
x The handover of forest to CFUGs is determined by their willingness and capacity to 
protect, manage and utilise the forest, and by their customary rights.
2. Natural capital 
x There is no limit to the forest area that can be handed over to communities.
x CFUGs can make optimal use of their forest by growing cash crops together with 
forest crops.
x &)8*V FDQ PRUWJDJH WKHLU VWDQGLQJ IRUHVW SURGXFWV ZLWK ¿QDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV WR
obtain loans.
3. Financial capital 
x CFUGs can utilise their funds for any purpose. 
x &)8*VFDQIUHHO\¿[SULFHVDQGPDUNHWWKHLUIRUHVWSURGXFH
x &)8*VFDQHVWDEOLVKHQWHUSULVHVDQGPDNHSUR¿W
x CFUGs can seek support from any organisation.
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x CFUGs can raise funds by various forestry and non-forestry means with all income 
JRLQJWRWKHJURXSIXQGDQGZLWKQRUHTXLUHPHQWWRVKDUH¿QDQFLDOUHYHQXHZLWKWKH
government because the protection and management cost is borne by the groups 
themselves.
4. Physical capital
x CFUGs can invest in any areas, persons or development activities according to the 
decision of the CFUG assembly.
5. Human capital
x CFUGs can develop its human resource capacity to effectively protect, manage and 
utilise their forests 
Source: Forest Act 1993 and Forest Regulation 1995
6.7.2 Study of community forestry and livelihoods in Swiss-supported 
areas 
The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) has been supporting 
Nepal to implement community forestry programmes through the Nepal-Swiss 
Community Forestry Project (NSCFP), which commenced in 1990. The Project 
is being implemented in three districts in the middle hills of Nepal: Dolakha, 
Ramechhap and Okhaldhunga. These districts have an estimated forest area of 
238,422 hectares, of which 38 per cent (90,186 ha) has been handed over to local 
communities as community forests. As at July 2007, a total of 98,800 household 
members (87% of the population of these districts) had been organised into 919 
community forestry user groups. The role of the project is to provide financial and 
technical support to facilitate a process in which government and non-governmental 
agencies and CFUGs work together to further promote community forestry for its 
economic, ecological and institutional sustainability. 
A comprehensive survey of CFUGs, together with a monitoring and coaching 
exercise, was conducted by local NGOs and CFUG federation with the financial 
and technical support of Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project (NSCFP) in 
November 2005. A total of 692 CFUGs were surveyed. Group discussions with 
CFUG committee members and users (at least 20 people in each group) were 
held. Selective CFUG committee chairs and secretaries were also interviewed. 
Information was compiled and stored in a database system. A desk study was 
carried out to analyse the ecological, economic and institutional sustainability 
of CFUGs at the group level. In addition, a checklist was prepared to gather 
information about livelihood assets, the effect of the policy environment and social 
processes. Household interviews and livelihoods coaching were conducted in about 
500 households to help them to prepare their household livelihoods plan. Cross-
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section households were selected from different socio-economic groups based on 
wellbeing ranking categories to document the impact of community forestry at the 
household level.
6.7.3 Analysis of community forestry using SLA
SLA is a valuable tool for analysing the effects of development interventions on 
people's livelihoods. Section 6.8 analyses Nepal's community forestry programme 
at the group level using DFID's Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (also see 
Pokharel 2001) to show its contribution to capital formation, policy reform, change 
in governance structures and social processes, and, to some extent, to reducing the 
effect of the vulnerability context on the rural poor. Section 6.9 analyses the impact 
of Nepal's community forestry programme at the household level on livelihood 
strategies and outcomes using both the SLA and the RLS. 
6.8 Impact of community forestry on livelihoods: A group 
perspective
This section analyses community forestry at the group level using the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Framework and based on the study conducted by NSCFP. This section 
focuses on livelihood assets (the five types of livelihood assets); policies and 
institutions, and social processes (see Figure 6.1).
6.8.1 Formation and mobilisation of livelihood assets
Natural capital
Forests handed over to a community are natural capital. In general, all over Nepal, 
community forestry has brought positive changes in regeneration status, canopy 
density, biodiversity and basal area (Branney & Yadav 1998; Jackson et al. 1998; 
Gautam et al. 2003; Karna et al. 2004). An analysis of the perceptions of 692 CFUG 
members in Dolakha, Ramechhap and Okhaldhunga districts also indicates that 
the condition of community forests has improved tremendously (NSCFP 2006). 
There are increased numbers of forestry user groups (FUGs), which are harvesting 
timber, fuelwood, grasses and non-timber forest products (NTFPs). The availability 
of forest products has also increased with a concurrent reduction in the time spent 
in collecting forest products (NSCFP 2006). 
Despite improved forest condition, there has been a reduction in access to forest 
products for the poorest because of the tendency to protect and harvest trees for 
timber, rather than use them for small wood and multiple products. Forest tree 
inventory data from Ramechhap District, for example, suggests that district officials 
prescribe only a quarter of the actual annual harvestable increment: the prescribed 
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volume is calculated by the Department of Forests at 1 per cent compared to a 
(conservatively estimated) 4 per cent mean annual increment found in matured 
natural forest. In addition, the CFUGs actually harvest only half of the prescribed 
volume (i.e., which is less than 10% of the available annual increment of the forest). 
In fact, the poorest households do not directly benefit at all from timber supply or 
sale (see Pokharel & Nurse 2004, p 23; also see Malla 2000; Adhikari 2008; Kanel 
2008; Khatri-Chetri 2008).
Despite improved forest condition, restrictive rules related to the distribution and 
sale of forest products (mainly timber) for domestic use deprive the poorest of 
access to these resources. Almost all the CFUGs stipulate in their rules on the sale 
and distribution of subsidised timber that subsidised timber can only be bought 
for household consumption. This rule benefits the rich who can afford to construct 
houses and make furniture out of timber; the poorest do not bother to buy the 
subsidised timber because they cannot sell it and they do not need timber for 
domestic use. A conservative mindset amongst committee members and forestry 
officials is responsible for these types of rules.
Social capital
It has been reported that the community forestry process has increased social 
cohesion, which has enhanced social capital for those who were previously 
powerless, isolated and excluded from mainstream social and political 
processes. For example, Pokharel et al. (2006) reports that the participation of 
women in committees has increased from 19 per cent in 1996 to 33 per cent in 
2005. Similarly, the representation of Dalits (so called ‘untouchables’) in CFUG 
committees has increased from 2 per cent in 1996 to 8 per cent in 2005. In addition, 
the representation of women and Dalits in key positions has also increased.
Despite increased social capital, the poorest cannot afford to participate or take 
up leadership roles, because they cannot spare the time away from their livelihood 
activities. Hence, there is a high cost involved in social capital formation for the 
marginalised. The poorest suffer the most because, first of all, they cannot afford to 
participate; secondly, if they do, they hardly speak; if they do speak, they are rarely 
heard; and, if they are heard, decisions are rarely made in their favour (Pokharel & 
Nurse 2004, p 24).
Human capital
The capacity of community forestry stakeholders, government and non-government 
service providers, and community members has increased as a result of community 
forestry. They have developed skills in relation to community mobilisation, financial 
management and administration, and in the management of community forests, 
among other things. However, the poorest are often left out of capacity-building 
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programmes run by the Government, NGOs and donors, because they are illiterate, 
under-valued, and perceived as having less ability to make and act on decisions 
(Pokharel & Nurse 2004, p 24).
Financial capital
Group funds generated from the sale of forest products, levies and outside grants 
are the financial capital created by community forestry. The average CFUG fund 
balance in each of the districts studied is almost equivalent to the Government's 
annual forestry development budget. Of the total 692 CFUGs studied, there are 
examples of 255 CFUGs (56%) establishing low interest credit schemes as well as 
grants to the poorest household members from the CFUG fund (NSCFP 2006).
Despite the increased financial capital and CFUG credit schemes, the bulk of 
money loaned to members was found to be ‘captured’ by those members of the 
groups deemed to be ‘creditworthy’ (i.e., able to pay the loan back on time). In 
many cases, the poorest are blacklisted because of delays in making repayments 
(Pokharel & Nurse 2004, p. 24). 
Physical capital
CFUGs have carried out many community development activities on their own. 
Construction of village trails, small bridges, community buildings, schools and 
temples are examples of the physical capital created by the community forestry 
programme. Analysis of the data of the NSCFP (2006) indicates that 47 per cent of 
CFUGs have spent funds on school buildings, 36 per cent on roads and 26 per cent 
on drinking water (NSCFP 2006). 
6.8.2 Policies and institutions
The Master Plan for the Forestry Sector 1989, the Forest Act of 1993, Forest 
Regulation of 1995, the Operational Guidelines of 1995, and the Government’s 
Three Year Interim Plan (2008-2011) are the forestry sector policy instruments 
that govern community forestry in Nepal. These instruments have legitimised 
community forestry user groups, which are grassroots-level institutions. According 
to the current legislation, CFUGs are independent, autonomous and self-governing 
institutions responsible for protecting, managing and using any patch of national 
forest with a defined forest boundary and user group members. CFUGs are formed 
democratically and must be registered at the District Forest Office (DFO), which 
hands over the forests to CFUGs with a written constitution and a forest Operational 
Plan (OP). These documents define the forest management objectives, action plan, 
and the rights, duties and responsibilities of the forest users of a particular forest. 
Moreover, community forestry has become an open university for policymakers 
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and practitioners to see the evidence of the effect of policies in practice. As a result 
policy reforms are made based on practical experiences that take place on the 
ground. 
6.8.3 Social processes: Gender, equity and empowerment
Nepali society is unequal in terms the social and political power held by people 
from different castes, classes, cultural groups, regions and religions. Discrimination 
is perpetuated through every day practices and contexts. Discrimination occurs 
at every level: within households, neighbourhoods, groups, organisations, 
communities and society in general. Only by changing everyday practices of 
discrimination can social relations of power be transformed. Community forestry 
is generally centred on institution building and forest management. Unfortunately, 
WKHEHQH¿WVRISURJUDPPHVWKDWDUHIRFXVHGRQGLVDGYDQWDJHGJURXSVDUHRIWHQ
captured by power elites (rich high caste males from urban areas) in the current 
inequitable political and social structure. The poor, low caste women from remote 
DUHDVDUHGLI¿FXOWWRUHDFKWKURXJKGHYHORSPHQW7KHFXUUHQWIRFXVRIFRPPXQLW\
forestry on providing women and low-caste members with education, encouraging 
their participation in CFUG committees, as local facilitators and as local resource 
persons (LRP), as well as evaluating whether or not they hold positions of 
responsibility such as CFUG secretary or president, have helped, to some 
extent, to shift local power dynamics. New initiatives at the household level are 
also important in terms of recognising the kind of support disadvantaged groups 
need in order to gain access to community arenas. Further programmes can be 
strengthened by creating networks of support, both horizontally and vertically, in 
the community (NSCFP 2006).
6.8.4 Vulnerability context
The economically poorest members of CFUGs who belong to socially disadvantaged 
households and live in remote areas are generally more vulnerable in terms of their 
capacity to cope with natural disasters and health conditions. CFUGs are becoming 
sensitive to the need to address issues of poverty and social exclusion in relation to 
such vulnerable households. Information from the 692 CFUGs in the study districts 
indicates that up to 61 per cent of CFUGs studied have made some kind of special 
provision for the poor or disadvantaged groups in their operational plans and have 
acted as a safety net for their disadvantaged members (NSCFP 2006). Table 6.6 
shows the results of the analysis of the CFUGs' information maintained in database 
and analysed for the purpose of the study in November 2005. 
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Table 6.6 Provisions made by CFUGs for poor and socially excluded 
household members
Areas in which positive discrimination 
provisions have been made
Community Forestry User Groups
Number Percentage
Forest products 279 61
Group funds 255 56
Skills training 203 44
Housing materials 187 41
Scholarships 85 18
Land allocation 65 14
Employment 45 10
Share holding in local forest based enterprise 37 8
Source: NSCFP (2006)
Table 6.6 shows a significant number of CFUGs trying to move from elite-centred 
decision making and programme activities to poor-centred. Similarly, Pokharel et 
al. (2009) has found that CFUGs are becoming self-sustaining grassroots-level 
institutions. Pro-poor strategies are having an effect; as a result, CFUGs are 
able to reach poor households. Nevertheless, pro-poor practices in community 
forestry develop in a sequential manner, building upon a strong institutional and 
environmental basis. The non-inclusive operation of the institutions has a negative 
effect on the overarching objective of poverty reduction. Thus, any kind of exclusion, 
of either elites or the poor, in this process should be avoided (Schreckenberg & 
Luttrell 2009). 
Despite this trend, Pokharel and Nurse (2004, p 24) have reported that the amount 
of funds allocated by CFUGs to disadvantaged households is very low compared to 
investment in community infrastructure. Moreover, on many occasions, the poorest 
have been excluded from membership of groups on account of not being ‘resident’ 
in the ward, due to the fact that they are recent migrants from other areas; they 
were therefore unable to be involved in protection and plantation activities from 
the beginning so had to bear the cost of membership. They are also sometimes 
excluded for not being able to participate in the voluntary labour schemes as 
prescribed by the CFUG committee. 
6.9 Impact of community forestry on livelihoods: A household 
perspective
Although the SLA framework is a useful tool for analysing the impact of community 
forestry at the programme level, it does not consider how people's emotions and 
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cultural values determine their livelihoods strategies. The application of the RLS 
can be useful for such analysis. Using the both the RLS and SLA frameworks as 
analytical tools and putting the household at the centre, an analysis of the impact 
of community forestry on livelihood strategies and outcomes at the household level 
is given in this section. 
Gorakh Bahadur, the Chairman of Bhiteri Community Forestry User Group of 
Dolakha district, has a vision to make his village wealthy with improved green forest. 
He remembers that the forest near his village was destroyed completely when its 
trees were sold by the government to contractors. The revenue went entirely to 
the Government treasury. Villagers considered the forest to be the property of the 
Government, and, hence, did not protect it. Although forest guards were present 
in the district headquarters, it was impossible for them to prevent villagers from 
cutting down trees. Slowly the forest was completely destroyed and degraded. 
Following the emergence of community forestry, the forest was handed over to the 
community; Gorakh played an important role in the handover. After the handover 
of the forest to the community, everyone from the village contributed to planting 
trees. Gorakh is a respected person in the village and was elected chairperson of 
the group, but fears that he will be unable to fulfil the expectations of the people. 
He says the following:
Upon our demand, the District Forest Officials handed this forest over to us 
as a community forest. The forest is now ours. We are now protecting it as 
our common resources. We hold regular meetings and assemblies. Rules are 
made collectively in the assemblies. Labour contribution and forest product 
distribution are sought equally and there is no discrimination against any sex 
or caste. Open discussion is allowed in the meetings. Decisions are made by 
consensus. The committee is usually selected unanimously. All sections of 
people are represented in the committee including women and disadvantaged 
groups. The forest condition has improved: it is greener, there is more 
biodiversity and more forest products are available. We have started reaping 
the benefits. We have helped build a school and purchased furniture for the 
children. There are five enterprises, three for furniture making and two for 
Nepali paper. Many poor households are employed. We have fixed the quota 
for timber and Lokta (a plant used to make paper) for these enterprises. The 
CFUG fund is increasing. Some of the funds are deposited in the bank, some 
are loaned to group members and the rest is kept safely by our treasurer. The 
forest is strictly protected against grazing. Some of us have attended training 
and been on study visits and we have learnt some new things such as Alaichi 
(cardamom) cultivation and enterprise promotion, which we have tried out in our 
group. We have received support from the Nepal Swiss Community Forestry 
Project and other agencies to build our capacity as community leaders. We now 
know many things about how to run an institution. Many people have visited us 
to see how we are operating as a group and managing the forest. Our previous 
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secretary, Lama Bhai is now in the District Federation of Community Forestry 
User Groups – he is an entrepreneur now. We have good relationships with 
the District Forest Officials, rangers and the District Federation. They are quite 
helpful to us. We coordinate with the local Village Development Committee 
(VDC) for planning. We received support from the VDC Chairperson during a 
boundary dispute with our neighbouring group. We are doing fine, progressing 
and advancing slowly and steadily. We are happy that we have been able to 
do this much.
Contrary to the above, Mr Mohan Kasai, one of the poorest Dalit men of Lang Lang 
Community Forest User Group of Nepal, describes the effect of community forestry 
on his livelihood in the following way:
I have just two ropani (0.1 ha) of land. I do not grow enough grain even for 
two months of the year from my land. I look for wage labour to survive. I have 
no connection to anyone like you. I do not know other things than working in 
Jethamukhiya’s (landlord’s) farm. My family has been in debt for generations 
and has no money or savings to buy things, do business, or to go to the city 
or abroad for work. No one has done anything for us so far. I do not think 
community forestry can do anything for us. I am also a member of the group 
and I have been told to come to the meetings and speak up there. I did go once 
or twice, but who cares about us? Who will listen to us? They (the leaders) 
talk of protection, fines, timber, grazing control, community building, school 
teachers, furniture, and so on, which sounds good to everyone, and to us also, 
but it does not feed us or benefit us. I am aware that some timber can be bought 
from the forest at a cheap rate if we build a house. I know that Bhakta Bahadur 
(furniture owner) got timber under this rule. But we cannot afford to buy timber. 
We wish we would get some dead fallen timber for free, but we are not even 
allowed to cut dead trees and sell them for food. If I am not allowed to sell the 
timber, what can I do with it? I cannot eat it. I cannot send my children to school, 
even if there are many teachers. People (outsiders) ask us to go to the meeting 
and speak out. But we do not know how to speak properly at these meetings. 
People laugh at us when we speak. I do not see any hope; therefore, I do not 
bother to go to the meetings anymore. There is no way that we can speak out. 
Gorakh went to Ilam on a study tour because he knows how to speak, but I do 
not think I will be selected for such a tour because I do not understand what 
people talk about, even in the assembly, and I cannot read or write. The best 
thing is to stay home or work as a wage labourer, as we have been doing for 
generations. That is how we are, and it will go on and on, I don't know for how 
many generations, unless we die.
This is not the end of the story. Tara Shrestha is a female member of Bichour 
Community Forestry User Group of Dolakha. She is landless, works as farm wage 
labourer, earns NRs. 90 (US$ 1.17) per day. Her husband makes his living by 
portering, but his income is not enough for his four-member family. Hence, the 
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family is in debt to the landlord. Among the 100 household members in the group, 
Tara has been identified by the group as one of the poor households. A few months 
ago, Tara was told by a facilitator that she had the same rights to the community 
forest as did the group's Chairperson and that she should, therefore, attend the 
group’s general assembly meeting and raise her voice to make the group consider 
her situation in its decisions. In one of the group's general assembly meetings Tara 
surprised herself by speaking up. She said that she should be helped by the group 
otherwise it was a waste of time for her to come to the meetings. This forced the 
Forestry User Group to take some decisions in her favour. Now there is a provision 
in the group's working plan that Tara, together with five other poor households, 
will get timber and fuelwood free of charge. The group requested the project to 
provide her with NRs. 4500 (US$ 58) to implement a Livelihood Improvement Plan 
in mushroom cultivation and vermiculture (compost making). The group agreed to 
provide wood and small timber and community forestland for income generating 
opportunities. She received training related to mushroom cultivation, built a small 
shed from the timber that the group provided and started producing mushrooms 
within a year. She now sells mushrooms in the local market and makes some 
money for her own use, which she uses particularly for her health check-up. She 
was happy to know that the project has provided a scholarship to the daughter of her 
neighbour, who was also identified as belonging to one of the poorest households. 
Tara is also very happy to know that one of her neighbouring groups has allocated 
a part of the community forestland to five households identified as disadvantaged. 
She was told by a committee member that they have provided some funds to start a 
business producing handmade Nepali paper. Tara intends to stand for a position on 
the committee so that she can influence others to make decisions in favour of poor 
people like her. Recently, she was visited by a service provider from another Swiss-
funded project called the Sustainable Soil Management Project (SSMP). Tara made 
a request that the project provide her with some support for goat rearing. She now 
owns four goats. Recently, Tara approached a Livestock Officer to provide support 
for the vaccination of her goats against disease. Some user members of another 
district made a study visit to her home. Tara said very confidently:
Now I am a different woman. I am more confident and I can now put ideas 
forward. If I continue like this, community forestry can help me to get out of 
poverty.
The analysis of the impact of Nepal's community forestry on the livelihoods of 
people, from a group perspective and a household perspective, indicates that 
the frameworks of RLS and SLA can be useful analytical tools for understanding 
the various elements and dimensions of livelihoods. The aim of the analysis was 
to use the SLA framework to analyse how community forestry has contributed 
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to the formation and mobilisation of livelihood assets, addressing poor people's 
vulnerability, improving the policy and enabling environment, and make the 
government and non-government institutions more accountable in addressing social 
and environmental issues. Similarly, the RLS framework, which is complemented 
by the SLA framework, is used to analyse the impact of community forestry on the 
livelihood strategies and outcomes of three households, namely, those of Gorakh 
Bahadur, Mohan Kasai and Tara Shrestha. For example, personal emotions and 
the CFUG's collective responsibility to provide support to Tara Shrestha; a feeling 
of ownership of the community forest on the part of Gorakh Bahadur; and the socio-
economic conditions and family base of Mohan Kasai can better be articulated by 
using both the SLA and RLS framework. However, neither has the ability to change 
existing power relations to better meet livelihood needs as human rights. The SLA, 
RLS and other livelihoods approaches are not the only ways of thinking, nor are 
they substitutes for other approaches. The most important point is that, based on 
practice on the ground, the SLA, RLS and other approaches need to be modified, 
adapted and adjusted to different local contexts and priorities. If these approaches 
can be used to analyse community forestry as described above, it should also be 
possible to use these approaches to analyse other development interventions.
6.10 Conclusion and main messages
A lot more can be written about the meaning, concepts and framework of the SLA 
(and other livelihoods approaches) and its linkages with other approaches. However, 
it is beyond the scope of this chapter to do so. In this chapter, an attempt was made 
to synthesise some conceptual and operational issues and observations related 
to livelihoods approaches, in general, and DFID's SLA, in particular. DFID's SLA 
was also used to analyse Nepal's community forestry programme. An alternative 
approach, the HRBA to development, is also suggested. In summary, the chapter 
contains four key messages.
First, the SLA is not a separate approach. Rather it ‘adds value’ to various existing 
approaches to development. It capitalises on the experiences and lessons learned 
from most of the leading concepts of the past. Although the approach is flexible 
and dynamic, its core principles, such as people-centred, holistic, dynamic, building 
on strengths, macro-micro links and sustainability are not compromised. Various 
livelihood frameworks have been developed by various agencies to help understand 
and analyse the livelihoods of the poor. In all of the livelihoods approaches, 
development is pursued using a humanistic, rather than a technocratic mode, 
which is similar to the HRBA. The livelihoods approaches are holistic in that they 
take a unified and integrated view of the entire social, economic, environmental 
and institutional system. The livelihoods approaches are reinforced, rather than 
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replaced, by the emerging HRBA in terms of its extended focus on 'livelihood needs' 
as part of 'human rights'. All have common elements such as capital, policies and 
social processes. These are the main elements to be considered in assessing the 
effectiveness of existing efforts of development in achieving the aim of poverty 
reduction.
Second, the livelihoods approach offers communities a checklist for analysing, 
appraising, planning and action. This approach provides development practitioners 
with a coherent and flexible framework for programming, and for trying to establish 
micro-macro linkages. It also provides a roadmap into some pretty complex issues 
adaptable for use in practical ways, guidance on how to use the framework and on 
what information is needed and why, and how to go about getting and analysing 
this information. 
Third, theoretical ideas and arguments on the conceptualisation of the SLA, defining 
and elaborating on the jargon (e.g., terms such ‘holistic’, ‘dynamic’, ‘environmentally 
friendly’, ‘gender sensitive’ and so on) have mostly been developed by western 
academics. The participation of poor people in this process is still a distant idea. 
Even professionals in the ‘South’ are not involved in this process of conceptualisation 
and operationalisation. For a reversal in power relations, a strong people's civil and 
political movement is needed, which the livelihoods approach does not recognise, 
or is at least silent on. This lack of emphasis on political processes and the means 
of changing power relations is the weakest part of the approach. Hence, the political 
transformation of local and supra-local political structures and processes is not 
within the scope of the SLA. Rather it, like other development approaches of the 
past, tends to promote ‘reformist’ ways and means of social and political change.
Fourth, many development programmes, such as Nepal's community forestry 
programme, can be analysed by applying the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework. 
However, an alternative approach should also be sought to address the issue 
of civil and political rights, without which people's right to access services and 
benefits generated by development interventions are always at risk. Therefore, the 
integration of HRBA, the RLS and other approaches with the SLA could be the way 
forward. The HRBA espouses the principle that basic human needs are human 
rights. The HRBA brings a new perspective to development; it looks at ‘the ethics 
of development’ by looking at causes of exclusion and sources of power. A key 
shift is that, under the HRBA, development cooperation is not viewed as ‘charity’, 
but as a ‘right’, i.e., the ‘beneficiaries’ become ‘rights holders’. The challenges in 
applying the HRBA, or a combination of livelihoods approaches and rights-based 
approaches, both at a theoretical and practical level, are many. Caution should 
nevertheless be taken, as with other development approaches, to adapt the 
approach to the local context.
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A critical reflection on the sustainable livelihoods approach
Abstract
The livelihood strategies of internally displaced people are affected by the various 
factors and the new contexts that they encounter in the host communities. This topic 
has also been of great interest in the broader framework of migration studies. Taking 
the case of the Rajhena Camp in the Western Terai, Nepal, this Chapter examines 
the livelihood strategies of conflict-induced internally displaced persons using the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (DFID 2002) and the Rural Livelihood System 
(Baumgartner 2006) as analytical tools. This Chapter attempts to understand how 
the circumstances endured by internally displaced persons affect their capacity 
to build assets or capitalise on available assets and, thus, shape their livelihood 
strategies. This chapter also discusses the relevance of livelihoods frameworks in 
studying the livelihood strategies of special categories of people.
7.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the livelihood strategies of internally displaced 
people using livelihoods frameworks. In doing so, this Chapter also examines the 
analytical scope of two common livelihoods frameworks, namely, the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Framework (SLF) (DFID 2002) and the Rural Livelihood System (RLS) 
(Baumgartner 2006). 
As discussed in previous chapters, one of the main impacts of the ten-year armed 
conflict was the displacement of an estimated 250,0001 people from their place of 
origin. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nepal are facing enormous hardship 
and practising various approaches to make a living (Upreti 2006). Most of them are 
from rural areas where land and land-based livelihoods were their primary source 
of subsistence and income. Their life and culture, beliefs and daily activities in their 
place of origin were shaped by the context in which they lived. After displacement, 
the IDPs came to urban and semi-urban areas that they perceived to be safer. Some 
of the IDPs interviewed for this study reported still living in fear; they suspected 
1  For discussions on the differences between the data see, Ghimire and Upreti (2008).
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that the Maoists visited the camps to keep a close eye on them and, hence, were 
hesitant to speak freely about their experiences. 
Apart from three camps – Rajhena in Nepalgunj, Birendranagar Camp in Surkhet 
and Dhanusa Camp in Dhanusa – most IDPs sustain their livelihoods outside the 
‘camp’ setting. The vast majority of IDPs have managed on their own. Some of 
them have settled on public lands, such as along the East West Highway, in urban 
slum areas, and on public lands and forest areas near road heads and towns. 
IDPs are cited as one of the main reasons for the rapid growth of slum areas in 
urban areas of Nepal especially along riverbanks (Adhikari 2006; Caritas 2005; Rai 
2005; Upreti 2007). Other IDPs have melted into so-called ‘informal settlements’ in 
residential areas of cities, sharing the rent with other poor migrants. A small fraction 
of IDPs, in particular, political leaders and village elites who already had houses in 
urban areas, were able to continue their lives without any major problems. 
A large number of IDPs also went to India and significant amount to the Gulf 
countries in search of work (Kollmair et al. 2006; Müller-Böker & Thieme 2007; 
Thieme 2006; Thieme et al. 2005; Thieme & Müller-Böker 2004; Thieme & Wyss 
2005). Others from rich and elite families migrated to Western or developed 
countries (Adhikari 2006).
With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the UCPN 
(M) and the Government of Nepal in November 2006, internal displacement was 
expected to diminish, and so initiatives were taken to return IDPs to their place of 
origin. However, the Government failed to ensure the rule of law and incidences of 
murder, torture, abduction and so forth continued, significantly impeding the return 
process. The eruption of violence in certain districts in the Terai soon after the 
signing of CPA displaced more people, mostly the so-called ‘Pahadiyas’ (people 
of hill origin).
7.2 IDPs in Nepal
Studies on conflict-induced displacement in Nepal have mostly assessed the 
situation for humanitarian assistance. There have been only a few academic 
studies and in-depth research conducted on IDPs in Nepal. 
Unlike the international practice of settling IDPs in camps that can be closely 
monitored, IDPs in Nepal have been largely supported by their families and social 
networks, and, thus, have remained beyond the reach of formal procedures for 
support or assistance. This is one of the reasons why there were few camps for 
IDPs in Nepal, compared to the total number of people displaced.
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Elected local representatives and the secretaries of village and district development 
committees were forced to either accept the dictates of the UCPN (M) or vacate 
their residences and leave their villages. Hence, many people left their villages. 
Family members of villagers working in the army or police forces often experienced 
difficulties in villages controlled by the UCPN (M). There were several incidents 
where the UCPN (M) asked family members of the security forces for money and 
even forced them to pressure their sons or husbands to resign from government 
jobs. This situation placed members of the security forces in a vulnerable position.
Box 7.1 Suffering on both sides 
During the night, groups of UCPN (M) would come and ask for food, shelter or money. If we 
refused, they would threaten to beat or even kill us. During the day, the security forces would come 
and create havoc ‘atanka machauchan’ in the village. They beat and harassed us, accusing us 
of giving shelter and food to the UCPN (M). When this started to happen regularly we were very 
afraid. So, we left our house to avoid such threats from the Army and the Maoists. 
Source: Interview with Mr G. Shahi (name changed) from Kalikot on 27 September 2007
The situation of silent IDPs – those who are either unaware of their status or who 
do not want their status to be known – is unclear. During the conflict, there were 
problems with access to IDPs, and, now, there is still a large number of IDPs who 
do not want to be known as IDPs due to fear and social stigma. Hence, it is very 
hard to find accurate data on IDPs in Nepal. The initial official Government estimate 
was only 6,000 to 7,000 IDPs. The Government had counted only people displaced 
by the actions of the UCPN (M). Human rights activists and advocacy groups 
estimate the number of IDPs to be between 400,000 and 600,0002. After the CPA, 
an IDP unit in the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) was created. It has 
started targeted work for IDPs, like the registration of IDPs, and is trying to maintain 
records and provide relief funds, among other things. As a result, the number of 
people registering as IDPs has steeply increased. According to the latest estimate 
of the MoPR, the total number of people internally displaced due to the conflict is 
44,861. This number is based on the data collected by the Government taskforce 
for determining the conflict induced human and structural costs and includes the 
total number of people who have registered as IDPs with the district administration 
offices. Simultaneously, return movements have also been counted. However, the 
validity of data for returnees is questionable as most of the returnees have again 
left the place to which they returned, which has not been monitored.
2  The reason for such a high discrepancy between these figures is mainly due to the definition of IDP. The Government 
recognises IDPs as those people who have registered with a district administration office (DAO) and obtained a 
certificate. However, some people do not register with the DAO due to fear (as the DAO, being a government body, 
is a local party to the conflict) and mistrust, and others have very little incentive to register.
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The CPA highlights that IDPs need a targeted approach to livelihood support, as 
they are spread across urban areas and town centres without proper support. The 
lives of IDPs living in settlements is compounded by the sorrow of leaving property 
behind, being separated from family members, grieving for loved ones killed in the 
conflict and so forth. Studies on the situation of displaced people in Nepal (UNHCR 
et al. 2006; Rai 2005; Tamang & Fedrick 2006; Dhakal 2004; Upadhaya 2006; 
IDD 2005; Upreti 2007; Ghimire & Upreti 2008) show that, for most IDPs, living 
conditions are difficult and there is little support to cope with high unemployment 
rates and large debts; there is also a high level of dependency on assistance from 
friends, relatives and the community. Some have been forced to beg for food at 
local hotels. Because of the distrust of IDPs among the host community, many face 
problems renting flats or finding jobs. Many have run up large debts to survive, 
having left all their property and investments behind and having used all their 
savings. Displaced women were reported to be working in hotels and bars and 
felt vulnerable to different forms of abuse. There are increasing incidences of child 
labour. The malnutrition rate among children was found to be very high, sometimes 
above the critical 15 per cent threshold set by the World Health Organization to 
define emergency situations (IDMC 2007). The same report found that IDPs in 
Nepal do not have sufficient access to clean drinking water and sanitation. 
7.3 Study methodology 
The methods used in this case study include observation (of IDPs’ living conditions, 
physical facilities and livelihood bases); semi-structured interviews with 55 individual 
IDPs and concerned local authorities (Banke District Development Committee, 
Banke District Administration Office, Nepalgunj Municipality); key-informant 
interviews with selected individuals including representatives of the Maoist Victims 
Association, local social and political leaders, and IDP activists; focus group 
discussions with 7 groups of IDPs (5 to 10 persons per group); and interactions 
with informants including NGO workers, local leaders and officers, and members 
of community organisations working in the case study area. In addition, in-depth 
discussions were held with seven NGO workers, two local leaders, three community 
organisations and eight government officials to further explore the specific issues 
related to livelihoods and security3. Secondary sources of information were also 
used.
The Rajhena Camp in Banke District was selected as a case study because of its 
location as the main centre for IDPs coming from rural areas (mainly in the mid and 
3 The primary data were gathered by Masters student Mr Subash Pokharel in mid-2006 and later by Anita Ghimire in 
2007. 
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far west of Nepal) to urban centres in Nepal and also to India. It is also the first of 
its kind (i.e., the first government run IDP camp in Nepal) and closely monitored 
by various NGOs. The camp is run with the collaboration of the government and 
international agencies and their local partners4.
According to the respondents, the IDPs in Rajhena Camp were displaced due to 
the UCPN (M). The IDPs victimised by the security forces were said to be scattered 
because they were not ready to concentrate in an identified cluster due to fear of 
possible raids and action by the security forces. In addition to the IDPs in Rajhena 
Camp, other IDPs staying outside the camps in Nepalgunj and Kathmandu were 
consulted to collect information and for triangulation of the data collected in the 
field. 
7.4 Study area
The case study site, Rajhena Camp, is located in Kiran Nala Village, Rajhena VDC, 
in Banke District. It is situated 20 km north-east of Nepalgunj Municipality, south of 
the Mahendra Highway. The nearest market is Kohalpur Market. Rajhena is Nepal’s 
first IDP camp. Hence, although the case is not representative of the national IDP 
situation, the study could elucidate the specific livelihood situation of the IDPs in the 
camp and initiate debate at a wider level.
Banke District, in general, and Nepalgunj, in particular, is known to have received 
a significant number of IDPs over the last 10 years, mostly from conflict-affected 
districts in the Mid-Western and Far West Development Regions of Nepal. However, 
IDPs from the Mid-Western Development Region were observed on a mass scale 
between 2002 and 2005 (IDMC 2006). 
There are 91 houses in the camp, which are made of mud with thatched roofs. 
The road to other villages passes through the middle of the settlement. The 
camp is situated close to the security base camp, and, hence, is regarded as a    
safe place. There are two small grocery shops in the camp. The camp covers 
6 Bighas (4.08 hectares) of land and accommodates 216 households. The land 
is government property, originally meant for building accommodation for female 
security personnel. 
Children (30%) and women (33%) constitute the majority of IDPs in the camp 
(63%). Male members were mostly either political party workers or schoolteachers 
in their place of origin. Female IDPs were mainly housewives in their place of origin. 
The main causes of displacement were: perceived or actual security risks from 
the security forces and the UCPN (M), pressure from the Maoists to join them as 
4  In 2009, Camp Rajhena closed and at time of publishing (2010), there are now no IDP camps in Nepal.
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a fulltime worker, painful family circumstance (e.g., the killing or torture of family 
members), and fear of being caught in crossfire. 
7.5 Analytical frameworks for studying livelihoods of IDPs
Two concepts, namely, the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF), developed 
and widely applied by DFID in its international development cooperation projects, 
and the Rural Livelihood System (RLS) developed mainly to bring in other 
dimensions not covered by the SLF, provide the conceptual basis for examining 
the livelihoods of IDPs.
7.5.1 Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF)
The Department for International Development of the United Kingdom’s (DFID’s) 
SLF is widely used in development practices and provides operational tools for 
understanding people’s livelihood strategies (DFID 2002; Carney et al. 1999). It 
has been used by DFID almost as a condition for development cooperation in 
developing countries. In comparison, the RLS provides interesting heuristic tools 
for analysing the psychological, spiritual and emotional aspects of individuals 
(Baumgartner 2006) and their role in developing livelihood options and strategies. 
The SLF is widely used in development projects and programmes, in both rural and 
urban settings, in Nepal, but the RLS is less known. The SLF is relevant in terms of 
rural to urban migration (Thieme 2006). Its main value lies in the fact that it is able 
to identify the factors affecting livelihoods and show the relationships between them 
(see Chapter 6 for more details and Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for conceptual diagrams 
of DFID’s SLF). 
However, some scholars criticise DFID’s framework for being an oversimplification 
of a very complex reality. The basic problem in using DFID’s SLF is that it does 
not take into account inner realities, i.e., the emotions, feelings and memories of 
the individual under study. This inner reality is highly relevant in the study of the 
livelihoods of IDPs. 
7.5.2 Rural Livelihood System (RLS)
The Rural Livelihood System (RLS) was developed by the Swiss scholars 
Baumgartner and Hoegger, together with their Indian research team, based on 
their extensive research work in India (Baumgartner 2006). It emphasises the same 
core principles established by the SLF, but deals explicitly with crucial elements of 
decision-making, such as experience, individual orientations, worldviews, emotions 
and attachments – dimensions that are missing in the SLF (see Chapter 6 for more 
details and Figure 6.3 for a diagrammatic representation of RLS’s nine-square 
Mandala).
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In exploring livelihoods, the RLS helps us to look at the complexity of countless 
forces, and factors, in addition to the lean notion of income sources, to understand 
how IDPs “keep their household going” (Baumgartner & Hoegger 2004). The 
complexity of the life experience of IDPs has, as Baumgartner and Hoegger explain, 
a tangible and a non-tangible symbolic aspect (Baumgartner & Hoegger 2004). 
The life trajectories and experiences of IDPs are often highly emotional and even 
traumatic; the analytical framework of the RLS is able to grasp these dimensions. 
The RLS aims to understand human livelihoods by going beyond the physical 
dimensions and dealing with the inner human space, emotional bases and 
worldviews, at both the individual and collective levels. For the purpose of this 
study, both the SLF and RLS were adapted and combined to form a new analytical 
framework.
7.5.3 New analytical framework developed to study IDPs
Figure 7.1 describes a comprehensive approach to assessing the IDP issues, 
combining aspects of both the SLF and RLS. 
The livelihoods of IDPs in their new surroundings are affected by physical and 
emotional factors. Similar to the ‘outer realities’ of the RLS (Baumgartner 2006), 
physical factors are those that are not part of the former life of the IDPs. They 
are responses by state and non-state actors in the form of policies, practices and 
regulations; the resources of the host community; and individual and family livelihood 
assets. Emotional factors are internal constraints and strengths – the psychological 
conditions of an individual, such as his or her fear, experience of trauma, anxiety, 
identity, willingness to participate, aims in life and motives. These are similar to 
the ‘internal realities’ of the RLS framework. Drawing from the RLS framework, we 
divide the emotional factors into the emotional base of the individual and his or her 
family, individual and family space, and individual and family orientation. 
Both the internal and external factors interact with each other and shape the strategies 
and decisions of IDPs in bringing about their desired livelihood outcomes.
Displaced people, by virtue of their conditions, demand certain rights of protection 
and special provisions, which must primarily be addressed by the state. If the state 
is unable to do so due to lack of expertise or resources it can ask for external 
intervention. This response of protection and provision is referred to here as a 
‘comprehensive response’. The first response is physical resettlement. For an 
effective comprehensive response, the state should ensure that the environment 
is conducive for displaced people to either return to their place of origin, integrate 
with their host community, settle in another part of the country, or resettle in areas 
provided by different agencies. However, all of these options are voluntary. A 
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comprehensive response includes the process of reconciliation, resettlement, 
rehabilitation, repatriation and reintegration, which will be explained in the coming 
sections. 
For the outcome to be positive an integrated approach is needed. A positive 
outcome, in turn, affects the physical and emotional factors in favour of IDPs by 
giving them power to negotiate the situation for their benefit. Thus, the process 
becomes cyclic. 
Social Field (Host Area)
Figure 7.1 New analytical framework combining SLF and RLS 
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Table 7.1 Effect of policies and practices and socio-economic position on 
livelihood outcomes of IDPs
Good policy and practices, but weak socio-
economic position makes IDPs reliant on 
external factors for livelihoods:
• Poor economic conditions
• Failure to self maintain livelihoods 
after assistance ends
• Poor self-sustainability 
• Over dependence on external 
factors
Optimum situation for IDPs
Strong policy and practices and 
strong socio-economic position 
creates positive livelihood outcomes 
for IDPs:
 1R,'3VSHFL¿F
vulnerabilities
• En   d of status of IDPs with 
full exercise of rights as 
ordinary citizens
 -XVWL¿DEOHFRPSHQVDWLRQ
for all kinds of loss, such as 
social, human, psychological 
and economic loss
Most vulnerable situation for IDPs
Poor policies and practices, and weak 
socio-economic position:
• Poor economy related 
conditions, such as poor health 
and access to health services 
and education 
• Unable to exercise their rights
Poor policy and practices, but strong 
socio-economic position creates 
tension between IDPs and the state:
• Good economic conditions
• Self maintained livelihoods
• Poor insurance and 
protection of rights 
• Poor exercise of rights
Socio-economic empowerment of IDPs
Socio-economic empowerment and good policies and practices are both equally 
necessary for positive livelihoods outcomes. As shown in Table 7.1 socio-economic 
empowerment and policies and practices directly affect the livelihoods of IDPs. 
With a weak socio-economic status and ‘poor’ policies and practices, IDPs are 
in the most vulnerable position (represented by the bottom left box). Good policy 
and practices, but weak socio-economic status makes IDPs dependent on external 
factors like policies and practices for their livelihoods. However, with strong socio-
economic conditions, but poor policy, the rights of IDPs are denied. This brings 
them into conflict with the state, as it is the state that ensures rights. The desired 
option for IDPs, which we have called ‘positive livelihood outcomes’, (Table 7.1) 
would be a blend of conducive policy and practices and strong socio-economic 
status.
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7.5.4 Livelihood realities of IDPs
This section describes the factors that affect the livelihoods of the IDPs in the 
Rajhena Camp and how, in this context, the IDPs strategise their livelihood 
practices and adopt specific ways of life in the camp. The study found that the 
livelihoods of IDPs could only be understood by looking beyond their practices to 
see how these practices are formulated. The study found that the specific practices 
adopted by IDPs are often the result of calculated motives, driven by physical and 
emotional factors. These are the bases on which the person stands or determines 
his position in the social field when interacting with the social field. The strategies 
and practices are the dynamics in the space of the structure. For example, when 
a new person from an organisation comes to a camp settlement, from previous 
experience the IDPs know that they have something to offer. This experience forms 
the basis of knowledge that the IDPs use to strategise their practices before the 
new person. Their strategy may be to attract such persons to their issues. This, 
most IDPs perceive, can be accomplished by explaining their conditions in detail. 
Thus, in practice, IDPs often show representative of organisations how they have 
been affected by the conflict/displacement, for example, by showing their wounds, 
introducing them to disabled family members or producing documents that reveal 
the magnitude of their loss.
Thus, practices result from calculated strategies although these strategies may 
produce desired or undesired outcomes. These outcomes, in turn, determine the 
relative position of the individual in the social field. The position we imply here is a 
network of social relationships, rather than a physical position in the field. By virtue 
of social interaction which is related to the capacity of the relative position, the 
person also affects the social field, i.e., the space where the individuals' livelihood 
practices take place. Thus, the person negotiates and renegotiates the basic 
physical and emotional basis of his or her livelihood.
7.6 Factors affecting strategies
In this section the factors that shape the present livelihoods of IDPs are analysed 
using concepts from the RLS framework. However, in contextualising the framework 
to explain the livelihoods of displaced people it was found that their disposition of 
origin and their status of being displaced heavily affected their present livelihood 
strategies. It then becomes necessary to know about their livelihoods before 
displacement.
7.6.1 Disposition of origin
Disposition of origin refers to the internalised behaviour of an IDP as a result of the 
structure of his or her home community. The IDPs in the camps were found to be 
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displaced from rural areas of Nepal. These were people from villages in some of 
the least developed districts of Nepal. Table 7.2 presents their place of origin by 
district. Even within these districts, these people were living in the villages rather 
than in the district headquarters or urban areas.
Table 7.2 Displaced households in Rajhena Camp by district
District
Number and percentage of IDPs
Remarks
Number Percentage
Mugu 73 33.8 Out of 814 internally displaced 
people in the camp only 36.1 
per cent were literate and 
most of the women were 
illiterate. 
Dailekh 63 29.2
Jajarkot 40 18.5
Surkhet 23 10.6
Kalikot 9 4.2
Jumla 4 1.9
Humla 2 0.9
Salyan 1 0.5
Bajura 1 0.5
Total 216 100
The disposition of the IDPs before interacting with the urban environment was 
shaped by the rural environment. Agriculture and livestock rearing was the main 
occupation of all the surveyed families. The IDPs lived closely with the environment, 
and, in particular, with the agricultural environment, in fulfilling their basic livelihood 
needs. Their village communities of origin can be compared to medieval village 
communities: i.e., the main occupation is agriculture and there is an owner-
tenant relationship in agriculture, occupational unity, and a distinct set of common 
traditions, habits and activities. Ninety-five per cent of those in Rajhena Camp 
were landlords in their villages of origin. Their thinking and practices were shaped 
by a strong community consciousness, the important role of neighbourhoods, 
activities centred around religious faith, very high social control through informal 
agents like norms, values, folkways and norms traditions, customs, religion and 
morality, and resistance to change. These informal agencies have great influences 
on practices, whereas formal agencies like state rules and regulation have lesser 
influence as most people are much less aware of the specific functions of such 
formal agencies.
7.6.2 Implications of being displaced
Changes in the disposition of IDPs due to the experience of displacement related to 
FRQÀLFWDOVRDIIHFWVWKHLUOLYHOLKRRGFDSDFLW\1HSDOKDVDORQJKLVWRU\RIPLJUDWLRQ
from rural to urban areas, mostly for economic reasons. Spatially speaking, the 
IDPs in the camps were also transferred from rural to urban areas. However, we 
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the usual rural to urban migration, has different consequences than planned 
migration. 
As Oslender (2007) states, a significant ontological change occurs through 
displacement. Not only have their physical selves been removed from one place to 
another, their being is changed. Against their will they have been categorised using 
a new vocabulary – as ‘IDPs’ – and have been bundled into a new statistic, and 
come under new interventions and legislation. Their identity has been changed. 
Most of the families in Rajhena camp had been displaced because the men in 
those families were active and important members of their community. They were 
landlords, people who had important positions in the village like VDC chairmen and 
teachers, or people who were politically and socially active. They had roles in all 
the important village decisions. They participated actively in developmental and 
social spheres of village life and had an ability to influence their fellow community 
members. For most of the IDPs, their former identity gave them a certain social 
status. However, in the camps, they had a new identity, which was unwanted and 
a source of stigma. They were bundled into a new category of ‘displaced’, masking 
their individuality. 
The label ‘IDP’ also establishes a power relationship with the host in the socio-
economic space of livelihood. When collectively labelled as IDPs, they think that 
they are perceived as outsiders who do not belong and are often looked upon as 
possible encroachers on the resources and facilities of the host population.
Beside this, there are physical implications to being displaced. Displacement is 
often found to have similar consequences – families are torn apart, communities 
dispersed, culture suppressed, normal support systems destroyed and the affected 
population is forced to depend on others for the basics of survival (Korn 1999). 
Life for migrants and IDPs, even though they are in the same urban areas, is very 
different. The forced nature of displacement, "the experience of displacement"5 (Kett 
2005) or the "refugee experience" (Ager 1999), makes a difference. For economic 
migrants, it is usually a family decision to diversify income – a common practice 
and a livelihood strategy connected with hopes for future success (Thieme 2006; 
Thieme et al. 2005; Kollmair et al. 2006; Müller-Böker & Thieme 2007; Thieme 
& Müller-Böker 2004; Thieme & Wyss 2005), but for the IDPs in the camp, the 
urban life and culture and the camp life itself is something new. Their habitual 
social affiliation to their community of origin is destroyed and they are forced to 
depend on external institutions like the government and humanitarian agencies 
5 "Before, during and after flight, IDPs and refugees may have experienced conflict, trauma and violence, suffered 
persecution, hunger, exhaustion, separation from their families and undergone many other painful experiences"(Kett 
2005, p 2). 
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and on the mandates of such agencies (like International Red Cross, Norwegian 
Refugee Council) Caritas and other local organisations (like Lumanti) for survival. 
It is more about overcoming immediate challenges than looking for future success. 
Thus, their strategies are aimed at the immediate fulfilment of basic needs, rather 
than a long-term sustainable future.
The specific situation of IDPs (such as having lost of property, land and documents), 
negatively affects the ability of IDPs to make a living in host area (The Brookings 
Institution – University of Bern Project 2007). Due to this, although they were 
generally economically well off in their place of origin, IDPs in Rajhena Camp 
were found to have not been able to achieve productivity after displacement. 
The respondents said that only a few people had managed to retrieve cash and 
jewellery. These assets were usually used up for health and other emergencies. 
Hence, the IDPs were unable to invest in income-generating activities, nor were 
they able to return to their villages and sell their property or retrieve cash and other 
valuables.
This study indicates that the present strategies of IDPs in camps depend upon their 
disposition acquired due to other realities, which short surveys and frameworks like 
DFID’s SLF do not adequately explain. As Moser (1998) said, for the urban poor 
at the household level internal factors brought about by conflict, such as death 
or disability, impermanence, insecurity and lingering fear, and trauma, affect their 
livelihood strategy. This was also found to be true for IDPs in Rajhena Camp. All 
the IDP in the camp had left their place of origin due to threats and feelings of 
insecurity, mostly caused by the Maoists. Most of the families had witnessed the 
brutal legacy of the war-killings of family members, have had to look after maimed 
family members, have had physical and mental torture inflicted upon them or their 
dear ones, been separated from their families, or lost property and valuables. The 
conflict and displacement has caused ruptures in the continuity of life and the 
breakdown of social systems and safety nets. This has had a deep psychological 
impact. It greatly affects their ability to use present resources to achieve positive 
livelihood outcomes, as well as their ways of thinking and responding to daily 
events, and, hence, their livelihood struggle. 
Some of the informants stated that, as they had left their place in a time of conflict, 
they did not bring important documents like citizenship certificates, property 
ownership certificates, etc., which determine their rights as citizens – including 
political rights, the right to admit their children to schools, the ability to obtain a 
citizenship certificate for their children, the right to buy and sell land, and the ability 
to obtain finance from a bank. This has crippled their ability to obtain good jobs or 
to obtain seed money to start a business, and much more. Now they depend on 
money given as assistance and on migrant remittances. 
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7.6.3 Physical factors that influence the livelihoods of IDPs in their host 
area
The physical factors that influence the livelihood strategies and practices of IDPs 
form the basis of livelihood. ‘Physical basis’ refers to the most obvious and primary 
external factors such as the physical environment including natural resources and 
other physical capital of the host community and of the displaced people, as well 
as policies and practices. 
Assets
Rajhena Camp, as described in the previous section, is situated 20 km north-east 
of Nepalgunj Municipality, which is one of the most developed municipalities in the 
Mid-Western Development Region of Nepal. The camp is well connected by road 
and lies in the hinterland between Banke and the neighbouring district of Bardiya. 
Local transport is moderately frequent, although not scheduled. However, the local 
public transport from Nepalgunj Municipality stops 2 km before the camp. The land 
is fertile enough for cultivation, as shown by the growing of vegetables, rice and 
wheat. Water from the nearby river is used to water the fields near the camp. The 
nearest forest, which is the only source of firewood for the camp, is 10 km from the 
camp. Besides carrying firewood, people also use rickshaws and jeeps to transport 
firewood. There is no electricity or any source of lighting in the camp. 
Looking at the assets of IDPs, intangible assets (World Bank 1990, Moser 1998), 
mostly social capital and household relations, were important to them in the camp. 
According to Bourdieu and Massey (cited in Arango 2000) and Thieme (2006), 
social capital is cumulative in nature and has a multiplier effect. This form and 
nature of capital also plays a prominent role in Rajhena Camp. 
Social networks formed both at the place of origin and destination have become 
social capital, which has facilitated opportunities for IDPs to come to the camp and 
gain access to services in the camp. The social capital of IDPs has reduced the 
cost of sustaining their livelihoods. Social capital also translates into various types 
of support (information, assistance in obtaining employment, facilitation of access 
to assistance and even provision of financial assistance, accommodation and so 
forth), which has facilitated migration or reduced the costs involved in migration. 
However, the negative effects of social networks (Thieme 2007) were also seen in 
the camp. For example, people who were nearest to the leaders of the IDP camp 
sometimes occupied two or more houses, whereas others displaced families were 
waiting for their turn.
The respondents explained that almost all who left the village in a hurry first went 
to their district headquarters where they had friends or neighbours before coming 
Livelihood strategies of internally displaced people
231
Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal
to Nepalgunj. Others who came prior to the establishment of the camp first lived 
in different parts of Nepalgunj. Later they acquired places in the camp. A few who 
had relatives, neighbours or friends in Nepalgunj, ‘bonding social capital’ (Thieme 
2006), received information about the camp and, thus, came directly to the camp. 
Such networks also helped them to secure land and materials to build houses in 
the camp. 
Housing is an important tangible asset, but there is a no formal legal title to houses 
in Rajhena camp. Nonetheless, when IDPs with houses moved out of the camp, 
there was often an unofficial trading of houses among the IDPs in the camp. Those 
who moved out of the camp sold their houses in whole or part to other people, 
sometimes members of the neighbouring community. The price is determined by 
negotiation between the buyer and seller and varies according to the urgency of 
the sale and the mutual relationship between the parties. Hence, IDPs generate 
social and physical capital through a continuous process of negotiation and 
renegotiation.
Knowledge and activity base of the individual and family
The knowledge and activity base refers to all activities that have an economic 
purpose, but at the same time are tied to traditions, emotions and specific forms of 
self-esteem. It refers to the skills and knowledge of individuals and families that are 
carried within the wider emotional basis of the individual and the community.
For most of the families, agriculture was the main occupation in their place of origin. 
All the families in the camp said that they formerly had enough land to provide food 
for the whole year. However, now, most of the families had no landholding in the 
host area. 
In Nepalgunj, IDPs from Rajhena Camp were engaged in casual labour, mostly 
in construction, while women worked informally selling tea and food in the street 
(‘street trading’) (Siham 2005) and doing domestic and agricultural work during 
the harvest season. With the majority of IDPs depending on informal employment 
to make a living, their income is low and they have little chance of improving their 
economic status and access to even basic services. The analysis of livelihood 
options also showed that, for most (54.6%) of the people, relief assistance from 
different humanitarian organisations was the main source of livelihood. In Rajhena 
Camp, 16.2 per cent of IDPs relied on local casual labour, mostly in agriculture, and 
16.2 per cent relied on loans (borrowing). Only 7.9 per cent of IDPs had regular 
jobs. Other livelihood options for IDPs were operating small retail shops or mobile 
shops (‘nanglo pasal’, ‘gada pasal’) and establishing small hotels However, none 
of their sources of income were permanent. 
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Table 7.3 Recurrent livelihood options for IDPs in Rajhena Camp 
(Nepalgunj)
Livelihood option Number of households % of IDPs
Retail shop 2 0.9
Small mobile shop 1 0.5
Small hotel 4 1.9
Local casual labour 35 16.2
Regular job 17 7.9
Agriculture 4 1.9
Borrowing 35 16.2
Dependant on relief assistant 118 54.6
Total 216 100
Source: SCF-US (2005) 
Note: Eighty-three families reported having two or more means of livelihood, and two IDPS were 
employed in government jobs.
Table 7.3 shows that relying on relief assistance was the main livelihood basis 
for most of the IDPs (54.6%) in Rajhena Camp, followed by local casual labour 
(16.2%).
Table 7.4 Proportion of IDP family members engaged in work outside 
Rajhena Camp
Working abroad Working locally 
Nepal India Overseas Government Job Private job Business
Don’t 
know
56 (No.) 33 (No.) 10 (No.) 31 (No.) 39 (No.) 2 (No.) 27 (No.)
56.6% 33.3% 10.1% 31.3% 39.4% 2% 27.3%
Source: SCF-US (2005)
Shelter in the camp was provided by the INGO Okendon International in a phase-
wise manner. However, if an individual had a good relationship (belonged to the 
same village or district, were related, or had another form of association) with the 
heads of the IDP camp, they were given shelter earlier.
Similarly, due to lack of human capital, like education and prior knowledge and 
experience in dealing with service providing organisations, meant that women and 
mostly women-headed households had to depend on men from other households 
for such tasks (e.g., including simple tasks such as taking children to hospital). 
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In unfamiliar and difficult situations, women's voices become feeble; they cannot 
speak up or relate their problems properly (Sammadar 2003). 
Policy and practices
Structures, institutions and processes play an important role in livelihood outcomes 
(DFID 2002; Kollmair et al. 2006). Structures, institutions and processes in the 
form of material and non-material responses by government and other actors have 
shaped the livelihood practices of IDPs.
Sustainable solutions for IDPs involve addressing the root causes of conflict, 
resolution of the armed conflict (and the causes of the armed conflict) and support 
systems for the post-conflict situation. Resolving issues of internal displacement 
is inextricably linked to peace (Koser 2007), as unresolved problems of internal 
displacement threaten the peace-process. According to the Brookings Institution, 
(The Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project 2007), the peace process 
in general and peace agreements in particular have to address displacement-
related issues, which usually involves addressing the needs and vulnerabilities of 
displaced people.
The United Nations developed the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
(GPID) to address the issues of internally displaced people. These GPIDs are the 
major international instrument for dealing with displacement problems and are 
becoming an important international agenda item. The GPID defines IDPs as:
[P]ersons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid, in 
particular, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, 
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have 
not crossed an internationally recognized state border. (Deng 1998)
The GPIDs were devised in 1998, but are not binding for two reasons. Firstly, there 
was an urgent need for a leading document to help humanitarian agencies start 
assisting IDPs (Cohen 2006). The GPID took two years to complete and it was 
considered that the ratification process would take too long. Secondly, as most 
governments were themselves a cause of displacement or had neglected IDPs, 
it was thought that they would not readily ratify such a document. However, 10 
years since the GPIDs were produced, these ‘unbinding principles’ have not been 
able to fully address the issues faced by IDPs. Most often, IDPs are at the mercy 
of whoever wins the war between state sovereignty and international intervention. 
Burma’s crisis, at least prior to the cyclone in 2008, is an example.
However, some argue that the GPID is only a preliminary document and that it is 
still the state’s responsibility to devise policies to meet the requirements of the local 
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situation. Nonetheless, countries like Nepal rely on the expertise of INGOs and 
external aid agencies for this.
The Brookings Institution – University of Bern Project (2007) has extensively 
examined the situation of IDPs and provided important insights. IDPs came to 
international attention after the Ethiopian famine (1984) and later during the 
Sudanese war (1988). Post cold war, intra state conflict was on the rise; IDPs 
outnumbered refugees by two to one, and their number was ever-increasing 
(Cohen 2006). Although this ratio is widely accepted, there is no independent body 
solely responsible for IDPs. IDPs are handled by a small division of the UNHCR – 
whose primary mandate is for refugees. There are a range of differences between 
refugees and IDPs in terms of needs, accessibility, realisation of impact, sovereignty 
v/s responsibility of state and so forth. Had 250,000 IDPs from Nepal crossed the 
border into China, they would have gained immediate international attention. But, 
as they are merely internally displaced, they have not attracted the same level 
of attention. Hence, it appears that it is not the seriousness of the problem that 
attracts prompt international or national attention, but geographical boundaries 
and numbers of refugees. We could similarly debate other differences between 
refugees and IDPs. This is what happens when there is no specific international or 
national body to closely monitor IDPs.
Different provisions of the CPA are directly and indirectly related to IDPs. There 
are several sections related to the reconciliation, reintegration and rehabilitation of 
IDPs and other conflict victims. Section 5.2.4 is one of the important provisions. It 
states:
Both parties agree to form a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission to 
initiate the process of rehabilitation and provide relief support to the persons 
victimized by the conflict and normalise the difficult situation created due to the 
armed conflict.
Similarly, Section 5.2.5 states:
Both parties agree to form a high level Truth and Reconciliation Commission on 
mutual understanding to conduct investigation about those who were involved 
in gross violation of human rights at the time of the conflict and those who 
committed crimes against humanity and to create the situation of reconciliation 
in the society.
Section 5.2.8 states: 
Both parties express the commitment to allow without any political prejudice 
the people displaced due to the armed conflict to return back voluntarily to 
their respective ancestral or former residence, reconstruct the infrastructure 
destroyed during the conflict and rehabilitate and socialize the displaced people 
into the society.
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Section 8 of the CPA contains provisions relating to dispute settlement and 
implementation mechanisms. It states: 
Both parties agree to become responsible and accountable in an individual and 
collective manner and not to repeat in future the mistakes committed in the past 
and also to correct these mistakes on a gradual basis (Section 8.1).
The National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission shall be set up as per the 
need for making the campaign for peace successful. The composition and 
working procedures of the Commission shall be as determined by the interim 
Council of Ministers (Section 8.2).
Both parties are committed to settle all kinds of present or possible future 
differences or problems through mutual talks, understanding, consensus and 
dialogue (Section 8.3). 
Both parties express commitment that the interim Council of Ministers shall 
constitute and determine the working procedures of the National Peace and 
Rehabilitation Commission, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the High-
level State Restructuring Recommendation Commission and other mechanisms 
as per the need to implement this agreement, the Interim Constitution and all 
the decisions, agreements and understandings reached between the Seven-
Party Alliance, the Government of Nepal and the UCPN (M) (Section 8.4).
Implementation of the various provisions of the CPA would help to solve the 
problems of the IDPs. However, a major challenge is to translate policies and 
provisions into action. 
The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) came into existence after 
signing the CPA. At present, the MoPR looks after the management of IDPs. The 
Government has developed an ‘IDP Policy, 2006’ after amending the pre-existing 
policy for the third time. However, due to the absence of a directive for implementing 
the procedure, the policy has not been fully implemented. In short, the MoPR is yet 
to realise the need for an integrated approach in dealing with IDPs.
The Government focus was initially on the immediate settlement of the problem 
– mostly on the quick return of IDPs to their place of origin. The Government was 
unable to ensure peace and security back in the villages. The issue of return of 
confiscated land, the main means of livelihood of people in their place of origin, 
was not settled according to the provisions of the CPA. The Maoists at the local 
level said that they would return property after the implementation of ‘scientific land 
reform’ envisioned in the CPA. However, so far, the Government has not started 
the process of ‘scientific land reform’, and is unlikely to do so soon, as there are 
serious differences between the major political parties on the understanding of land 
reform.
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The management of IDPs, irrespective of who has displaced them, is the responsibility 
of the state (Slim & Eguren 2004; Global IDP Project 2006; Deng 1998), so it should 
not matter who was the cause of the displacement. Displacement should be seen 
as a negative consequence of the armed conflict, with both short and long-term 
consequences. Consequently, the focus should be on identifying the problem and 
its causes and addressing them. However, over time, the Government’s IDP policy 
has changed and the structures and procedures for implementation of the policy 
are not in place. 
To help IDPs improve relevant livelihood skills in urban areas, the Government 
has at times conducted short-term training programmes. Training in candle making 
was given to female members of the camp. Young girls participated actively in the 
training, but they could not use the skills gained because they had no initial funds 
to start a business and had no knowledge of a market for their product. Similarly, 
the Government trained internally displaced girls to drive ‘tempos’ – the local five-
wheel vehicle. After completing the training, girls were given driving licences, but 
no one took tempo driving up as an occupation because they couldn't hire or buy 
the vehicle. The Government had arranged jobs such as digging canals and roads 
for host communities, but, due to conflict with the host communities, who were 
equally in need of jobs, the jobs were terminated.
7.6.4 Emotional basis of livelihood
The emotional basis of livelihood as described by Baumgartner and Hoegger (2004; 
Baumgartner 2006) keeps people going when economic resources collapse. These 
are emotional attachments to what they consider to be their home and way of life. 
These are also anxieties and emotional factors inherent in every livelihood system, 
which influence every decision taken. They can be deep-rooted feelings, a sense 
of belonging or strong emotional attachments. In this study, the emotional basis of 
livelihoods has been divided into the following three categories: Social space within 
the host community, family space and individual space.
While the emotional basis of livelihoods is not a statistical reality, it was found to 
be of the greatest relevance to the study of the livelihoods of displaced people. 
Emotional realities are some of the core components of the RLS framework. The 
notion of emotional realities seems particularly important in the IDP study because 
of its value in looking at the individual’s orientation, focusing on his or her own 
visions, hopes, aspirations, fears, self-image, integrity, identity, awareness, 
courage, anxiety, memories and feelings. These attachments are at the core of 
each individual and shape their internal orientation and livelihood strategies.
Although the vulnerability context often lies outside the IDPs control, emotional 
realities, being inherent in the individuals, help them to cope with shocks and risks. 
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Hence, an individual’s emotional basis is not static and is subject to change with the 
context. Emotional bases are important for two reasons in IDP studies. Firstly, the 
experience of being displaced from their place of habitual residence due to conflict 
and the hardships that they have endured (killings, atrocities, torture, etc.) must be 
taken into account when studying IDPs livelihoods. Secondly, the experience of the 
new (urban) environment and having to adapt to it impacts on the capacity of IDPs 
to acknowledge and use their assets to produce positive livelihood outcomes.
As observed in the camp setting, the livelihood strategies of IDPs depended on 
individual orientations together with family and collective orientations. In many 
circumstances, the external or physical base becomes weak and the emotional 
base guides individuals to behave in a particular manner. Therefore, the notion 
of an emotional basis for livelihood becomes a powerful concept in the study of 
conflict-affected people in general and IDPs in particular. 
Socio-economic space 
Poor men and women in cities frequently face a set of vulnerability factors like 
the social context of cities, the nature of the urban economy, and urban systems 
of governance. This holds true for IDPs in camps who originate mostly from rural 
areas and are used to a different social context (like close kinship relations and 
ties, a close knit community and systems, e.g., division of labour according to class 
and caste, and so forth), economy (agriculture being the basic form) and system 
of governance (government members belonging to same village or neighbouring 
village, often from the same family or cultural group). 
Displaced people, by virtue of being labelled as such, have a distinct social space 
that is different from that of the host community. The host community sees them as 
people who do not ‘belong’ to the place. In addition to this demarcation between 
IDPs and the host population, there is further demarcation within the camp. The 
most complete demarcation found during the study was on the basis of place or 
district of origin. The camps were arranged such that within each physical area, 
houses of people from the same district were built. There was a sense of connection 
between people from to the same district even if they did not know each other 
previously. Within the camp, daily interactions, social interactions, and trade and 
exchange between family groups were practised more between people from the 
same village or district. For example, the people form Jajarkot (a district in the Mid-
Western Development Region) regarded people from Dailekh (another district in 
the Mid-Western Development Region) as different. Group names were based on 
place of origin, for example, ‘Jajarkoti’ and ‘Dailekhi’. There was also a distinction 
between groups based on class of the origin. People who knew each other in the 
place of origin paid respect based on their social status/class in the place of origin, 
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rather than in the camp. The class hierarchy in the place of origin was very visible 
in their interactions in the camp. For example, a big landlord in the place of origin 
was automatically the leader of at least the people from the same district.
The working population of IDPs went to the nearest market at Kohalpur or to 
Nepalgunj municipality for work. Of those who migrated abroad for work, 33.33 per 
cent went to India. These places then become the socio-economic space within 
which their livelihood system develops. 
The effect of socio-economic space on livelihoods will now be discussed in relation 
to the host community, the family, and the individual’s inner space.
i. Relationship with host community
Box 7.2 Loss of identity 
The same people who lived with us back in the village are now in Nepalgunj. They have built houses 
there. They think that they belong to Nepalgunj, but since we live in the camps, we do not. They see 
us as displaced ‘Bistaphits’ or ‘Kiran Nala's’. So our identity is lost. 
Source: Personal Interview with Mr R. Karki (name changed) on 20 September 2007. 
The above statement raises the important issue of identity and the recognition 
of IDPs in the host community. IDPs are not recognised as equal in their host 
communities.
Forest and land are important natural resources of the host area, both to host 
communities and IDPs. Access to and control over these resources is of great 
concern to IDPs as it is in relation to the use of this space that their ‘displaced’ 
status has the most direct disadvantages. IDPs in Rajhena camp are not allowed 
to use the nearest forest for firewood or grass for their cattle. It is community forest 
and they are not regarded as members of the community. Firewood is the only 
source of fuel for the IDPs to cook food. The next nearest forest is 20 km from the 
camp. This forest is a government owned forest and they are only allowed to collect 
dry twigs. The IDPs complained of harassment by the forest guards. Sometimes 
the guards would snatch their firewood and throw it away or restrict them from 
entering the forest; at other times the guards verbally abused them.
There is constant conflict with the neighbouring host communities over the land 
settled by IDPs and the infrastructure built especially for them. Their crops are often 
destroyed by the people or cattle from the neighbouring host community, which 
has led to severe violence in certain instances. According to the respondents, 
they have registered 52 cases against violence by the people of the neighbouring 
host community. They recalled several incidents when IDPs from the camps were 
beaten nearly to death and dumped in the nearby river between the camp and the 
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host community. The host community’s perception is that the IDPs have been given 
land which was previously used by the host community, although it is government 
land. 
Rajhena camp is located at Kiran Nala, which is around 25 km from Nepalgunj 
where all the government offices and international and national non-governmental 
organisations are concentrated. Transport services to the camp are infrequent and 
rates are high. Nonetheless, in order to visit government offices, organisations and 
the hospital, IDPs have to go to Nepalgunj. However, there is a perception that 
IDPs cannot pay, so no vehicle will take them. Such response by service providers 
frustrates IDPs and adds to their insecurity and uncertainty. 
ii. Family space
Although social space is an important factor for determining strategies for action 
(social and economic decision-making), the family space plays an important role in 
determining the final strategy.
The demarcation based on gender was the most obvious demarcation of space 
within the family observed in the camps. Jobs were divided on the basis of gender; 
most of the indoor activities like cooking, cleaning and tending the house were the 
primary duty of the female members. The only outdoor duty undertaken by females 
was the collecting of firewood and fodder for the animals. The male members did 
most of the outdoor activities like going to the municipality and the city to visit 
government and other organisations, looking for help and trying to provide for basic 
needs.
However, within the educated younger generation, families were not very strict 
with gender roles. Thus, girls visited different organisations and hospitals with 
male members from the camp. They even represented elderly male members in 
organisations and at demonstrations or meetings organised for IDPs. However, 
among the elderly and uneducated members gender roles were still strongly 
defined. 
Another strong differentiation of space was between generation and age. From 
observation of the IDPs in the camp, it was clear that the individual in the family had 
power within the family, not according to age or belonging to an elderly generation 
as in traditional cases, but according to how much responsibility they undertook 
within the family. There was certainly a specific respect for age, but power was 
distributed according to the responsibility one bears for the family. It was generally 
found that in a household consisting of three generations, the mother/father, their 
married sons/daughters-in-law, and their unmarried sons and daughters (which 
was the general composition of the families in the camps), the sons and daughters-
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in-law were the main providers and had the major say in family decisions. The elder 
generations had their space and respect, but rarely had the final say in decisions, 
although their concerns (old age, health status) were taken into consideration in 
decisions.
iii. Inner human space of individuals
According to Baumgartner and Hoegger (2004), neither the broadly accepted 
rules of socio-economic space, nor those of the family, alone determine how 
strategy is devised and actions are taken. Such actions depend on very personal 
considerations and the qualities of individual people, irrespective of their social and 
family position. Although the mainstream opinions of the society and family exert 
their influence upon individuals, the ultimate actions that they take depend upon 
personal decisions and how much these individuals allow their family/society to 
influence them. These decisions are in turn affected by their personal individual 
qualities, like integrity, awareness, maturity, capacity to accept change, capacity to 
integrate, courage, endurance and so forth.
Differences in individual space can be traced to individual dispositions acquired as a 
result of their positions in their home villages. Most of the elderly males living in the 
camp were very active in their villages of origin. They held significant political and 
social positions (e.g., they were VDC chairmen, important political cadre, influential 
members of important social organisations like the forest users group). All of those in 
the camp were displaced because they did not comply with the Maoists and for their 
position of influence over the local population. Because of this previous disposition 
resulting from their previous social status, these IDPs had a stronger individual 
capacity to resist the influence of society and family. They had knowledge of their 
status as IDPs, legal procedures, and services provided by the Government and of 
initiatives, projects and incoming resources targeted to IDPs, as well as access to 
these resources. Those who had knowledge and were accustomed to dealing with 
government and other organisations were able to access benefits. These people 
(mostly male members of the camp) were approached for help and also had their 
say in the distribution of resources6. They were also more aware of the political 
processes of the country, like different negotiations and policies regarding IDPs 
and conflict victims, making them more capable in negotiating and less influenced 
by the larger social forces of the society in making livelihood decisions. 
The women in the camp were more guided by the decisions of the male members 
or by the collective orientation of the camp community. The collective orientation 
of the host community is also structured by the decisions made by the majority of 
6 This is highly applicable outside the camps. Political elites shape the policy and distribution of compensation highly in 
their own favour. 
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male members. One strong manifestation of this was the fact that all of the women 
in the camp wanted to stay in the urban area because they thought that urban life 
offered more educational opportunities for their children and better healthcare. The 
same was true of the young people. However, most of the men in the camp had a 
strong determination to return back. When the issue was discussed within groups 
of both men and women, women supported the men with gestures of agreement. 
When the issue was discussed only among women (the same women who had 
participated in the mixed group earlier), the women said that they wanted to stay 
in the urban area. This has two implications for women’s inner human space, both 
of which relate to being influenced by other forces. Firstly, the IDP group is fighting 
with the Government for their sustainable return to their place of origin. This is 
the most specific and manifested collective orientation of the group in the camp. 
However, the women within the group had a different opinion, which they could 
only express discreetly. In the absence of a discreet environment they tended to be 
influenced by the collective demands of the group (which can be read as the will of 
the senior male population).
The second implication is that, within the family, women’s decisions are influenced 
by the decisions of the male household head. So even when women participate 
in the family decision-making process, their decisions are influenced by the ideas 
of the male members, due to their relatively weak inner human capacity to resist 
influence. 
Similarly, the influence of male power relations within the broader camp was also 
seen in the socio-political status of the women. In the camp there was an IDP 
committee. Women representatives who fulfil quota for women on the committee 
were generally household members or relatives of male committee leaders. These 
women were readily accepted by the other women in the camp because they are 
dependent on the male leaders of committee in dealing with various administrative 
issues. So, displaced women without access to power and networks suffered more 
than those women who had male family members active in the camps and thus 
better access. 
The young people, however, displayed a greater capacity to resist outside forces 
(e.g., in relation to the issue of return, forces such as influence by the head of 
the family and the collective orientation) in their individual decision making. This 
can be attributed to individual qualities such as awareness, education, capacity to 
accept change, identification with the urban population, capacity to integrate and 
integrity.
The dynamics of the influence of individual human spaces has a significant effect on 
the livelihood dynamics of IDPs as a group, and, through a ripple effect, affects all 
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the intervening players and the whole intervention scenario. This will be discussed 
further in the section on results and discussion.
The above-mentioned factors, which influence livelihood strategies, are in turn 
influenced by the mental process that shape and guide individuals. Such mental 
guidance, according to the RLS framework, comes from their orientation.
Orientation
Orientations are the mental processes that shape and guide the practices of 
individuals. This concept is most adequately depicted in the nine-square RLS 
Mandala by the roof – something that one looks up to. So, orientations are mental 
process, like visions and aspiration that guide our practices. However, as individuals 
live and interact within societies, their practices are also fostered or restricted by 
the collective orientation of a collective natured superstructure.
i. Collective orientation
At the wider group level, the collective orientation of the IDPs in Rajhena camp 
as a specific group is their group aspiration for a better life, shared sense of loss 
and hope of regaining what can be regained. Their common motivations include to 
improve their current livelihood situation in an urban setting, as well as to get to the 
end of the plight of displacement. This leads to a vision of demanding their rights and 
the expectation of protection and the fulfilment of basic needs by the Government 
and other players in this field. This is, however, guided by and complies with the 
general collective orientation, which is based on traditions, religion, values and 
worldviews. This broader orientation defines what counts as loss and what counts 
as compensation, what to fight for and the rules of the fight, as well as broader rules 
for social interaction. All these forms of specific and general orientation provide the 
drive for collective action, such as forming a group and fighting for their rights.
However, in the midst of the collective sense of loss and the collective vision of 
fighting for their rights in the hope of ending their plight of displacement, families 
within the camp differed in the magnitude of their involvement in collective action. 
For example, in the family of one of the leaders all of the family members were 
involved in group activities either through physical action or mental support; 
whereas in other families, although they live in the same camp and share the same 
collective sense of loss, the members participated less in group actions, preferring 
to work or look for work. This is shaped by the family’s orientation – a common 
family aspiration for wealth, power, social status, and so forth. 
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ii. Family orientation
In the camp, family orientations differ. As stated above, although there is a common 
vision to better their lives, the paths they choose are different. For some families, 
based on knowledge and activity base and family space, the motivation is to use 
the urban environment for the betterment of their life, for example, by positively 
using the physical base and socio-economic space of the host environment, 
complying with the wider orientations of the host community and trying to integrate 
into the host community. For others, the motivation is to achieve betterment by 
fighting for their rights, rather than using the opportunity provided by the urban 
environment. Some of the families maintain a dual role, dividing the roles among 
family members: some of the members go for demonstrations when asked to do 
so, while others work. However, in the midst of the polarization and duality, the 
difference in family orientations is evidenced by the fact that, even in the same 
camp, in a similar environment, some families initiate demonstrations and lead the 
group, whereas some simply comply with such collective action to maintain their 
social relationship with the group. 
The family’s history and status in the place of origin was frequently referred to by 
all interviewed families when they remembered their previous life. All of the families 
were proud of their socio-economic status in their place of origin. The influence 
of their status of origin was seen in how people were treated in the camp. Thus, 
the previous socio-economic status was maintained in the camp. Most families 
preferred traditional gendered roles within the family to keep their status – so the 
role of women was more restricted in families with a high socio-economic status in 
the place of origin. For example, the female family members of big landlords (in the 
place of origin) did not work in others’ fields for money. 
The decisions of the household regarding their future and, hence, their daily 
activities were also shaped by their perceptions of the future. For some, returning 
to their place of origin offered a more secure future and, therefore, their strategies 
were centred upon making this happen. For example, elder male members of such 
families frequently went to the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) office, which 
is responsible for returning IDPs. 
However, there are others who do not intend to return and would not like to do so. 
These are mainly people who, until 2007 had left the camps to settle in the host 
community (however, most of them took the money that the Government gave to 
returnees). In general, those who had invested in Nepalgunj or had nothing in their 
place of origin did not wish to return. 
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no matter how attached an individual is to their family or community, everyone 
ultimately makes their own final decision. There is always a situation where the 
individual may not comply with the general orientation of the family or community. 
These ultimate decisions are very personal decisions guided by individual 
orientations according to personal hopes, visions, and aspirations and influenced 
by role models, self-image and so forth. 
iii. Individual orientation
In in-depth interviews, most of the IDPs revealed fear, depression, frustration and 
suicidal tendencies. These IDPs were full of pessimism, hopelessness, helplessness 
and uncertainty for the future both in their speech and facial expressions. They 
often compared life in the camps with life back in the village. Many respondents 
still measure time of displacement according to the festival that was approaching 
when they left the village, and by the fruits and crops that would have been found in 
their fields at this time of year. They still get together and discuss how a particular 
festival might have been celebrated back in their villages. They are curious and ask 
people who travel back and forth about what happened during certain festivals. 
In the camp, the people with strong individual orientations were mostly the male 
leaders and the educated young people. For the elder leaders, their vision and 
aspiration was to re-establish their lost socio-economic and political status in their 
place of origin. They identified themselves with the Maoists Victim Association-led 
movement which is centred in Kathmandu. They were interested in the mainstream 
politics of the centre and discussed the scope for return in the context of the ongoing 
situation. They wished to return to their villages of origin. 
Most of the elderly IDPs stated that they did not feel at home in the new environment. 
They kept remembering their life back in village and found it hard to adjust to the 
new semi-urban life where norms and worldviews are different than what they were 
used to. They had never heard of or seen a camp before – let alone experienced 
camp life. Many were living away from their ancestral home for the first time, and at 
an old age. They had a hard time adjusting to the new, remote and semi-urban life 
of the city and life in the camp. Life for them is just a means of subsistence until the 
time comes to return. Thus, their capacity to use resources for positive livelihood 
outcomes is severely restricted. This is further complicated by the fact that they 
were not engaged in constructive and collective (group work) activities in the camp, 
nor did they have any active interaction with the host population.
The interviews also showed that those who didn’t have much property back home 
were reluctant to return as they said that, while the income for them is the same, 
in the urban areas their children have better opportunities. This indicates that 
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coming to urban areas has had some positive outcomes, although the status and 
circumstances of being displaced are still assessed as traumatic. 
Contrary to the above discourse, from an age perspective, it was found that in the 
same situation younger groups of people are more optimistic. The youth want to 
stay in Nepalgunj because they feel that Nepalgunj has more opportunities than 
their village to obtain academic and professional qualifications and employment. 
For young people, the way of life was closer to what they aspired to. They easily 
accepted the broader ways of the same culture. For them, the outcome is positive 
or at least has a hope of being so. As they see a positive future in Nepalgunj, to the 
extent that their resources allow, they are engaged in academic and job-oriented 
skill learning processes that they think will be useful in the future. 
The factor of fear for IDP’s in relation to livelihoods is due to the perceived or 
expected temporariness of their existence in the camp. According to the concept 
of human security (Leaning & Arie 2001), if people do not have hope for the future 
they tend to use resources rather than invest. The people in the camps were people 
who had worked actively in their villages for better livelihoods. However, as they 
perceive the camp as impermanent and believe that one day they will eventually 
return home, they do not use resources available inside the camp (land, trees) 
properly. Although some people have lived in the camp for more than four years, 
they still they do not plant even seasonal vegetables around their house, a common 
practice back home. Most of the elderly and women who were used to doing such 
work said that they didn't plant anything on the land (small plot of vegetable garden) 
because they were told that they would soon be returned back to their place of 
origin. 
Box 7.3 Uncertainties about their return
They (people managing the camp) always told us that our turn to go back would come next month 
or after two months. So we just waited doing nothing rather than tending these lands. But it has 
almost been one and half years and there is no sign of them taking us back. 
Source: Personal interview with Mrs Tika Maya Rokaya (name changed) on 25 September 2007
7.7 Strategies and practices
In line with global trends (IDMC 2007), one of the main strategies adopted by 
IDPs was to go to urban areas, but their motive being to escape the conflict rather 
than to diversify income like most economic migrants (IDMC 2007). Regarding the 
livelihoods of IDPs in urban areas, most of the literature is unanimous in saying that 
the livelihoods of IDPs are precarious (Upreti 2006; Tamang & Fedrick 2006 Duijn 
2003; Adhikari 2006; Caritas 2005; IDMC 2006). If we take informal sectors as 
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defined by Ray (2003) as a loose amalgam of (usually small-scale) organisations 
that escape the cover of many of the regulations and do not receive access to 
privileged facilities, then most IDPs, both outside and inside camps in Nepalgunj 
and other urban areas in Nepal, are absorbed by such sectors. 
Human security frameworks (Leaning & Arie 2001) assume that people tend to 
make investments for positive outcomes in the future only when the future is visible 
and holds promise. The impermanence of life in camps has shaped IDPs’ strategies 
for livelihoods such that they focus on meeting immediate needs rather than on 
positive outcomes for the future. For example, using children for household work is 
a common strategy in camps. Children accompanying women to labour forces or 
working in the household is another important strategy in response to vulnerability 
for urban poor. However, this increases vulnerability in the long term, rather than 
keeping households out of poverty (Moser 1998). Children played an important 
role in doing household chores like cooking, bringing firewood and looking after 
young ones in the camp. When households depend upon their children's labour as 
an asset to maintain current consumption, rather than investing in their children's 
future human capital, they risk future income and earning capacity (Moser 1998). 
Most IDPs move from the camp and settle in the neighbouring community as 
soon as they can afford to do so. This a way for them to overcome the stigma 
associated with being ‘displaced’ and also to gain access to important resources 
like community forests. As a result, a migrant community has formed in Nepalgunj. 
However, some of them still continue to make their presence felt in the camp to 
gain facilities and benefits such as assistance provided by governmental and non-
governmental organisations to IDPs in the camp. This is done either by staying in 
the camp when such organisations come, or are likely to come, like in the morning 
or during the day.
To cope with their new situation, IDPs have to change the way that they make 
their living (Siham 2005). Most women surveyed were actively engaged in the 
agriculture sector in their place of origin. Thus, they were economically productive. 
Most of them described themselves as well off in their place of origin and not used to 
working in others’ fields to earn money; they shun such practices as not respectable 
for women from respected households. In the camp, where they have no land of 
their own, initially they did not work as labourers in others’ fields. However, as their 
stay became prolonged, a significant number of women started to work in the fields 
in the neighbouring community, changing their general habit. Some also started 
moving out of the house to keep small shops in the nearby market – a job they had 
never done before. However, these women, mostly of women-headed households, 
have not ventured very far from their camp for jobs. This may be because mobility is 
still to a large extent gendered and limited for women in rural Nepal (Thieme 2006). 
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Some women also migrated to India, however, this was only with their husbands.
The lack of lighting in the camp makes it difficult for IDPs to work during the evening 
and early morning. The people in the camp depend upon either kerosene lights or 
candles, but prefer to finish their work (which in the evening is dinner and washing 
and cleaning after dinner) early so they don’t have to use kerosene or candles.
The IDPs who had taken on a large amount of debt were hoping to sell their land 
to repay their loans once they returned to their village after the peace accord. But 
the few IDPs whose land was returned were not allowed to sell their land and still 
had to pay tax to the Maoists on their crops. The IDPs who returned were unable 
to stay in their village, despite the Government’s assistance. They now regularly 
visit organisations that advocate for their rights and attend the camp when the 
organisations come to the camp. The people who had been migrating to Nepalgunj 
as economic migrants and those who moved out of the camp were working actively 
to enhance their status economically and otherwise, whereas the IDPs in camps 
were mostly dependent upon the intervening organizations for their basic needs 
and were working towards making the government aware of their issues. 
7.8 Results and discussion
The growing phenomenon of displacement has numerous implications. The most 
visible – similar to that shown by studies elsewhere (Goudner 2005; UNDP 1997) 
– is the rise in squatter settlements. In Kathmandu, the population has increased 
from 1.5 million at the start of the conflict to about 2.8 million in 2007) (for details 
Upreti 2007). We only can assume that a high proportion of IDPs have settled in 
Kathmandu.
On the macro-level, besides inducing an increase in international migration at an 
alarming rate (Thieme 2006; Thieme et al. 2005; Kollmair et al. 2006; Müller-Böker 
& Thieme 2007; Thieme & Müller-Böker 2004; Thieme & Wyss 2005), displacement 
has posed a serious challenge for local government to effectively manage this 
group, which is partly created by the Government as one of the parties to the armed 
conflict.
Although the reasons for coming to an urban area are different for migrants and 
IDPs, one of the similar consequences, as predicted by migration theory is increased 
competition in the unskilled labour market, which was previously occupied mainly 
by people of rural origin who came to cities for economic reasons. However, due 
to the conflict and the associated slowdown of the labour market’s absorption 
capacity, these masses were already having a hard time maintaining their livelihood 
in urban areas. IDPs, like other poor urban migrants, live in economic conditions 
shaped by the existence of almost-saturated labour markets that do not provide 
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many employment opportunities (Schutte 2005). Competition and consequent 
mistrust and conflict between IDPs and the host population, especially between 
IDPs (and migrants) living in separate settlements such as slums and camps and 
their neighbouring residential community, are on the rise. This mistrust has resulted 
in the erosion of social relations and Nepal’s rich culture of hospitality.
The presence of displaced people in the host community has been accepted as 
an expression of the country's internal conflict, although the displaced are not 
accepted and still face discrimination (Oslender 2007). For the host population, 
IDPs are people in distress and in need. The fact of being an IDP has eclipsed their 
individual personalities, skills and knowledge. Their broader inner human space 
(Baumgartner 2006), in terms of their capacity and skills, and their socio economic 
space and interactions with communities are constricted in the new environment 
of the camps.
Women-headed households found it hard to obtain benefits and services from 
the government because of their lack of knowledge and ability. The support 
they received depended mainly on the proximity of their relationships with male 
camp leaders. Women back in the villages were mostly uneducated and limited 
to managing their households and farms. When they came to the camps they 
neither had the required knowledge and experience, nor could they access these 
organisations. So, although the state has a policy intending to facilitate women, in 
practice it is not of much effect. This is because the implementation procedures are 
structurally patriarchal (male officers in the field, official procedures not suitable 
for women, etc.) and not women friendly. What and how they received their 
rightful share depends upon the male camp members who help them. This is how 
patriarchy is reinforced in humanitarian assistance, although policies are framed to 
be power-neutral (Upreti & Ghimire 2008).
The Government and its approach towards IDPs keeps changing, leading to more 
uncertainty. The Government’s priority is to maintain and strengthen power sharing. 
Hence, not enough attention has been given to IDPs, which also creates confusion. 
Furthermore, the project duration of agencies involved in camp management, their 
frequently changing mandates, procedures and staff, as well as their assessment 
of the situation, has created further uncertainties among IDPs in the camp.
The first IDP policy was designed to create negative publicity for the UCPN (M), 
rather than to solve the problems of the IDPs. This first policy defined IDPs as only 
those who were affected by the UCPN (M), excluding those affected by the state 
security forces. Duijin rightly observed: [I]t clearly excludes the following several 
important categories of IDP, including: families of security forces forced to flee by 
the Maoist; ex-Maoists; those fleeing, conscription; people who are too frightened 
to register or see no benefit in doing so (Duijn 2003, p 6).
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Furthermore, both governmental and non-governmental agencies have predefined 
mandates, budgets and timeframes, which are far less than required to properly 
respond to IDP needs. Most children in the camps were sponsored for education, 
but when the term of the project expired in 2005, almost all girls had to quit their 
education. A project responsible for medicine was also phased-out and leaving lots 
of medicine behind, which was distributed to some people with some instructions 
for use. This is a glaring example of how projects funded by aid agencies are 
inadequate to address IDP issues. Similarly, the provision of electricity was neither 
a mandate of any agency, nor regarded as a basic need. So, although there is 
electricity in all the nearby communities, and electric wires pass right above the 
huts of IDPs, there is no electricity in the camp. Children were sponsored for 
education, but were not able to study at night because they could not afford to light 
their houses.
Another main problem is the lack of interest in long-term solutions. Agriculture was 
the main source of livelihood for displaced people in their place of origin. Nepalgunj 
is a semi-urban area with lots of cultivable land. If, instead of giving 5 to 6 kg of 
rice per day, agencies had encouraged farming, given seed money for the initial 
investment and training on urban methods of agriculture, the IDPs would not have 
become so dependent and non-productive. Engaged in productive occupations, 
they would have been better able to cope with their grief and loss, which would also 
help once they return to their place of origin. Some agencies did supported IDPs to 
sustain their livelihoods. However, services provided to IDPs were inadequate and 
occasional in nature.
The return process was initiated without the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure; 
this infrastructure had contributed significantly to the daily livelihoods of people. 
A large number of youths, who had gained skills and found better livelihood 
opportunities in the urban area, preferred to stay in Nepalgunj. The Government, 
looking for an immediate solution, failed to understand or consult these youths, 
rather hoping that giving assistance to return would make the IDPs return to their 
place of origin. The consequence was that a lot of people took the assistance, and 
from many districts (even though an IDP is entitled to take assistance for return 
from only one district), but didn’t go back.
Nepal represents a unique case for the GPID and raises questions about the 
definition of IDP. Around 2 million (Aditya et al. 2006) people are estimated to 
have crossed the Indo-Nepal border to go to India due to the conflict. Because of 
the treaty between India and Nepal, the border is porous and Nepalese in India 
do not enjoy refugee status according to the definition in the GPID. Hence, the 
refugee provisions do not apply, nor are they considered IDPs. Consequently, 
these people are in a unique situation. The concerns of those who have gone 
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to India due to the conflict are neither addressed by the refugee law nor the IDP 
policy. Furthermore, even if they were considered refugees, India has not signed 
the refugee convention.
Displacement is a social phenomenon that requires preventive strategies. Social 
and economic development is the only way of avoiding the permanent dependence 
of IDPs on humanitarian assistance. Hence, a comprehensive approach is needed 
to properly address IDPs issues. 
Experiences in post-conflict countries show that dealing with the issues of IDPs 
requires huge resources, which governments alone cannot provide; therefore, 
donor assistance is needed (Brun 2003; Aditya et al. 2006; the Brookings Institution 
– University of Bern Project 2007). There is a need for an independent body both 
nationally and internationally with sufficient resources to identify and quickly 
respond to this emergency in an effective and co-ordinated manner.
A functional early warning system in the context of conflict does not exist in Nepal. 
Minor threats, fear, conflict and disputes could be resolved at the local level by 
negotiating with the concerned parties. There should be a mechanism that 
constitutes conflict experts, legal advisors, human rights organisations, credible 
individuals and human rights activists to negotiate with local people and warring 
parties to stop conflict from escalating. Peace Brigade International is the example 
of such a mechanism aimed at serving people in the conflict zone in rural Colombia 
(Slim & Eguren 2004).
Human and social conditions, shaped by widespread illiteracy and child labour, 
as seen in Rajhena camp, also have long-term negative effects on health and 
education, and result in fewer income-earners per dependents (Schütte 2005). 
Women's economic contribution to the household varies depending on their 
opportunities and on their constraints (e.g., education level and their need to 
balance employment with household responsibilities) (Moser 1998). Similarly, 
asymmetries in rights and obligations on the basis of gender within households 
also translate into differences (Moser 1998) and influence women's abilities. 
The urban poor, including IDPs in urban areas, live in political conditions arising 
from an evolving and largely uncoordinated policy environment, poor governance 
and widespread insecurity (Schütte 2005). The situation for IDPs in camps is 
similar. As the Government is witnessing a rise in the number of urban poor, local 
authorities like municipalities, district hospitals and district administration offices 
are finding it hard to cope with the added burden with the already scarce resources. 
This has placed pressure on existing basic infrastructure, such as roads, water 
supply, sanitation, waste management and housing, increasing the exploitation 
of the scarce natural resources of the host areas (Upreti 2007). The problem is 
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aggravated by poor preparation in terms of strategies, resources and policies in 
response to such an immediate crisis. In times to come, this will have its own 
negative consequences for the Government. 
In such a situation, tangible assets (World Bank 1990; Moser 1998) like labour and 
human capital become important, in the absence of other productive assets like 
housing. Although housing is an important productive asset, which IDPs are provided 
with, as Moser (1998) points out in relation to other urban poor, for IDPs, housing 
insecurity (lacking of formal legal title) creates vulnerability and a disincentive to 
upgrade their homes and use them productively. Like other urban poor, IDPs live 
in particular environmental conditions such as cramped neighbourhoods without 
basic infrastructure and with inadequate housing, high population density, and 
significant health risks, all of which create added vulnerabilities (Schütte 2005). 
Although there may be certain arguments against the urban informal sector, 
it can also open up a lot of opportunities for the unskilled unemployed and for 
budding entrepreneurs (Goudner 2005). Coming to urban areas has also created 
positive outcomes for a few IDPs. Firstly, in situations of protracted displacement 
of eight to ten years people have learnt skills (like driving vehicles) for better 
earning opportunities in urban areas. Secondly, the fieldwork found that a lot of 
young people no longer worked in farms in their villages. Previously, they had no 
other significant income opportunities. They said that the urban areas offer them 
more opportunities than they had in their villages, enabling them to pursue both 
education and employment at the same time. These, however, are only some of the 
immediate effects of displacement – the long term consequences remain.
7.9 Comprehensive response
Positive livelihood outcomes for IDPs imply their increased wellbeing, both in 
material and non-material aspects. The recommendations outlined in this section 
reshape IDPs’ inner realities, which again influence their capacity to recognise and 
use assets, thus contributing to positive livelihood outcomes in the future when they 
will no longer be IDPs. 
This section provides recommendations for a comprehensive or integrated approach 
to addressing the issues faced by IDPs. This approach covers general and specific 
provisions that offer long-term and permanent solutions to IDPs. 
General provisions:
1. State takes responsibility for the IDPs and sincerely follows the Guiding 
Principles of Internal Displacement
2. Integration of IDP issues in peace agreements and provisions
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3. Responsible institutional setting and regulatory provisions
 $OORFDWLRQRIVXI¿FLHQWKXPDQDQG¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV
5. International human rights and humanitarian provisions are followed 
when responding to IDPs concerns
Specific provisions (options):
1. Return of IDPs to place of origin and reintegration
2. Local integration in place of displacement 
3. Resettlement in IDP’s place of choice inside the country 
4. Resettlement in the resettlement areas provided by different agencies
For the wellbeing of IDPs, regardless of which of the above options they choose, 
five integrated and complementary components are needed, namely, reconciliation, 
rehabilitation, resettlement, reintegration and repatriation (for details see Upreti & 
Ghimire 2008). The IDPs must be allowed to voluntary choose between options. 
7.10 Conclusions
To date, IDPs have been treated as a homogenous entity and a blanket approach 
has been applied to dealing their issues. However, IDPs are not homogenous 
groups, therefore, a single approach cannot deal with the livelihood issues of all 
IDPs. The worldviews of different categories of IDPs, age, power relations, and 
socio-economic status in place of origin significantly affect the current livelihood 
strategies and overall status of IDPs. 
The livelihoods of IDPs in Nepal are very insecure. IDPs’ problems are 
multidimensional in nature and demand comprehensive policies and measures to 
address them. Political, social, psychological and economic issues are attached 
to displacement. Therefore, a comprehensive approach is needed to address 
humanitarian components, security needs and special legal requirements, as well 
as the short and longer-term needs of IDPs. 
When considering IDPs, rehabilitation and return are important, but are not the 
entire solution. IDPs’ past experiences will very much shape their attitudes towards 
integration, return and rehabilitation. This study found that the circumstances 
that IDPs have endured also affect their capacity to build assets or capitalise on 
available assets at the place of origin; their experiences also affect their livelihood 
strategies. Because the SLF fails to consider the psychological or human aspects 
of livelihoods, which play an important part in shaping the livelihoods of IDPs, a 
combination of the RLS and SLF was developed as an analytical tool to study the 
livelihoods of IDPs. However, these frameworks are just for conceptual analysis, 
and do not constitute complete theories. The authors agree with Thieme’s (2008) 
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argument that using these frameworks together with existing social theories results 
in a more complete analysis of livelihoods. 
This study confirms that the SLF is a suitable tool for explaining the assets situation 
of IDPs staying in camps. Its strengths lie in the physical aspects of assets. 
However, the accumulation or expansion of assets by an individual largely depends 
upon the internal aspects of individuals such as personality, willingness to develop 
networks and generate capital, and psychological satisfaction or dissatisfaction, 
which are not able to be explained by the SLF.
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8
Addressing livelihood 
insecurity and the need for 
further research
Bishnu  Raj  Upreti
Abstract
The livelihoods of people in conflict-ridden countries like Nepal are threatened by 
various conventional and non-conventional factors. The decade long conflict and 
the ongoing peace process have altered the livelihood options in Nepal, creating 
new options while constraining others. This Chapter highlights the need for a 
proper understanding of livelihoods in Nepal in the current transitional context 
to develop a response strategy to address livelihood insecurity and to capitalise 
on the opportunities brought about by the political changes in the country. It also 
suggests some areas for further research and analysis.
8.1 Introduction
Livelihood insecurity has been identified as one of the structural causes of the 
armed conflict and continuing instability in Nepal (Upreti 2006; Hutt 2004). 
The decade long armed conflict was the result of economic insecurity, social 
discrimination and political marginalisation in the mid and far western hills of 
Nepal, and quickly spread across the whole country (Kumar 2006; Karki & Seddon 
2003). Researchers, analysts and policymakers have now realised that peace and 
stability is not possible without addressing livelihood insecurity (Upreti 2009). In the 
following section some of the potential ways of addressing livelihood insecurity are 
presented.
8.2 Addressing livelihood insecurity
Livelihood insecurity is connected to many factors ranging from bad policies, poor 
implementation of policies and programmes, bad governance, climate related 
stresses, market distortions and price hikes, the weak purchasing power of people, 
and lack of employment opportunities, among other things. Livelihood security 
is primarily dependent on people having access to food that is affordable and 
available (see Chapter 4 for detailed discussion and Box 5.1 in Chapter 5 for the 
seven principles of food sovereignty) and the existence of diversified livelihood 
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options (Adhikari & Ghimire 2006; Adhikari & Bohle 1999; Seddon & Adhikari 2003; 
Upreti 2009; WFP & FAO 2006; SAARC 2005; Adhikari et al. 2000; Strasser 2009). 
Livelihood security is also affected by environmental security, skill training and 
vocational education, and the policy and institutional environment. 
8.2.1 Food security
Food security is one of the fundamental bases of livelihood security (see Chapters 
4 and 5). The Interim Constitution of Nepal acknowledges access to food as a 
basic human right, making the state responsible for upholding this right. Food 
security depends upon the availability of food, people’s ability to access food and 
their ability to purchase it (Adhikari & Ghimire 2006). The state in collaboration with 
the people are responsible for ensuring food security, which requires appropriate 
policies, responsive institutions, appropriate operational procedures, and the 
commitment of the state and the private sector (Adhikari & Bohle 1999; Seddon 
& Adhikari 2003). Availability is becoming one of the major factors affecting food 
security in the remote rural areas and hills of Nepal, as transportation is extremely 
poor (WFP & FAO 2006). The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) has also realised that food insecurity is an issue in its eight member 
countries including Nepal (SAARC 2005). One of the causes of food insecurity is 
the conditions imposed by international aid agencies on the granting of assistance 
(Adhikari et al. 2000). In Nepal, such conditions include the abolition of government 
subsidised food depots from remote food deficit areas.
8.2.2 Livelihood diversification
The livelihood base in Nepal is very narrow: most of the people in rural areas 
depend upon subsistence agriculture, daily wage labour and seasonal migration. In 
urban areas, poor people engage in daily wage labour for their livelihoods. Hence, 
diversifying livelihood options by providing alternative income options is essential 
to overcome livelihood insecurity. Tourism, ecotourism and rural tourism have great 
potential in Nepal for diversifying livelihood options. Other areas with potential for 
livelihood diversification include water-based development (e.g., hydropower, 
rafting, rural electrification and electricity-based small cottage industries); non-
timber forest products, especially medicinal plants; and rural non-farm enterprises, 
cottage industries and small scale industries (e.g., wood carving, knitting and 
weaving, tailoring, vegetable farming, fruit cultivation, jam making, and poultry and 
pig farming). These activities can provide broader livelihood options to rural women 
and marginalised people, if the state is willing to support them through accessible 
finance, a conducive policy environment and market expansion (Upreti 2009).
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8.2.3 Environmental security and environmental justice
Livelihood security is linked to environmental security. Environmental security, for 
the purpose of this chapter, is defined as freedom from social instability due to 
environmental degradation and the maintenance of the physical surroundings of 
society for its needs, without diminishing the natural stock. In other words, it is a 
state of human-environment dynamics in which the balance of the environment 
is maintained, environmental damage caused by human activity is restored, 
and resource scarcities and environmental degradation that may cause conflict 
are ameliorated. Hence, environmental security is the proactive minimisation of 
anthropogenic threats to the functional integrity of the biosphere and, thus, to 
its interdependent human component. Environmental security aims to achieve 
economic and social development without depleting natural resources (Upreti 
forthcoming). Hence, environmental security is a precondition for livelihood 
security.
Similarly, environmental justice is ensuring justice to people suffering from 
environmental inequity. The concept of environmental justice requires that the 
burden from the use of environmental services by certain groups should not be 
unfairly borne by those who do not receive the benefit (such as people living 
around garbage dumping sites or communities displaced by mines). The equitable 
redistribution of burden and benefit and securing ecologically sustainable livelihoods 
are essential for livelihood security.
8.2.4 Skill training and vocational education 
The diversification of livelihood options requires vocational training and the 
development of the skills of rural people. The generation of alternative income 
options for rural people and migrant workers requires specific skills and vocational 
training. A state policy focusing on industrialisation will also create employment for 
those with skills. The Government, policymakers, international organisations and 
farmers’ associations have to work together in this area to strengthen livelihood 
security. 
Skill training and vocational education for youth is essential, not only for livelihood 
security, but also for peace and stability. Massive youth unemployment in Nepal 
provided the UCPN (M) with a reservoir of combatants during the armed conflict.
8.2.5 The policy and institutional environment
Underdevelopment and extreme poverty are major livelihood problems in Nepal. 
The overall economic conditions are characterised by extremely low per capita 
income – more than half the population is living below the absolute poverty line 
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with an average economic growth rate of two per cent during the last five decades. 
Hence, the Government’s priority should be to break the vicious cycle of poverty 
and underdevelopment and remove the structural bottleneck in the Nepalese 
economy through rapid economic growth along with the equitable distribution of the 
benefits of such growth. 
Stagnation of the agriculture sector is identified as another key problem in improving 
the livelihoods of the poor and marginalised sections of society, because it is the 
major factor in underdevelopment and poverty. Although the agriculture sector 
provides employment to almost 68 per cent of Nepalese people, its contribution 
to Gross Domestic Product is only 32 per cent. Rapid economic growth and 
poverty alleviation in Nepal is only achievable through an increase in productivity 
in the agriculture sector and the creation of alternative employment opportunities 
to absorb the excess manpower currently relying on the agriculture sector. The 
overall transformation of the agriculture sector is possible only by breaking the 
century-long feudal production relations where the farmers cultivating the lands do 
not own the land and those who own the land do not cultivate it. A High Level Land 
Reform Commission (HLRC) was constituted by the Government to recommend 
how Nepal should implement land reform to address equity and social justice, while 
at the same time enhancing the productivity of agriculture to contribute to broader 
economic growth. However, this Commission has not been able to complete its work 
due to the current political deadlock. Land reform has been a political rallying cry 
for more than five decades. Now scholars and researchers working on land issues 
are arguing that land reform is not just for economic growth, but is also essential 
for strengthening democracy, promoting justice and socio-cultural rights, sustaining 
the ecology and environment, and generally making society prosperous. 
Nepal has a huge labour force, which is not fully utilised, and there is widespread 
unemployment and under-unemployment. Hence, Nepal’s youth are compelled 
to seek risky, low-paid unskilled or semi-skilled employment in foreign countries. 
Educated youth are also attracted to working abroad, increasing the brain drain of 
educated and trained human resource. While remittances have contributed to the 
country’s economy, their sustainability and regularity is uncertain, and they are 
not without personal and social costs. Creating employment opportunities within 
the country for youth and marginalised people should be the priority. This can 
be done only through massive sectoral development (such as hydropower, road-
networks, irrigation and communication, as well as tourism and off-farm activities). 
Such sectoral development will also address the problem of widespread under-
unemployment and disguised unemployment in the agriculture and rural sector. 
The Government’s Three Year Interim Plan has captured some of these concerns. 
However, the political commitment to translate these policies into action is in 
question, and the Government lacks the financial resources to do so.
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The Three Year Interim Plan has identified inequality and discrimination, economic 
dependency, the quality of services such as health and education, corruption and 
weak governance as some of the other sources of livelihood insecurity and conflict. 
Pervasive socio-cultural and economic discrimination and inequality on the basis of 
class, caste, region and gender also are a serious problem in the country. Political 
forces have concluded that these problems cannot be solved by a centralised and 
unitary political system. It is hoped that the proposed federal system will provide a 
broader basis for addressing these concerns by properly addressing the concerns 
of the various oppressed castes/groups including Madheshis, various regional 
groups, women, Dalits, indigenous and ethnic groups, and other marginalised 
groups. Unfortunately, Nepal is still in a transitional phase and in the process of 
drafting a new constitution; hence, it is not possible to address all of these concerns 
at present. However, if the new constitution is drafted with these issues in mind it 
could provide a broader framework for tackling these issues.
The inadequate and disproportionate development of physical infrastructure is one 
of the factors impeding the overall development of the country and fuelling inequality 
in society. Basic infrastructure, such as hydropower, road networks, electricity, 
drinking water, irrigation facilities and communication services, has not yet reached 
the majority who live in rural areas. The absence of a nationwide road network, low 
road access in remote districts, and the lack of expansion of agricultural roads are 
also hindering the economic transformation of Nepal. While the Three Year Interim 
Plan and the annual budget and plan for the year 2008/09 made some provision 
for infrastructure development, implementation is a major challenge in the current 
political situation.
The quality of the public education system and educational discrimination is of great 
concern and impacts directly on livelihoods. Large numbers of the population are 
still illiterate despite the huge investment by the Government. The quality of public 
schools, attended by the majority of children, continues to deteriorate. The divide 
between the well off and the poor is reflected in the country’s education system: 
those who can afford to prefer enrolling their children in private schools because 
of the poor quality of the education in public schools. Consequently, there is a 
huge difference between the performance of public schools and private schools, 
which determines the level of opportunities open to graduates. The unregulated 
fees charged by private schools have increased class discrimination, prohibiting 
children from disadvantaged families from competing. The only way to end such 
discrimination rests with the Government’s ability to provide quality and skill-
oriented education in public schools. ‘Education for all’ and other various education 
policies are there to address these concerns, but have been largely unsuccessful 
so far. 
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The above discussion presents the various challenges and problems facing Nepal 
at present. A few of the main reasons for these problems and challenges are the 
high level of corruption and extremely weak service delivery of the public system. 
Political mistrust, competition and opportunistic behaviour among the major 
political parties, a lack of sufficient resources, and the ineffective and inefficient 
use of available financial and human resource are the major causes behind these 
issues. In relation to resources, several potential sources exist. The international 
community has indicated that it is willing to support the Government of Nepal if 
the governing system is transparent, functional and non-corrupt. The domestic 
private sector is willing to invest if there is a conducive environment for investment. 
The potential for foreign direct investment in hydropower and other sectors is also 
high if the Government is able to provide a secure investment environment. More 
importantly, the Nepalese people are supportive and willing to contribute to national 
development. 
8.2.6 State restructuring for livelihood security
Nepal changed from a centralised, monarchical, feudalistic, and socio-culturally, 
politically and economically exclusionary state, to a federal democratic republic 
with the declaration of a republic on 29 May 2008 by the newly elected Constituent 
Assembly. Hence, the state structures (judiciary, bureaucracy, security) and the 
policies, rules and programmes of the old regimes are no longer adequate to 
deal with the changing context. It is essential to restructure them to meet public 
expectations and to ensure the livelihood security of the Nepalese people. State 
restructuring is a complex, risky and lengthy process that requires a huge amount 
of resources, time and commitment at the political level. Furthermore, it has to be 
done in a comprehensive and integrated manner.
Important governing structures of the state, such as the security apparatus, 
bureaucracy, judiciary and legal apparatus, are not responsive to the people; 
they are systematically structured to strengthen feudal and centralised governing 
practices. Hence, the very first step is to restructure them to bring them into the 21st 
Century and make them more responsive to the people. Some important governing 
structures to be reformed are: 
Security sector
Nepal is currently in a transition from war to peace; it is, therefore, the right time to 
undertaken a holistic restructuring of the security sector, including the restructuring 
of the Ministry of Defence, Nepal Army, Armed Police Force, Civilian Police, National 
Investigation Department and Intelligence Service, Ministry of Home Affairs, and 
other security related agencies. The armed conflict has had a very detrimental 
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effect on society. This period saw the militarisation of society, which consequently 
created insecurity. Nepal needs to address the sources of conventional insecurity 
like crime and violence, as well as non-conventional sources of insecurity such as 
food insecurity, livelihood insecurity and environmental insecurity.
Bureaucracy
The existing state bureaucracy is facing challenges in relation to competency in the 
changing context. The entire bureaucracy is politicised and unprofessional. Many of 
the staff in government offices and government managed public sector offices are 
inclined towards particular political parties or recruited to fulfil the vested interests 
of political parties instead of improving organisational performance and efficiency. 
The current oversized bureaucracy needs to be reduced and restructured to 
provide effective services to the people. The restructuring of the bureaucracy will 
also provide opportunities for livelihood diversification as the existing bureaucratic 
orientation is controlling in nature and not conducive to decentralised, people-
centric development. Once the existing bureaucracy is restructured to facilitate the 
promotion of local ownership in development, it will enhance the performance of 
the development sector, expand employment opportunities and widen livelihood 
options.
Table 8.1 Major tasks to perform in the changing political context for 
livelihood security and to address the root causes of conflict 
S.N. Issue/sector Reason/objective Actors
1 Restructure of 
economic sector
To address poverty, inequality, 
discrimination and livelihood 
insecurity
Parliament, National 
Planning Commission 
(NPC), Ministry 
of Finance (MoF), 
Federation of Nepalese 
Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry (FNCCI), 
Confederation of 
Nepalese Industries 
(CNI), Nepal Rastra 
Bank, bankers 
associations, concerned 
ministries 
2 Restructure of 
judicial sector
To ensure access to justice for 
the poor and marginalised and to 
address impunity
Parliament, Supreme 
Court, Nepal Bar 
Association, Attorney 
General, Judicial Council 
3 Restructure of 
governing units
To ensure the meaningful 
participation of people in 
decision making
3DUOLDPHQW2I¿FHRI
Prime Minister and 
Council of Ministers
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S.N. Issue/sector Reason/objective Actors
4 5H¿QHHOHFWRUDO
system
To increase the representation of 
non-represented people 
Parliament, Election 
Commission 
5 5HGH¿QHIRUHLJQ
policy 
To improve international relations 
towards changing domestic and 
global contexts
Parliament, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MoFA)
6 Reform political 
parties
To make parties accountable to 
the people, strengthen internal 
democracy and promote good 
governance
Political parties, 
Parliament, 
7 Reform religious 
sector 
To move from an orthodox to a 
liberal system of government 
(religion secularism) and avoid 
religious extremism and biases 
Concerned ministries, 
Parliament, religious 
networks
8 Reform social 
sector
To provide better health, 
education and other social 
services 
To provide social security to 
people and safety net measures 
for vulnerable people
To address the problems of 
WKHFRQÀLFWYLFWLPVLQWHUQDOO\
displaced people, and the 
families of people killed and 
ZRXQGHGGXULQJWKHFRQÀLFW
To promote reconciliation and 
provide a conducive environment 
for better livelihood options
Parliament, concerned 
ministries
9 Strengthen human 
rights apparatus
To promote and ensure the rule 
of law
Parliament, National 
Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC), 
security providers, 
concerned ministries
10 Implement 
transformative land 
reform 
To promote social justice 
based and productivity oriented 
land reform for economic 
development 
Parliament, Land Reform 
Commission, Ministry 
of Land Reform and 
Management (MoLRM), 
3ULPH0LQLVWHUV¶2I¿FH
NPC, MoF 
11 5HGH¿QHDFFHVV
and utilisation of 
natural resources
To promote and protect 
indigenous knowledge and 
practices, and to conserve and 
protect biodiversity
Parliament, concerned 
ministries, associations 
related to natural 
resources, private 
companies
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S.N. Issue/sector Reason/objective Actors
12 Restructure 
security sector 
To provide national security and 
human security
To control criminals and 
disreputable people, arms 
WUDGHUVDQGKXPDQWUDI¿FNHUV
Parliament, Ministry 
of Defence (MoD), 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MoHA), Nepal Army, 
Armed Police and 
Civilian Police, Central 
Investigation Department 
8.3 Further research needs
Chapters 1 to 7 have discussed the many important dynamics of livelihood 
insecurity associated with conflict and tension. One of the important conclusions is 
that too much generalisation and the oversimplification of the realities of a socially 
complex and politically unstable society do not provide in-depth insights about the 
diversity of people, their livelihood strategies, coping mechanisms and plurality. 
This book has presented the livelihoods of the people of a conflict-ridden country 
as a very complex, interrelated and interconnected phenomena. The issues that 
have emerged from the discussion in the different chapters and some other issues 
directly related to the content of this book are presented in this section as areas 
for further research, analysis and debate to strengthen the various dimensions of 
livelihoods in a country in transition from war to peace. 
8.3.1 Strengthening analytical frameworks for the study of livelihoods
The discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 clearly demonstrates that the different analytical 
frameworks and tools developed so far to study the livelihoods of people are strong 
in some aspects, weak in others and even silent in some important dimensions, 
such as negotiating power and resources. The strengths of the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Framework (SLF) lies in the understanding of the various types of 
capital that contribute to the livelihoods of people, but needs further elaboration to 
deal with the psychological and inter-personal dimensions of the individual actors 
and their livelihoods. The Rural Livelihood System (RLS) is strongly conceptually 
orientated to inner realities, covering emotional, spiritual, and psychosocial 
dimensions, and even attempts to combine the important elements of the SLF. Its 
focus on rural systems and individuals and, hence, its wider conceptualisation and 
operationalisation, is a major step forward. Other livelihood approaches developed 
by different non-governmental organisations are mainly development oriented and 
are weak conceptually. Important work has been started in the conceptualisation, 
operationalisation and strengthening of analytical frameworks for the study of 
livelihoods, but further efforts are needed to refine and expand these frameworks.
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From the above discussion it is clear that livelihood realities are related to policies, 
governing systems and institutions. However, a livelihood analysis alone is not 
sufficient to examine the institutional context. Analytical frameworks related 
to governance and policy analysis have to be introduced here. Conceptually, 
governance is a set of values, policies, technologies and institutions through which 
societies manage their political, economic, social and environmental resources in a 
transparent, accountable and sustainable manner. The ‘good governance’ concept, 
promoted by many development agencies, aims to provide adequate space for 
each and every citizen to exercise his or her rights and accomplish his or her duties. 
Traditionally, governance was perceived to be the activities of the government; now 
it is understood as a process that should involve all the stakeholders in a society. 
Hence, good governance is the framework for the rules, institutions, values and 
policies by which a society manages economic, political, and social processes and 
ways of exercising power in the management of resources (Upreti 2009). Hence, 
governance in the context of livelihoods is a critical process that helps achieve 
sustainable economic growth, social development and environmental quality for 
people. The quality of governance directly affects the livelihoods of the people. 
Poor governance causes poor delivery of services and promotes conflict, mistrust, 
and corruption and, consequently, the marginalisation of the poor and powerless in 
society. In contrast, good governance promotes mutually supportive, transparent 
process and equitable and democratic practices wherein people enjoy a secure 
livelihood. However, in order to achieve good governance, an understanding of the 
livelihood realities of the people is crucial. 
8.3.2 Spatial dimensions of livelihood strategies
Multi-locality livelihood strategies are becoming a regular phenomenon (Thieme 
2006) with globalisation and in the changing global and local context. Internal and 
international migration is becoming a powerful livelihood strategy. To keep up with 
people’s multi-locality (rural to urban, villages to cities, villages to big cities and 
capital to international) livelihood strategies, the framework for livelihood studies 
also needs to be broadened. Similarly, changes in society and in state policies 
brought about by the spatial dimensions of livelihood strategies need further 
research and analysis to understand their complexity. However, a lot of conceptual 
and empirical progress has been made on the spatial dimensions of livelihood 
strategies (cp Müller-Böker 1991, 1999).
8.3.3 Participation of displaced people in socio-political spheres
Chapter 7 demonstrates that the lack of participation of displaced people in policy 
decisions and socio-political spheres affects their access to services and influences 
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the processes and outcomes of these policies. Hence, in-depth analysis of the 
relationship between people’s participation in policy making and the livelihood 
outcomes of specific groups of people is needed. A blanket approach cannot 
address the livelihood needs of IDPs and other groups (women, children, disabled, 
conflict victims, elderly people, etc.). 
Displacement in Nepal is largely understood to mean conflict induced displacement. 
However, large numbers of people (far more than induced by the conflict) are 
displaced each year due to natural disasters and calamities (e.g., more than half a 
million people were displaced by floods in the far western Terai in September 2008 
and the same number again in the eastern Terai in August 2008); their livelihood 
strategies and coping mechanisms are not receiving enough attention in studies 
and analysis. 
8.3.4 Property versus possession debate in livelihood studies 
One of the important issues emerging in the livelihood debate is property versus 
possession. From the livelihood perspective, property ownership, particularly of 
land, may not be important if people possess land as tenants and can generate 
a living from it. In a society with feudalistic production relations and a subsistence 
agrarian economy, land ownership is viewed as important to sustaining livelihoods. 
Hence, an in-depth analysis of property versus possession vis-à-vis livelihood 
strategies is needed to conceptually contribute to the livelihood debate.
8.3.5 The relationship between power and livelihoods
Power plays an important role in negotiating the livelihood strategies of individuals 
and groups. Level of awareness, social status, knowledge and skills, social 
networks, access to centres of power and access to resources shape the livelihoods 
of people. However, the relationship between power and livelihoods needs further 
research and analysis to establish a definitive relationship between livelihood 
strategies and power in a society. 
Both external (international) and internal (domestic) actors engage in creating 
livelihood opportunities, setting the policy framework and creating institutional 
arrangements. Their relationships, ability to manoeuvre each other and the power 
balance between them affect the creation of livelihood options for local people. This 
relationship also needs further analysis. 
8.3.6 Policy formulation and implementation
In a power-skewed society, the people to be affected or benefited by a particular policy 
are often excluded from the policy formulation process. Policies are negotiated or 
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renegotiated mainly at the centre by political leaders and policymakers/bureaucrats. 
Such negotiated policies affect rural, marginalised, poor and powerless people 
the most. Agrarian policies and their implementation determine the livelihoods 
of people. However, an understanding of the determinants of policy production, 
dissemination and revision in the context of a developing country like Nepal 
(particularly in the changing political context) is important to positively contribute 
to the livelihood debate. 
8.3.7 Vulnerability and resilience
Vulnerability to social, economic and political threats and stress create livelihood 
insecurity. Furthermore, the physical weaknesses of individuals and natural 
calamities create additional vulnerability. However, local people have developed 
coping strategies (social, economic, political) and resilience mechanisms. It is 
important to study the coping strategies and resilience mechanisms that help 
people to overcome or minimise vulnerability. 
8.3.8 Land, food security and climate change
Livelihood issues are directly connected to some of the new issues and challenges 
facing Nepal, such as climate change and related non-conventional insecurity 
issues such as arsenic contamination, acid rain, prolonged drought or unusual 
precipitation, and glacier lake outburst floods. Such issues are contributing to 
land use change and negatively impacting on the food security situation, which 
is creating livelihood insecurity. A thorough analysis of the relationship between 
climate change, land use issues and livelihood insecurity is, therefore, necessary 
to better understand the issues and formulate appropriate responses. 
It is increasingly being realised that indigenous knowledge is important in the 
livelihood strategies of people in the context of climate change and climate change 
adaptation strategies. Some pioneering work has been done in Nepal by one of 
the editors of this book (Müller-Böker 1991, 1999). However, very few people 
are presently engaged in this field. This is another area that needs research and 
analysis to further develop our understanding.
8.3.9 Emerging policy and institutional frameworks in post-conflict 
countries
Global experiences in war-torn and conflict-ridden counties (UNEP 2006; Aditya 
et al. 2006; Colletta et al. 1996; Schmidt 1997; OECD 2001; Nyheim et al. 2001; 
Murdoch & Sandler 2002; Fitzpatrick 2002; DFID 2002; Adedeji 2005; Upreti 2006) 
have demonstrated that policy frameworks used during times of war or earlier 
policies and strategies do not work in post-conflict situations. Policy frameworks 
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often have to be generated from peace agreements and are driven by the new needs 
and opportunities brought about by the changing political context. New institutional 
arrangements, new regulatory provisions and new operational procedures are 
needed to tackle the changing circumstances. Hence, it is necessary to examine 
the emerging policy and institutional frameworks in Nepal to better understand the 
livelihood options and opportunities for people. Research on natural resources 
governance focusing on rural land policy, irrigation policy, and access to and use 
of natural resources by marginalised sections of society is essential to understand 
the livelihood options of rural people.
8.4 Conclusions
Addressing livelihood insecurities in a troubled, insecure and transitional 
political environment is a new challenge for policymakers, planners, politicians 
and researchers in Nepal. However, haste in devising policies, strategies and 
operational arrangements without a proper understandings of the relationships 
between elements of the changing context and livelihoods (including livelihood 
constraints, opportunities and possible threats) could lead to further complications 
and the consequent failure of response strategies. Hence, the thorough research 
and analysis of livelihoods in Nepal in the new context is needed. New policies and 
institutional frameworks are needed in the post-conflict situation; hence, existing 
fundamental sectors such as the security sector, judiciary, and bureaucracy must 
be restructured to appropriately respond to the demands of the changed political 
context. Addressing livelihood insecurities and expanding livelihood options for poor 
and marginalised people requires coherence between research and policy; they 
must complement each other to enhance the outcomes. A holistic understanding of 
livelihood issues and operational strategies requires a combination of the livelihood 
perspective and governance framework. 
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